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In protocol verification we observe a wide spectrum from fully automated methods to interactive
theorem proving with proof assistants like Isabelle/HOL. In this AFP entry, we present a fully-
automated approach for verifying stateful security protocols, i.e., protocols with mutable state that
may span several sessions. The approach supports reachability goals like secrecy and authentica-
tion. We also include a simple user-friendly transaction-based protocol specification language that
is embedded into Isabelle.
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In protocol verification we observe a wide spectrum from fully automated methods to interactive theorem proving
with proof assistants like Isabelle/HOL. The latter provide overwhelmingly high assurance of the correctness,
which automated methods often cannot: due to their complexity, bugs in such automated verification tools are
likely and thus the risk of erroneously verifying a flawed protocol is non-negligible. There are a few works that
try to combine advantages from both ends of the spectrum: a high degree of automation and assurance.
Inspired by [1], we present here a first step towards achieving this for a more challenging class of protocols,
namely those that work with a mutable long-term state. To our knowledge this is the first approach that achieves
fully automated verification of stateful protocols in an LCF-style theorem prover. The approach also includes
a simple user-friendly transaction-based protocol specification language embedded into Isabelle, and can also
leverage a number of existing results such as soundness of a typed model (see, e.g., [2–4]) and compositionality
(see, e.g., [2, 5]). The Isabelle formalization extends the AFP entry on stateful protocol composition and
typing [6].
The rest of this document is automatically generated from the formalization in Isabelle/HOL, i.e., all content
is checked by Isabelle. Overall, the structure of this document follows the theory dependencies (see Figure 1.1):
We start with the formal framework for verifying stateful security protocols (chapter 2). We continue with the
setup for supporting the high-level protocol specifications language for security protocols (the Trac format) and
the implementation of the fully automated proof tactics (chapter 3). Finally, we present examples (chapter 4).
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Figure 1.1: The Dependency Graph of the Isabelle Theories.
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datatype (’a,’b,’c) prot_fun =
Fu (the_Fu: ’a)
| Set (the_Set: ’c)
| Val (the_Val: "nat × bool")
| Abs (the_Abs: "’c set")
| Pair
| Attack nat







definition "is_Fun_Set t ≡ is_Fun t ∧ args t = [] ∧ is_Set (the_Fun t)"
abbreviation occurs where
"occurs t ≡ Fun OccursFact [Fun OccursSec [], t]"
type synonym (’a,’b,’c) prot_term_type = "((’a,’b,’c) prot_fun,’b prot_atom) term_type"
type synonym (’a,’b,’c) prot_var = "(’a,’b,’c) prot_term_type × nat"
type synonym (’a,’b,’c) prot_term = "((’a,’b,’c) prot_fun,(’a,’b,’c) prot_var) term"
type synonym (’a,’b,’c) prot_terms = "(’a,’b,’c) prot_term set"
type synonym (’a,’b,’c) prot_subst = "((’a,’b,’c) prot_fun, (’a,’b,’c) prot_var) subst"
type synonym (’a,’b,’c,’d) prot_strand_step =
"((’a,’b,’c) prot_fun, (’a,’b,’c) prot_var, ’d) labeled_stateful_strand_step"
type synonym (’a,’b,’c,’d) prot_strand = "(’a,’b,’c,’d) prot_strand_step list"
type synonym (’a,’b,’c,’d) prot_constr = "(’a,’b,’c,’d) prot_strand_step list"
datatype (’a,’b,’c,’d) prot_transaction =
Transaction
(transaction_fresh: "(’a,’b,’c) prot_var list")
9








transaction_receive T@transaction_selects T@transaction_checks T@
transaction_updates T@transaction_send T"
fun transaction_proj where
"transaction_proj l (Transaction A B C D E F) = (
let f = proj l
in Transaction A (f B) (f C) (f D) (f E) (f F))"
fun transaction_star_proj where
"transaction_star_proj (Transaction A B C D E F) = (
let f = filter is_LabelS
in Transaction A (f B) (f C) (f D) (f E) (f F))"
abbreviation fv_transaction where
"fv_transaction T ≡ fv lsst (transaction_strand T)"
abbreviation bvars_transaction where
"bvars_transaction T ≡ bvars lsst (transaction_strand T)"
abbreviation vars_transaction where
"vars_transaction T ≡ vars lsst (transaction_strand T)"
abbreviation trms_transaction where
"trms_transaction T ≡ trms lsst (transaction_strand T)"
abbreviation setops_transaction where
"setops_transaction T ≡ setopssst (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
definition wellformed_transaction where
"wellformed_transaction T ≡
list_all is_Receive (unlabel (transaction_receive T)) ∧
list_all is_Assignment (unlabel (transaction_selects T)) ∧
list_all is_Check (unlabel (transaction_checks T)) ∧
list_all is_Update (unlabel (transaction_updates T)) ∧
list_all is_Send (unlabel (transaction_send T)) ∧
set (transaction_fresh T) ⊆ fv lsst (transaction_updates T) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_send T) ∧
set (transaction_fresh T) ∩ fv lsst (transaction_receive T) = {} ∧
set (transaction_fresh T) ∩ fv lsst (transaction_selects T) = {} ∧
fv_transaction T ∩ bvars_transaction T = {} ∧
fv lsst (transaction_checks T) ⊆ fv lsst (transaction_receive T) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_selects T) ∧
fv lsst (transaction_updates T) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_send T) - set (transaction_fresh T)
⊆ fv lsst (transaction_receive T) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_selects T) ∧
(∀ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T)).
is_Equality x −→ fv (the_rhs x) ⊆ fv lsst (transaction_receive T))"
type synonym (’a,’b,’c,’d) prot = "(’a,’b,’c,’d) prot_transaction list"
abbreviation Var_Value_term ("〈_〉v") where
"〈n〉v ≡ Var (Var Value, n)::(’a,’b,’c) prot_term"
abbreviation Fun_Fu_term ("〈_ _〉t") where
"〈f T〉t ≡ Fun (Fu f) T::(’a,’b,’c) prot_term"
abbreviation Fun_Fu_const_term ("〈_〉c") where
"〈c〉c ≡ Fun (Fu c) []::(’a,’b,’c) prot_term"
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abbreviation Fun_Set_const_term ("〈_〉s") where
"〈f〉s ≡ Fun (Set f) []::(’a,’b,’c) prot_term"
abbreviation Fun_Abs_const_term ("〈_〉a") where
"〈a〉a ≡ Fun (Abs a) []::(’a,’b,’c) prot_term"
abbreviation Fun_Attack_const_term ("attack〈_〉") where
"attack〈n〉 ≡ Fun (Attack n) []::(’a,’b,’c) prot_term"
abbreviation prot_transaction1 ("transaction1 _ _ new _ _ _") where
"transaction1 (S1::(’a,’b,’c,’d) prot_strand) S2 new (B::(’a,’b,’c) prot_term list) S3 S4
≡ Transaction (map the_Var B) S1 [] S2 S3 S4"
abbreviation prot_transaction2 ("transaction2 _ _ _ _") where
"transaction2 (S1::(’a,’b,’c,’d) prot_strand) S2 S3 S4
≡ Transaction [] S1 [] S2 S3 S4"
2.1.2 Lemmata
lemma prot_atom_UNIV:
"(UNIV::’b prot_atom set) = range Atom ∪ {Value, SetType, AttackType, Bottom, OccursSecType}"
proof -
have "a ∈ range Atom ∨ a = Value ∨ a = SetType ∨ a = AttackType ∨ a = Bottom ∨ a = OccursSecType"
for a::"’b prot_atom"
by (cases a) auto
thus ?thesis by auto
qed
instance prot_atom::(finite) finite
by intro_classes (simp add: prot_atom_UNIV)
instantiation prot_atom::(enum) enum
begin
definition "enum_prot_atom == map Atom enum_class.enum@[Value, SetType, AttackType, Bottom, OccursSecType]"
definition "enum_all_prot_atom P == list_all P (map Atom enum_class.enum@[Value, SetType, AttackType, Bottom,
OccursSecType])"




have *: "set (map Atom (enum_class.enum::’a list)) = range Atom"
"distinct (enum_class.enum::’a list)"
using UNIV_enum enum_distinct by auto
show "(UNIV::’a prot_atom set) = set enum_class.enum"
using *(1) by (simp add: prot_atom_UNIV enum_prot_atom_def)
have "set (map Atom enum_class.enum) ∩ set [Value, SetType, AttackType, Bottom, OccursSecType] = {}"
by auto
moreover have "inj_on Atom (set (enum_class.enum::’a list))" unfolding inj_on_def by auto
hence "distinct (map Atom (enum_class.enum::’a list))" by (metis *(2) distinct_map)
ultimately show "distinct (enum_class.enum::’a prot_atom list)" by (simp add: enum_prot_atom_def)
have "Ball UNIV P ←→ Ball (range Atom) P ∧ Ball {Value, SetType, AttackType, Bottom, OccursSecType}
P"
for P::"’a prot_atom ⇒ bool"
by (metis prot_atom_UNIV UNIV_I UnE)
thus "enum_class.enum_all P = Ball (UNIV::’a prot_atom set) P" for P
using *(1) Ball_set[of "map Atom enum_class.enum" P]
by (auto simp add: enum_all_prot_atom_def)
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have "Bex UNIV P ←→ Bex (range Atom) P ∨ Bex {Value, SetType, AttackType, Bottom, OccursSecType} P"
for P::"’a prot_atom ⇒ bool"
by (metis prot_atom_UNIV UNIV_I UnE)
thus "enum_class.enum_ex P = Bex (UNIV::’a prot_atom set) P" for P
using *(1) Bex_set[of "map Atom enum_class.enum" P]






"(l,x) ∈ set (transaction_receive T) =⇒ ∃ t. x = receive〈t〉" ( is "?A =⇒ ?A’")
"(l,x) ∈ set (transaction_selects T) =⇒
(∃ t s. x = 〈t := s〉) ∨ (∃ t s. x = select〈t,s〉)" ( is "?B =⇒ ?B’")
"(l,x) ∈ set (transaction_checks T) =⇒
(∃ t s. x = 〈t == s〉) ∨ (∃ t s. x = 〈t in s〉) ∨ (∃ X F G. x = ∀ X〈∨6=: F ∨/∈: G〉)" ( is "?C
=⇒ ?C’")
"(l,x) ∈ set (transaction_updates T) =⇒
(∃ t s. x = insert〈t,s〉) ∨ (∃ t s. x = delete〈t,s〉)" ( is "?D =⇒ ?D’")
"(l,x) ∈ set (transaction_send T) =⇒ ∃ t. x = send〈t〉" ( is "?E =⇒ ?E’")
proof -
have a:
"list_all is_Receive (unlabel (transaction_receive T))"
"list_all is_Assignment (unlabel (transaction_selects T))"
"list_all is_Check (unlabel (transaction_checks T))"
"list_all is_Update (unlabel (transaction_updates T))"
"list_all is_Send (unlabel (transaction_send T))"
using assms unfolding wellformed_transaction_def by metis+
note b = Ball_set unlabel_in
note c = stateful_strand_step.collapse
show "?A =⇒ ?A’" by (metis (mono_tags, lifting) a(1) b c(2))
show "?B =⇒ ?B’" by (metis (mono_tags, lifting) a(2) b c(3,6))
show "?C =⇒ ?C’" by (metis (mono_tags, lifting) a(3) b c(3,6,7))
show "?D =⇒ ?D’" by (metis (mono_tags, lifting) a(4) b c(4,5))





"x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T)) =⇒ ∃ t. x = receive〈t〉" ( is "?A =⇒ ?A’")
"x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T)) =⇒
(∃ t s. x = 〈t := s〉) ∨ (∃ t s. x = select〈t,s〉)" ( is "?B =⇒ ?B’")
"x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T)) =⇒
(∃ t s. x = 〈t == s〉) ∨ (∃ t s. x = 〈t in s〉) ∨ (∃ X F G. x = ∀ X〈∨6=: F ∨/∈: G〉)"
( is "?C =⇒ ?C’")
"x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_updates T)) =⇒
(∃ t s. x = insert〈t,s〉) ∨ (∃ t s. x = delete〈t,s〉)" ( is "?D =⇒ ?D’")
"x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T)) =⇒ ∃ t. x = send〈t〉" ( is "?E =⇒ ?E’")
proof -
have a:
"list_all is_Receive (unlabel (transaction_receive T))"
"list_all is_Assignment (unlabel (transaction_selects T))"
"list_all is_Check (unlabel (transaction_checks T))"
"list_all is_Update (unlabel (transaction_updates T))"
"list_all is_Send (unlabel (transaction_send T))"
using assms unfolding wellformed_transaction_def by metis+
note b = Ball_set
note c = stateful_strand_step.collapse
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show "?A =⇒ ?A’" by (metis (mono_tags, lifting) a(1) b c(2))
show "?B =⇒ ?B’" by (metis (mono_tags, lifting) a(2) b c(3,6))
show "?C =⇒ ?C’" by (metis (mono_tags, lifting) a(3) b c(3,6,7))
show "?D =⇒ ?D’" by (metis (mono_tags, lifting) a(4) b c(4,5))
show "?E =⇒ ?E’" by (metis (mono_tags, lifting) a(5) b c(1))
qed
lemma transaction_strand_subsets[simp]:
"set (transaction_receive T) ⊆ set (transaction_strand T)"
"set (transaction_selects T) ⊆ set (transaction_strand T)"
"set (transaction_checks T) ⊆ set (transaction_strand T)"
"set (transaction_updates T) ⊆ set (transaction_strand T)"
"set (transaction_send T) ⊆ set (transaction_strand T)"
"set (unlabel (transaction_receive T)) ⊆ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
"set (unlabel (transaction_selects T)) ⊆ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
"set (unlabel (transaction_checks T)) ⊆ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
"set (unlabel (transaction_updates T)) ⊆ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
"set (unlabel (transaction_send T)) ⊆ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
unfolding transaction_strand_def unlabel_def by force+
lemma transaction_strand_subst_subsets[simp]:
"set (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ) ⊆ set (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ)"
"set (transaction_selects T ·lsst ϑ) ⊆ set (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ)"
"set (transaction_checks T ·lsst ϑ) ⊆ set (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ)"
"set (transaction_updates T ·lsst ϑ) ⊆ set (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ)"
"set (transaction_send T ·lsst ϑ) ⊆ set (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ)"
"set (unlabel (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ)) ⊆ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))"
"set (unlabel (transaction_selects T ·lsst ϑ)) ⊆ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))"
"set (unlabel (transaction_checks T ·lsst ϑ)) ⊆ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))"
"set (unlabel (transaction_updates T ·lsst ϑ)) ⊆ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))"
"set (unlabel (transaction_send T ·lsst ϑ)) ⊆ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))"
unfolding transaction_strand_def unlabel_def subst_apply_labeled_stateful_strand_def by force+
lemma transaction_dual_subst_unfold:
"unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ)) =
unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ))@
unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_selects T ·lsst ϑ))@
unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_checks T ·lsst ϑ))@
unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_updates T ·lsst ϑ))@
unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_send T ·lsst ϑ))"
by (simp add: transaction_strand_def unlabel_append dual lsst_append subst_lsst_append)
lemma trms_transaction_unfold:
"trms_transaction T =
trms lsst (transaction_receive T) ∪ trms lsst (transaction_selects T) ∪
trms lsst (transaction_checks T) ∪ trms lsst (transaction_updates T) ∪
trms lsst (transaction_send T)"
by (metis trmssst_append unlabel_append append_assoc transaction_strand_def)
lemma trms_transaction_subst_unfold:
"trms lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ) =
trms lsst (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ) ∪ trms lsst (transaction_selects T ·lsst ϑ) ∪
trms lsst (transaction_checks T ·lsst ϑ) ∪ trms lsst (transaction_updates T ·lsst ϑ) ∪
trms lsst (transaction_send T ·lsst ϑ)"
by (metis trmssst_append unlabel_append append_assoc transaction_strand_def subst_lsst_append)
lemma vars_transaction_unfold:
"vars_transaction T =
vars lsst (transaction_receive T) ∪ vars lsst (transaction_selects T) ∪
vars lsst (transaction_checks T) ∪ vars lsst (transaction_updates T) ∪
vars lsst (transaction_send T)"
by (metis varssst_append unlabel_append append_assoc transaction_strand_def)
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lemma vars_transaction_subst_unfold:
"vars lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ) =
vars lsst (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ) ∪ vars lsst (transaction_selects T ·lsst ϑ) ∪
vars lsst (transaction_checks T ·lsst ϑ) ∪ vars lsst (transaction_updates T ·lsst ϑ) ∪
vars lsst (transaction_send T ·lsst ϑ)"
by (metis varssst_append unlabel_append append_assoc transaction_strand_def subst_lsst_append)
lemma fv_transaction_unfold:
"fv_transaction T =
fv lsst (transaction_receive T) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_selects T) ∪
fv lsst (transaction_checks T) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_updates T) ∪
fv lsst (transaction_send T)"
by (metis fvsst_append unlabel_append append_assoc transaction_strand_def)
lemma fv_transaction_subst_unfold:
"fv lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ) =
fv lsst (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_selects T ·lsst ϑ) ∪
fv lsst (transaction_checks T ·lsst ϑ) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_updates T ·lsst ϑ) ∪
fv lsst (transaction_send T ·lsst ϑ)"
by (metis fvsst_append unlabel_append append_assoc transaction_strand_def subst_lsst_append)
lemma fv_wellformed_transaction_unfold:
assumes "wellformed_transaction T"
shows "fv_transaction T =
fv lsst (transaction_receive T) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_selects T) ∪ set (transaction_fresh T)"
proof -
let ?A = "set (transaction_fresh T)"
let ?B = "fv lsst (transaction_updates T)"
let ?C = "fv lsst (transaction_send T)"
let ?D = "fv lsst (transaction_receive T)"
let ?E = "fv lsst (transaction_selects T)"
let ?F = "fv lsst (transaction_checks T)"
have "?A ⊆ ?B ∪ ?C" "?A ∩ ?D = {}" "?A ∩ ?E = {}" "?F ⊆ ?D ∪ ?E" "?B ∪ ?C - ?A ⊆ ?D ∪ ?E"
using assms unfolding wellformed_transaction_def by fast+




bvars lsst (transaction_receive T) ∪ bvars lsst (transaction_selects T) ∪
bvars lsst (transaction_checks T) ∪ bvars lsst (transaction_updates T) ∪
bvars lsst (transaction_send T)"
by (metis bvarssst_append unlabel_append append_assoc transaction_strand_def)
lemma bvars_transaction_subst_unfold:
"bvars lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ) =
bvars lsst (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ) ∪ bvars lsst (transaction_selects T ·lsst ϑ) ∪
bvars lsst (transaction_checks T ·lsst ϑ) ∪ bvars lsst (transaction_updates T ·lsst ϑ) ∪
bvars lsst (transaction_send T ·lsst ϑ)"
by (metis bvarssst_append unlabel_append append_assoc transaction_strand_def subst_lsst_append)
lemma bvars_wellformed_transaction_unfold:
assumes "wellformed_transaction T"
shows "bvars_transaction T = bvars lsst (transaction_checks T)" ( is ?A)
and "bvars lsst (transaction_receive T) = {}" ( is ?B)
and "bvars lsst (transaction_selects T) = {}" ( is ?C)
and "bvars lsst (transaction_updates T) = {}" ( is ?D)
and "bvars lsst (transaction_send T) = {}" ( is ?E)
proof -
have 0: "list_all is_Receive (unlabel (transaction_receive T))"
"list_all is_Assignment (unlabel (transaction_selects T))"
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"list_all is_Update (unlabel (transaction_updates T))"
"list_all is_Send (unlabel (transaction_send T))"
using assms unfolding wellformed_transaction_def by metis+
have "filter is_NegChecks (unlabel (transaction_receive T)) = []"
"filter is_NegChecks (unlabel (transaction_selects T)) = []"
"filter is_NegChecks (unlabel (transaction_updates T)) = []"
"filter is_NegChecks (unlabel (transaction_send T)) = []"
using list_all_filter_nil[OF 0(1), of is_NegChecks]
list_all_filter_nil[OF 0(2), of is_NegChecks]
list_all_filter_nil[OF 0(3), of is_NegChecks]
list_all_filter_nil[OF 0(4), of is_NegChecks]
stateful_strand_step.distinct_disc(11,21,29,35,39,41)
by blast+
thus ?A ?B ?C ?D ?E
using bvars_transaction_unfold[of T]
bvarssst_NegChecks[of "unlabel (transaction_receive T)"]
bvarssst_NegChecks[of "unlabel (transaction_selects T)"]
bvarssst_NegChecks[of "unlabel (transaction_updates T)"]
bvarssst_NegChecks[of "unlabel (transaction_send T)"]
by (metis bvarssst_def UnionE emptyE list.set(1) list.simps(8) subsetI subset_Un_eq sup_commute)+
qed
lemma transaction_strand_memberD[dest]:
assumes "x ∈ set (transaction_strand T)"
shows "x ∈ set (transaction_receive T) ∨ x ∈ set (transaction_selects T) ∨
x ∈ set (transaction_checks T) ∨ x ∈ set (transaction_updates T) ∨
x ∈ set (transaction_send T)"
using assms by (simp add: transaction_strand_def)
lemma transaction_strand_unlabel_memberD[dest]:
assumes "x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
shows "x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T)) ∨ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T)) ∨
x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T)) ∨ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_updates T)) ∨
x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T))"
using assms by (simp add: unlabel_def transaction_strand_def)
lemma wellformed_transaction_strand_memberD[dest]:
assumes "wellformed_transaction T" and "(l,x) ∈ set (transaction_strand T)"
shows
"x = receive〈t〉 =⇒ (l,x) ∈ set (transaction_receive T)" ( is "?A =⇒ ?A’")
"x = select〈t,s〉 =⇒ (l,x) ∈ set (transaction_selects T)" ( is "?B =⇒ ?B’")
"x = 〈t == s〉 =⇒ (l,x) ∈ set (transaction_checks T)" ( is "?C =⇒ ?C’")
"x = 〈t in s〉 =⇒ (l,x) ∈ set (transaction_checks T)" ( is "?D =⇒ ?D’")
"x = ∀ X〈∨6=: F ∨/∈: G〉 =⇒ (l,x) ∈ set (transaction_checks T)" ( is "?E =⇒ ?E’")
"x = insert〈t,s〉 =⇒ (l,x) ∈ set (transaction_updates T)" ( is "?F =⇒ ?F’")
"x = delete〈t,s〉 =⇒ (l,x) ∈ set (transaction_updates T)" ( is "?G =⇒ ?G’")
"x = send〈t〉 =⇒ (l,x) ∈ set (transaction_send T)" ( is "?H =⇒ ?H’")
proof -
have "(l,x) ∈ set (transaction_receive T) ∨ (l,x) ∈ set (transaction_selects T) ∨
(l,x) ∈ set (transaction_checks T) ∨ (l,x) ∈ set (transaction_updates T) ∨
(l,x) ∈ set (transaction_send T)"
using assms(2) by auto
thus "?A =⇒ ?A’" "?B =⇒ ?B’" "?C =⇒ ?C’" "?D =⇒ ?D’"
"?E =⇒ ?E’" "?F =⇒ ?F’" "?G =⇒ ?G’" "?H =⇒ ?H’"
using wellformed_transaction_cases[OF assms(1)] by fast+
qed
lemma wellformed_transaction_strand_unlabel_memberD[dest]:
assumes "wellformed_transaction T" and "x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
shows
"x = receive〈t〉 =⇒ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T))" ( is "?A =⇒ ?A’")
"x = select〈t,s〉 =⇒ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T))" ( is "?B =⇒ ?B’")
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"x = 〈t == s〉 =⇒ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))" ( is "?C =⇒ ?C’")
"x = 〈t in s〉 =⇒ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))" ( is "?D =⇒ ?D’")
"x = ∀ X〈∨6=: F ∨/∈: G〉 =⇒ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))" ( is "?E =⇒ ?E’")
"x = insert〈t,s〉 =⇒ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_updates T))" ( is "?F =⇒ ?F’")
"x = delete〈t,s〉 =⇒ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_updates T))" ( is "?G =⇒ ?G’")
"x = send〈t〉 =⇒ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T))" ( is "?H =⇒ ?H’")
proof -
have "x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T)) ∨ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T)) ∨
x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T)) ∨ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_updates T)) ∨
x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T))"
using assms(2) by auto
thus "?A =⇒ ?A’" "?B =⇒ ?B’" "?C =⇒ ?C’" "?D =⇒ ?D’"
"?E =⇒ ?E’" "?F =⇒ ?F’" "?G =⇒ ?G’" "?H =⇒ ?H’"
using wellformed_transaction_unlabel_cases[OF assms(1)] by fast+
qed
lemma wellformed_transaction_send_receive_trm_cases:
assumes T: "wellformed_transaction T"
shows "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_receive T) =⇒ receive〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T))"
and "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T) =⇒ send〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T))"
using wellformed_transaction_unlabel_cases(1,5)[OF T]
trmssst_in[of t "unlabel (transaction_receive T)"]
trmssst_in[of t "unlabel (transaction_send T)"]
by fastforce+
lemma wellformed_transaction_send_receive_subst_trm_cases:
assumes T: "wellformed_transaction T"
shows "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_receive T) ·set ϑ =⇒ receive〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive
T ·lsst ϑ))"
and "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T) ·set ϑ =⇒ send〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T ·lsst ϑ))"
proof -
assume "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_receive T) ·set ϑ"
then obtain s where s: "s ∈ trms lsst (transaction_receive T)" "t = s · ϑ"
by blast
hence "receive〈s〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T))"
using wellformed_transaction_send_receive_trm_cases(1)[OF T] by simp
thus "receive〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ))"
by (metis s(2) unlabel_subst[of _ ϑ] stateful_strand_step_subst_inI(2))
next
assume "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T) ·set ϑ"
then obtain s where s: "s ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T)" "t = s · ϑ"
by blast
hence "send〈s〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T))"
using wellformed_transaction_send_receive_trm_cases(2)[OF T] by simp
thus "send〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T ·lsst ϑ))"
by (metis s(2) unlabel_subst[of _ ϑ] stateful_strand_step_subst_inI(1))
qed
lemma wellformed_transaction_send_receive_fv_subset:
assumes T: "wellformed_transaction T"
shows "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_receive T) =⇒ fv t ⊆ fv_transaction T" ( is "?A =⇒ ?A’")
and "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T) =⇒ fv t ⊆ fv_transaction T" ( is "?B =⇒ ?B’")
proof -
have "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_receive T) =⇒ receive〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
"t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T) =⇒ send〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
using wellformed_transaction_send_receive_trm_cases[OF T, of t]
unfolding transaction_strand_def by force+
thus "?A =⇒ ?A’" "?B =⇒ ?B’" by (induct "transaction_strand T") auto
qed
lemma dual_wellformed_transaction_ident_cases[dest]:
"list_all is_Assignment (unlabel S) =⇒ dual lsst S = S"
"list_all is_Check (unlabel S) =⇒ dual lsst S = S"
16
2.1 Protocol Transactions (Transactions)
"list_all is_Update (unlabel S) =⇒ dual lsst S = S"
proof (induction S)
case (Cons s S)
obtain l x where s: "s = (l,x)" by moura
{ case 1 thus ?case using Cons s unfolding unlabel_def dual lsst_def by (cases x) auto }
{ case 2 thus ?case using Cons s unfolding unlabel_def dual lsst_def by (cases x) auto }
{ case 3 thus ?case using Cons s unfolding unlabel_def dual lsst_def by (cases x) auto }
qed simp_all
lemma wellformed_transaction_wfsst:
fixes T::"(’a, ’b, ’c, ’d) prot_transaction"
assumes T: "wellformed_transaction T"
shows "wf’sst (set (transaction_fresh T)) (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T)))" ( is ?A)
and "fv_transaction T ∩ bvars_transaction T = {}" ( is ?B)
and "set (transaction_fresh T) ∩ bvars_transaction T = {}" ( is ?C)
proof -
define T1 where "T1 ≡ unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_receive T))"
define T2 where "T2 ≡ unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_selects T))"
define T3 where "T3 ≡ unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_checks T))"
define T4 where "T4 ≡ unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_updates T))"
define T5 where "T5 ≡ unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_send T))"
define X where "X ≡ set (transaction_fresh T)"
define Y where "Y ≡ X ∪ wfvarsoccssst T1"
define Z where "Z ≡ Y ∪ wfvarsoccssst T2"
define f where "f ≡ λS::((’a,’b,’c) prot_fun, (’a,’b,’c) prot_var) stateful_strand.⋃
((λx. case x of
Receive t ⇒ fv t
| Equality Assign _ t’ ⇒ fv t’
| Insert t t’ ⇒ fv t ∪ fv t’
| _ ⇒ {}) ‘ set S)"
note defs1 = T1_def T2_def T3_def T4_def T5_def
note defs2 = X_def Y_def Z_def
note defs3 = f_def
have 0: "wf’sst V (S @ S’)"
when "wf’sst V S" "f S’ ⊆ wfvarsoccssst S ∪ V" for V S S’
by (metis that wfsst_append_suffix’ f_def)
have 1: "unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T)) = T1@T2@T3@T4@T5"
using dual lsst_append unlabel_append unfolding transaction_strand_def defs1 by simp
have 2:
"∀ x ∈ set T1. is_Send x" "∀ x ∈ set T2. is_Assignment x" "∀ x ∈ set T3. is_Check x"
"∀ x ∈ set T4. is_Update x" "∀ x ∈ set T5. is_Receive x"
"fvsst T3 ⊆ fvsst T1 ∪ fvsst T2" "fvsst T4 ∪ fvsst T5 ⊆ X ∪ fvsst T1 ∪ fvsst T2"
"X ∩ fvsst T1 = {}" "X ∩ fvsst T2 = {}"
"∀ x ∈ set T2. is_Equality x −→ fv (the_rhs x) ⊆ fvsst T1"
using T unfolding defs1 defs2 wellformed_transaction_def
by (auto simp add: Ball_set dual lsst_list_all fvsst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq simp del: fvsst_def)
have 3: "wf’sst X T1" using 2(1)
proof (induction T1 arbitrary: X)
case (Cons s T)
obtain t where "s = send〈t〉" using Cons.prems by (cases s) moura+
thus ?case using Cons by auto
qed simp
have 4: "f T1 = {}" "fvsst T1 = wfvarsoccssst T1" using 2(1)
proof (induction T1)
case (Cons s T)
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{ case 1 thus ?case using Cons unfolding defs3 by (cases s) auto }
{ case 2 thus ?case using Cons unfolding defs3 wfvarsoccssst_def fvsst_def by (cases s) auto }
qed (simp_all add: defs3 wfvarsoccssst_def fvsst_def)
have 5: "f T2 ⊆ wfvarsoccssst T1" "fvsst T2 = f T2 ∪ wfvarsoccssst T2" using 2(2,10)
proof (induction T2)
case (Cons s T)
{ case 1 thus ?case using Cons
proof (cases s)
case (Equality ac t t’) thus ?thesis using 1 Cons 4(2) unfolding defs3 by (cases ac) auto
qed (simp_all add: defs3)
}
{ case 2 thus ?case using Cons
proof (cases s)
case (Equality ac t t’)
hence "ac = Assign" "fvsstp s = fv t’ ∪ wfvarsoccssstp s" "f (s#T) = fv t’ ∪ f T"
using 2 unfolding defs3 by auto
moreover have "fvsst T = f T ∪ wfvarsoccssst T" using Cons.IH(2) 2 by auto
ultimately show ?thesis unfolding wfvarsoccssst_def fvsst_def by auto
next
case (InSet ac t t’)
hence "ac = Assign" "fvsstp s = wfvarsoccssstp s" "f (s#T) = f T"
using 2 unfolding defs3 by auto
moreover have "fvsst T = f T ∪ wfvarsoccssst T" using Cons.IH(2) 2 by auto
ultimately show ?thesis unfolding wfvarsoccssst_def fvsst_def by auto
qed (simp_all add: defs3)
}
qed (simp_all add: defs3 wfvarsoccssst_def fvsst_def)
have "f T ⊆ fvsst T" for T
proof
fix x show "x ∈ f T =⇒ x ∈ fvsst T"
proof (induction T)
case (Cons s T) thus ?case
proof (cases "x ∈ f T")
case False thus ?thesis
using Cons.prems unfolding defs3 fvsst_def
by (auto split: stateful_strand_step.splits poscheckvariant.splits)
qed auto
qed (simp add: defs3 fvsst_def)
qed
hence 6:
"f T3 ⊆ X ∪ wfvarsoccssst T1 ∪ wfvarsoccssst T2"
"f T4 ⊆ X ∪ wfvarsoccssst T1 ∪ wfvarsoccssst T2"
"f T5 ⊆ X ∪ wfvarsoccssst T1 ∪ wfvarsoccssst T2"
using 2(6,7) 4 5 by blast+
have 7:
"wfvarsoccssst T3 = {}"
"wfvarsoccssst T4 = {}"
"wfvarsoccssst T5 = {}"
using 2(3,4,5) unfolding wfvarsoccssst_def
by (auto split: stateful_strand_step.splits)
have 8:
"f T2 ⊆ wfvarsoccssst T1 ∪ X"
"f T3 ⊆ wfvarsoccssst (T1@T2) ∪ X"
"f T4 ⊆ wfvarsoccssst ((T1@T2)@T3) ∪ X"
"f T5 ⊆ wfvarsoccssst (((T1@T2)@T3)@T4) ∪ X"





2.1 Protocol Transactions (Transactions)
have "wf’sst X (T1@T2@T3@T4@T5)"
using 0[OF 0[OF 0[OF 0[OF 3 8(1)] 8(2)] 8(3)] 8(4)]
unfolding Y_def Z_def by simp
thus ?A using 1 unfolding defs1 defs2 by simp
have "set (transaction_fresh T) ⊆ fv lsst (transaction_updates T) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_send T)"
"fv_transaction T ∩ bvars_transaction T = {}"
using T unfolding wellformed_transaction_def by fast+




shows "dual lsst (transaction_selects T) = transaction_selects T"
"dual lsst (transaction_checks T) = transaction_checks T"
"dual lsst (transaction_updates T) = transaction_updates T"
using assms unfolding wellformed_transaction_def by auto
lemma dual_transaction_strand:
assumes "wellformed_transaction T"
shows "dual lsst (transaction_strand T) =
dual lsst (transaction_receive T)@transaction_selects T@transaction_checks T@
transaction_updates T@dual lsst (transaction_send T)"
using dual_wellformed_transaction_ident_cases’[OF assms] dual lsst_append
unfolding transaction_strand_def by metis
lemma dual_unlabel_transaction_strand:
assumes "wellformed_transaction T"
shows "unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T)) =
(unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_receive T)))@(unlabel (transaction_selects T))@
(unlabel (transaction_checks T))@(unlabel (transaction_updates T))@
(unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_send T)))"
using dual_transaction_strand[OF assms] by (simp add: unlabel_def)
lemma dual_transaction_strand_subst:
assumes "wellformed_transaction T"
shows "dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst δ) =
(dual lsst (transaction_receive T)@transaction_selects T@transaction_checks T@
transaction_updates T@dual lsst (transaction_send T)) ·lsst δ"
proof -
have "dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst δ) = dual lsst (transaction_strand T) ·lsst δ"
using dual lsst_subst by metis




shows "iksst (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T))) = trmssst (unlabel (transaction_send T))"
( is "?A = ?B")
proof -
{ fix t assume "t ∈ ?A"
hence "receive〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T)))" by (simp add: iksst_def)
hence "send〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
using dual lsst_unlabel_steps_iff(1) by metis
hence "t ∈ ?B" using wellformed_transaction_strand_unlabel_memberD(8)[OF assms] by force
} moreover {
fix t assume "t ∈ ?B"
hence "send〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T))"
using wellformed_transaction_unlabel_cases(5)[OF assms] by fastforce
hence "receive〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_send T)))"
using dual lsst_unlabel_steps_iff(1) by metis
hence "receive〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T)))"
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using dual_unlabel_transaction_strand[OF assms] by simp
hence "t ∈ ?A" by (simp add: iksst_def)





shows "iksst (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst δ))) =
trmssst (unlabel (transaction_send T)) ·set δ" ( is "?A = ?B")
using dual_transaction_ik_is_transaction_send[OF assms]
subst_lsst_unlabel[of "dual lsst (transaction_strand T)" δ]
iksst_subst[of "unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T))" δ]
dual lsst_subst[of "transaction_strand T" δ]
by auto
lemma dbsst_transaction_prefix_eq:
assumes T: "wellformed_transaction T"
and S: "prefix S (transaction_receive T@transaction_selects T@transaction_checks T)"
shows "db lsst A = db lsst (A@dual lsst (S ·lsst δ))"
proof -
let ?T1 = "transaction_receive T"
let ?T2 = "transaction_selects T"
let ?T3 = "transaction_checks T"
have *: "prefix (unlabel S) (unlabel (?T1@?T2@?T3))" using S prefix_proj(1) by blast
have "list_all is_Receive (unlabel ?T1)"
"list_all is_Assignment (unlabel ?T2)"
"list_all is_Check (unlabel ?T3)"
using T by (simp_all add: wellformed_transaction_def)
hence "∀ b ∈ set (unlabel ?T1). ¬is_Insert b ∧ ¬is_Delete b"
"∀ b ∈ set (unlabel ?T2). ¬is_Insert b ∧ ¬is_Delete b"
"∀ b ∈ set (unlabel ?T3). ¬is_Insert b ∧ ¬is_Delete b"
by (metis (mono_tags, lifting) Ball_set stateful_strand_step.distinct_disc(16,18),
metis (mono_tags, lifting) Ball_set stateful_strand_step.distinct_disc(24,26,33,37),
metis (mono_tags, lifting) Ball_set stateful_strand_step.distinct_disc(24,26,33,35,37,39))
hence "∀ b ∈ set (unlabel (?T1@?T2@?T3)). ¬is_Insert b ∧ ¬is_Delete b"
by (auto simp add: unlabel_def)
hence "∀ b ∈ set (unlabel S). ¬is_Insert b ∧ ¬is_Delete b"
using * unfolding prefix_def by fastforce
hence "∀ b ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst S) ·sst δ). ¬is_Insert b ∧ ¬is_Delete b"
proof (induction S)
case (Cons a S)
then obtain l b where "a = (l,b)" by (metis surj_pair)
thus ?case
using Cons unfolding dual lsst_def unlabel_def subst_apply_stateful_strand_def
by (cases b) auto
qed simp
hence **: "∀ b ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (S ·lsst δ))). ¬is_Insert b ∧ ¬is_Delete b"
by (metis dual lsst_subst_unlabel)
show ?thesis
using dbsst_no_upd_append[OF **] unlabel_append
unfolding dbsst_def by metis
qed
lemma db lsst_dual lsst_set_ex:
assumes "d ∈ set (db’ lsst (dual lsst A ·lsst ϑ) I D)"
"∀ t u. insert〈t,u〉 ∈ set (unlabel A) −→ (∃ s. u = Fun (Set s) [])"
"∀ t u. delete〈t,u〉 ∈ set (unlabel A) −→ (∃ s. u = Fun (Set s) [])"
"∀ d ∈ set D. ∃ s. snd d = Fun (Set s) []"
shows "∃ s. snd d = Fun (Set s) []"
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using assms
proof (induction A arbitrary: D)
case (Cons a A)
obtain l b where a: "a = (l,b)" by (metis surj_pair)
have 1: "unlabel (dual lsst (a#A) ·lsst ϑ) = receive〈t · ϑ〉#unlabel (dual lsst A ·lsst ϑ)"
when "b = send〈t〉" for t
by (simp add: a that subst_lsst_unlabel_cons)
have 2: "unlabel (dual lsst (a#A) ·lsst ϑ) = send〈t · ϑ〉#unlabel (dual lsst A ·lsst ϑ)"
when "b = receive〈t〉" for t
by (simp add: a that subst_lsst_unlabel_cons)
have 3: "unlabel (dual lsst (a#A) ·lsst ϑ) = (b ·sstp ϑ)#unlabel (dual lsst A ·lsst ϑ)"
when "@ t. b = send〈t〉 ∨ b = receive〈t〉"
using a that dual lsst_Cons subst_lsst_unlabel_cons[of l b]
by (cases b) auto
show ?case using 1 2 3 a Cons by (cases b) fastforce+
qed simp
lemma is_Fun_SetE[elim]:
assumes t: "is_Fun_Set t"
obtains s where "t = Fun (Set s) []"
proof (cases t)
case (Fun f T)
then obtain s where "f = Set s" using t unfolding is_Fun_Set_def by (cases f) moura+
moreover have "T = []" using Fun t unfolding is_Fun_Set_def by (cases T) auto
ultimately show ?thesis using Fun that by fast
qed (use t is_Fun_Set_def in fast)
lemma Fun_Set_InSet_iff:
"(u = 〈a: Var x ∈ Fun (Set s) []〉) ←→
(is_InSet u ∧ is_Var (the_elem_term u) ∧ is_Fun_Set (the_set_term u) ∧
the_Set (the_Fun (the_set_term u)) = s ∧ the_Var (the_elem_term u) = x ∧ the_check u = a)"
( is "?A ←→ ?B")
proof




case (InSet b t t’)
hence "b = a" "t = Var x" "t’ = Fun (Set s) []"
using B by (simp, fastforce, fastforce)




"(u = 〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉) ←→
(is_NegChecks u ∧ bvarssstp u = [] ∧ the_eqs u = [] ∧ length (the_ins u) = 1 ∧
is_Var (fst (hd (the_ins u))) ∧ is_Fun_Set (snd (hd (the_ins u)))) ∧
the_Set (the_Fun (snd (hd (the_ins u)))) = s ∧ the_Var (fst (hd (the_ins u))) = x"
( is "?A ←→ ?B")
proof




case (NegChecks X F F’)
hence "X = []" "F = []"
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using B by auto
moreover have "fst (hd (the_ins u)) = Var x" "snd (hd (the_ins u)) = Fun (Set s) []"
using B is_Fun_SetE[of "snd (hd (the_ins u))"]
by (force, fastforce)
hence "F’ = [(Var x, Fun (Set s) [])]"
using NegChecks B by (cases "the_ins u") auto
ultimately show ?thesis using NegChecks by fast
qed (use B in auto)
qed
lemma is_Fun_Set_exi: "is_Fun_Set x ←→ (∃ s. x = Fun (Set s) [])"




shows "is_Fun_Set (S’ · σ)"
using assms by (fastforce simp add: is_Fun_Set_def)
lemma is_Update_in_transaction_updates:
assumes tu: "is_Update t"
assumes t: "t ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand TT))"
assumes vt: "wellformed_transaction TT"
shows "t ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_updates TT))"
using t tu vt unfolding transaction_strand_def wellformed_transaction_def list_all_iff
by (auto simp add: unlabel_append)
lemma transaction_fresh_vars_subset:
assumes "wellformed_transaction T"
shows "set (transaction_fresh T) ⊆ fv_transaction T"




assumes T: "wellformed_transaction T"
and x: "x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
shows "x /∈ fv lsst (transaction_receive T)" ( is ?A)
and "x /∈ fv lsst (transaction_selects T)" ( is ?B)
and "x /∈ fv lsst (transaction_checks T)" ( is ?C)
and "x /∈ vars lsst (transaction_receive T)" ( is ?D)
and "x /∈ vars lsst (transaction_selects T)" ( is ?E)
and "x /∈ vars lsst (transaction_checks T)" ( is ?F)
and "x /∈ bvars lsst (transaction_receive T)" ( is ?G)
and "x /∈ bvars lsst (transaction_selects T)" ( is ?H)
and "x /∈ bvars lsst (transaction_checks T)" ( is ?I)
proof -
have 0:
"set (transaction_fresh T) ⊆ fv lsst (transaction_updates T) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_send T)"
"set (transaction_fresh T) ∩ fv lsst (transaction_receive T) = {}"
"set (transaction_fresh T) ∩ fv lsst (transaction_selects T) = {}"
"fv_transaction T ∩ bvars_transaction T = {}"
"fv lsst (transaction_checks T) ⊆ fv lsst (transaction_receive T) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_selects T)"
using T unfolding wellformed_transaction_def
by fast+
have 1: "set (transaction_fresh T) ∩ bvars lsst (transaction_checks T) = {}"
using 0(1,4) fv_transaction_unfold[of T] bvars_transaction_unfold[of T] by blast
have 2:
"vars lsst (transaction_receive T) = fv lsst (transaction_receive T)"
"vars lsst (transaction_selects T) = fv lsst (transaction_selects T)"
"bvars lsst (transaction_receive T) = {}"
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"bvars lsst (transaction_selects T) = {}"
using bvars_wellformed_transaction_unfold[OF T] bvars_transaction_unfold[of T]
varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel (transaction_receive T)"]
varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel (transaction_selects T)"]
by blast+
show ?A ?B ?C ?D ?E ?G ?H ?I using 0 1 2 x by fast+
show ?F using 0(2,3,5) 1 x varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel (transaction_checks T)"] by fast
qed
lemma transaction_proj_member:
assumes "T ∈ set P"
shows "transaction_proj n T ∈ set (map (transaction_proj n) P)"
using assms by simp
lemma transaction_strand_proj:
"transaction_strand (transaction_proj n T) = proj n (transaction_strand T)"
proof -
obtain A B C D E F where "T = Transaction A B C D E F" by (cases T) simp
thus ?thesis
using transaction_proj.simps[of n A B C D E F]
unfolding transaction_strand_def proj_def Let_def by auto
qed
lemma transaction_proj_fresh_eq:
"transaction_fresh (transaction_proj n T) = transaction_fresh T"
proof -
obtain A B C D E F where "T = Transaction A B C D E F" by (cases T) simp
thus ?thesis
using transaction_proj.simps[of n A B C D E F]
unfolding transaction_fresh_def proj_def Let_def by auto
qed
lemma transaction_proj_trms_subset:
"trms_transaction (transaction_proj n T) ⊆ trms_transaction T"
proof -
obtain A B C D E F where "T = Transaction A B C D E F" by (cases T) simp
thus ?thesis
using transaction_proj.simps[of n A B C D E F] trmssst_proj_subset(1)[of n]
unfolding transaction_fresh_def Let_def transaction_strand_def by auto
qed
lemma transaction_proj_vars_subset:
"vars_transaction (transaction_proj n T) ⊆ vars_transaction T"
proof -
obtain A B C D E F where "T = Transaction A B C D E F" by (cases T) simp
thus ?thesis
using transaction_proj.simps[of n A B C D E F]
sst_vars_proj_subset(3)[of n "transaction_strand T"]
unfolding transaction_fresh_def Let_def transaction_strand_def by simp
qed
end





2 Stateful Protocol Verification
2.2.1 Definitions
fun to_abs ("α0") where
"α0 [] _ = {}"
| "α0 ((Fun (Val m) [],Fun (Set s) S)#D) n =
(if m = n then insert s (α0 D n) else α0 D n)"
| "α0 (_#D) n = α0 D n"
fun abs_apply_term ( infixl " ·α" 67) where
"Var x ·α α = Var x"
| "Fun (Val n) T ·α α = Fun (Abs (α n)) (map (λt. t ·α α) T)"
| "Fun f T ·α α = Fun f (map (λt. t ·α α) T)"
definition abs_apply_list ( infixl " ·αlist" 67) where
"M ·αlist α ≡ map (λt. t ·α α) M"
definition abs_apply_terms ( infixl " ·αset" 67) where
"M ·αset α ≡ (λt. t ·α α) ‘ M"
definition abs_apply_pairs ( infixl " ·αpairs" 67) where
"F ·αpairs α ≡ map (λ(s,t). (s ·α α, t ·α α)) F"
definition abs_apply_strand_step ( infixl " ·αstp" 67) where
"s ·αstp α ≡ (case s of
(l,send〈t〉) ⇒ (l,send〈t ·α α〉)
| (l,receive〈t〉) ⇒ (l,receive〈t ·α α〉)
| (l,〈ac: t .= t’〉) ⇒ (l,〈ac: (t ·α α) .= (t’ ·α α)〉)
| (l,insert〈t,t’〉) ⇒ (l,insert〈t ·α α,t’ ·α α〉)
| (l,delete〈t,t’〉) ⇒ (l,delete〈t ·α α,t’ ·α α〉)
| (l,〈ac: t ∈ t’〉) ⇒ (l,〈ac: (t ·α α) ∈ (t’ ·α α)〉)
| (l,∀ X〈∨6=: F ∨/∈: F’〉) ⇒ (l,∀ X〈∨6=: (F ·αpairs α) ∨/∈: (F’ ·αpairs α)〉))"
definition abs_apply_strand ( infixl " ·αst" 67) where
"S ·αst α ≡ map (λx. x ·αstp α) S"
2.2.2 Lemmata
lemma to_abs_alt_def:
"α0 D n = {s. ∃ S. (Fun (Val n) [], Fun (Set s) S) ∈ set D}"
by (induct D n rule: to_abs.induct) auto
lemma abs_term_apply_const[simp]:
"is_Val f =⇒ Fun f [] ·α a = Fun (Abs (a (the_Val f))) []"
"¬is_Val f =⇒ Fun f [] ·α a = Fun f []"
by (cases f; auto)+
lemma abs_fv: "fv (t ·α a) = fv t"
by (induct t a rule: abs_apply_term.induct) auto
lemma abs_eq_if_no_Val:
assumes "∀ f ∈ funs_term t. ¬is_Val f"
shows "t ·α a = t ·α b"
using assms
proof (induction t)
case (Fun f T) thus ?case by (cases f) simp_all
qed simp
lemma abs_list_set_is_set_abs_set: "set (M ·αlist α) = (set M) ·αset α"
unfolding abs_apply_list_def abs_apply_terms_def by simp
lemma abs_set_empty[simp]: "{} ·αset α = {}"
unfolding abs_apply_terms_def by simp
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lemma abs_in:
assumes "t ∈ M"
shows "t ·α α ∈ M ·αset α"
using assms unfolding abs_apply_terms_def
by (induct t α rule: abs_apply_term.induct) blast+
lemma abs_set_union: "(A ∪ B) ·αset a = (A ·αset a) ∪ (B ·αset a)"
unfolding abs_apply_terms_def
by auto
lemma abs_subterms: "subterms (t ·α α) = subterms t ·αset α"
proof (induction t)
case (Fun f T) thus ?case by (cases f) (auto simp add: abs_apply_terms_def)
qed (simp add: abs_apply_terms_def)
lemma abs_subterms_in: "s ∈ subterms t =⇒ s ·α a ∈ subterms (t ·α a)"
proof (induction t)
case (Fun f T) thus ?case by (cases f) auto
qed simp




assumes "(Fun (Val n) [], Fun (Set s) []) ∈ set D"
shows "s ∈ α0 D n"
using assms by (induct rule: to_abs.induct) auto
lemma to_abs_empty_iff_notin_db:
"Fun (Val n) [] ·α α0 D = Fun (Abs {}) [] ←→ (@ s S. (Fun (Val n) [], Fun (Set s) S) ∈ set D)"
by (simp add: to_abs_alt_def)
lemma to_abs_list_insert:
assumes "Fun (Val n) [] 6= t"
shows "α0 D n = α0 (List.insert (t,s) D) n"
using assms to_abs_alt_def[of D n] to_abs_alt_def[of "List.insert (t,s) D" n]
by auto
lemma to_abs_list_insert’:
"insert s (α0 D n) = α0 (List.insert (Fun (Val n) [], Fun (Set s) S) D) n"
using to_abs_alt_def[of D n]
to_abs_alt_def[of "List.insert (Fun (Val n) [], Fun (Set s) S) D" n]
by auto
lemma to_abs_list_remove_all:
assumes "Fun (Val n) [] 6= t"
shows "α0 D n = α0 (List.removeAll (t,s) D) n"
using assms to_abs_alt_def[of D n] to_abs_alt_def[of "List.removeAll (t,s) D" n]
by auto
lemma to_abs_list_remove_all’:
"α0 D n - {s} = α0 (filter (λd. @ S. d = (Fun (Val n) [], Fun (Set s) S)) D) n"
using to_abs_alt_def[of D n]
to_abs_alt_def[of "filter (λd. @ S. d = (Fun (Val n) [], Fun (Set s) S)) D" n]
by auto
lemma to_abs_dbsst_append:
assumes "∀ u s. insert〈u, s〉 ∈ set B −→ Fun (Val n) [] 6= u · I"
and "∀ u s. delete〈u, s〉 ∈ set B −→ Fun (Val n) [] 6= u · I"
shows "α0 (db’sst A I D) n = α0 (db’sst (A@B) I D) n"
using assms
proof (induction B rule: List.rev_induct)
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case (snoc b B)
hence IH: "α0 (db’sst A I D) n = α0 (db’sst (A@B) I D) n" by auto
have *: "∀ u s. b = insert〈u,s〉 −→ Fun (Val n) [] 6= u · I"
"∀ u s. b = delete〈u,s〉 −→ Fun (Val n) [] 6= u · I"
using snoc.prems by simp_all
show ?case
proof (cases b)
case (Insert u s)
hence **: "db’sst (A@B@[b]) I D = List.insert (u · I,s · I) (db’sst (A@B) I D)"
using dbsst_append[of "A@B" "[b]"] by simp
have "Fun (Val n) [] 6= u · I" using *(1) Insert by auto
thus ?thesis using IH ** to_abs_list_insert by metis
next
case (Delete u s)
hence **: "db’sst (A@B@[b]) I D = List.removeAll (u · I,s · I) (db’sst (A@B) I D)"
using dbsst_append[of "A@B" "[b]"] by simp
have "Fun (Val n) [] 6= u · I" using *(2) Delete by auto
thus ?thesis using IH ** to_abs_list_remove_all by metis
qed (simp_all add: dbsst_no_upd_append[of "[b]" "A@B"] IH)
qed simp
lemma to_abs_neq_imp_db_update:
assumes "α0 (dbsst A I) n 6= α0 (dbsst (A@B) I) n"
shows "∃ u s. u · I = Fun (Val n) [] ∧ (insert〈u,s〉 ∈ set B ∨ delete〈u,s〉 ∈ set B)"
proof -
{ fix D have ?thesis when "α0 D n 6= α0 (db’sst B I D) n" using that
proof (induction B I D rule: db’sst.induct)
case 2 thus ?case
by (metis db’sst.simps(2) list.set_intros(1,2) subst_apply_pair_pair to_abs_list_insert)
next
case 3 thus ?case
by (metis db’sst.simps(3) list.set_intros(1,2) subst_apply_pair_pair to_abs_list_remove_all)
qed simp_all
} thus ?thesis using assms by (metis dbsst_append dbsst_def)
qed
lemma abs_term_subst_eq:
fixes δ ϑ::"((’a,’b,’c) prot_fun, (’d,’e prot_atom) term × nat) subst"
assumes "∀ x ∈ fv t. δ x ·α a = ϑ x ·α b"
and "@ n T. Fun (Val n) T ∈ subterms t"
shows "t · δ ·α a = t · ϑ ·α b"
using assms
proof (induction t)
case (Fun f T) thus ?case
proof (cases f)
case (Val n)
hence False using Fun.prems(2) by blast




fixes δ ϑ::"((’a,’b,’c) prot_fun, (’d,’e prot_atom) term × nat) subst"
assumes "∀ x ∈ fv t. δ x ·α a = ϑ x"
and "@ n T. Fun (Val n) T ∈ subterms t"
shows "t · δ ·α a = t · ϑ"
using assms
proof (induction t)
case (Fun f T) thus ?case
proof (cases f)
case (Val n)
hence False using Fun.prems(2) by blast
thus ?thesis by metis
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assumes "f ∈ funs_term t" "is_Val f"
shows "Abs (α (the_Val f)) ∈ funs_term (t ·α α)"
using assms by (induct t α rule: abs_apply_term.induct) auto
end







fixes arityf::"’fun ⇒ nat"
and aritys::"’sets ⇒ nat"
and publicf::"’fun ⇒ bool"
and Anaf::"’fun ⇒ (((’fun,’atom::finite,’sets) prot_fun, nat) term list × nat list)"
and Γf::"’fun ⇒ ’atom option"
and label_witness1::"’lbl"
and label_witness2::"’lbl"
assumes Anaf_assm1: "∀ f. let (K, M) = Anaf f in (∀ k ∈ subtermsset (set K).
is_Fun k −→ (is_Fu (the_Fun k)) ∧ length (args k) = arityf (the_Fu (the_Fun k)))"
and Anaf_assm2: "∀ f. let (K, M) = Anaf f in ∀ i ∈ fvset (set K) ∪ set M. i < arityf f"
and publicf_assm: "∀ f. arityf f > (0::nat) −→ publicf f"
and Γf_assm: "∀ f. arityf f = (0::nat) −→ Γf f 6= None"
and label_witness_assm: "label_witness1 6= label_witness2"
begin
lemma Anaf_assm1_alt:
assumes "Anaf f = (K,M)" "k ∈ subtermsset (set K)"
shows "(∃ x. k = Var x) ∨ (∃ h T. k = Fun (Fu h) T ∧ length T = arityf h)"
proof (cases k)
case (Fun g T)
let ?P = "λk. is_Fun k −→ is_Fu (the_Fun k) ∧ length (args k) = arityf (the_Fu (the_Fun k))"
let ?Q = "λK M. ∀ k ∈ subtermsset (set K). ?P k"
have "?Q (fst (Anaf f)) (snd (Anaf f))" using Anaf_assm1 split_beta[of ?Q "Anaf f"] by meson
hence "?Q K M" using assms(1) by simp
hence "?P k" using assms(2) by blast
thus ?thesis using Fun by (cases g) auto
qed simp
lemma Anaf_assm2_alt:
assumes "Anaf f = (K,M)" "i ∈ fvset (set K) ∪ set M"
shows "i < arityf f"
using Anaf_assm2 assms by fastforce
2.3.2 Definitions
fun arity where
"arity (Fu f) = arityf f"
| "arity (Set s) = aritys s"
| "arity (Val _) = 0"
| "arity (Abs _) = 0"
| "arity Pair = 2"
27
2 Stateful Protocol Verification
| "arity (Attack _) = 0"
| "arity OccursFact = 2"
| "arity OccursSec = 0"
| "arity (PubConstAtom _ _) = 0"
| "arity (PubConstSetType _) = 0"
| "arity (PubConstAttackType _) = 0"
| "arity (PubConstBottom _) = 0"
| "arity (PubConstOccursSecType _) = 0"
fun public where
"public (Fu f) = publicf f"
| "public (Set s) = (aritys s > 0)"
| "public (Val n) = snd n"
| "public (Abs _) = False"
| "public Pair = True"
| "public (Attack _) = False"
| "public OccursFact = True"
| "public OccursSec = False"
| "public (PubConstAtom _ _) = True"
| "public (PubConstSetType _) = True"
| "public (PubConstAttackType _) = True"
| "public (PubConstBottom _) = True"
| "public (PubConstOccursSecType _) = True"
fun Ana where
"Ana (Fun (Fu f) T) = (
if arityf f = length T ∧ arityf f > 0
then let (K,M) = Anaf f in (K ·list (!) T, map ((!) T) M)
else ([], []))"
| "Ana _ = ([], [])"
definition Γv where
"Γv v ≡ (
if (∀ t ∈ subterms (fst v).




"Γ (Var v) = Γv v"
| "Γ (Fun f T) = (
if arity f = 0
then case f of
(Fu g) ⇒ TAtom (case Γf g of Some a ⇒ Atom a | None ⇒ Bottom)
| (Val _) ⇒ TAtom Value
| (Abs _) ⇒ TAtom Value
| (Set _) ⇒ TAtom SetType
| (Attack _) ⇒ TAtom AttackType
| OccursSec ⇒ TAtom OccursSecType
| (PubConstAtom a _) ⇒ TAtom (Atom a)
| (PubConstSetType _) ⇒ TAtom SetType
| (PubConstAttackType _) ⇒ TAtom AttackType
| (PubConstBottom _) ⇒ TAtom Bottom
| (PubConstOccursSecType _) ⇒ TAtom OccursSecType
| _ ⇒ TAtom Bottom
else TComp f (map Γ T))"
lemma Γ_consts_simps[simp]:
"arityf g = 0 =⇒ Γ (Fun (Fu g) []) = TAtom (case Γf g of Some a ⇒ Atom a | None ⇒ Bottom)"
"Γ (Fun (Val n) []) = TAtom Value"
"Γ (Fun (Abs b) []) = TAtom Value"
"aritys s = 0 =⇒ Γ (Fun (Set s) []) = TAtom SetType"
"Γ (Fun (Attack x) []) = TAtom AttackType"
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"Γ (Fun OccursSec []) = TAtom OccursSecType"
"Γ (Fun (PubConstAtom a t) []) = TAtom (Atom a)"
"Γ (Fun (PubConstSetType t) []) = TAtom SetType"
"Γ (Fun (PubConstAttackType t) []) = TAtom AttackType"
"Γ (Fun (PubConstBottom t) []) = TAtom Bottom"
"Γ (Fun (PubConstOccursSecType t) []) = TAtom OccursSecType"
by simp+
lemma Γ_Set_simps[simp]:
"aritys s 6= 0 =⇒ Γ (Fun (Set s) T) = TComp (Set s) (map Γ T)"
"Γ (Fun (Set s) T) = TAtom SetType ∨ Γ (Fun (Set s) T) = TComp (Set s) (map Γ T)"
"Γ (Fun (Set s) T) 6= TAtom Value"
"Γ (Fun (Set s) T) 6= TAtom (Atom a)"
"Γ (Fun (Set s) T) 6= TAtom AttackType"
"Γ (Fun (Set s) T) 6= TAtom OccursSecType"




assumes "Ana (Fun f T) = (K,M)"
and "f = Fu g"
and "Anaf g = (K’,M’)"
shows "(K,M) = (if arityf g = length T ∧ arityf g > 0
then (K’ ·list (!) T, map ((!) T) M’)
else ([],[]))" ( is ?A)
and "(K,M) = (K’ ·list (!) T, map ((!) T) M’) ∨ (K,M) = ([],[])" ( is ?B)
proof -
show ?A using assms by (cases "arityf g = length T ∧ arityf g > 0") auto
thus ?B by metis
qed
lemma Ana_Fu_intro:
assumes "arityf f = length T" "arityf f > 0"
and "Anaf f = (K’,M’)"
shows "Ana (Fun (Fu f) T) = (K’ ·list (!) T, map ((!) T) M’)"
using assms by simp
lemma Ana_Fu_elim:
assumes "Ana (Fun f T) = (K,M)"
and "f = Fu g"
and "Anaf g = (K’,M’)"
and "(K,M) 6= ([],[])"
shows "arityf g = length T" ( is ?A)
and "(K,M) = (K’ ·list (!) T, map ((!) T) M’)" ( is ?B)
proof -
show ?A using assms by force
moreover have "arityf g > 0" using assms by force
ultimately show ?B using assms by auto
qed
lemma Ana_nonempty_inv:
assumes "Ana t 6= ([],[])"
shows "∃ f T. t = Fun (Fu f) T ∧ arityf f = length T ∧ arityf f > 0 ∧
(∃ K M. Anaf f = (K, M) ∧ Ana t = (K ·list (!) T, map ((!) T) M))"
using assms
proof (induction t rule: Ana.induct)
case (1 f T)
hence *: "arityf f = length T" "0 < arityf f"
"Ana (Fun (Fu f) T) = (case Anaf f of (K, M) ⇒ (K ·list (!) T, map ((!) T) M))"
using Ana.simps(1)[of f T] unfolding Let_def by metis+
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obtain K M where **: "Anaf f = (K, M)" by (metis surj_pair)
hence "Ana (Fun (Fu f) T) = (K ·list (!) T, map ((!) T) M)" using *(3) by simp
thus ?case using ** *(1,2) by blast
qed simp_all
lemma assm1:
assumes "Ana t = (K,M)"
shows "fvset (set K) ⊆ fv t"
using assms
proof (induction t rule: term.induct)
case (Fun f T)
have aux: "fvset (set K ·set (!) T) ⊆ fvset (set T)"
when K: "∀ i ∈ fvset (set K). i < length T"
for K::"((’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_fun, nat) term list"
proof
fix x assume "x ∈ fvset (set K ·set (!) T)"
then obtain k where k: "k ∈ set K" "x ∈ fv (k · (!) T)" by moura
have "∀ i ∈ fv k. i < length T" using K k(1) by simp
thus "x ∈ fvset (set T)"
by (metis (no_types, lifting) k(2) contra_subsetD fv_set_mono image_subsetI nth_mem
subst_apply_fv_unfold)
qed
{ fix g assume f: "f = Fu g" and K: "K 6= []"
obtain K’ M’ where *: "Anaf g = (K’,M’)" by moura
have "(K, M) 6= ([], [])" using K by simp
hence "(K, M) = (K’ ·list (!) T, map ((!) T) M’)" "arityf g = length T"
using Ana_Fu_cases(1)[OF Fun.prems f *]
by presburger+
hence ?case using aux[of K’] Anaf_assm2_alt[OF *] by auto
} thus ?case using Fun by (cases f) fastforce+
qed simp
lemma assm2:
assumes "Ana t = (K,M)"
and "
∧
g S’. Fun g S’ v t =⇒ length S’ = arity g"
and "k ∈ set K"
and "Fun f T’ v k"
shows "length T’ = arity f"
using assms
proof (induction t rule: term.induct)
case (Fun g T)
obtain h where 2: "g = Fu h"
using Fun.prems(1,3) by (cases g) auto
obtain K’ M’ where 1: "Anaf h = (K’,M’)" by moura
have "(K,M) 6= ([],[])" using Fun.prems(3) by auto
hence "(K,M) = (K’ ·list (!) T, map ((!) T) M’)"
"
∧
i. i ∈ fvset (set K’) ∪ set M’ =⇒ i < length T"
using Ana_Fu_cases(1)[OF Fun.prems(1) 2 1] Anaf_assm2_alt[OF 1]
by presburger+
hence "K = K’ ·list (!) T" and 3: "∀ i∈fvset (set K’). i < length T" by simp_all
then obtain k’ where k’: "k’ ∈ set K’" "k = k’ · (!) T" using Fun.prems(3) by moura
hence 4: "Fun f T’ ∈ subterms (k’ · (!) T)" "fv k’ ⊆ fvset (set K’)"
using Fun.prems(4) by auto
show ?case
proof (cases "∃ i ∈ fv k’. Fun f T’ ∈ subterms (T ! i)")
case True
hence "Fun f T’ ∈ subtermsset (set T)" using k’ Fun.prems(4) 3 by auto
thus ?thesis using Fun.prems(2) by auto
next
case False
then obtain S where "Fun f S ∈ subterms k’" "Fun f T’ = Fun f S · (!) T"
using k’(2) Fun.prems(4) subterm_subst_not_img_subterm by force
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assumes "Ana (Fun f T) = (K, M)"




obtain K’ M’ where *: "Anaf g = (K’,M’)" by moura
have "M = [] ∨ (arityf g = length T ∧ M = map ((!) T) M’)"
using Ana_Fu_cases(1)[OF assms Fu *]
by (meson prod.inject)
thus ?thesis using Anaf_assm2_alt[OF *] by auto
qed auto
lemma assm5: "Ana t = (K,M) =⇒ K 6= [] ∨ M 6= [] =⇒ Ana (t · δ) = (K ·list δ, M ·list δ)"
proof (induction t rule: term.induct)
case (Fun f T) thus ?case
proof (cases f)
case (Fu g)
obtain K’ M’ where *: "Anaf g = (K’,M’)" by moura
have **: "K = K’ ·list (!) T" "M = map ((!) T) M’"
"arityf g = length T" "∀ i ∈ fvset (set K’) ∪ set M’. i < arityf g" "0 < arityf g"
using Fun.prems(2) Ana_Fu_cases(1)[OF Fun.prems(1) Fu *] Anaf_assm2_alt[OF *]
by (meson prod.inject)+
have ***: "∀ i ∈ fvset (set K’). i < length T" "∀ i ∈ set M’. i < length T" using **(3,4) by auto
have "K ·list δ = K’ ·list (!) (map (λt. t · δ) T)"
"M ·list δ = map ((!) (map (λt. t · δ) T)) M’"
using subst_idx_map[OF ***(2), of δ]
subst_idx_map’[OF ***(1), of δ]
**(1,2)
by fast+
thus ?thesis using Fu * **(3,5) by auto
qed auto
qed simp
sublocale intruder_model arity public Ana
apply unfold_locales
by (metis assm1, metis assm2, rule Ana.simps, metis assm4, metis assm5)
adhoc overloading INTRUDER_SYNTH intruder_synth
adhoc overloading INTRUDER_DEDUCT intruder_deduct
lemma assm6: "arity c = 0 =⇒ ∃ a. ∀ X. Γ (Fun c X) = TAtom a" by (cases c) auto
lemma assm7: "0 < arity f =⇒ Γ (Fun f T) = TComp f (map Γ T)" by auto
lemma assm8: "infinite {c. Γ (Fun c []::(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term) = TAtom a ∧ public c}"
( is "?P a")
proof -
let ?T = "λf. (range f)::(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_fun set"
let ?A = "λf. ∀ x::nat ∈ UNIV. ∀ y::nat ∈ UNIV. (f x = f y) = (x = y)"
let ?B = "λf. ∀ x::nat ∈ UNIV. f x ∈ ?T f"
let ?C = "λf. ∀ y::(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_fun ∈ ?T f. ∃ x ∈ UNIV. y = f x"
let ?D = "λf b. ?T f ⊆ {c. Γ (Fun c []::(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term) = TAtom b ∧ public c}"
have sub_lmm: "?P b" when "?A f" "?C f" "?C f" "?D f b" for b f
proof -
have "∃ g::nat ⇒ (’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_fun. bij_betw g UNIV (?T f)"
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using bij_betwI’[of UNIV f "?T f"] that(1,2,3) by blast
hence "infinite (?T f)" by (metis nat_not_finite bij_betw_finite)




case (Atom b) thus ?thesis using sub_lmm[of "PubConstAtom b" a] by force
next
case Value thus ?thesis using sub_lmm[of "λn. Val (n,True)" a] by force
next
case SetType thus ?thesis using sub_lmm[of PubConstSetType a] by fastforce
next
case AttackType thus ?thesis using sub_lmm[of PubConstAttackType a] by fastforce
next
case Bottom thus ?thesis using sub_lmm[of PubConstBottom a] by fastforce
next
case OccursSecType thus ?thesis using sub_lmm[of PubConstOccursSecType a] by fastforce
qed
qed
lemma assm9: "TComp f T v Γ t =⇒ arity f > 0"
proof (induction t rule: term.induct)
case (Var x)
hence "Γ (Var x) 6= TAtom Bottom" by force
hence "∀ t ∈ subterms (fst x). case t of
TComp f T ⇒ arity f > 0 ∧ arity f = length T
| _ ⇒ True"
using Var Γ.simps(1)[of x] unfolding Γv_def by meson
thus ?case using Var by (fastforce simp add: Γv_def)
next
case (Fun g S)
have "arity g 6= 0" using Fun.prems Var_subtermeq assm6 by force
thus ?case using Fun by (cases "TComp f T = TComp g (map Γ S)") auto
qed
lemma assm10: "wf trm (Γ (Var x))"
unfolding wf trm_def by (auto simp add: Γv_def)
lemma assm11: "arity f > 0 =⇒ public f" using publicf_assm by (cases f) auto
lemma assm12: "Γ (Var (τ, n)) = Γ (Var (τ, m))" by (simp add: Γv_def)
lemma assm13: "arity c = 0 =⇒ Ana (Fun c T) = ([],[])" by (cases c) simp_all
lemma assm14:
assumes "Ana (Fun f T) = (K,M)"
shows "Ana (Fun f T · δ) = (K ·list δ, M ·list δ)"
proof -
show ?thesis
proof (cases "(K, M) = ([],[])")
case True
{ fix g assume f: "f = Fu g"
obtain K’ M’ where "Anaf g = (K’,M’)" by moura
hence ?thesis using assms f True by auto
} thus ?thesis using True assms by (cases f) auto
next
case False
then obtain g where **: "f = Fu g" using assms by (cases f) auto
obtain K’ M’ where *: "Anaf g = (K’,M’)" by moura
have ***: "K = K’ ·list (!) T" "M = map ((!) T) M’" "arityf g = length T"
"∀ i ∈ fvset (set K’) ∪ set M’. i < arityf g"
using Ana_Fu_cases(1)[OF assms ** *] False Anaf_assm2_alt[OF *]
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by (meson prod.inject)+
have ****: "∀ i∈fvset (set K’). i < length T" "∀ i∈set M’. i < length T" using ***(3,4) by auto
have "K ·list δ = K’ ·list (!) (map (λt. t · δ) T)"
"M ·list δ = map ((!) (map (λt. t · δ) T)) M’"
using subst_idx_map[OF ****(2), of δ]
subst_idx_map’[OF ****(1), of δ]
***(1,2)
by auto
thus ?thesis using assms * ** ***(3) by auto
qed
qed
sublocale labeled_stateful_typed_model’ arity public Ana Γ Pair label_witness1 label_witness2
by unfold_locales
(metis assm6, metis assm7, metis assm8, metis assm9,
rule assm10, metis assm11, rule arity.simps(5), metis assm14,
metis assm12, metis assm13, metis assm14, rule label_witness_assm)
2.3.4 Minor Lemmata
lemma Γv_TAtom[simp]: "Γv (TAtom a, n) = TAtom a"
unfolding Γv_def by simp
lemma Γv_TAtom’:
assumes "a 6= Bottom"
shows "Γv (τ, n) = TAtom a ←→ τ = TAtom a"
proof
assume "Γv (τ, n) = TAtom a"
thus "τ = TAtom a" by (metis (no_types, lifting) assms Γv_def fst_conv term.inject(1))
qed simp
lemma Γv_TAtom_inv:
"Γv x = TAtom (Atom a) =⇒ ∃ m. x = (TAtom (Atom a), m)"
"Γv x = TAtom Value =⇒ ∃ m. x = (TAtom Value, m)"
"Γv x = TAtom SetType =⇒ ∃ m. x = (TAtom SetType, m)"
"Γv x = TAtom AttackType =⇒ ∃ m. x = (TAtom AttackType, m)"
"Γv x = TAtom OccursSecType =⇒ ∃ m. x = (TAtom OccursSecType, m)"
by (metis Γv_TAtom’ surj_pair prot_atom.distinct(7),
metis Γv_TAtom’ surj_pair prot_atom.distinct(15),
metis Γv_TAtom’ surj_pair prot_atom.distinct(21),
metis Γv_TAtom’ surj_pair prot_atom.distinct(25),
metis Γv_TAtom’ surj_pair prot_atom.distinct(30))
lemma Γv_TAtom’’:
"(fst x = TAtom (Atom a)) = (Γv x = TAtom (Atom a))" ( is "?A = ?A’")
"(fst x = TAtom Value) = (Γv x = TAtom Value)" ( is "?B = ?B’")
"(fst x = TAtom SetType) = (Γv x = TAtom SetType)" ( is "?C = ?C’")
"(fst x = TAtom AttackType) = (Γv x = TAtom AttackType)" ( is "?D = ?D’")
"(fst x = TAtom OccursSecType) = (Γv x = TAtom OccursSecType)" ( is "?E = ?E’")
proof -
have 1: "?A =⇒ ?A’" "?B =⇒ ?B’" "?C =⇒ ?C’" "?D =⇒ ?D’" "?E =⇒ ?E’"
by (metis Γv_TAtom prod.collapse)+
have 2: "?A’ =⇒ ?A" "?B’ =⇒ ?B" "?C’ =⇒ ?C" "?D’ =⇒ ?D" "?E’ =⇒ ?E"
using Γv_TAtom Γv_TAtom_inv(1) apply fastforce
using Γv_TAtom Γv_TAtom_inv(2) apply fastforce
using Γv_TAtom Γv_TAtom_inv(3) apply fastforce
using Γv_TAtom Γv_TAtom_inv(4) apply fastforce
using Γv_TAtom Γv_TAtom_inv(5) by fastforce
show "?A = ?A’" "?B = ?B’" "?C = ?C’" "?D = ?D’" "?E = ?E’"
using 1 2 by metis+
qed
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lemma Γv_Var_image:
"Γv ‘ X = Γ ‘ Var ‘ X"
by force
lemma Γ_Fu_const:
assumes "arityf g = 0"
shows "∃ a. Γ (Fun (Fu g) T) = TAtom (Atom a)"
proof -
have "Γf g 6= None" using assms Γf_assm by blast
thus ?thesis using assms by force
qed
lemma Fun_Value_type_inv:
fixes T::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term list"
assumes "Γ (Fun f T) = TAtom Value"
shows "(∃ n. f = Val n) ∨ (∃ bs. f = Abs bs)"
proof -
have *: "arity f = 0" by (metis const_type_inv assms)
show ?thesis using assms
proof (cases f)
case (Fu g)
hence "arityf g = 0" using * by simp
hence False using Fu Γ_Fu_const[of g T] assms by auto
thus ?thesis by metis
next
case (Set s)
hence "aritys s = 0" using * by simp
hence False using Set assms by auto
thus ?thesis by metis
qed simp_all
qed
lemma abs_Γ: "Γ t = Γ (t ·α α)"
by (induct t α rule: abs_apply_term.induct) auto
lemma Anaf_keys_not_pubval_terms:
assumes "Anaf f = (K, T)"
and "k ∈ set K"




then obtain n S where *: "Fun (Val n) S ∈ subtermsset (set K)"
using assms(2) funs_term_Fun_subterm[OF assms(3)]
by (cases g) auto
show False using Anaf_assm1_alt[OF assms(1) *] by simp
qed
lemma Anaf_keys_not_abs_terms:
assumes "Anaf f = (K, T)"
and "k ∈ set K"




then obtain a S where *: "Fun (Abs a) S ∈ subtermsset (set K)"
using assms(2) funs_term_Fun_subterm[OF assms(3)]
by (cases g) auto
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assumes "Anaf f = (K, T)"
and "k ∈ set K"
and "g ∈ funs_term k"
shows "g 6= Pair"
proof
assume "g = Pair"
then obtain S where *: "Fun Pair S ∈ subtermsset (set K)"
using assms(2) funs_term_Fun_subterm[OF assms(3)]
by (cases g) auto
show False using Anaf_assm1_alt[OF assms(1) *] by simp
qed
lemma Ana_Fu_keys_funs_term_subset:
fixes K::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term list"
assumes "Ana (Fun (Fu f) S) = (K, T)"
and "Anaf f = (K’, T’)"
shows "
⋃
(funs_term ‘ set K) ⊆ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set K’) ∪ funs_term (Fun (Fu f) S)"
proof -
{ fix k assume k: "k ∈ set K"
then obtain k’ where k’:
"k’ ∈ set K’" "k = k’ · (!) S" "arityf f = length S"
"subterms k’ ⊆ subtermsset (set K’)"
using assms Ana_Fu_elim[OF assms(1) _ assms(2)] by fastforce
have 1: "funs_term k’ ⊆ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set K’)" using k’(1) by auto
have "i < length S" when "i ∈ fv k’" for i
using that Anaf_assm2_alt[OF assms(2), of i] k’(1,3)
by auto
hence 2: "funs_term (S ! i) ⊆ funs_term (Fun (Fu f) S)" when "i ∈ fv k’" for i
using that by force
have "funs_term k ⊆ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set K’) ∪ funs_term (Fun (Fu f) S)"
using funs_term_subst[of k’ "(!) S"] k’(2) 1 2 by fast




assumes "Ana (Fun (Fu f) S) = (K, T)"
and "Anaf f = (K’, T’)"
and "k ∈ set K"
and "∀ g ∈ funs_term (Fun (Fu f) S). is_Val g −→ ¬public g"
shows "∀ g ∈ funs_term k. is_Val g −→ ¬public g"





assumes "Ana (Fun (Fu f) S) = (K, T)"
and "Anaf f = (K’, T’)"
and "k ∈ set K"
and "∀ g ∈ funs_term (Fun (Fu f) S). ¬is_Abs g"
shows "∀ g ∈ funs_term k. ¬is_Abs g"





assumes "Ana (Fun (Fu f) S) = (K, T)"
and "Anaf f = (K’, T’)"
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and "k ∈ set K"
and "∀ g ∈ funs_term (Fun (Fu f) S). g 6= Pair"
shows "∀ g ∈ funs_term k. g 6= Pair"





assumes t: "M ` occurs t"
and M: "∀ s ∈ subtermsset M. OccursFact /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana s)))"
"∀ s ∈ subtermsset M. OccursSec /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana s)))"
"Fun OccursSec [] /∈ M"
shows "occurs t ∈ M"




assumes T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
and I: "strand_sem_stateful IK DB (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))) I"
and s: "receive〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ))"
shows "IK ` t · I"
proof -
let ?R = "unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ))"
let ?S = "λA. unlabel (dual lsst (A ·lsst ϑ))"
let ?S’ = "?S (transaction_receive T)"
obtain l B s where B:
"(l,send〈t〉) = dual lsstp ((l,s) ·lsstp ϑ)"
"prefix ((B ·lsst ϑ)@[(l,s) ·lsstp ϑ]) (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ)"
using s dual lsst_unlabel_steps_iff(2)[of t "transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ"]
dual lsst_in_set_prefix_obtain_subst[of "send〈t〉" "transaction_receive T" ϑ]
by blast
have 1: "unlabel (dual lsst ((B ·lsst ϑ)@[(l,s) ·lsstp ϑ])) = unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))@[send〈t〉]"
using B(1) unlabel_append dual lsstp_subst dual lsst_subst singleton_lst_proj(4)
dual lsst_subst_snoc subst_lsst_append subst_lsst_singleton
by (metis (no_types, lifting) subst_apply_labeled_stateful_strand_step.simps )
have "strand_sem_stateful IK DB ?S’ I"
using I strand_sem_append_stateful[of IK DB _ _ I] transaction_dual_subst_unfold[of T ϑ]
by fastforce
hence "strand_sem_stateful IK DB (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))@[send〈t〉]) I"
using B 1 unfolding prefix_def unlabel_def
by (metis dual lsst_def map_append strand_sem_append_stateful)
hence t_deduct: "IK ∪ (ik lsst (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ)) ·set I) ` t · I"
using strand_sem_append_stateful[of IK DB "unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))" "[send〈t〉]" I]
by simp
have "∀ s ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T)). ∃ t. s = receive〈t〉"
using T_valid wellformed_transaction_unlabel_cases(1)[OF T_valid] by auto
moreover { fix A::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_strand" and ϑ
assume "∀ s ∈ set (unlabel A). ∃ t. s = receive〈t〉"
hence "∀ s ∈ set (unlabel (A ·lsst ϑ)). ∃ t. s = receive〈t〉"
proof (induction A)
case (Cons a A) thus ?case using subst_lsst_cons[of a A ϑ] by (cases a) auto
qed simp
hence "∀ s ∈ set (unlabel (A ·lsst ϑ)). ∃ t. s = receive〈t〉"
by (simp add: list.pred_set is_Receive_def)
hence "∀ s ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (A ·lsst ϑ))). ∃ t. s = send〈t〉"
by (metis dual lsst_memberD dual lsstp_inv(2) unlabel_in unlabel_mem_has_label)
}
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ultimately have "∀ s ∈ set ?R. ∃ t. s = send〈t〉" by simp
hence "iksst ?R = {}" unfolding unlabel_def iksst_def by fast
hence "ik lsst (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ)) = {}"
using B(2) 1 iksst_append dual lsst_append
by (metis (no_types, lifting) Un_empty map_append prefix_def unlabel_def)
thus ?thesis using t_deduct by simp
qed
lemma wellformed_transaction_sem_selects:
assumes T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
and I: "strand_sem_stateful IK DB (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))) I"
and "select〈t,u〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T ·lsst ϑ))"
shows "(t · I, u · I) ∈ DB"
proof -
let ?s = "select〈t,u〉"
let ?R = "transaction_receive T@transaction_selects T"
let ?R’ = "unlabel (dual lsst (?R ·lsst ϑ))"
let ?S = "λA. unlabel (dual lsst (A ·lsst ϑ))"
let ?S’ = "?S (transaction_receive T)@?S (transaction_selects T)"
let ?P = "λa. is_Receive a ∨ is_Assignment a"
let ?Q = "λa. is_Send a ∨ is_Assignment a"
have s: "?s ∈ set (unlabel (?R ·lsst ϑ))"
using assms(3) subst_lsst_append[of "transaction_receive T"]
unlabel_append[of "transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ"]
by auto
obtain l B s where B:
"(l,?s) = dual lsstp ((l,s) ·lsstp ϑ)"
"prefix ((B ·lsst ϑ)@[(l,s) ·lsstp ϑ]) (?R ·lsst ϑ)"
using s dual lsst_unlabel_steps_iff(6)[of assign t u]
dual lsst_in_set_prefix_obtain_subst[of ?s ?R ϑ]
by blast
have 1: "unlabel (dual lsst ((B ·lsst ϑ)@[(l,s) ·lsstp ϑ])) = unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))@[?s]"
using B(1) unlabel_append dual lsstp_subst dual lsst_subst singleton_lst_proj(4)
dual lsst_subst_snoc subst_lsst_append subst_lsst_singleton
by (metis (no_types, lifting) subst_apply_labeled_stateful_strand_step.simps)
have "strand_sem_stateful IK DB ?S’ I"
using I strand_sem_append_stateful[of IK DB _ _ I] transaction_dual_subst_unfold[of T ϑ]
by fastforce
hence "strand_sem_stateful IK DB (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))@[?s]) I"
using B 1 strand_sem_append_stateful subst_lsst_append
unfolding prefix_def unlabel_def dual lsst_def
by (metis (no_types) map_append)
hence in_db: "(t · I, u · I) ∈ dbupdsst (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))) I DB"
using strand_sem_append_stateful[of IK DB "unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))" "[?s]" I]
by simp
have "∀ a ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))). ?Q a"
proof
fix a assume a: "a ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ)))"





hence "∀ a ∈ set (unlabel (?R ·lsst ϑ)). ?P a"
using stateful_strand_step_cases_subst(2,8)[of _ ϑ] subst_lsst_unlabel[of ?R ϑ]
by (simp add: subst_apply_stateful_strand_def del: unlabel_append)
hence B_P: "∀ a ∈ set (unlabel (B ·lsst ϑ)). ?P a"
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using unlabel_mono[OF set_mono_prefix[OF append_prefixD[OF B(2)]]]
by blast
obtain l where "(l,a) ∈ set (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))"
using a by (meson unlabel_mem_has_label)
then obtain b where b: "(l,b) ∈ set (B ·lsst ϑ)" "dual lsstp (l,b) = (l,a)"
using dual lsst_memberD by blast
hence "?P b" using B_P unfolding unlabel_def by fastforce
thus "?Q a" using dual lsstp_inv[OF b(2)] by (cases b) auto
qed
hence "∀ a ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))). ¬is_Insert a ∧ ¬is_Delete a" by fastforce
thus ?thesis using dbupdsst_no_upd[of "unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))" I DB] in_db by simp
qed
lemma wellformed_transaction_sem_pos_checks:
assumes T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
and I: "strand_sem_stateful IK DB (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))) I"
and "〈t in u〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T ·lsst ϑ))"
shows "(t · I, u · I) ∈ DB"
proof -
let ?s = "〈t in u〉"
let ?R = "transaction_receive T@transaction_selects T@transaction_checks T"
let ?R’ = "unlabel (dual lsst (?R ·lsst ϑ))"
let ?S = "λA. unlabel (dual lsst (A ·lsst ϑ))"
let ?S’ = "?S (transaction_receive T)@?S (transaction_selects T)@?S (transaction_checks T)"
let ?P = "λa. is_Receive a ∨ is_Assignment a ∨ is_Check a"
let ?Q = "λa. is_Send a ∨ is_Assignment a ∨ is_Check a"
have s: "?s ∈ set (unlabel (?R ·lsst ϑ))"
using assms(3) subst_lsst_append[of "transaction_receive T@transaction_selects T"]
unlabel_append[of "transaction_receive T@transaction_selects T ·lsst ϑ"]
by auto
obtain l B s where B:
"(l,?s) = dual lsstp ((l,s) ·lsstp ϑ)"
"prefix ((B ·lsst ϑ)@[(l,s) ·lsstp ϑ]) (?R ·lsst ϑ)"
using s dual lsst_unlabel_steps_iff(6)[of check t u]
dual lsst_in_set_prefix_obtain_subst[of ?s ?R ϑ]
by blast
have 1: "unlabel (dual lsst ((B ·lsst ϑ)@[(l,s) ·lsstp ϑ])) = unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))@[?s]"
using B(1) unlabel_append dual lsstp_subst dual lsst_subst singleton_lst_proj(4)
dual lsst_subst_snoc subst_lsst_append subst_lsst_singleton
by (metis (no_types, lifting) subst_apply_labeled_stateful_strand_step.simps )
have "strand_sem_stateful IK DB ?S’ I"
using I strand_sem_append_stateful[of IK DB _ _ I] transaction_dual_subst_unfold[of T ϑ]
by fastforce
hence "strand_sem_stateful IK DB (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))@[?s]) I"
using B 1 strand_sem_append_stateful subst_lsst_append
unfolding prefix_def unlabel_def dual lsst_def
by (metis (no_types) map_append)
hence in_db: "(t · I, u · I) ∈ dbupdsst (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))) I DB"
using strand_sem_append_stateful[of IK DB "unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))" "[?s]" I]
by simp
have "∀ a ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))). ?Q a"
proof
fix a assume a: "a ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ)))"
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by fastforce
hence "∀ a ∈ set (unlabel (?R ·lsst ϑ)). ?P a"
using stateful_strand_step_cases_subst(2,8,9)[of _ ϑ] subst_lsst_unlabel[of ?R ϑ]
by (simp add: subst_apply_stateful_strand_def del: unlabel_append)
hence B_P: "∀ a ∈ set (unlabel (B ·lsst ϑ)). ?P a"
using unlabel_mono[OF set_mono_prefix[OF append_prefixD[OF B(2)]]]
by blast
obtain l where "(l,a) ∈ set (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))"
using a by (meson unlabel_mem_has_label)
then obtain b where b: "(l,b) ∈ set (B ·lsst ϑ)" "dual lsstp (l,b) = (l,a)"
using dual lsst_memberD by blast
hence "?P b" using B_P unfolding unlabel_def by fastforce
thus "?Q a" using dual lsstp_inv[OF b(2)] by (cases b) auto
qed
hence "∀ a ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))). ¬is_Insert a ∧ ¬is_Delete a" by fastforce
thus ?thesis using dbupdsst_no_upd[of "unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))" I DB] in_db by simp
qed
lemma wellformed_transaction_sem_neg_checks:
assumes T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
and I: "strand_sem_stateful IK DB (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))) I"
and "NegChecks X [] [(t,u)] ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T ·lsst ϑ))"
shows "∀ δ. subst_domain δ = set X ∧ ground (subst_range δ) −→ (t · δ · I, u · δ · I) /∈ DB" ( is ?A)
and "X = [] =⇒ (t · I, u · I) /∈ DB" ( is "?B =⇒ ?B’")
proof -
let ?s = "NegChecks X [] [(t,u)]"
let ?R = "transaction_receive T@transaction_selects T@transaction_checks T"
let ?R’ = "unlabel (dual lsst (?R ·lsst ϑ))"
let ?S = "λA. unlabel (dual lsst (A ·lsst ϑ))"
let ?S’ = "?S (transaction_receive T)@?S (transaction_selects T)@?S (transaction_checks T)"
let ?P = "λa. is_Receive a ∨ is_Assignment a ∨ is_Check a"
let ?Q = "λa. is_Send a ∨ is_Assignment a ∨ is_Check a"
let ?U = "λδ. subst_domain δ = set X ∧ ground (subst_range δ)"
have s: "?s ∈ set (unlabel (?R ·lsst ϑ))"
using assms(3) subst_lsst_append[of "transaction_receive T@transaction_selects T"]
unlabel_append[of "transaction_receive T@transaction_selects T ·lsst ϑ"]
by auto
obtain l B s where B:
"(l,?s) = dual lsstp ((l,s) ·lsstp ϑ)"
"prefix ((B ·lsst ϑ)@[(l,s) ·lsstp ϑ]) (?R ·lsst ϑ)"
using s dual lsst_unlabel_steps_iff(7)[of X "[]" "[(t,u)]"]
dual lsst_in_set_prefix_obtain_subst[of ?s ?R ϑ]
by blast
have 1: "unlabel (dual lsst ((B ·lsst ϑ)@[(l,s) ·lsstp ϑ])) = unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))@[?s]"
using B(1) unlabel_append dual lsstp_subst dual lsst_subst singleton_lst_proj(4)
dual lsst_subst_snoc subst_lsst_append subst_lsst_singleton
by (metis (no_types, lifting) subst_apply_labeled_stateful_strand_step.simps)
have "strand_sem_stateful IK DB ?S’ I"
using I strand_sem_append_stateful[of IK DB _ _ I] transaction_dual_subst_unfold[of T ϑ]
by fastforce
hence "strand_sem_stateful IK DB (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))@[?s]) I"
using B 1 strand_sem_append_stateful subst_lsst_append
unfolding prefix_def unlabel_def dual lsst_def
by (metis (no_types) map_append)
hence "negchecks_model I (dbupdsst (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))) I DB) X [] [(t,u)]"
using strand_sem_append_stateful[of IK DB "unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))" "[?s]" I]
by fastforce
hence in_db: "∀ δ. ?U δ −→ (t · δ · I, u · δ · I) /∈ dbupdsst (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))) I DB"
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unfolding negchecks_model_def
by simp
have "∀ a ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))). ?Q a"
proof
fix a assume a: "a ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ)))"




hence "∀ a ∈ set (unlabel (?R ·lsst ϑ)). ?P a"
using stateful_strand_step_cases_subst(2,8,9)[of _ ϑ] subst_lsst_unlabel[of ?R ϑ]
by (simp add: subst_apply_stateful_strand_def del: unlabel_append)
hence B_P: "∀ a ∈ set (unlabel (B ·lsst ϑ)). ?P a"
using unlabel_mono[OF set_mono_prefix[OF append_prefixD[OF B(2)]]]
by blast
obtain l where "(l,a) ∈ set (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))"
using a by (meson unlabel_mem_has_label)
then obtain b where b: "(l,b) ∈ set (B ·lsst ϑ)" "dual lsstp (l,b) = (l,a)"
using dual lsst_memberD by blast
hence "?P b" using B_P unfolding unlabel_def by fastforce
thus "?Q a" using dual lsstp_inv[OF b(2)] by (cases b) auto
qed
hence "∀ a ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))). ¬is_Insert a ∧ ¬is_Delete a" by fastforce
thus ?A using dbupdsst_no_upd[of "unlabel (dual lsst (B ·lsst ϑ))" I DB] in_db by simp
moreover have "δ = Var" "t · δ = t"
when "subst_domain δ = set []" for t and δ::"(’fun, ’atom, ’sets) prot_subst"
using that by auto
moreover have "subst_domain Var = set []" "range_vars Var = {}"
by simp_all
ultimately show "?B =⇒ ?B’" unfolding range_vars_alt_def by metis
qed
lemma wellformed_transaction_fv_in_receives_or_selects:
assumes T: "wellformed_transaction T"
and x: "x ∈ fv_transaction T" "x /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
shows "x ∈ fv lsst (transaction_receive T) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_selects T)"
proof -
have "x ∈ fv lsst (transaction_receive T) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_selects T) ∪
fv lsst (transaction_checks T) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_updates T) ∪
fv lsst (transaction_send T)"
using x(1) fvsst_append unlabel_append
by (metis transaction_strand_def append_assoc)
thus ?thesis using T x(2) unfolding wellformed_transaction_def by blast
qed
lemma dual_transaction_ik_is_transaction_send’’:
fixes δ I::"(’a,’b,’c) prot_subst"
assumes "wellformed_transaction T"
shows "(iksst (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst δ))) ·set I) ·αset a =
(trmssst (unlabel (transaction_send T)) ·set δ ·set I) ·αset a" ( is "?A = ?B")
using dual_transaction_ik_is_transaction_send[OF assms]
subst_lsst_unlabel[of "dual lsst (transaction_strand T)" δ]
iksst_subst[of "unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T))" δ]
dual lsst_subst[of "transaction_strand T" δ]
by (auto simp add: abs_apply_terms_def)
lemma while_prot_terms_fun_mono:
"mono (λM’. M ∪ ⋃ (subterms ‘ M’) ∪ ⋃ ((set ◦ fst ◦ Ana) ‘ M’))"
unfolding mono_def by fast
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lemma while_prot_terms_SMP_overapprox:
fixes M::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_terms"
assumes N_supset: "M ∪ ⋃ (subterms ‘ N) ∪ ⋃ ((set ◦ fst ◦ Ana) ‘ N) ⊆ N"
and Value_vars_only: "∀ x ∈ fvset N. Γv x = TAtom Value"
shows "SMP M ⊆ {a · δ | a δ. a ∈ N ∧ wtsubst δ ∧ wf trms (subst_range δ)}"
proof -
define f where "f ≡ λM’. M ∪ ⋃ (subterms ‘ M’) ∪ ⋃ ((set ◦ fst ◦ Ana) ‘ M’)"
define S where "S ≡ {a · δ | a δ. a ∈ N ∧ wtsubst δ ∧ wf trms (subst_range δ)}"
note 0 = Value_vars_only
have "t ∈ S" when "t ∈ SMP M" for t
using that
proof (induction t rule: SMP.induct)
case (MP t)
hence "t ∈ N" "wtsubst Var" "wf trms (subst_range Var)" using N_supset by auto
hence "t · Var ∈ S" unfolding S_def by blast
thus ?case by simp
next
case (Subterm t t’)
then obtain δ a where a: "a · δ = t" "a ∈ N" "wtsubst δ" "wf trms (subst_range δ)"
by (auto simp add: S_def)
hence "∀ x ∈ fv a. ∃ τ. Γ (Var x) = TAtom τ" using 0 by auto
hence *: "∀ x ∈ fv a. (∃ f. δ x = Fun f []) ∨ (∃ y. δ x = Var y)"
using a(3) TAtom_term_cases[OF wf_trm_subst_rangeD[OF a(4)]]
by (metis wtsubst_def)
obtain b where b: "b · δ = t’" "b ∈ subterms a"
using subterms_subst_subterm[OF *, of t’] Subterm.hyps(2) a(1)
by fast
hence "b ∈ N" using N_supset a(2) by blast
thus ?case using a b(1) unfolding S_def by blast
next
case (Substitution t ϑ)
then obtain δ a where a: "a · δ = t" "a ∈ N" "wtsubst δ" "wf trms (subst_range δ)"
by (auto simp add: S_def)
have "wtsubst (δ ◦s ϑ)" "wf trms (subst_range (δ ◦s ϑ))"
by (fact wt_subst_compose[OF a(3) Substitution.hyps(2)],
fact wf_trms_subst_compose[OF a(4) Substitution.hyps(3)])
moreover have "t · ϑ = a · δ ◦s ϑ" using a(1) subst_subst_compose[of a δ ϑ] by simp
ultimately show ?case using a(2) unfolding S_def by blast
next
case (Ana t K T k)
then obtain δ a where a: "a · δ = t" "a ∈ N" "wtsubst δ" "wf trms (subst_range δ)"
by (auto simp add: S_def)
obtain Ka Ta where a’: "Ana a = (Ka,Ta)" by moura
have *: "K = Ka ·list δ"
proof (cases a)
case (Var x)
then obtain g U where gU: "t = Fun g U"
using a(1) Ana.hyps(2,3) Ana_var
by (cases t) simp_all
have "Γ (Var x) = TAtom Value" using Var a(2) 0 by auto
hence "Γ (Fun g U) = TAtom Value"
using a(1,3) Var gU wt_subst_trm’’[OF a(3), of a]
by argo
thus ?thesis using gU Fun_Value_type_inv Ana.hyps(2,3) by fastforce
next
case (Fun g U) thus ?thesis using a(1) a’ Ana.hyps(2) Ana_subst’[of g U] by simp
qed
then obtain ka where ka: "k = ka · δ" "ka ∈ set Ka" using Ana.hyps(3) by auto
have "ka ∈ set ((fst ◦ Ana) a)" using ka(2) a’ by simp
hence "ka ∈ N" using a(2) N_supset by auto
thus ?case using ka a(3,4) unfolding S_def by blast
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qed
thus ?thesis unfolding S_def by blast
qed
2.3.5 The Protocol Transition System, Defined in Terms of the Reachable Constraints
definition transaction_fresh_subst where
"transaction_fresh_subst σ T A ≡
subst_domain σ = set (transaction_fresh T) ∧
(∀ t ∈ subst_range σ. ∃ n. t = Fun (Val (n,False)) []) ∧
(∀ t ∈ subst_range σ. t /∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)) ∧
(∀ t ∈ subst_range σ. t /∈ subtermsset (trms_transaction T)) ∧
inj_on σ (subst_domain σ)"
definition transaction_renaming_subst where
"transaction_renaming_subst α P A ≡
∃ n ≥ max_var_set (⋃ (vars_transaction ‘ set P) ∪ vars lsst A). α = var_rename n"
definition constraint_model where
"constraint_model I A ≡
constr_sem_stateful I (unlabel A) ∧
interpretationsubst I ∧
wf trms (subst_range I)"
definition welltyped_constraint_model where
"welltyped_constraint_model I A ≡ wtsubst I ∧ constraint_model I A"
lemma constraint_model_prefix:
assumes "constraint_model I (A@B)"
shows "constraint_model I A"
by (metis assms strand_sem_append_stateful unlabel_append constraint_model_def)
lemma welltyped_constraint_model_prefix:
assumes "welltyped_constraint_model I (A@B)"
shows "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
by (metis assms constraint_model_prefix welltyped_constraint_model_def)
lemma constraint_model_Val_is_Value_term:
assumes "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
and "t · I = Fun (Val n) []"
shows "t = Fun (Val n) [] ∨ (∃ m. t = Var (TAtom Value, m))"
proof -
have "wtsubst I" using assms(1) unfolding welltyped_constraint_model_def by simp
moreover have "Γ (Fun (Val n) []) = TAtom Value" by auto




obtain τ m where x: "x = (τ, m)" by (metis surj_pair)
have "Γv x = TAtom Value" using * Var by auto
hence "τ = TAtom Value" using x Γv_TAtom’[of Value τ m] by simp
thus ?thesis using x Var by metis
next
case (Fun f T) thus ?thesis using assms(2) by auto
qed
qed
The set of symbolic constraints reachable in any symbolic run of the protocol P.
σ instantiates the fresh variables of transaction T with fresh terms. α is a variable-renaming whose range
consists of fresh variables.
inductive set reachable_constraints::
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"[] ∈ reachable_constraints P"
| step:
" [[A ∈ reachable_constraints P;
T ∈ set P;
transaction_fresh_subst σ T A;
transaction_renaming_subst α P A




∀ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T)).
is_Check x ∧
(is_InSet x −→
is_Var (the_elem_term x) ∧ is_Fun_Set (the_set_term x) ∧
fst (the_Var (the_elem_term x)) = TAtom Value) ∧
(is_NegChecks x −→
bvarssstp x = [] ∧
((the_eqs x = [] ∧ length (the_ins x) = 1) ∨
(the_ins x = [] ∧ length (the_eqs x) = 1))) ∧
(is_NegChecks x ∧ the_eqs x = [] −→ (let h = hd (the_ins x) in
is_Var (fst h) ∧ is_Fun_Set (snd h) ∧
fst (the_Var (fst h)) = TAtom Value))"
definition admissible_transaction_selects where
"admissible_transaction_selects T ≡
∀ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T)).
is_InSet x ∧ the_check x = Assign ∧ is_Var (the_elem_term x) ∧ is_Fun_Set (the_set_term x) ∧
fst (the_Var (the_elem_term x)) = TAtom Value"
definition admissible_transaction_updates where
"admissible_transaction_updates T ≡
∀ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_updates T)).
is_Update x ∧ is_Var (the_elem_term x) ∧ is_Fun_Set (the_set_term x) ∧
fst (the_Var (the_elem_term x)) = TAtom Value"
definition admissible_transaction_terms where
"admissible_transaction_terms T ≡
wf trms’ arity (trms lsst (transaction_strand T)) ∧
(∀ f ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ trms_transaction T).
¬is_Val f ∧ ¬is_Abs f ∧ ¬is_PubConstSetType f ∧ f 6= Pair ∧
¬is_PubConstAttackType f ∧ ¬is_PubConstBottom f ∧ ¬is_PubConstOccursSecType f) ∧
(∀ r ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T)).
(∃ f ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (trmssstp r)). is_Attack f) −→
(let t = the_msg r in is_Send r ∧ is_Fun t ∧ is_Attack (the_Fun t) ∧ args t = []))"
definition admissible_transaction_occurs_checks where
"admissible_transaction_occurs_checks T ≡ (
(∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T). fst x = TAtom Value −→
receive〈occurs (Var x)〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T))) ∧
(∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). fst x = TAtom Value −→
send〈occurs (Var x)〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T))) ∧
(∀ r ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T)). is_Receive r −→
(OccursFact ∈ funs_term (the_msg r) ∨ OccursSec ∈ funs_term (the_msg r)) −→
(∃ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T).
fst x = TAtom Value ∧ the_msg r = occurs (Var x))) ∧
(∀ r ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T)). is_Send r −→
(OccursFact ∈ funs_term (the_msg r) ∨ OccursSec ∈ funs_term (the_msg r)) −→
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(∃ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T).
fst x = TAtom Value ∧ the_msg r = occurs (Var x)))
)"
definition admissible_transaction where
"admissible_transaction T ≡ (
wellformed_transaction T ∧
distinct (transaction_fresh T) ∧
list_all (λx. fst x = TAtom Value) (transaction_fresh T) ∧
(∀ x ∈ vars lsst (transaction_strand T). is_Var (fst x) ∧ (the_Var (fst x) = Value)) ∧
bvars lsst (transaction_strand T) = {} ∧
(∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T).
∀ y ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T).
x 6= y −→ 〈Var x != Var y〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T)) ∨









shows "fv_transaction T = vars_transaction T"
and "bvars_transaction T = {}"
proof -
have "wellformed_transaction T" "bvars lsst (transaction_strand T) = {}"
using assms unfolding admissible_transaction_def
by blast+





assumes "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
shows "(
⋃
T ∈ set P. fv_transaction T) ∩ (⋃ T ∈ set P. bvars_transaction T) = {}"
using assms transaction_no_bvars(2) by fast
lemma transaction_bvars_no_Value_type:
assumes "admissible_transaction T"
and "x ∈ bvars_transaction T"
shows "¬TAtom Value v Γv x"
using assms transaction_no_bvars(2) by blast
lemma transaction_receive_deduct:
assumes T_adm: "admissible_transaction T"
and I: "constraint_model I (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
and σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and t: "receive〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
shows "ik lsst A ·set I ` t · I"
proof -
define ϑ where "ϑ ≡ σ ◦s α"
have t’: "send〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ)))"
using t dual lsst_unlabel_steps_iff(2) unfolding ϑ_def by blast
then obtain T1 T2 where T: "unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ)) = T1@send〈t〉#T2"
using t’ by (meson split_list)
have "constr_sem_stateful I (unlabel A@unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ)))"
using I unlabel_append[of A] unfolding constraint_model_def ϑ_def by simp
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hence "constr_sem_stateful I (unlabel A@T1@[send〈t〉])"
using strand_sem_append_stateful[of "{}" "{}" "unlabel A@T1@[send〈t〉]" _ I]
transaction_dual_subst_unfold[of T ϑ] T
by (metis append.assoc append_Cons append_Nil)
hence "iksst (unlabel A@T1) ·set I ` t · I"
using strand_sem_append_stateful[of "{}" "{}" "unlabel A@T1" "[send〈t〉]" I] T
by force
moreover have "¬is_Receive x"
when x: "x ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ)))" for x
proof -
have *: "is_Receive a" when "a ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T))" for a
using T_adm Ball_set[of "unlabel (transaction_receive T)" is_Receive] that
unfolding admissible_transaction_def wellformed_transaction_def
by blast
obtain l where l: "(l,x) ∈ set (dual lsst (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ))"
using x unfolding unlabel_def by fastforce
then obtain ly where ly: "ly ∈ set (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ)" "(l,x) = dual lsstp ly"
unfolding dual lsst_def by auto
obtain j y where j: "ly = (j,y)" by (metis surj_pair)
hence "j = l" using ly(2) by (cases y) auto
hence y: "(l,y) ∈ set (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ)" "(l,x) = dual lsstp (l,y)"
by (metis j ly(1), metis j ly(2))
obtain z where z:
"z ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T))"
"(l,z) ∈ set (transaction_receive T)"
"(l,y) = (l,z) ·lsstp ϑ"
using y(1) unfolding subst_apply_labeled_stateful_strand_def unlabel_def by force
have "is_Receive y" using *[OF z(1)] z(3) by (cases z) auto
thus "¬is_Receive x" using l y by (cases y) auto
qed
hence "¬is_Receive x" when "x ∈ set T1" for x using T that by simp
hence "iksst T1 = {}" unfolding iksst_def is_Receive_def by fast
hence "iksst (unlabel A@T1) = ik lsst A" using iksst_append[of "unlabel A" T1] by simp
ultimately show ?thesis by (simp add: ϑ_def)
qed
lemma transaction_checks_db:
assumes T: "admissible_transaction T"
and I: "constraint_model I (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
and σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
shows "〈Var (TAtom Value, n) in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))
=⇒ (α (TAtom Value, n) · I, Fun (Set s) []) ∈ set (db lsst A I)"
( is "?A =⇒ ?B")
and "〈Var (TAtom Value, n) not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))
=⇒ (α (TAtom Value, n) · I, Fun (Set s) []) /∈ set (db lsst A I)"
( is "?C =⇒ ?D")
proof -
let ?x = "λn. (TAtom Value, n)"
let ?s = "Fun (Set s) []"
let ?T = "transaction_receive T@transaction_selects T@transaction_checks T"
let ?T’ = "?T ·lsst σ ◦s α"
let ?S = "λS. transaction_receive T@transaction_selects T@S"
let ?S’ = "λS. ?S S ·lsst σ ◦s α"
have T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T" using T by (simp add: admissible_transaction_def)
have "constr_sem_stateful I (unlabel (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)))"
using I unfolding constraint_model_def by simp
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moreover have
"dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst δ) =
dual lsst (?S (T1@[c]) ·lsst δ)@
dual lsst (T2@transaction_updates T@transaction_send T ·lsst δ)"
when "transaction_checks T = T1@c#T2" for T1 T2 c δ
using that dual lsst_append subst_lsst_append
unfolding transaction_strand_def
by (metis append.assoc append_Cons append_Nil)
ultimately have T’_model: "constr_sem_stateful I (unlabel (A@dual lsst (?S’ (T1@[(l,c)]))))"
when "transaction_checks T = T1@(l,c)#T2" for T1 T2 l c
using strand_sem_append_stateful[of _ _ _ _ I]
by (simp add: that transaction_strand_def)
show "?A =⇒ ?B"
proof -
assume a: ?A
hence *: "〈Var (?x n) in ?s〉 ∈ set (unlabel ?T)"
unfolding transaction_strand_def unlabel_def by simp
then obtain l T1 T2 where T1: "transaction_checks T = T1@(l,〈Var (?x n) in ?s〉)#T2"
by (metis a split_list unlabel_mem_has_label)
have "?x n ∈ fv lsst (transaction_checks T)"
using a by force
hence "?x n /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
using a transaction_fresh_vars_notin[OF T_valid] by fast
hence "unlabel (A@dual lsst (?S’ (T1@[(l,〈Var (?x n) in ?s〉)]))) =
unlabel (A@dual lsst (?S’ T1))@[〈α (?x n) in ?s〉]"
using T a σ dual lsst_append subst_lsst_append unlabel_append
by (fastforce simp add: transaction_fresh_subst_def unlabel_def dual lsst_def
subst_apply_labeled_stateful_strand_def)
moreover have "dbsst (unlabel A) = dbsst (unlabel (A@dual lsst (?S’ T1)))"
by (simp add: T1 dbsst_transaction_prefix_eq[OF T_valid] del: unlabel_append)
ultimately have "∃ M. strand_sem_stateful M (set (dbsst (unlabel A) I)) [〈α (?x n) in ?s〉] I"
using T’_model[OF T1] dbsst_set_is_dbupdsst[of _ I] strand_sem_append_stateful[of _ _ _ _ I]
by (simp add: dbsst_def del: unlabel_append)
thus ?B by simp
qed
show "?C =⇒ ?D"
proof -
assume a: ?C
hence *: "〈Var (?x n) not in ?s〉 ∈ set (unlabel ?T)"
unfolding transaction_strand_def unlabel_def by simp
then obtain l T1 T2 where T1: "transaction_checks T = T1@(l,〈Var (?x n) not in ?s〉)#T2"
by (metis a split_list unlabel_mem_has_label)
have "?x n ∈ varssstp 〈Var (?x n) not in ?s〉"
using varssstp_cases(9)[of "[]" "Var (?x n)" ?s] by auto
hence "?x n ∈ vars lsst (transaction_checks T)"
using a unfolding varssst_def by force
hence "?x n /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
using a transaction_fresh_vars_notin[OF T_valid] by fast
hence "unlabel (A@dual lsst (?S’ (T1@[(l,〈Var (?x n) not in ?s〉)]))) =
unlabel (A@dual lsst (?S’ T1))@[〈α (?x n) not in ?s〉]"
using T a σ dual lsst_append subst_lsst_append unlabel_append
by (fastforce simp add: transaction_fresh_subst_def unlabel_def dual lsst_def
subst_apply_labeled_stateful_strand_def)
moreover have "dbsst (unlabel A) = dbsst (unlabel (A@dual lsst (?S’ T1)))"
by (simp add: T1 dbsst_transaction_prefix_eq[OF T_valid] del: unlabel_append)
ultimately have "∃ M. strand_sem_stateful M (set (dbsst (unlabel A) I)) [〈α (?x n) not in ?s〉] I"
using T’_model[OF T1] dbsst_set_is_dbupdsst[of _ I] strand_sem_append_stateful[of _ _ _ _ I]
by (simp add: dbsst_def del: unlabel_append)
thus ?D using stateful_strand_sem_NegChecks_no_bvars(1)[of _ _ _ ?s I] by simp
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assumes T: "admissible_transaction T"
and I: "constraint_model I (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
and σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
shows "select〈Var (TAtom Value, n), Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T))
=⇒ (α (TAtom Value, n) · I, Fun (Set s) []) ∈ set (db lsst A I)"
( is "?A =⇒ ?B")
proof -
let ?x = "λn. (TAtom Value, n)"
let ?s = "Fun (Set s) []"
let ?T = "transaction_receive T@transaction_selects T@transaction_checks T"
let ?T’ = "?T ·lsst σ ◦s α"
let ?S = "λS. transaction_receive T@S"
let ?S’ = "λS. ?S S ·lsst σ ◦s α"
have T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T" using T by (simp add: admissible_transaction_def)
have "constr_sem_stateful I (unlabel (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)))"
using I unfolding constraint_model_def by simp
moreover have
"dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst δ) =
dual lsst (?S (T1@[c]) ·lsst δ)@
dual lsst (T2@transaction_checks T @ transaction_updates T@transaction_send T ·lsst δ)"
when "transaction_selects T = T1@c#T2" for T1 T2 c δ
using that dual lsst_append subst_lsst_append
unfolding transaction_strand_def by (metis append.assoc append_Cons append_Nil)
ultimately have T’_model: "constr_sem_stateful I (unlabel (A@dual lsst (?S’ (T1@[(l,c)]))))"
when "transaction_selects T = T1@(l,c)#T2" for T1 T2 l c
using strand_sem_append_stateful[of _ _ _ _ I]
by (simp add: that transaction_strand_def)
show "?A =⇒ ?B"
proof -
assume a: ?A
hence *: "select〈Var (?x n), ?s〉 ∈ set (unlabel ?T)"
unfolding transaction_strand_def unlabel_def by simp
then obtain l T1 T2 where T1: "transaction_selects T = T1@(l,select〈Var (?x n), ?s〉)#T2"
by (metis a split_list unlabel_mem_has_label)
have "?x n ∈ fv lsst (transaction_selects T)"
using a by force
hence "?x n /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
using a transaction_fresh_vars_notin[OF T_valid] by fast
hence "unlabel (A@dual lsst (?S’ (T1@[(l,select〈Var (?x n), ?s〉)]))) =
unlabel (A@dual lsst (?S’ T1))@[select〈α (?x n), ?s〉]"
using T a σ dual lsst_append subst_lsst_append unlabel_append
by (fastforce simp add: transaction_fresh_subst_def unlabel_def dual lsst_def
subst_apply_labeled_stateful_strand_def)
moreover have "dbsst (unlabel A) = dbsst (unlabel (A@dual lsst (?S’ T1)))"
by (simp add: T1 dbsst_transaction_prefix_eq[OF T_valid] del: unlabel_append)
ultimately have "∃ M. strand_sem_stateful M (set (dbsst (unlabel A) I)) [〈α (?x n) in ?s〉] I"
using T’_model[OF T1] dbsst_set_is_dbupdsst[of _ I] strand_sem_append_stateful[of _ _ _ _ I]
by (simp add: dbsst_def del: unlabel_append)






2 Stateful Protocol Verification
and "t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_strand T))"
shows "@ a T. t = Fun (Val a) T" ( is ?A)
and "@ a T. t = Fun (Abs a) T" ( is ?B)
proof -
have "admissible_transaction_terms T" using assms(1) unfolding admissible_transaction_def by blast
hence "¬is_Val f" "¬is_Abs f"
when "f ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (trms_transaction T))" for f
using that unfolding admissible_transaction_terms_def by blast+
moreover have "f ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (trms_transaction T))"
when "f ∈ funs_term t" for f
using that assms(2) funs_term_subterms_eq(2)[of "trms_transaction T"] by blast+
ultimately have *: "¬is_Val f" "¬is_Abs f"
when "f ∈ funs_term t" for f
using that by presburger+
show ?A using *(1) by force




and "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_strand T)"
shows "@ a T. Fun (Val a) T ∈ subterms t"
and "@ a T. Fun (Abs a) T ∈ subterms t"
using transactions_have_no_Value_consts[OF assms(1)] assms(2) by fast+
lemma transactions_have_no_PubConsts:
assumes "admissible_transaction T"
and "t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_strand T))"
shows "@ a T. t = Fun (PubConstSetType a) T" ( is ?A)
and "@ a T. t = Fun (PubConstAttackType a) T" ( is ?B)
and "@ a T. t = Fun (PubConstBottom a) T" ( is ?C)
and "@ a T. t = Fun (PubConstOccursSecType a) T" ( is ?D)
proof -
have "admissible_transaction_terms T" using assms(1) unfolding admissible_transaction_def by blast
hence "¬is_PubConstSetType f" "¬is_PubConstAttackType f"
"¬is_PubConstBottom f" "¬is_PubConstOccursSecType f"
when "f ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (trms_transaction T))" for f
using that unfolding admissible_transaction_terms_def by blast+
moreover have "f ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (trms_transaction T))"
when "f ∈ funs_term t" for f
using that assms(2) funs_term_subterms_eq(2)[of "trms_transaction T"] by blast+
ultimately have *:
"¬is_PubConstSetType f" "¬is_PubConstAttackType f"
"¬is_PubConstBottom f" "¬is_PubConstOccursSecType f"
when "f ∈ funs_term t" for f
using that by presburger+
show ?A using *(1) by force
show ?B using *(2) by force
show ?C using *(3) by force




and "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_strand T)"
shows "@ a T. Fun (PubConstSetType a) T ∈ subterms t"
and "@ a T. Fun (PubConstAttackType a) T ∈ subterms t"
and "@ a T. Fun (PubConstBottom a) T ∈ subterms t"
and "@ a T. Fun (PubConstOccursSecType a) T ∈ subterms t"
using transactions_have_no_PubConsts[OF assms(1)] assms(2) by fast+
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lemma transaction_inserts_are_Value_vars:
assumes T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
and "admissible_transaction_updates T"
and "insert〈t,s〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
shows "∃ n. t = Var (TAtom Value, n)"
and "∃ u. s = Fun (Set u) []"
proof -
let ?x = "insert〈t,s〉"
have "?x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_updates T))"
using assms(3) wellformed_transaction_unlabel_cases[OF T_valid, of ?x]
by (auto simp add: transaction_strand_def unlabel_def)
hence *: "is_Var (the_elem_term ?x)" "fst (the_Var (the_elem_term ?x)) = TAtom Value"
"is_Fun (the_set_term ?x)" "args (the_set_term ?x) = []"
"is_Set (the_Fun (the_set_term ?x))"
using assms(2) unfolding admissible_transaction_updates_def is_Fun_Set_def by fastforce+
show "∃ n. t = Var (TAtom Value, n)" using *(1,2) by (cases t) auto
show "∃ u. s = Fun (Set u) []" using *(3,4,5) unfolding is_Set_def by (cases s) auto
qed
lemma transaction_deletes_are_Value_vars:
assumes T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
and "admissible_transaction_updates T"
and "delete〈t,s〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
shows "∃ n. t = Var (TAtom Value, n)"
and "∃ u. s = Fun (Set u) []"
proof -
let ?x = "delete〈t,s〉"
have "?x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_updates T))"
using assms(3) wellformed_transaction_unlabel_cases[OF T_valid, of ?x]
by (auto simp add: transaction_strand_def unlabel_def)
hence *: "is_Var (the_elem_term ?x)" "fst (the_Var (the_elem_term ?x)) = TAtom Value"
"is_Fun (the_set_term ?x)" "args (the_set_term ?x) = []"
"is_Set (the_Fun (the_set_term ?x))"
using assms(2) unfolding admissible_transaction_updates_def is_Fun_Set_def by fastforce+
show "∃ n. t = Var (TAtom Value, n)" using *(1,2) by (cases t) auto
show "∃ u. s = Fun (Set u) []" using *(3,4,5) unfolding is_Set_def by (cases s) auto
qed
lemma transaction_selects_are_Value_vars:
assumes T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
and "admissible_transaction_selects T"
and "select〈t,s〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
shows "∃ n. t = Var (TAtom Value, n) ∧ (TAtom Value, n) /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)" ( is ?A)
and "∃ u. s = Fun (Set u) []" ( is ?B)
proof -
let ?x = "select〈t,s〉"
have *: "?x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T))"
using assms(3) wellformed_transaction_unlabel_cases[OF T_valid, of ?x]
by (auto simp add: transaction_strand_def unlabel_def)
have **: "is_Var (the_elem_term ?x)" "fst (the_Var (the_elem_term ?x)) = TAtom Value"
"is_Fun (the_set_term ?x)" "args (the_set_term ?x) = []"
"is_Set (the_Fun (the_set_term ?x))"
using * assms(2) unfolding admissible_transaction_selects_def is_Fun_Set_def by fastforce+
have "fvsstp ?x ⊆ fv lsst (transaction_selects T)"
using * by force
hence ***: "fvsstp ?x ∩ set (transaction_fresh T) = {}"
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using T_valid unfolding wellformed_transaction_def by fast
show ?A using **(1,2) *** by (cases t) auto
show ?B using **(3,4,5) unfolding is_Set_def by (cases s) auto
qed
lemma transaction_inset_checks_are_Value_vars:
assumes T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
and "admissible_transaction_checks T"
and "〈t in s〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
shows "∃ n. t = Var (TAtom Value, n) ∧ (TAtom Value, n) /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)" ( is ?A)
and "∃ u. s = Fun (Set u) []" ( is ?B)
proof -
let ?x = "〈t in s〉"
have *: "?x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))"
using assms(3) wellformed_transaction_unlabel_cases[OF T_valid, of ?x]
by (auto simp add: transaction_strand_def unlabel_def)
have **: "is_Var (the_elem_term ?x)" "fst (the_Var (the_elem_term ?x)) = TAtom Value"
"is_Fun (the_set_term ?x)" "args (the_set_term ?x) = []"
"is_Set (the_Fun (the_set_term ?x))"
using * assms(2) unfolding admissible_transaction_checks_def is_Fun_Set_def by fastforce+
have "fvsstp ?x ⊆ fv lsst (transaction_checks T)"
using * by force
hence ***: "fvsstp ?x ∩ set (transaction_fresh T) = {}"
using T_valid unfolding wellformed_transaction_def by fast
show ?A using **(1,2) *** by (cases t) auto
show ?B using **(3,4,5) unfolding is_Set_def by (cases s) auto
qed
lemma transaction_notinset_checks_are_Value_vars:
assumes T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
and "admissible_transaction_checks T"
and "∀ X〈∨6=: F ∨/∈: G〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
and "(t,s) ∈ set G"
shows "∃ n. t = Var (TAtom Value, n) ∧ (TAtom Value, n) /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)" ( is ?A)
and "∃ u. s = Fun (Set u) []" ( is ?B)
proof -
let ?x = "∀ X〈∨6=: F ∨/∈: G〉"
have 0: "?x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))"
using assms(3) wellformed_transaction_unlabel_cases[OF T_valid, of ?x]
by (auto simp add: transaction_strand_def unlabel_def)
hence 1: "F = [] ∧ length G = 1"
using assms(2,4) unfolding admissible_transaction_checks_def by fastforce
hence "hd G = (t,s)" using assms(4) by (cases "the_ins ?x") auto
hence **: "is_Var t" "fst (the_Var t) = TAtom Value" "is_Fun s" "args s = []" "is_Set (the_Fun s)"
using 0 1 assms(2) unfolding admissible_transaction_checks_def Let_def is_Fun_Set_def
by fastforce+
have "fvsstp ?x ⊆ fv lsst (transaction_checks T)"
"set (bvarssstp ?x) ⊆ bvars lsst (transaction_checks T)"
using 0 by force+
moreover have
"fv lsst (transaction_checks T) ⊆ fv lsst (transaction_receive T) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_selects T)"
"set (transaction_fresh T) ∩ fv lsst (transaction_receive T) = {}"
"set (transaction_fresh T) ∩ fv lsst (transaction_selects T) = {}"
using T_valid unfolding wellformed_transaction_def by fast+
ultimately have
"fvsstp ?x ∩ set (transaction_fresh T) = {}"
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"set (bvarssstp ?x) ∩ set (transaction_fresh T) = {}"
using wellformed_transaction_wfsst(2,3)[OF T_valid]
fv_transaction_unfold[of T] bvars_transaction_unfold[of T]
by blast+
hence ***: "fv t ∩ set (transaction_fresh T) = {}"
using assms(4) by auto
show ?A using **(1,2) *** by (cases t) auto
show ?B using **(3,4,5) unfolding is_Set_def by (cases s) auto
qed
lemma admissible_transaction_strand_step_cases:
assumes T_adm: "admissible_transaction T"
shows "r ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T)) =⇒ ∃ t. r = receive〈t〉"
( is "?A =⇒ ?A’")
and "r ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T)) =⇒
∃ x s. r = select〈Var x, Fun (Set s) []〉 ∧
fst x = TAtom Value ∧ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T)"
( is "?B =⇒ ?B’")
and "r ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T)) =⇒
(∃ x s. (r = 〈Var x in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∨ r = 〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉) ∧
fst x = TAtom Value ∧ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T)) ∨
(∃ s t. r = 〈s == t〉 ∨ r = 〈s != t〉)"
( is "?C =⇒ ?C’")
and "r ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_updates T)) =⇒
∃ x s. (r = insert〈Var x, Fun (Set s) []〉 ∨ r = delete〈Var x, Fun (Set s) []〉) ∧
fst x = TAtom Value"
( is "?D =⇒ ?D’")
and "r ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T)) =⇒ ∃ t. r = send〈t〉"
( is "?E =⇒ ?E’")
proof -
have T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
using T_adm unfolding admissible_transaction_def by metis
show "?A =⇒ ?A’"
using T_valid Ball_set[of "unlabel (transaction_receive T)" is_Receive]
unfolding wellformed_transaction_def is_Receive_def
by blast
show "?E =⇒ ?E’"
using T_valid Ball_set[of "unlabel (transaction_send T)" is_Send]
unfolding wellformed_transaction_def is_Send_def
by blast




using T_adm unfolding admissible_transaction_def by simp
hence *: "is_InSet r" "the_check r = Assign" "is_Var (the_elem_term r)"
"is_Fun (the_set_term r)" "is_Set (the_Fun (the_set_term r))"
"args (the_set_term r) = []" "fst (the_Var (the_elem_term r)) = TAtom Value"
using r unfolding admissible_transaction_selects_def is_Fun_Set_def
by fast+
obtain rt rs where r’: "r = select〈rt,rs〉" using *(1,2) by (cases r) auto
obtain x where x: "rt = Var x" "fst x = TAtom Value" using *(3,7) r’ by auto
obtain f S where fS: "rs = Fun f S" using *(4) r’ by auto
obtain s where s: "f = Set s" using *(5) fS r’ by (cases f) auto
hence S: "S = []" using *(6) fS r’ by (cases S) auto
have fv_r1: "fvsstp r ⊆ fv_transaction T"
using r fv_transaction_unfold[of T] by auto
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have fv_r2: "fvsstp r ∩ set (transaction_fresh T) = {}"
using r T_valid unfolding wellformed_transaction_def by fastforce
show ?B’ using r’ x fS s S fv_r1 fv_r2 by simp
qed
show "?C =⇒ ?C’"
proof -
assume r: ?C
have adm_checks: "admissible_transaction_checks T"
using assms unfolding admissible_transaction_def by simp
have fv_r1: "fvsstp r ⊆ fv_transaction T"
using r fv_transaction_unfold[of T] by auto
have fv_r2: "fvsstp r ∩ set (transaction_fresh T) = {}"
using r T_valid unfolding wellformed_transaction_def by fastforce
have "(is_InSet r ∧ the_check r = Check) ∨
(is_Equality r ∧ the_check r = Check) ∨
is_NegChecks r"
using r adm_checks unfolding admissible_transaction_checks_def by fast
thus ?C’
proof (elim disjE conjE)
assume *: "is_InSet r" "the_check r = Check"
hence **: "is_Var (the_elem_term r)" "is_Fun (the_set_term r)"
"is_Set (the_Fun (the_set_term r))" "args (the_set_term r) = []"
"fst (the_Var (the_elem_term r)) = TAtom Value"
using r adm_checks unfolding admissible_transaction_checks_def is_Fun_Set_def
by fast+
obtain rt rs where r’: "r = 〈rt in rs〉" using * by (cases r) auto
obtain x where x: "rt = Var x" "fst x = TAtom Value" using **(1,5) r’ by auto
obtain f S where fS: "rs = Fun f S" using **(2) r’ by auto
obtain s where s: "f = Set s" using **(3) fS r’ by (cases f) auto
hence S: "S = []" using **(4) fS r’ by auto
show ?C’ using r’ x fS s S fv_r1 fv_r2 by simp
next
assume *: "is_NegChecks r"
hence **: "bvarssstp r = []"
"(the_eqs r = [] ∧ length (the_ins r) = 1) ∨
(the_ins r = [] ∧ length (the_eqs r) = 1)"
using r adm_checks unfolding admissible_transaction_checks_def by fast+
show ?C’ using **(2)
proof (elim disjE conjE)
assume ***: "the_eqs r = []" "length (the_ins r) = 1"
then obtain t s where ts: "the_ins r = [(t,s)]" by (cases "the_ins r") auto
hence "hd (the_ins r) = (t,s)" by simp
hence ****: "is_Var (fst (t,s))" "is_Fun (snd (t,s))"
"is_Set (the_Fun (snd (t,s)))" "args (snd (t,s)) = []"
"fst (the_Var (fst (t,s))) = TAtom Value"
using r adm_checks * ***(1) unfolding admissible_transaction_checks_def is_Fun_Set_def
by metis+
obtain x where x: "t = Var x" "fst x = TAtom Value" using ts ****(1,5) by (cases t) simp_all
obtain f S where fS: "s = Fun f S" using ts ****(2) by (cases s) simp_all
obtain ss where ss: "f = Set ss" using fS ****(3) by (cases f) simp_all
have S: "S = []" using ts fS ss ****(4) by simp
show ?C’ using ts x fS ss S *** **(1) * fv_r1 fv_r2 by (cases r) auto
next
assume ***: "the_ins r = []" "length (the_eqs r) = 1"
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then obtain t s where "the_eqs r = [(t,s)]" by (cases "the_eqs r") auto
thus ?C’ using *** **(1) * by (cases r) auto
qed
qed (auto simp add: is_Equality_def the_check_def)
qed
show "?D =⇒ ?D’"
proof -
assume r: ?D
have adm_upds: "admissible_transaction_updates T"
using assms unfolding admissible_transaction_def by simp
have *: "is_Update r" "is_Var (the_elem_term r)" "is_Fun (the_set_term r)"
"is_Set (the_Fun (the_set_term r))" "args (the_set_term r) = []"
"fst (the_Var (the_elem_term r)) = TAtom Value"
using r adm_upds unfolding admissible_transaction_updates_def is_Fun_Set_def by fast+
obtain t s where ts: "r = insert〈t,s〉 ∨ r = delete〈t,s〉" using *(1) by (cases r) auto
obtain x where x: "t = Var x" "fst x = TAtom Value" using ts *(2,6) by (cases t) auto
obtain f T where fT: "s = Fun f T" using ts *(3) by (cases s) auto
obtain ss where ss: "f = Set ss" using ts fT *(4) by (cases f) fastforce+
have T: "T = []" using ts fT *(5) ss by (cases T) auto
show ?D’





and "x ∈ vars_transaction T"
and "Γv x = TAtom Value"
shows "x ∈ fv_transaction T"
using assms Γv_TAtom’’(2)[of x] varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel (transaction_strand T)"]
unfolding admissible_transaction_def by fast
lemma protocol_transaction_vars_TAtom_typed:
assumes P: "admissible_transaction T"
shows "∀ x ∈ vars_transaction T. Γv x = TAtom Value ∨ (∃ a. Γv x = TAtom (Atom a))"
and "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T. Γv x = TAtom Value ∨ (∃ a. Γv x = TAtom (Atom a))"
and "∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
proof -
have P’: "wellformed_transaction T"
using P unfolding admissible_transaction_def by fast
show "∀ x ∈ vars_transaction T. Γv x = TAtom Value ∨ (∃ a. Γv x = TAtom (Atom a))"
using P Γv_TAtom’’
unfolding admissible_transaction_def is_Var_def prot_atom.is_Atom_def the_Var_def
by fastforce
thus "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T. Γv x = TAtom Value ∨ (∃ a. Γv x = TAtom (Atom a))"
using varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst by fast
have "list_all (λx. fst x = Var Value) (transaction_fresh T)"
using P Γv_TAtom’’ unfolding admissible_transaction_def by fast
thus "∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
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lemma protocol_transactions_no_abss:
assumes "admissible_transaction T"




assumes T_adm: "admissible_transaction T"
and I: "strand_sem_stateful IK DB (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))) I"
and x: "x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T)"
and y: "y ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T)"
and x_not_y: "x 6= y"
shows "ϑ x · I 6= ϑ y · I"
proof -
have "〈Var x != Var y〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T)) ∨
〈Var y != Var x〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))"
using x y x_not_y T_adm unfolding admissible_transaction_def by auto
hence "〈Var x != Var y〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T)) ∨
〈Var y != Var x〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
unfolding transaction_strand_def unlabel_def by auto
hence "〈ϑ x != ϑ y〉 ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))) ∨
〈ϑ y != ϑ x〉 ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ)))"
using stateful_strand_step_subst_inI(8)[of _ _ "unlabel (transaction_strand T)" ϑ]
subst_lsst_unlabel[of "transaction_strand T" ϑ]
dual lsst_unlabel_steps_iff(7)[of "[]" _ "[]"]
by force
then obtain B where B:
"prefix (B@[〈ϑ x != ϑ y〉]) (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))) ∨
prefix (B@[〈ϑ y != ϑ x〉]) (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ)))"
unfolding prefix_def
by (metis (no_types, hide_lams) append.assoc append_Cons append_Nil split_list)
thus ?thesis







shows "wf trms (trms_transaction T)"
by (metis wf trms_code assms admissible_transaction_def admissible_transaction_terms_def)
lemma admissible_transaction_no_Ana_Attack:
assumes "admissible_transaction_terms T"
and "t ∈ subtermsset (trms_transaction T)"
shows "attack〈n〉 /∈ set (snd (Ana t))"
proof -
obtain r where r: "r ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))" "t ∈ subtermsset (trmssstp r)"
using assms(2) by force




assume n: "attack〈n〉 ∈ set (snd (Ana t))"
hence "attack〈n〉 ∈ set M" using t by simp
hence n’: "attack〈n〉 ∈ subtermsset (trmssstp r)"
using Ana_subterm[OF t] r(2) subterms_subset by fast
hence "∃ f ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ trmssstp r). is_Attack f"
using funs_term_Fun_subterm’ unfolding is_Attack_def by fast
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hence "is_Send r" "is_Fun (the_msg r)" "is_Attack (the_Fun (the_msg r))" "args (the_msg r) = []"
using assms(1) r(1) unfolding admissible_transaction_terms_def by metis+
hence "t = attack〈n〉"
using n’ r(2) unfolding is_Send_def is_Attack_def by auto





and "x ∈ vars_transaction T"
shows "∃ a. Γ (Var x) = TAtom a ∧ Γ (Var x) 6= TAtom OccursSecType"
proof -
have "is_Var (fst x)" "the_Var (fst x) = Value"
using assms unfolding admissible_transaction_def by blast+
thus ?thesis using Γv_TAtom’’(2)[of x] by force
qed
lemma admissible_transaction_Value_vars:
assumes T: "admissible_transaction T"
and x: "x ∈ fv_transaction T"
shows "Γv x = TAtom Value"
proof -
have "x ∈ vars_transaction T"
using x varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel (transaction_strand T)"]
by blast
hence "is_Var (fst x)" "the_Var (fst x) = Value"
using T assms unfolding admissible_transaction_def list_all_iff by fast+
thus "Γv x = TAtom Value" using Γv_TAtom’’(2)[of x] by force
qed
2.3.7 Lemmata: Renaming and Fresh Substitutions
lemma transaction_renaming_subst_is_renaming:
fixes α::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
shows "∃ m. α (τ,n) = Var (τ,n+Suc m)"
using assms by (auto simp add: transaction_renaming_subst_def var_rename_def)
lemma transaction_renaming_subst_is_renaming’:
fixes α::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
shows "∃ y. α x = Var y"
using assms by (auto simp add: transaction_renaming_subst_def var_rename_def)
lemma transaction_renaming_subst_vars_disj:
fixes α::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
shows "fvset (α ‘ (
⋃
(vars_transaction ‘ set P))) ∩ (⋃ (vars_transaction ‘ set P)) = {}" ( is ?A)
and "fvset (α ‘ vars lsst A) ∩ vars lsst A = {}" ( is ?B)
and "T ∈ set P =⇒ vars_transaction T ∩ range_vars α = {}" ( is "T ∈ set P =⇒ ?C1")
and "T ∈ set P =⇒ bvars_transaction T ∩ range_vars α = {}" ( is "T ∈ set P =⇒ ?C2")
and "T ∈ set P =⇒ fv_transaction T ∩ range_vars α = {}" ( is "T ∈ set P =⇒ ?C3")
and "vars lsst A ∩ range_vars α = {}" ( is ?D1)
and "bvars lsst A ∩ range_vars α = {}" ( is ?D2)
and "fv lsst A ∩ range_vars α = {}" ( is ?D3)
proof -
define X where "X ≡ ⋃ (vars_transaction ‘ set P) ∪ vars lsst A"
have 1: "finite X" by (simp add: X_def)
obtain n where n: "n ≥ max_var_set X" "α = var_rename n"
using assms unfolding transaction_renaming_subst_def X_def by moura
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hence 2: "∀ x ∈ X. snd x < Suc n"
using less_Suc_max_var_set[OF _ 1] unfolding var_rename_def by fastforce
have 3: "x /∈ fvset (α ‘ X)" "fv (α x) ∩ X = {}" "x /∈ range_vars α" when x: "x ∈ X" for x
using 2 x n unfolding var_rename_def by force+
show ?A ?B using 3(1,2) unfolding X_def by auto
show ?C1 when T: "T ∈ set P" using T 3(3) unfolding X_def by blast
thus ?C2 ?C3 when T: "T ∈ set P"
using T by (simp_all add: disjoint_iff_not_equal varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst)
show ?D1 using 3(3) unfolding X_def by auto




assumes "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
shows "wtsubst α"
proof -
{ fix x::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_var"
obtain τ n where x: "x = (τ,n)" by moura
then obtain m where m: "α x = Var (τ,m)"
using assms transaction_renaming_subst_is_renaming by moura
hence "Γ (α x) = Γv x" using x by (simp add: Γv_def)




assumes "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
shows "wf trm (α v)"
proof -
obtain τ n where "v = (τ, n)" by moura
then obtain m where "α v = Var (τ, n + Suc m)"
using transaction_renaming_subst_is_renaming[OF assms]
by moura




assumes "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
shows "wf trms (subst_range α)"
by (metis transaction_renaming_subst_is_wf_trm[OF assms] wf_trm_subst_range_iff)
lemma transaction_renaming_subst_range_notin_vars:
fixes α::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
shows "∃ y. α x = Var y ∧ y /∈ ⋃ (vars_transaction ‘ set P) ∪ vars lsst A"
proof -
obtain τ n where x: "x = (τ,n)" by (metis surj_pair)
define y where "y ≡ λm. (τ,n+Suc m)"
have "∃ m ≥ max_var_set (⋃ (vars_transaction ‘ set P) ∪ vars lsst A). α x = Var (y m)"
using assms x by (auto simp add: y_def transaction_renaming_subst_def var_rename_def)
moreover have "finite (
⋃
(vars_transaction ‘ set P) ∪ vars lsst A)" by auto
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fixes α::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes x: "x ∈ fvsst (S ·sst α)"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
shows "∃ y. α y = Var x"
proof -
obtain y where y: "y ∈ fvsst S" "x ∈ fv (α y)" using fvsst_subst_obtain_var[OF x] by moura




assumes "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
shows "wf trm (σ v)"
proof (cases "v ∈ subst_domain σ")
case True
then obtain n where "σ v = Fun (Val n) []"
using assms unfolding transaction_fresh_subst_def
by moura




assumes "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and "∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
shows "wtsubst σ"
proof -
have 1: "subst_domain σ = set (transaction_fresh T)"
and 2: "∀ t ∈ subst_range σ. ∃ n. t = Fun (Val n) []"
using assms(1) unfolding transaction_fresh_subst_def by metis+
{ fix x::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_var"
have "Γ (Var x) = Γ (σ x)" using assms(2) 1 2 by (cases "x ∈ subst_domain σ") force+




assumes "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
shows "subst_domain σ = set (transaction_fresh T)"
using assms unfolding transaction_fresh_subst_def by fast
lemma transaction_fresh_subst_range_wf_trms:
fixes σ::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
shows "wf trms (subst_range σ)"
by (metis transaction_fresh_subst_is_wf_trm[OF assms] wf_trm_subst_range_iff)
lemma transaction_fresh_subst_range_fresh:
fixes σ::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
shows "∀ t ∈ subst_range σ. t /∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)"
and "∀ t ∈ subst_range σ. t /∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_strand T))"
using assms unfolding transaction_fresh_subst_def by meson+
lemma transaction_fresh_subst_sends_to_val:
fixes σ::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and "y ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
obtains n where "σ y = Fun (Val n) []" "Fun (Val n) [] ∈ subst_range σ"
proof -
have "σ y ∈ subst_range σ" using assms unfolding transaction_fresh_subst_def by simp
thus ?thesis
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fixes σ α::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and "y ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
obtains n where "(σ ◦s α) y · I = Fun (Val n) []" "Fun (Val n) [] ∈ subst_range σ"
proof -
obtain n where "σ y = Fun (Val n) []" "Fun (Val n) [] ∈ subst_range σ"
using transaction_fresh_subst_sends_to_val[OF assms] by moura




assumes "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and "y ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
shows "fv (σ y) = {}"
proof -
obtain n where "σ y = Fun (Val n) []"
using transaction_fresh_subst_sends_to_val[OF assms]
by moura
thus ?thesis by simp
qed
lemma transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range:
fixes σ α::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A" "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
shows "x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T) =⇒ ∃ n. (σ ◦s α) x = Fun (Val (n,False)) []"
and "x /∈ set (transaction_fresh T) =⇒ ∃ y. (σ ◦s α) x = Var y"
proof -
assume "x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
then obtain n where "σ x = Fun (Val (n,False)) []"
using assms(1) unfolding transaction_fresh_subst_def by fastforce
thus "∃ n. (σ ◦s α) x = Fun (Val (n,False)) []" using subst_compose[of σ α x] by simp
next
assume "x /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
hence "σ x = Var x"
using assms(1) unfolding transaction_fresh_subst_def by fastforce
thus "∃ y. (σ ◦s α) x = Var y"
using transaction_renaming_subst_is_renaming[OF assms(2)] subst_compose[of σ α x]
by (cases x) force
qed
lemma transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range’:
fixes σ α::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A" "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and "t ∈ subst_range (σ ◦s α)"
shows "(∃ n. t = Fun (Val (n,False)) []) ∨ (∃ x. t = Var x)"
proof -
obtain x where "x ∈ subst_domain (σ ◦s α)" "(σ ◦s α) x = t"
using assms(3) by auto
thus ?thesis




fixes σ α::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes s: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A" "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and y: "y ∈ fv ((σ ◦s α) x)"
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shows "σ x = Var x"
and "α x = Var y"
and "(σ ◦s α) x = Var y"
proof -
have "∃ z. z ∈ fv (σ x)"
using y subst_compose_fv’
by fast
hence x: "x /∈ subst_domain σ"
using y transaction_fresh_subst_domain[OF s(1)]
transaction_fresh_subst_grounds_domain[OF s(1), of x]
by blast
thus "σ x = Var x" by blast
thus "α x = Var y" "(σ ◦s α) x = Var y"
using y transaction_renaming_subst_is_renaming’[OF s(2), of x]
unfolding subst_compose_def by fastforce+
qed
lemma transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_vars_subset:
fixes σ α::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
shows "
⋃
(fv_transaction ‘ set P) ⊆ subst_domain (σ ◦s α)" ( is ?A)
and "fv lsst A ⊆ subst_domain (σ ◦s α)" ( is ?B)
and "T’ ∈ set P =⇒ fv_transaction T’ ⊆ subst_domain (σ ◦s α)" ( is "T’ ∈ set P =⇒ ?C")
and "T’ ∈ set P =⇒ fv lsst (transaction_strand T’ ·lsst (σ ◦s α)) ⊆ range_vars (σ ◦s α)"
( is "T’ ∈ set P =⇒ ?D")
proof -
have *: "x ∈ subst_domain (σ ◦s α)" for x
proof (cases "x ∈ subst_domain σ")
case True
hence "x /∈ {x. ∃ y. σ x = Var y ∧ α y = Var x}"
using transaction_fresh_subst_domain[OF σ]
transaction_fresh_subst_grounds_domain[OF σ, of x]
by auto
thus ?thesis using subst_domain_subst_compose[of σ α] by blast
next
case False
hence "(σ ◦s α) x = α x" unfolding subst_compose_def by fastforce
moreover have "α x 6= Var x"
using transaction_renaming_subst_is_renaming[OF α, of "fst x" "snd x"] by (cases x) auto
ultimately show ?thesis by fastforce
qed
show ?A ?B using * by blast+
show ?C when T: "T’ ∈ set P" using T * by blast
hence "fvsst (unlabel (transaction_strand T’) ·sst σ ◦s α) ⊆ range_vars (σ ◦s α)"
when T: "T’ ∈ set P"
using T fvsst_subst_subset_range_vars_if_subset_domain by blast
thus ?D when T: "T’ ∈ set P" by (metis T unlabel_subst)
qed
lemma transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_vars_disj:
fixes σ α::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
shows "fvset ((σ ◦s α) ‘ (⋃ (vars_transaction ‘ set P))) ∩ (⋃ (vars_transaction ‘ set P)) = {}"
( is ?A)
and "x ∈ ⋃ (vars_transaction ‘ set P) =⇒ fv ((σ ◦s α) x) ∩ (⋃ (vars_transaction ‘ set P)) = {}"
( is "?B’ =⇒ ?B")
and "T’ ∈ set P =⇒ vars_transaction T’ ∩ range_vars (σ ◦s α) = {}" ( is "T’ ∈ set P =⇒ ?C1")
and "T’ ∈ set P =⇒ bvars_transaction T’ ∩ range_vars (σ ◦s α) = {}" ( is "T’ ∈ set P =⇒ ?C2")
and "T’ ∈ set P =⇒ fv_transaction T’ ∩ range_vars (σ ◦s α) = {}" ( is "T’ ∈ set P =⇒ ?C3")
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and "vars lsst A ∩ range_vars (σ ◦s α) = {}" ( is ?D1)
and "bvars lsst A ∩ range_vars (σ ◦s α) = {}" ( is ?D2)
and "fv lsst A ∩ range_vars (σ ◦s α) = {}" ( is ?D3)
proof -
note 0 = transaction_renaming_subst_vars_disj[OF α]
show ?A
proof (cases "fvset ((σ ◦s α) ‘ (⋃ (vars_transaction ‘ set P))) = {}")
case False
hence "∀ x ∈ (⋃ (vars_transaction ‘ set P)). (σ ◦s α) x = α x ∨ fv ((σ ◦s α) x) = {}"
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range’’[OF σ α] by auto
thus ?thesis using 0(1) by force
qed blast
thus "?B’ =⇒ ?B" by auto
have 1: "range_vars (σ ◦s α) ⊆ range_vars α"




show ?C1 ?C2 ?C3 when T: "T’ ∈ set P" using T 1 0(3,4,5)[of T’] by blast+
show ?D1 ?D2 ?D3 using 1 0(6,7,8) by blast+
qed
lemma transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_trms:
fixes σ α::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A" "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and "bvars lsst S ∩ subst_domain σ = {}"
and "bvars lsst S ∩ subst_domain α = {}"
shows "subtermsset (trms lsst (S ·lsst (σ ◦s α))) = subtermsset (trms lsst S) ·set (σ ◦s α)"
proof -
have 1: "∀ x ∈ fvset (trms lsst S). (∃ f. (σ ◦s α) x = Fun f []) ∨ (∃ y. (σ ◦s α) x = Var y)"
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range[OF assms(1,2)] by blast
have 2: "bvars lsst S ∩ subst_domain (σ ◦s α) = {}"
using assms(3,4) subst_domain_compose[of σ α] by blast
show ?thesis using subterms_subst_lsst[OF 1 2] by simp
qed
lemma transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_wt:
fixes σ α::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A" "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and "∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"





fixes σ α::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and x: "x ∈ fv lsst (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
shows "∃ y ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T). (σ ◦s α) y = Var x"
proof -
have "x ∈ fvsst (unlabel (transaction_strand T) ·sst σ ◦s α)"
using x fvsst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq[of "transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α"]
unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
by argo
then obtain y where "y ∈ fv_transaction T" "x ∈ fv ((σ ◦s α) y)"
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by (metis fvsst_subst_obtain_var)
thus ?thesis
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range[OF σ α, of y]




assumes σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and T: "wellformed_transaction T"
shows "send〈occurs t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))
=⇒ ∃ s. send〈occurs s〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T)) ∧ t = s · σ ◦s α"
( is "?A =⇒ ?A’")
and "receive〈occurs t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))
=⇒ ∃ s. receive〈occurs s〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T)) ∧ t = s · σ ◦s α"
( is "?B =⇒ ?B’")
proof -
assume ?A
then obtain s where s: "send〈s〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))" "occurs t = s · σ ◦s α"
using stateful_strand_step_subst_inv_cases(1)[
of "occurs t" "unlabel (transaction_strand T)" "σ ◦s α"]
unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
by auto
note 0 = s(2) transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range[OF σ α]
have "∃ u. s = occurs u"
proof (cases s)
case (Var x)
hence "(∃ n. s · σ ◦s α = Fun (Val (n, False)) []) ∨ (∃ y. s · σ ◦s α = Var y)"
using 0(2,3)[of x] by (auto simp del: subst_subst_compose)
thus ?thesis
using 0(1) by simp
next
case (Fun f T)
hence 1: "f = OccursFact" "length T = 2" "T ! 0 · σ ◦s α = Fun OccursSec []" "T ! 1 · σ ◦s α = t"
using 0(1) by auto
have "T ! 0 = Fun OccursSec []"
proof (cases "T ! 0")
case (Var x) thus ?thesis using 0(2,3)[of x] 1(3) by (auto simp del: subst_subst_compose)
qed (use 1(3) in simp)
thus ?thesis using Fun 1 0(1) by (auto simp del: subst_subst_compose)
qed
then obtain u where u: "s = occurs u" by moura
hence "t = u · σ ◦s α" using s(2) by fastforce
thus ?A’ using s u wellformed_transaction_strand_unlabel_memberD(8)[OF T] by metis
next
assume ?B
then obtain s where s: "receive〈s〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))" "occurs t = s · σ ◦s α"
using stateful_strand_step_subst_inv_cases(2)[
of "occurs t" "unlabel (transaction_strand T)" "σ ◦s α"]
unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
by auto
note 0 = s(2) transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range[OF σ α]
have "∃ u. s = occurs u"
proof (cases s)
case (Var x)
hence "(∃ n. s · σ ◦s α = Fun (Val (n, False)) []) ∨ (∃ y. s · σ ◦s α = Var y)"
using 0(2,3)[of x] by (auto simp del: subst_subst_compose)
thus ?thesis
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using 0(1) by simp
next
case (Fun f T)
hence 1: "f = OccursFact" "length T = 2" "T ! 0 · σ ◦s α = Fun OccursSec []" "T ! 1 · σ ◦s α = t"
using 0(1) by auto
have "T ! 0 = Fun OccursSec []"
proof (cases "T ! 0")
case (Var x) thus ?thesis using 0(2,3)[of x] 1(3) by (auto simp del: subst_subst_compose)
qed (use 1(3) in simp)
thus ?thesis using Fun 1 0(1) by (auto simp del: subst_subst_compose)
qed
then obtain u where u: "s = occurs u" by moura
hence "t = u · σ ◦s α" using s(2) by fastforce
thus ?B’ using s u wellformed_transaction_strand_unlabel_memberD(1)[OF T] by metis
qed
lemma transaction_fresh_subst_proj:
assumes "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
shows "transaction_fresh_subst σ (transaction_proj n T) (proj n A)"
using assms transaction_proj_fresh_eq[of n T]
contra_subsetD[OF subtermsset_mono[OF transaction_proj_trms_subset[of n T]]]
contra_subsetD[OF subtermsset_mono[OF trmssst_proj_subset(1)[of n A]]]
unfolding transaction_fresh_subst_def by metis
lemma transaction_renaming_subst_proj:
assumes "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
shows "transaction_renaming_subst α (map (transaction_proj n) P) (proj n A)"
proof -
let ?X = "λP A.
⋃
(vars_transaction ‘ set P) ∪ vars lsst A"
define Y where "Y ≡ ?X (map (transaction_proj n) P) (proj n A)"
define Z where "Z ≡ ?X P A"
have "Y ⊆ Z"
using sst_vars_proj_subset(3)[of n A] transaction_proj_vars_subset[of n]
unfolding Y_def Z_def by fastforce
hence "insert 0 (snd ‘ Y) ⊆ insert 0 (snd ‘ Z)" by blast
moreover have "finite (insert 0 (snd ‘ Z))" "finite (insert 0 (snd ‘ Y))"
unfolding Y_def Z_def by auto
ultimately have 0: "max_var_set Y ≤ max_var_set Z" using Max_mono by blast
have "∃ n≥max_var_set Z. α = var_rename n"
using assms unfolding transaction_renaming_subst_def Z_def by blast
hence "∃ n≥max_var_set Y. α = var_rename n" using 0 le_trans by fast
thus ?thesis unfolding transaction_renaming_subst_def Y_def by blast
qed
lemma protocol_transaction_wf_subst:
fixes σ α::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst"
assumes T: "wf’sst (set (transaction_fresh T)) (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T)))"
and σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
shows "wf’sst {} (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)))"
proof -
have 0: "range_vars σ ∩ bvars lsst (dual lsst (transaction_strand T)) = {}"
"ground (σ ‘ set (transaction_fresh T))" "ground (α ‘ {})"
using transaction_fresh_subst_domain[OF σ] transaction_fresh_subst_grounds_domain[OF σ]
by fastforce+
have "wf’sst {} ((unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T)) ·sst σ) ·sst α)"
by (metis wfsst_subst_apply[OF wfsst_subst_apply[OF T]] 0(2,3))
thus ?thesis
by (metis dual lsst_subst unlabel_subst labeled_stateful_strand_subst_comp[OF 0(1)])
qed
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2.3.8 Lemmata: Reachable Constraints
lemma reachable_constraints_wf trms:
assumes "∀ T ∈ set P. wf trms (trms_transaction T)"
and "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
shows "wf trms (trms lsst A)"
using assms(2)
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
have "wf trms (trms_transaction T)"
using assms(1) step.hyps(2) by blast
moreover have "wf trms (subst_range (σ ◦s α))"




ultimately have "wf trms (trms_transaction T ·set σ ◦s α)" by (metis wf_trms_subst)
hence "wf trms (trms lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
using wf trms_trmssst_subst unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"] by metis
hence "wf trms (trms lsst (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)))"
using trmssst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq by blast
thus ?case using step.IH unlabel_append[of A] trmssst_append[of "unlabel A"] by auto
qed simp
lemma reachable_constraints_TAtom_types:
assumes "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and "∀ T ∈ set P. ∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
shows "Γv ‘ fv lsst A ⊆ (
⋃
T ∈ set P. Γv ‘ fv_transaction T)" ( is "?A A")
and "Γv ‘ bvars lsst A ⊆ (
⋃
T ∈ set P. Γv ‘ bvars_transaction T)" ( is "?B A")
and "Γv ‘ vars lsst A ⊆ (
⋃
T ∈ set P. Γv ‘ vars_transaction T)" ( is "?C A")
using assms(1)
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
define T’ where "T’ ≡ dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
have 2: "wtsubst (σ ◦s α)"
using transaction_renaming_subst_wt[OF step.hyps(4)]
transaction_fresh_subst_wt[OF step.hyps(3)]
by (metis step.hyps(2) assms(2) wt_subst_compose)
have 3: "∀ t ∈ subst_range (σ ◦s α). fv t = {} ∨ (∃ x. t = Var x)"
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range’[OF step.hyps(3,4)]
by fastforce
have "fv lsst T’ = fv lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
"bvars lsst T’ = bvars lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
"vars lsst T’ = vars lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
unfolding T’_def
by (metis fvsst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq,
metis bvarssst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq,
metis varssst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq)
hence "Γ ‘ Var ‘ fv lsst T’ ⊆ Γ ‘ Var ‘ fv_transaction T"
"Γ ‘ Var ‘ bvars lsst T’ = Γ ‘ Var ‘ bvars_transaction T"
"Γ ‘ Var ‘ vars lsst T’ ⊆ Γ ‘ Var ‘ vars_transaction T"
using wt_subst_lsst_vars_type_subset[OF 2 3, of "transaction_strand T"]
by argo+
hence "Γv ‘ fv lsst T’ ⊆ Γv ‘ fv_transaction T"
"Γv ‘ bvars lsst T’ = Γv ‘ bvars_transaction T"
"Γv ‘ vars lsst T’ ⊆ Γv ‘ vars_transaction T"
by (metis Γv_Var_image)+
hence 4: "Γv ‘ fv lsst T’ ⊆ (
⋃
T ∈ set P. Γv ‘ fv_transaction T)"
"Γv ‘ bvars lsst T’ ⊆ (
⋃
T ∈ set P. Γv ‘ bvars_transaction T)"
"Γv ‘ vars lsst T’ ⊆ (
⋃
T ∈ set P. Γv ‘ vars_transaction T)"
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using step.hyps(2) by fast+
have 5: "Γv ‘ fv lsst (A @ T’) = (Γv ‘ fv lsst A) ∪ (Γv ‘ fv lsst T’)"
"Γv ‘ bvars lsst (A @ T’) = (Γv ‘ bvars lsst A) ∪ (Γv ‘ bvars lsst T’)"
"Γv ‘ vars lsst (A @ T’) = (Γv ‘ vars lsst A) ∪ (Γv ‘ vars lsst T’)"
using unlabel_append[of A T’]
fvsst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel T’"]
bvarssst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel T’"]
varssst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel T’"]
by auto
{ case 1 thus ?case
using step.IH(1) 4(1) 5(1)
unfolding T’_def by (simp del: subst_subst_compose fvsst_def)
}
{ case 2 thus ?case
using step.IH(2) 4(2) 5(2)
unfolding T’_def by (simp del: subst_subst_compose bvarssst_def)
}
{ case 3 thus ?case
using step.IH(3) 4(3) 5(3)




assumes A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. bvars lsst (transaction_strand T) = {}"
shows "bvars lsst A = {}"
using assms proof (induction)
case init
then show ?case
unfolding unlabel_def by auto
next
case (step A T σ α)
then have "bvars lsst A = {}"
by metis
moreover
have "bvars lsst (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)) = {}"
using step by (metis bvars lsst_subst bvarssst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq)
ultimately
show ?case
using bvarssst_append unlabel_append by (metis sup_bot.left_neutral)
qed
lemma reachable_constraints_fv_bvars_disj:
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and P: "∀ S ∈ set P. admissible_transaction S"
shows "fv lsst A ∩ bvars lsst A = {}"
proof -
let ?X = "
⋃
T ∈ set P. bvars_transaction T"
note 0 = transactions_fv_bvars_disj[OF P]
have 1: "bvars lsst A ⊆ ?X" using A_reach
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
have "bvars lsst (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)) = bvars_transaction T"
using bvarssst_subst[of "unlabel (transaction_strand T)" "σ ◦s α"]
bvarssst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq[of "transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α"]
dual lsst_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
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unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
by argo






qed (simp add: unlabel_def bvarssst_def)
have 2: "fv lsst A ∩ ?X = {}" using A_reach
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
have "x 6= y" when x: "x ∈ ?X" and y: "y ∈ fv lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)" for x y
proof -
obtain y’ where y’: "y’ ∈ fv_transaction T" "y ∈ fv ((σ ◦s α) y’)"
using y unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
by (metis fvsst_subst_obtain_var)
have "y /∈ ⋃ (vars_transaction ‘ set P)"
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range’’[OF step.hyps(3,4) y’(2)]
transaction_renaming_subst_range_notin_vars[OF step.hyps(4), of y’]
by auto
thus ?thesis using x varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst by fast
qed




fvsst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq[of "transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α"]
dual lsst_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
fvsst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"]
unlabel_append[of A "transaction_strand T"]
by force
qed (simp add: unlabel_def fvsst_def)
show ?thesis using 0 1 2 by blast
qed
lemma reachable_constraints_vars_TAtom_typed:
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and x: "x ∈ vars lsst A"
shows "Γv x = TAtom Value ∨ (∃ a. Γv x = TAtom (Atom a))"
proof -
have A_wf trms: "wf trms (trms lsst A)"
by (metis reachable_constraints_wf trms admissible_transactions_wf trms P A_reach)
have T_adm: "admissible_transaction T" when "T ∈ set P" for T
by (meson that Ball_set P)
have "∀ T∈set P. ∀ x∈set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
using protocol_transaction_vars_TAtom_typed(3) P by blast
hence *: "Γv ‘ vars lsst A ⊆ (
⋃
T∈set P. Γv ‘ vars_transaction T)"
using reachable_constraints_TAtom_types[of A P, OF A_reach] by auto
have "Γv ‘ vars lsst A ⊆ TAtom ‘ insert Value (range Atom)"
proof -
have "Γv x = TAtom Value ∨ (∃ a. Γv x = TAtom (Atom a))"
when "T ∈ set P" "x ∈ vars_transaction T" for T x
using that protocol_transaction_vars_TAtom_typed(1)[of T] P
unfolding admissible_transaction_def
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T∈set P. Γv ‘ vars_transaction T) ⊆ TAtom ‘ insert Value (range Atom)"
using P by blast
thus "Γv ‘ vars lsst A ⊆ TAtom ‘ insert Value (range Atom)"
using * by auto
qed
thus ?thesis using x by auto
qed
lemma reachable_constraints_Value_vars_are_fv:
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and x: "x ∈ vars lsst A"
and "Γv x = TAtom Value"
shows "x ∈ fv lsst A"
proof -
have "∀ T∈set P. bvars_transaction T = {}"
using P unfolding list_all_iff admissible_transaction_def by metis
hence A_no_bvars: "bvars lsst A = {}"
using reachable_constraints_no_bvars[OF A_reach] by metis
thus ?thesis using x varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel A"] by blast
qed
lemma reachable_constraints_subterms_subst:
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
shows "subtermsset (trms lsst (A ·lsst I)) = (subtermsset (trms lsst A)) ·set I"
proof -
have A_wf trms: "wf trms (trms lsst A)"
by (metis reachable_constraints_wf trms admissible_transactions_wf trms P A_reach)
from I have I’: "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
using welltyped_constraint_model_prefix by auto
have 1: "∀ x ∈ fvset (trms lsst A). (∃ f. I x = Fun f []) ∨ (∃ y. I x = Var y)"
proof
fix x
assume xa: "x ∈ fvset (trms lsst A)"
have "∃ f T. I x = Fun f T"
using I interpretation_grounds[of I "Var x"]
unfolding welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def
by (cases "I x") auto
then obtain f T where fT_p: "I x = Fun f T"
by auto






have "x ∈ vars lsst A"
using xa var_subterm_trmssst_is_varssst[of x "unlabel A"] vars_iff_subtermeq[of x]
by auto
hence "∃ a. Γv x = TAtom a"
using reachable_constraints_vars_TAtom_typed[OF A_reach P] by blast
hence "∃ a. Γ (Var x) = TAtom a"
by simp
hence "∃ a. Γ (Fun f T) = TAtom a"
by (metis (no_types, hide_lams) I’ welltyped_constraint_model_def fT_p wtsubst_def)
ultimately show "(∃ f. I x = Fun f []) ∨ (∃ y. I x = Var y)"
using TAtom_term_cases fT_p by metis
qed
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have "∀ T∈set P. bvars_transaction T = {}"
using assms unfolding list_all_iff admissible_transaction_def by metis
then have "bvars lsst A = {}"
using reachable_constraints_no_bvars assms by metis
then have 2: "bvars lsst A ∩ subst_domain I = {}"
by auto
show ?thesis




assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and f: "f ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ trms lsst A)"
shows "is_Val f =⇒ ¬public f"
and "¬is_Abs f"
proof -
have "(is_Val f −→ ¬public f) ∧ ¬is_Abs f" using A_reach f
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
let ?T’ = "unlabel (transaction_strand T) ·sst σ ◦s α"
let ?T’’ = "transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α"
have T: "admissible_transaction_terms T"
using P step.hyps(2) unfolding admissible_transaction_def by metis
show ?thesis using step
proof (cases "f ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ trms lsst A)")
case False
then obtain t where t: "t ∈ trmssst ?T’" "f ∈ funs_term t"
using step.prems trmssst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq[of ?T’’]
trmssst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel (dual lsst ?T’’)"]
unlabel_append[of A "dual lsst ?T’’"] unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T"]
by fastforce
show ?thesis using trmssst_funs_term_cases[OF t]
proof
assume "∃ u ∈ trms_transaction T. f ∈ funs_term u"
thus ?thesis using T unfolding admissible_transaction_terms_def by blast
next
assume "∃ x ∈ fv_transaction T. f ∈ funs_term ((σ ◦s α) x)"
then obtain x where "x ∈ fv_transaction T" "f ∈ funs_term ((σ ◦s α) x)" by moura
thus ?thesis
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range[OF step.hyps(3,4), of x]




thus "is_Val f =⇒ ¬public f" "¬is_Abs f" by simp_all
qed
lemma reachable_constraints_occurs_fact_ik_case:
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and occ: "occurs t ∈ ik lsst A"
shows "∃ n. t = Fun (Val (n,False)) []"
using A_reach occ
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
define ϑ where "ϑ ≡ σ ◦s α"
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have T: "wellformed_transaction T" "admissible_transaction_occurs_checks T"
using P step.hyps(2) unfolding list_all_iff admissible_transaction_def by blast+
show ?case
proof (cases "occurs t ∈ ik lsst A")
case False
hence "occurs t ∈ ik lsst (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))"
using step.prems unfolding ϑ_def by simp
hence "receive〈occurs t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ)))"
unfolding iksst_def by force
hence "send〈occurs t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))"
using dual lsst_unlabel_steps_iff(1) by blast
then obtain s where s:
"send〈s〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))" "s · ϑ = occurs t"
by (metis (no_types) stateful_strand_step_subst_inv_cases(1) unlabel_subst)
note 0 = transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range[OF step.hyps(3,4)]
have 1: "send〈s〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T))"
using s(1) wellformed_transaction_strand_unlabel_memberD(8)[OF T(1)] by blast
have 2: "is_Send (send〈s〉)"
unfolding is_Send_def by simp
have 3: "∃ u. s = occurs u"
proof -
{ fix z




hence "@ u. ϑ z = occurs u" "ϑ z 6= Fun OccursSec []" by auto
} note * = this
obtain u u’ where T: "s = Fun OccursFact [u,u’]"
using *(1) s(2) by (cases s) auto
thus ?thesis using *(2) s(2) by (cases u) auto
qed
obtain x where x: "x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)" "s = occurs (Var x)"
using T(2) 1 2 3
unfolding admissible_transaction_occurs_checks_def
by fastforce
have "t = ϑ x"
using s(2) x(2) by auto
thus ?thesis
using 0(1)[OF x(1)] unfolding ϑ_def by fast
qed (simp add: step.IH)
qed simp
lemma reachable_constraints_occurs_fact_send_ex:
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and x: "Γv x = TAtom Value" "x ∈ fv lsst A"
shows "send〈occurs (Var x)〉 ∈ set (unlabel A)"
using A_reach x(2)
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
have T: "admissible_transaction_occurs_checks T"
using P step.hyps(2) unfolding list_all_iff admissible_transaction_def by blast
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show ?case
proof (cases "x ∈ fv lsst A")
case True
show ?thesis




then obtain y where y: "y ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T)" "(σ ◦s α) y = Var x"
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_fv[OF step.hyps(3,4), of x]
step.prems(1) fvsst_append[of "unlabel A"] unlabel_append[of A]
by auto
have "σ y = Var y" using y(1) step.hyps(3) unfolding transaction_fresh_subst_def by auto
hence "α y = Var x" using y(2) unfolding subst_compose_def by simp
hence y_val: "fst y = TAtom Value"
using x(1) Γv_TAtom’’[of x] Γv_TAtom’’[of y]
wt_subst_trm’’[OF transaction_renaming_subst_wt[OF step.hyps(4)], of "Var y"]
by force
hence "receive〈occurs (Var y)〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T))"
using y(1) T unfolding admissible_transaction_occurs_checks_def by fast
hence *: "receive〈occurs (Var y)〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
using transaction_strand_subsets(6) by blast
have "receive〈occurs (Var x)〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
using y(2) unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
stateful_strand_step_subst_inI(2)[OF *, of "σ ◦s α"]
by (auto simp del: subst_subst_compose)
hence "send〈occurs (Var x)〉 ∈ set (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)))"
using dual lsst_unlabel_steps_iff(2) by blast




assumes A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and PP: "list_all wellformed_transaction P"
and admissible_transaction_updates:
"let f = (λT. ∀ x ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_updates T)).
is_Update x ∧ is_Var (the_elem_term x) ∧ is_Fun_Set (the_set_term x) ∧
fst (the_Var (the_elem_term x)) = TAtom Value)
in list_all f P"
and d: "(t, s) ∈ set (db lsst A I)"
shows "∃ ss. s = Fun (Set ss) []"
using A d
proof (induction)
case (step A TT σ α)
let ?TT = "transaction_strand TT ·lsst σ ◦s α"
let ?TTu = "unlabel ?TT"
let ?TTd = "dual lsst ?TT"
let ?TTdu = "unlabel ?TTd"
from step(6) have "(t, s) ∈ set (db’sst ?TTdu I (db’sst (unlabel A) I []))"
unfolding dbsst_def by (simp add: dbsst_append)
hence "(t, s) ∈ set (db’sst (unlabel A) I []) ∨
(∃ t’ s’. insert〈t’,s’〉 ∈ set ?TTdu ∧ t = t’ · I ∧ s = s’ · I)"
using dbsst_in_cases[of t "s" ?TTdu I] by metis
thus ?case
proof
assume "∃ t’ s’. insert〈t’,s’〉 ∈ set ?TTdu ∧ t = t’ · I ∧ s = s’ · I"
then obtain t’ s’ where t’s’_p: "insert〈t’,s’〉 ∈ set ?TTdu" "t = t’ · I" "s = s’ · I" by metis
then obtain lll where "(lll, insert〈t’,s’〉) ∈ set ?TTd" by (meson unlabel_mem_has_label)
hence "(lll, insert〈t’,s’〉) ∈ set (transaction_strand TT ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
using dual lsst_steps_iff(4) by blast
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hence "insert〈t’,s’〉 ∈ set ?TTu" by (meson unlabel_in)
hence "insert〈t’,s’〉 ∈ set ((unlabel (transaction_strand TT)) ·sst σ ◦s α)"
by (simp add: subst_lsst_unlabel)
hence "insert〈t’,s’〉 ∈ (λx. x ·sstp σ ◦s α) ‘ set (unlabel (transaction_strand TT))"
unfolding subst_apply_stateful_strand_def by auto
then obtain u where "u ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand TT)) ∧ u ·sstp σ ◦s α = insert〈t’,s’〉"
by auto
hence "∃ t’’ s’’. insert〈t’’,s’’〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand TT)) ∧
t’ = t’’ · σ ◦s α ∧ s’ = s’’ · σ ◦s α"
by (cases u) auto
then obtain t’’ s’’ where t’’s’’_p:
"insert〈t’’,s’’〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand TT)) ∧
t’ = t’’ · σ ◦s α ∧ s’ = s’’ · σ ◦s α"
by auto
hence "insert〈t’’,s’’〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_updates TT))"
using is_Update_in_transaction_updates[of "insert〈t’’,s’’〉" TT]
using PP step(2) unfolding list_all_iff by auto
moreover have "∀ x∈set (unlabel (transaction_updates TT)). is_Fun_Set (the_set_term x)"
using step(2) admissible_transaction_updates unfolding is_Fun_Set_def list_all_iff by auto
ultimately have "is_Fun_Set (the_set_term (insert〈t’’,s’’〉))" by auto
moreover have "s’ = s’’ · σ ◦s α" using t’’s’’_p by blast
ultimately have "is_Fun_Set (the_set_term (insert〈t’,s’〉))" by (auto simp add: is_Fun_Set_subst)
hence "is_Fun_Set s" by (simp add: t’s’_p(3) is_Fun_Set_subst)
thus ?case using is_Fun_Set_exi by auto
qed (auto simp add: step dbsst_def)
qed auto
lemma reachable_constraints_occurs_fact_ik_ground:
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and t: "occurs t ∈ ik lsst A"
shows "fv (occurs t) = {}"
proof -
have 0: "admissible_transaction T"
when "T ∈ set P" for T
using P that unfolding list_all_iff by simp
have 1: "wellformed_transaction T"
when "T ∈ set P" for T
using 0[OF that] unfolding admissible_transaction_def by simp
have 2: "ik lsst (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ)) =
(ik lsst A) ∪ (trms lsst (transaction_send T) ·set ϑ)"
when "T ∈ set P" for T ϑ and A::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_constr"
using dual_transaction_ik_is_transaction_send’[OF 1[OF that]] by fastforce
have 3: "admissible_transaction_occurs_checks T"
when "T ∈ set P" for T
using 0[OF that] unfolding admissible_transaction_def by simp
show ?thesis using A_reach t
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α) thus ?case
proof (cases "occurs t ∈ ik lsst A")
case False
hence "occurs t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T) ·set σ ◦s α"
using 2[OF step.hyps(2)] step.prems by blast
hence "send〈occurs t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
using wellformed_transaction_send_receive_subst_trm_cases(2)[OF 1[OF step.hyps(2)]]
by blast
then obtain s where s:
"send〈occurs s〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T))" "t = s · σ ◦s α"
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_occurs_fact_send_receive(1)[
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OF step.hyps(3,4) 1[OF step.hyps(2)]]
transaction_strand_subst_subsets(10)
by blast
obtain x where x: "x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)" "s = Var x"
using s(1) 3[OF step.hyps(2)]
unfolding admissible_transaction_occurs_checks_def
by fastforce
have "fv t = {}"
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range(1)[OF step.hyps(3,4) x(1)]
s(2) x(2)
by (auto simp del: subst_subst_compose)






assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
shows "∀ s ∈ subtermsset (ik lsst A ·set I). OccursFact /∈
⋃
(funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana s)))" ( is "?A A")
and "∀ s ∈ subtermsset (ik lsst A ·set I). OccursSec /∈
⋃
(funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana s)))" ( is "?B A")
and "Fun OccursSec [] /∈ ik lsst A ·set I" ( is "?C A")
and "∀ x ∈ vars lsst A. I x 6= Fun OccursSec []" ( is "?D A")
proof -
have T_adm: "admissible_transaction T" when "T ∈ set P" for T
using P that unfolding list_all_iff by simp
have T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T" when "T ∈ set P" for T
using T_adm[OF that] unfolding admissible_transaction_def by blast
have T_occ: "admissible_transaction_occurs_checks T" when "T ∈ set P" for T
using T_adm[OF that] unfolding admissible_transaction_def by blast
have I_wt: "wtsubst I" by (metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def)
have I_wf trms: "wf trms (subst_range I)"
by (metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def)
have I_grounds: "fv (I x) = {}" "∃ f T. I x = Fun f T" for x
using I interpretation_grounds[of I, of "Var x"] empty_fv_exists_fun[of "I x"]
unfolding welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def by auto
have 00: "fvset (trms lsst (transaction_send T)) ⊆ vars_transaction T"
"fvset (subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T))) = fvset (trms lsst (transaction_send T))"
for T::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_transaction"
using fv_trmssst_subset(1)[of "unlabel (transaction_send T)"] vars_transaction_unfold
fv_subterms_set[of "trms lsst (transaction_send T)"]
by blast+
have 0: "∀ x ∈ fvset (trms lsst (transaction_send T)). ∃ a. Γ (Var x) = TAtom a"
"∀ x ∈ fvset (trms lsst (transaction_send T)). Γ (Var x) 6= TAtom OccursSecType"
"∀ x ∈ fvset (subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T))). ∃ a. Γ (Var x) = TAtom a"
"∀ x ∈ fvset (subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T))). Γ (Var x) 6= TAtom OccursSecType"
"∀ x ∈ vars_transaction T. ∃ a. Γ (Var x) = TAtom a"
"∀ x ∈ vars_transaction T. Γ (Var x) 6= TAtom OccursSecType"
when "T ∈ set P" for T
using admissible_transaction_occurs_fv_types[OF T_adm[OF that]] 00
by blast+
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have 1: "ik lsst (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ)) ·set I =
(ik lsst A ·set I) ∪ (trms lsst (transaction_send T) ·set ϑ ·set I)"
when "T ∈ set P" for T ϑ and A::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_constr"
using dual_transaction_ik_is_transaction_send’[OF T_valid[OF that]]
by fastforce
have 2: "subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T) ·set ϑ ·set I) =
subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T)) ·set ϑ ·set I"
when "T ∈ set P" and ϑ: "wtsubst ϑ" "wf trms (subst_range ϑ)" for T ϑ
using wt_subst_TAtom_subterms_set_subst[OF wt_subst_compose[OF ϑ(1) I_wt] 0(1)[OF that(1)]]
wf_trm_subst_rangeD[OF wf_trms_subst_compose[OF ϑ(2) I_wf trms]]
by auto
have 3: "wtsubst (σ ◦s α)" "wf trms (subst_range (σ ◦s α))"
when "T ∈ set P" "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A" "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
for σ α and T::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_transaction"
and A::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_constr"






have 4: "∀ s ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T)).
OccursFact /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana s))) ∧
OccursSec /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana s)))"
when T: "T ∈ set P" for T
proof
fix t assume t: "t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T))"
then obtain s where s: "send〈s〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_send T))" "t ∈ subterms s"
using wellformed_transaction_unlabel_cases(5)[OF T_valid[OF T]]
by fastforce
have s_occ: "∃ x. s = occurs (Var x)" when "OccursFact ∈ funs_term t ∨ OccursSec ∈ funs_term t"
proof -
have "OccursFact ∈ funs_term s ∨ OccursSec ∈ funs_term s"
using that subtermeq_imp_funs_term_subset[OF s(2)]
by blast
thus ?thesis




obtain K T’ where K: "Ana t = (K,T’)" by moura
show "OccursFact /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana t))) ∧
OccursSec /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana t)))"
proof (rule ccontr)
assume "¬(OccursFact /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana t))) ∧
OccursSec /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana t))))"
hence a: "OccursFact ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana t))) ∨
OccursSec ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana t)))"
by simp
hence "OccursFact ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set T’) ∨ OccursSec ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set T’)"
using K by simp
hence "OccursFact ∈ funs_term t ∨ OccursSec ∈ funs_term t"
using Ana_subterm[OF K] funs_term_subterms_eq(1)[of t] by blast
then obtain x where x: "t ∈ subterms (occurs (Var x))"
using s(2) s_occ by blast
thus False using a by fastforce
qed
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qed
have 5: "OccursFact /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ subst_range (σ ◦s α))"
"OccursSec /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ subst_range (σ ◦s α))"
when σα: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A" "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
for σ α and T::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_transaction"
and A::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_constr"
proof -
have "OccursFact /∈ funs_term t" "OccursSec /∈ funs_term t"
when "t ∈ subst_range (σ ◦s α)" for t
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range’[OF σα that]
by auto
thus "OccursFact /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ subst_range (σ ◦s α))"
"OccursSec /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ subst_range (σ ◦s α))"
by blast+
qed
have 6: "I x 6= Fun OccursSec []" "@ t. I x = occurs t" "∃ a. Γ (I x) = TAtom a ∧ a 6= OccursSecType"
when T: "T ∈ set P"
and σα: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A" "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and x: "Var x ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T) ·set σ ◦s α"
for x σ α and T::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_transaction"
and A::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_constr"
proof -
obtain t where t: "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T)" "t · (σ ◦s α) = Var x"
using x by moura
then obtain y where y: "t = Var y" by (cases t) auto
have "∃ a. Γ t = TAtom a ∧ a 6= OccursSecType"
using 0(1,2)[OF T] t(1) y
by force
thus "∃ a. Γ (I x) = TAtom a ∧ a 6= OccursSecType"
using wt_subst_trm’’[OF 3(1)[OF T σα]] wt_subst_trm’’[OF I_wt] t(2)
by (metis subst_apply_term.simps(1))
thus "I x 6= Fun OccursSec []" "@ t. I x = occurs t"
by auto
qed
have 7: "I x 6= Fun OccursSec []" "@ t. I x = occurs t" "∃ a. Γ (I x) = TAtom a ∧ a 6= OccursSecType"
when T: "T ∈ set P"
and σα: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A" "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and x: "x ∈ fvset ((σ ◦s α) ‘ vars_transaction T)"
for x σ α and T::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_transaction"
and A::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_constr"
proof -
obtain y where y: "y ∈ vars_transaction T" "x ∈ fv ((σ ◦s α) y)"
using x by auto
hence y’: "(σ ◦s α) y = Var x"
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range’[OF σα]
by (cases "(σ ◦s α) y ∈ subst_range (σ ◦s α)") force+
have "∃ a. Γ (Var y) = TAtom a ∧ a 6= OccursSecType"
using 0(5,6)[OF T] y
by force
thus "∃ a. Γ (I x) = TAtom a ∧ a 6= OccursSecType"
using wt_subst_trm’’[OF 3(1)[OF T σα]] wt_subst_trm’’[OF I_wt] y’
by (metis subst_apply_term.simps(1))
thus "I x 6= Fun OccursSec []" "@ t. I x = occurs t"
by auto
qed
have 8: "I x 6= Fun OccursSec []" "@ t. I x = occurs t" "∃ a. Γ (I x) = TAtom a ∧ a 6= OccursSecType"
when T: "T ∈ set P"
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and σα: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A" "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and x: "Var x ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T)) ·set σ ◦s α"
for x σ α and T::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_transaction"
and A::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_constr"
proof -
obtain t where t: "t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T))" "t · (σ ◦s α) = Var x"
using x by moura
then obtain y where y: "t = Var y" by (cases t) auto
have "∃ a. Γ t = TAtom a ∧ a 6= OccursSecType"
using 0(3,4)[OF T] t(1) y
by force
thus "∃ a. Γ (I x) = TAtom a ∧ a 6= OccursSecType"
using wt_subst_trm’’[OF 3(1)[OF T σα]] wt_subst_trm’’[OF I_wt] t(2)
by (metis subst_apply_term.simps(1))
thus "I x 6= Fun OccursSec []" "@ t. I x = occurs t"
by auto
qed
have s_fv: "fv s ⊆ fvset ((σ ◦s α) ‘ vars_transaction T)"
when s: "s ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T)) ·set σ ◦s α"
and T: "T ∈ set P"
for s and σ α::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_subst" and T::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_transaction"
proof
fix x assume "x ∈ fv s"
hence "x ∈ fvset (subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T)) ·set σ ◦s α)"
using s by auto
hence *: "x ∈ fvset (trms lsst (transaction_send T) ·set σ ◦s α)"
using fv_subterms_set_subst’ by fast
have **: "list_all is_Send (unlabel (transaction_send T))"
using T_valid[OF T] unfolding wellformed_transaction_def by blast
have "x ∈ fvset ((σ ◦s α) ‘ vars lsst (transaction_send T))"
proof -
obtain t where t: "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T)" "x ∈ fv (t · σ ◦s α)"
using * by fastforce
hence "fv t ⊆ vars lsst (transaction_send T)"
using fv_trmssst_subset(1)[of "unlabel (transaction_send T)"]
by auto
thus ?thesis using t(2) subst_apply_fv_subset by fast
qed
thus "x ∈ fvset ((σ ◦s α) ‘ vars_transaction T)"
using vars_transaction_unfold[of T] by fastforce
qed
show "?A A" using A_reach
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
have *: "∀ s ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T)).
OccursFact /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana s)))"
using 4[OF step.hyps(2)] by blast
have "∀ s ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T)) ·set σ ◦s α ·set I.
OccursFact /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana s)))"
proof
fix t assume t: "t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T)) ·set σ ◦s α ·set I"
then obtain s u where su:
"s ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T)) ·set σ ◦s α" "s · I = t"
"u ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T))" "u · σ ◦s α = s"
by force
obtain Ku Tu where KTu: "Ana u = (Ku,Tu)" by moura
have *: "OccursFact /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set Tu)"
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"OccursFact /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ subst_range (σ ◦s α))"
"OccursFact /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ ⋃ (((set ◦ snd ◦ Ana) ‘ subst_range (σ ◦s α))))"
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range’[OF step.hyps(3,4)]
4[OF step.hyps(2)] su(3) KTu
by fastforce+
have "OccursFact /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (Tu ·list σ ◦s α))"
proof -
{ fix f assume f: "f ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (Tu ·list σ ◦s α))"
then obtain tf where tf: "tf ∈ set Tu" "f ∈ funs_term (tf · σ ◦s α)" by moura
hence "f ∈ funs_term tf ∨ f ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ subst_range (σ ◦s α))"
using funs_term_subst[of tf "σ ◦s α"] by force
hence "f 6= OccursFact" using *(1,2) tf(1) by blast
} thus ?thesis by metis
qed
hence **: "OccursFact /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana s)))"
proof (cases u)
case (Var xu)
hence "s = (σ ◦s α) xu" using su(4) by (metis subst_apply_term.simps(1))
thus ?thesis using *(3) by fastforce
qed (use su(4) KTu Ana_subst’[of _ _ Ku Tu "σ ◦s α"] in simp)
show "OccursFact /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana t)))"
proof (cases s)
case (Var sx)
then obtain a where a: "Γ (I sx) = Var a"
using su(1) 8(3)[OF step.hyps(2,3,4), of sx] by fast
hence "Ana (I sx) = ([],[])" by (metis I_grounds(2) const_type_inv[THEN Ana_const])
thus ?thesis using Var su(2) by simp
next
case (Fun f S)
hence snd_Ana_t: "snd (Ana t) = snd (Ana s) ·list I"
using su(2) Ana_subst’[of f S _ "snd (Ana s)" I] by (cases "Ana s") simp_all
{ fix g assume "g ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana t)))"
hence "g ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana s))) ∨
(∃ x ∈ fvset (set (snd (Ana s))). g ∈ funs_term (I x))"
using snd_Ana_t funs_term_subst[of _ I] by auto
hence "g 6= OccursFact"
proof
assume "∃ x ∈ fvset (set (snd (Ana s))). g ∈ funs_term (I x)"
then obtain x where x: "x ∈ fvset (set (snd (Ana s)))" "g ∈ funs_term (I x)" by moura
have "x ∈ fv s" using x(1) Ana_vars(2)[of s] by (cases "Ana s") auto
hence "x ∈ fvset ((σ ◦s α) ‘ vars_transaction T)"
using s_fv[OF su(1) step.hyps(2)] by blast
then obtain a h U where h:
"I x = Fun h U" "Γ (I x) = Var a" "a 6= OccursSecType" "arity h = 0"
using I_grounds(2) 7(3)[OF step.hyps(2,3,4)] const_type_inv
by metis
hence "h 6= OccursFact" by auto
moreover have "U = []" using h(1,2,4) const_type_inv_wf[of h U a] I_wf trms by fastforce
ultimately show ?thesis using h(1) x(2) by auto
qed (use ** in blast)




using step.IH step.prems 1[OF step.hyps(2), of A "σ ◦s α"]
2[OF step.hyps(2) 3[OF step.hyps(2,3,4)]]
by auto
qed simp
show "?B A" using A_reach
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proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
have "∀ s ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T)) ·set σ ◦s α ·set I.
OccursSec /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana s)))"
proof
fix t assume t: "t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T)) ·set σ ◦s α ·set I"
then obtain s u where su:
"s ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T)) ·set σ ◦s α" "s · I = t"
"u ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T))" "u · σ ◦s α = s"
by force
obtain Ku Tu where KTu: "Ana u = (Ku,Tu)" by moura
have *: "OccursSec /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set Tu)"
"OccursSec /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ subst_range (σ ◦s α))"
"OccursSec /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ ⋃ (((set ◦ snd ◦ Ana) ‘ subst_range (σ ◦s α))))"
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range’[OF step.hyps(3,4)]
4[OF step.hyps(2)] su(3) KTu
by fastforce+
have "OccursSec /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (Tu ·list σ ◦s α))"
proof -
{ fix f assume f: "f ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (Tu ·list σ ◦s α))"
then obtain tf where tf: "tf ∈ set Tu" "f ∈ funs_term (tf · σ ◦s α)" by moura
hence "f ∈ funs_term tf ∨ f ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ subst_range (σ ◦s α))"
using funs_term_subst[of tf "σ ◦s α"] by force
hence "f 6= OccursSec" using *(1,2) tf(1) by blast
} thus ?thesis by metis
qed
hence **: "OccursSec /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana s)))"
proof (cases u)
case (Var xu)
hence "s = (σ ◦s α) xu" using su(4) by (metis subst_apply_term.simps(1))
thus ?thesis using *(3) by fastforce
qed (use su(4) KTu Ana_subst’[of _ _ Ku Tu "σ ◦s α"] in simp)
show "OccursSec /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana t)))"
proof (cases s)
case (Var sx)
then obtain a where a: "Γ (I sx) = Var a"
using su(1) 8(3)[OF step.hyps(2,3,4), of sx] by fast
hence "Ana (I sx) = ([],[])" by (metis I_grounds(2) const_type_inv[THEN Ana_const])
thus ?thesis using Var su(2) by simp
next
case (Fun f S)
hence snd_Ana_t: "snd (Ana t) = snd (Ana s) ·list I"
using su(2) Ana_subst’[of f S _ "snd (Ana s)" I] by (cases "Ana s") simp_all
{ fix g assume "g ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana t)))"
hence "g ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set (snd (Ana s))) ∨
(∃ x ∈ fvset (set (snd (Ana s))). g ∈ funs_term (I x))"
using snd_Ana_t funs_term_subst[of _ I] by auto
hence "g 6= OccursSec"
proof
assume "∃ x ∈ fvset (set (snd (Ana s))). g ∈ funs_term (I x)"
then obtain x where x: "x ∈ fvset (set (snd (Ana s)))" "g ∈ funs_term (I x)" by moura
have "x ∈ fv s" using x(1) Ana_vars(2)[of s] by (cases "Ana s") auto
hence "x ∈ fvset ((σ ◦s α) ‘ vars_transaction T)"
using s_fv[OF su(1) step.hyps(2)] by blast
then obtain a h U where h:
"I x = Fun h U" "Γ (I x) = Var a" "a 6= OccursSecType" "arity h = 0"
using I_grounds(2) 7(3)[OF step.hyps(2,3,4)] const_type_inv
by metis
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hence "h 6= OccursSec" by auto
moreover have "U = []" using h(1,2,4) const_type_inv_wf[of h U a] I_wf trms by fastforce
ultimately show ?thesis using h(1) x(2) by auto
qed (use ** in blast)




using step.IH step.prems 1[OF step.hyps(2), of A "σ ◦s α"]
2[OF step.hyps(2) 3[OF step.hyps(2,3,4)]]
by auto
qed simp
show "?C A" using A_reach
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
have *: "Fun OccursSec [] /∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T)"




have **: "Fun OccursSec [] /∈ subst_range (σ ◦s α)"
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range’[OF step.hyps(3,4)]
by auto
have "Fun OccursSec [] /∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T) ·set σ ◦s α ·set I"
proof
assume "Fun OccursSec [] ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T) ·set σ ◦s α ·set I"
then obtain s where "s ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T) ·set σ ◦s α" "s · I = Fun OccursSec []"
by moura
moreover have "Fun OccursSec [] /∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T) ·set σ ◦s α"
proof
assume "Fun OccursSec [] ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T) ·set σ ◦s α"
then obtain u where "u ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T)" "u · σ ◦s α = Fun OccursSec []"
by moura
thus False using * ** by (cases u) (force simp del: subst_subst_compose)+
qed
ultimately show False using 6[OF step.hyps(2,3,4)] by (cases s) auto
qed
thus ?case using step.IH step.prems 1[OF step.hyps(2), of A "σ ◦s α"] by fast
qed simp
show "?D A" using A_reach
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
{ fix x assume x: "x ∈ vars lsst (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
hence x’: "x ∈ varssst (unlabel (transaction_strand T) ·sst σ ◦s α)"
by (metis varssst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq unlabel_subst)
hence "x ∈ vars_transaction T ∨ x ∈ fvset ((σ ◦s α) ‘ vars_transaction T)"
using varssst_subst_cases[OF x’] by metis
moreover have "I x 6= Fun OccursSec []" when "x ∈ vars_transaction T"
using that 0(5,6)[OF step.hyps(2)] wt_subst_trm’’[OF I_wt, of "Var x"]
by fastforce
ultimately have "I x 6= Fun OccursSec []"
using 7(1)[OF step.hyps(2,3,4), of x]
by blast




assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
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and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and t: "t ∈ ik lsst A" "t · I = occurs s"
shows "∃ u. t = occurs u"
proof -
have "wtsubst I"
using I unfolding welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def by metis
hence 0: "Γ t = Γ (occurs s)"
using t(2) wt_subst_trm’’ by metis
have 1: "Γv ‘ fv lsst A ⊆ (
⋃
T ∈ set P. Γv ‘ fv_transaction T)"








using 0 1 t(1) var_subterm_iksst_is_fvsst[of x "unlabel A"]
by fastforce
next
case (Fun f T)
hence 2: "f = OccursFact" "length T = Suc (Suc 0)" "T ! 0 · I = Fun OccursSec []"
using t(2) by auto
have "T ! 0 = Fun OccursSec []"
proof (cases "T ! 0")
case (Var y)
hence "I y = Fun OccursSec []" using Fun 2(3) by simp
moreover have "Var y ∈ set T" using Var 2(2) length_Suc_conv[of T 1] by auto
hence "y ∈ fvset (ik lsst A)" using Fun t(1) by force
hence "y ∈ vars lsst A"
using fv_ik_subset_fv_sst’[of "unlabel A"] varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel A"]
by blast
ultimately have False
using reachable_constraints_occurs_fact_ik_funs_terms(4)[OF A_reach I P]
by blast
thus ?thesis by simp
qed (use 2(3) in simp)
moreover have "∃ u u’. T = [u,u’]"
using 2(2) by (metis (no_types) length_0_conv length_Suc_conv)




assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and t: "occurs t ∈ ik lsst A ·set I"
shows "occurs t ∈ ik lsst A"
proof -
have I_wt: "wtsubst I"
using I unfolding welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def by metis
obtain s where s: "s ∈ ik lsst A" "s · I = occurs t"
using t by auto
hence u: "∃ u. s = occurs u"
using I_wt reachable_constraints_occurs_fact_ik_subst_aux[OF A_reach I P]
by blast
hence "fv s = {}"
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using reachable_constraints_occurs_fact_ik_ground[OF A_reach P] s
by fast
thus ?thesis




assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and x: "send〈occurs (Var x)〉 ∈ set (unlabel A)"
shows "occurs (I x) ∈ ik lsst A"
using A_reach I x
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
define ϑ where "ϑ ≡ σ ◦s α"
define T’ where "T’ ≡ dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ)"
have T_adm: "admissible_transaction T"
using P step.hyps(2) unfolding list_all_iff by blast
have T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
using T_adm unfolding admissible_transaction_def by blast
have T_adm_occ: "admissible_transaction_occurs_checks T"
using T_adm unfolding admissible_transaction_def by blast
have I_is_T_model: "strand_sem_stateful (ik lsst A ·set I) (set (db lsst A I)) (unlabel T’) I"
using step.prems unlabel_append[of A T’] dbsst_set_is_dbupdsst[of "unlabel A" I "[]"]
strand_sem_append_stateful[of "{}" "{}" "unlabel A" "unlabel T’" I]
by (simp add: T’_def ϑ_def welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def dbsst_def)
show ?case
proof (cases "send〈occurs (Var x)〉 ∈ set (unlabel A)")
case False
hence "send〈occurs (Var x)〉 ∈ set (unlabel T’)"
using step.prems(2) unfolding T’_def ϑ_def by simp
hence "receive〈occurs (Var x)〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))"
using dual lsst_unlabel_steps_iff(2) unfolding T’_def by blast
then obtain y where y:
"receive〈occurs (Var y)〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T))"
"ϑ y = Var x"
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_occurs_fact_send_receive(2)[
OF step.hyps(3,4) T_valid]
subst_to_var_is_var[of _ ϑ x]
unfolding ϑ_def by (force simp del: subst_subst_compose)
hence "receive〈occurs (Var y) · ϑ〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T ·lsst ϑ))"
using subst_lsst_unlabel_member[of "receive〈occurs (Var y)〉" "transaction_receive T" ϑ]
by fastforce
hence "ik lsst A ·set I ` occurs (Var y) · ϑ · I"
using wellformed_transaction_sem_receives[
OF T_valid, of "ik lsst A ·set I" "set (db lsst A I)" ϑ I "occurs (Var y) · ϑ"]
I_is_T_model
by (metis T’_def)
hence *: "ik lsst A ·set I ` occurs (ϑ y · I)"
by auto
have "occurs (ϑ y · I) ∈ ik lsst A"
using deduct_occurs_in_ik[OF *]
reachable_constraints_occurs_fact_ik_subst[
OF step.hyps(1) welltyped_constraint_model_prefix[OF step.prems(1)] P, of "ϑ y · I"]
reachable_constraints_occurs_fact_ik_funs_terms[
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OF step.hyps(1) welltyped_constraint_model_prefix[OF step.prems(1)] P]
by blast
thus ?thesis using y(2) by simp
qed (simp add: step.IH[OF welltyped_constraint_model_prefix[OF step.prems(1)]])
qed simp
lemma reachable_contraints_fv_bvars_subset:
assumes A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
shows "bvars lsst A ⊆ (
⋃
T ∈ set P. bvars_transaction T)"
using assms
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)




bvars lsst_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
bvarssst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel (dual lsst ?T’)"]
unlabel_append[of A "dual lsst ?T’"]
by (metis (no_types, lifting) SUP_upper Un_subset_iff)
qed simp
lemma reachable_contraints_fv_disj:
assumes A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
shows "fv lsst A ∩ (
⋃
T ∈ set P. bvars_transaction T) = {}"
using A
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
define T’ where "T’ ≡ transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α"
define X where "X ≡ ⋃ T ∈ set P. bvars_transaction T"
have "fv lsst T’ ∩ X = {}"
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_vars_disj(4)[OF step.hyps(3,4)]
transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_vars_subset(4)[OF step.hyps(3,4,2)]
unfolding T’_def X_def by blast
hence "fv lsst (A@dual lsst T’) ∩ X = {}"
using step.IH[unfolded X_def[symmetric]] fvsst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq[of T’] by auto
thus ?case unfolding T’_def X_def by blast
qed simp
lemma reachable_contraints_fv_bvars_disj:
assumes P: "∀ T ∈ set P. wellformed_transaction T"
and A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
shows "fv lsst A ∩ bvars lsst A = {}"
using A
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
define T’ where "T’ ≡ dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
note 0 = transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_vars_disj[OF step.hyps(3,4)]
note 1 = transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_vars_subset[OF step.hyps(3,4)]
have 2: "bvars lsst A ∩ fv lsst T’ = {}"
using 0(7) 1(4)[OF step.hyps(2)] fvsst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq
unfolding T’_def by (metis (no_types) disjoint_iff_not_equal subset_iff)
have "bvars lsst T’ ⊆
⋃
(bvars_transaction ‘ set P)"
"fv lsst A ∩
⋃
(bvars_transaction ‘ set P) = {}"
using reachable_contraints_fv_bvars_subset[OF reachable_constraints.step[OF step.hyps]]
reachable_contraints_fv_disj[OF reachable_constraints.step[OF step.hyps]]
unfolding T’_def by auto
hence 3: "fv lsst A ∩ bvars lsst T’ = {}" by blast
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have "fv lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α) ∩ bvars_transaction T = {}"
using 0(4)[OF step.hyps(2)] 1(4)[OF step.hyps(2)] by blast
hence 4: "fv lsst T’ ∩ bvars lsst T’ = {}"
by (metis (no_types) T’_def fvsst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq bvarssst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq
unlabel_subst bvarssst_subst)
have "fv lsst (A@T’) ∩ bvars lsst (A@T’) = {}"
using 2 3 4 step.IH
unfolding unlabel_append[of A T’]
fvsst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel T’"]
bvarssst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel T’"]
by fast




"∀ T ∈ set P. wellformed_transaction T"
"∀ T ∈ set P. wf trms’ arity (trms_transaction T)"
and A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
shows "wfsst (unlabel A)"
and "wf trms (trms lsst A)"
proof -
have "wellformed_transaction T"
when "T ∈ set P" for T
using P(1) that by fast+
hence 0: "wf’sst (set (transaction_fresh T)) (unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T)))"
"fv lsst (dual lsst (transaction_strand T)) ∩ bvars lsst (dual lsst (transaction_strand T)) = {}"
"wf trms (trms_transaction T)"
when T: "T ∈ set P" for T
unfolding admissible_transaction_terms_def
by (metis T wellformed_transaction_wfsst(1),
metis T wellformed_transaction_wfsst(2) fvsst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq bvarssst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq,
metis T wf trms_code P(2))
from A have "wfsst (unlabel A) ∧ wf trms (trms lsst A)"
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
let ?T’ = "dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
have IH: "wf’sst {} (unlabel A)" "fv lsst A ∩ bvars lsst A = {}" "wf trms (trms lsst A)"
using step.IH by metis+
have 1: "wf’sst {} (unlabel (A@?T’))"
using protocol_transaction_wf_subst[OF 0(1)[OF step.hyps(2)] step.hyps(3,4)]
wfsst_vars_mono[of "{}"] wfsst_append[OF IH(1)]
by simp




have "wf trms (trms lsst ?T’)"








hence 3: "wf trms (trms lsst (A@?T’))"
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using IH(3) by auto
show ?case using 1 2 3 by force
qed simp
thus "wfsst (unlabel A)" "wf trms (trms lsst A)" by metis+
qed
lemma reachable_constraints_no_Ana_Attack:
assumes A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and t: "t ∈ subtermsset (ik lsst A)"
shows "attack〈n〉 /∈ set (snd (Ana t))"
proof -
have T_adm: "admissible_transaction T" when "T ∈ set P" for T
using P that by blast
have T_adm_term: "admissible_transaction_terms T" when "T ∈ set P" for T
using T_adm[OF that] unfolding admissible_transaction_def by blast
have T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T" when "T ∈ set P" for T
using T_adm[OF that] unfolding admissible_transaction_def by blast
show ?thesis
using A t
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α) thus ?case
proof (cases "t ∈ subtermsset (ik lsst A)")
case False
hence "t ∈ subtermsset (ik lsst (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)))"
using step.prems by simp
hence "t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T) ·set σ ◦s α)"
using dual_transaction_ik_is_transaction_send’[OF T_valid[OF step.hyps(2)]]
by metis
hence "t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T)) ·set σ ◦s α"
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_trms[
OF step.hyps(3,4), of "transaction_send T"]
wellformed_transaction_unlabel_cases(5)[OF T_valid[OF step.hyps(2)]]
by fastforce
then obtain s where s: "s ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_send T))" "t = s · σ ◦s α"
by moura
hence s’: "attack〈n〉 /∈ set (snd (Ana s))"
using admissible_transaction_no_Ana_Attack[OF T_adm_term[OF step.hyps(2)]]
trms_transaction_unfold[of T]
by blast
note * = transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range’[OF step.hyps(3,4)]
show ?thesis
proof
assume n: "attack〈n〉 ∈ set (snd (Ana t))"
thus False
proof (cases s)
case (Var x) thus ?thesis using Var * n s(2) by (force simp del: subst_subst_compose)
next
case (Fun f T)
hence "attack〈n〉 ∈ set (snd (Ana s)) ·set σ ◦s α"
using Ana_subst’[of f T _ "snd (Ana s)" "σ ◦s α"] s(2) s’ n
by (cases "Ana s") auto
hence "attack〈n〉 ∈ set (snd (Ana s)) ∨ attack〈n〉 ∈ subst_range (σ ◦s α)"
using const_mem_subst_cases’ by fast









assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and x: "Γv x = TAtom Value" "x ∈ fv lsst A"
shows "∃ n. I x = Fun (Val (n,False)) []"
using reachable_constraints_occurs_fact_send_ex[OF A_reach P x]




assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and x: "(TAtom Value, m) ∈ fv lsst A"
shows "∃ n. I (TAtom Value, m) = Fun (Val (n,False)) []"
using constraint_model_Value_term_is_Val[OF A_reach I P _ x] by simp
lemma constraint_model_Value_var_in_constr_prefix:
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
shows "∀ x ∈ fv lsst A. Γv x = TAtom Value
−→ (∃ B. prefix B A ∧ x /∈ fv lsst B ∧ I x ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst B))" ( is "?P A")
using A_reach I
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
have IH: "?P A" using step welltyped_constraint_model_prefix by fast
define T’ where "T’ ≡ dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
have T_adm: "admissible_transaction T"
by (metis P step.hyps(2))
have T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
by (metis T_adm admissible_transaction_def)
have I_is_T_model: "strand_sem_stateful (ik lsst A ·set I) (set (db lsst A I)) (unlabel T’) I"
using step.prems unlabel_append[of A T’] dbsst_set_is_dbupdsst[of "unlabel A" I "[]"]
strand_sem_append_stateful[of "{}" "{}" "unlabel A" "unlabel T’" I]
by (simp add: T’_def welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def dbsst_def)
have I_interp: "interpretationsubst I"
and I_wt: "wtsubst I"
and I_wf trms: "wf trms (subst_range I)"
by (metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def,
metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def,
metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def)
have 1: "∃ B. prefix B A ∧ x /∈ fv lsst B ∧ I x ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst B)"
when x: "x ∈ fv lsst T’" "Γv x = TAtom Value" for x
proof -
obtain n where n: "I x = Fun n []" "is_Val n ∨ is_Abs n" "¬public n"
using constraint_model_Value_term_is_Val[
OF reachable_constraints.step[OF step.hyps] step.prems P x(2)]
x(1) fvsst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel T’"] unlabel_append[of A T’]
unfolding T’_def by moura
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have "x ∈ fv lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
using x(1) fvsst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq unfolding T’_def by fastforce
then obtain y where y: "y ∈ fv lsst (transaction_strand T)" "x ∈ fv ((σ ◦s α) y)"
using fvsst_subst_obtain_var[of x "unlabel (transaction_strand T)" "σ ◦s α"]
unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
by auto
have y_x: "(σ ◦s α) y = Var x"
using y(2) transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range[OF step.hyps(3,4), of y]
by force
have "Γ ((σ ◦s α) y) = TAtom Value" using x(2) y_x by simp
moreover have "wtsubst (σ ◦s α)"
using protocol_transaction_vars_TAtom_typed(3) P(1) step.hyps(2)
transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_wt[OF step.hyps(3,4)]
by fast
ultimately have y_val: "Γv y = TAtom Value"
by (metis wtsubst_def Γ.simps(1))
have y_not_fresh: "y /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
using y(2) transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range(1)[OF step.hyps(3,4)]
by fastforce
have y_n: "Fun n [] = (σ ◦s α) y · I" using n y_x by simp
hence y_n’: "Fun n [] = (σ ◦s α ◦s I) y"
by (metis subst_subst_compose[of "Var y" "σ ◦s α" I] subst_apply_term.simps(1))
have "y ∈ fv lsst (transaction_receive T) ∨ y ∈ fv lsst (transaction_selects T)"
using wellformed_transaction_fv_in_receives_or_selects[OF T_valid] y(1) y_not_fresh by blast
hence n_cases:
"Fun n [] ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A) ∨
(∃ z ∈ fv lsst A. Γv z = TAtom Value ∧ I z = Fun n [])"
proof
assume y_in: "y ∈ fv lsst (transaction_receive T)"
then obtain t where t: "receive〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T))" "y ∈ fv t"
using admissible_transaction_strand_step_cases(1)[OF T_adm]
by force
hence "receive〈t · σ ◦s α〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
using subst_lsst_unlabel_member[of "receive〈t〉" "transaction_receive T" "σ ◦s α"]
by fastforce
hence *: "ik lsst A ·set I ` t · σ ◦s α · I"
using wellformed_transaction_sem_receives[
OF T_valid, of "ik lsst A ·set I" "set (db lsst A I)" "σ ◦s α" I "t · σ ◦s α"]
I_is_T_model
by (metis T’_def)
have "∃ a. Γ (I x) = Var a" when "x ∈ fv lsst A" for x
using that reachable_constraints_vars_TAtom_typed[OF step.hyps(1) P, of x]
varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel A"] wt_subst_trm’’[OF I_wt, of "Var x"]
by force
hence "∃ f. I x = Fun f []" when "x ∈ fv lsst A" for x
using that wf_trm_subst[OF I_wf trms, of "Var x"] wf_trm_Var[of x] const_type_inv_wf
empty_fv_exists_fun[OF interpretation_grounds[OF I_interp], of "Var x"]
by (metis subst_apply_term.simps(1)[of x I])
hence A_ik_I_vals: "∀ x ∈ fvset (ik lsst A). ∃ f. I x = Fun f []"
using fv_ik_subset_fv_sst’[of "unlabel A"] varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel A"]
by blast
hence "subtermsset (ik lsst A ·set I) = subtermsset (ik lsst A) ·set I"
using iksst_subst[of "unlabel A" I] unlabel_subst[of A I]
subterms_subst_lsst_ik[of A I]
by metis
moreover have "v ∈ fv lsst A" when "v ∈ fvset (ik lsst A)" for v
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by (meson contra_subsetD fv_ik_subset_fv_sst’ that)
moreover have "Fun n [] ∈ subterms (t · σ ◦s α · I)"
using imageI[of "Var y" "subterms t" "λx. x · σ ◦s α ◦s I"]
var_is_subterm[OF t(2)] subterms_subst_subset[of "σ ◦s α ◦s I" t]
subst_subst_compose[of t "σ ◦s α" I] y_n’
by (auto simp del: subst_subst_compose)
hence "Fun n [] ∈ subtermsset (ik lsst A ·set I)"
using private_fun_deduct_in_ik[OF *, of n "[]"] n(2,3)
unfolding is_Val_def is_Abs_def
by auto
hence "Fun n [] ∈ subtermsset (ik lsst A) ∨
(∃ z ∈ fvset (ik lsst A). Fun n [] ∈ subterms (I z))"
using const_subterm_subst_cases[of n _ I]
by auto
hence "Fun n [] ∈ subtermsset (ik lsst A) ∨ (∃ z ∈ fvset (ik lsst A). I z = Fun n [])"
using A_ik_I_vals by fastforce
hence "Fun n [] ∈ subtermsset (ik lsst A) ∨
(∃ z ∈ fvset (ik lsst A). Γv z = TAtom Value ∧ I z = Fun n [])"
using I_wt n(2) unfolding wtsubst_def is_Val_def is_Abs_def by force
ultimately show ?thesis using iksst_trmssst_subset[of "unlabel A"] by fast
next
assume y_in: "y ∈ fv lsst (transaction_selects T)"
then obtain s where s: "select〈Var y,Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T))"
using admissible_transaction_strand_step_cases(2)[OF T_adm]
by force
hence "select〈(σ ◦s α) y, Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
using subst_lsst_unlabel_member
by fastforce
hence n_in_db: "(Fun n [], Fun (Set s) []) ∈ set (db’sst (unlabel A) I [])"
using wellformed_transaction_sem_selects[
OF T_valid, of "ik lsst A ·set I" "set (db lsst A I)" "σ ◦s α" I




obtain tn sn where tsn: "insert〈tn,sn〉 ∈ set (unlabel A)" "Fun n [] = tn · I"
using dbsst_in_cases[OF n_in_db] by force
have "Fun n [] = tn ∨ (∃ z. Γv z = TAtom Value ∧ tn = Var z)"
using I_wt tsn(2) n(2) unfolding wtsubst_def is_Val_def is_Abs_def by (cases tn) auto
moreover have "tn ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)" "fv tn ⊆ fv lsst A"
using tsn(1) in_subterms_Union by force+
ultimately show ?thesis using tsn(2) by auto
qed
have x_nin_A: "x /∈ fv lsst A"
proof -
have "x ∈ fv lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
using x(1) fvsst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq
unfolding T’_def
by fast
hence "x ∈ fvsst ((unlabel (transaction_strand T) ·sst σ) ·sst α)"
using transaction_fresh_subst_grounds_domain[OF step.hyps(3)] step.hyps(3)
labeled_stateful_strand_subst_comp[of σ "transaction_strand T" α]
unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T ·lsst σ" α]
unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" σ]
by (simp add: transaction_fresh_subst_def range_vars_alt_def)
then obtain y where y: "α y = Var x"
using transaction_renaming_subst_var_obtain[OF _ step.hyps(4)]
by blast
thus ?thesis
using transaction_renaming_subst_range_notin_vars[OF step.hyps(4), of y]
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from n_cases show ?thesis
proof
assume "∃ z ∈ fv lsst A. Γv z = TAtom Value ∧ I z = Fun n []"
then obtain B where B: "prefix B A" "Fun n [] ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst B)"
by (metis IH n(1))
thus ?thesis
using n x_nin_A trmssst_unlabel_prefix_subset(1)[of B]
by (metis (no_types, hide_lams) self_append_conv subset_iff subtermsset_mono prefix_def)
qed (use n x_nin_A in fastforce)
qed
have "?P (A@T’)"
proof (intro ballI impI)
fix x assume x: "x ∈ fv lsst (A@T’)" "Γv x = TAtom Value"
show "∃ B. prefix B (A@T’) ∧ x /∈ fv lsst B ∧ I x ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst B)"
proof (cases "x ∈ fv lsst A")
case False
hence x’: "x ∈ fv lsst T’" using x(1) unlabel_append[of A] fvsst_append[of "unlabel A"] by simp
then obtain B where B: "prefix B A" "x /∈ fv lsst B" "I x ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst B)"
using x(2) 1 by moura
thus ?thesis using prefix_prefix by fast
qed (use x(2) IH prefix_prefix in fast)
qed
thus ?case unfolding T’_def by blast
qed simp
lemma admissible_transaction_occurs_checks_prop:
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and f: "f ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (I ‘ fv lsst A))"
shows "is_Val f =⇒ ¬public f"
and "¬is_Abs f"
proof -
obtain x where x: "x ∈ fv lsst A" "f ∈ funs_term (I x)" using f by moura
obtain T where T: "Fun f T v I x" using funs_term_Fun_subterm[OF x(2)] by moura
have I_interp: "interpretationsubst I"
and I_wt: "wtsubst I"
and I_wf trms: "wf trms (subst_range I)"
by (metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def,
metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def,
metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def)
have 1: "Γ (Var x) = Γ (I x)" using wt_subst_trm’’[OF I_wt, of "Var x"] by simp
hence "∃ a. Γ (I x) = Var a"
using x(1) reachable_constraints_vars_TAtom_typed[OF A_reach P, of x]
varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel A"]
by force
hence "∃ f. I x = Fun f []"
using x(1) wf_trm_subst[OF I_wf trms, of "Var x"] wf_trm_Var[of x] const_type_inv_wf
empty_fv_exists_fun[OF interpretation_grounds[OF I_interp], of "Var x"]
by (metis subst_apply_term.simps(1)[of x I])
hence 2: "I x = Fun f []" using x(2) by force
have "(is_Val f −→ ¬public f) ∧ ¬is_Abs f"
proof (cases "Γv x = TAtom Value")
case True
then obtain B where B: "prefix B A" "x /∈ fv lsst B" "I x ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst B)"
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using constraint_model_Value_var_in_constr_prefix[OF A_reach I P] x(1)
by fast
have "I x ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)"
using B(1,3) trmssst_append[of "unlabel B"] unlabel_append[of B]
unfolding prefix_def by auto
hence "f ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ trms lsst A)"
using x(2) funs_term_subterms_eq(2)[of "trms lsst A"] by blast
thus ?thesis
using reachable_constraints_val_funs_private[OF A_reach P]
by blast+
next
case False thus ?thesis using x 1 2 by (cases f) auto
qed
thus "is_Val f =⇒ ¬public f" "¬is_Abs f" by metis+
qed
lemma admissible_transaction_occurs_checks_prop’:
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and f: "f ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (I ‘ fv lsst A))"
shows "@ n. f = Val (n,True)"
and "@ n. f = Abs n"
using admissible_transaction_occurs_checks_prop[OF A_reach I P f] by auto
lemma transaction_var_becomes_Val:
assumes A_reach: "A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α) ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
and σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and T: "T ∈ set P"
and x: "x ∈ fv_transaction T" "fst x = TAtom Value"
shows "∃ n. Fun (Val (n,False)) [] = (σ ◦s α) x · I"
proof -
obtain m where m: "x = (TAtom Value, m)" by (metis x(2) eq_fst_iff)
have x_not_bvar: "x /∈ bvars_transaction T" "fv ((σ ◦s α) x) ∩ bvars_transaction T = {}"
using x(1) transactions_fv_bvars_disj[OF P] T
transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_vars_disj(2)[OF σ α, of x]
varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel (transaction_strand T)"]
by blast+
show ?thesis
proof (cases "x ∈ subst_domain σ")
case True
then obtain n where "σ x = Fun (Val (n, False)) []"
using σ unfolding transaction_fresh_subst_def by fastforce
thus ?thesis using subst_compose[of σ α x] by simp
next
case False
hence "σ x = Var x" by auto
then obtain n where n: "(σ ◦s α) x = Var (TAtom Value, n)"
using m transaction_renaming_subst_is_renaming[OF α] subst_compose[of σ α x]
by force
hence "(TAtom Value, n) ∈ fv lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
using x_not_bvar fvsst_subst_fv_subset[OF x(1), of "σ ◦s α"]
unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
by force
hence "∃ n’. I (TAtom Value, n) = Fun (Val (n’,False)) []"
using constraint_model_Value_term_is_Val’[OF A_reach I P, of n] x
fvsst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq[of "transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α"]
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fvsst_append[of "unlabel A"] unlabel_append[of A]
by fastforce




assumes A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. ∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
shows "SMP (trms lsst A) ⊆ SMP (
⋃
T ∈ set P. trms_transaction T)" ( is "?A A")
and "SMP (pair‘setopssst (unlabel A)) ⊆ SMP (⋃ T∈set P. pair‘setops_transaction T)" ( is "?B A")
proof -
have "?A A ∧ ?B A" using A
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
define T’ where "T’ ≡ transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α"
define M where "M ≡ ⋃ T ∈ set P. trms_transaction T"
define N where "N ≡ ⋃ T ∈ set P. pair ‘ setops_transaction T"
let ?P = "λt. ∃ s δ. s ∈ M ∧ wtsubst δ ∧ wf trms (subst_range δ) ∧ t = s · δ"
let ?Q = "λt. ∃ s δ. s ∈ N ∧ wtsubst δ ∧ wf trms (subst_range δ) ∧ t = s · δ"
have IH: "SMP (trms lsst A) ⊆ SMP M" "SMP (pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel A)) ⊆ SMP N"
using step.IH by (metis M_def, metis N_def)








have 0: "SMP (trms lsst (A@dual lsst T’)) = SMP (trms lsst A) ∪ SMP (trms lsst T’)"
"SMP (pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel (A@dual lsst T’))) =
SMP (pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel A)) ∪ SMP (pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel T’))"
using trmssst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq[of T’]
setopssst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq[of T’]
trmssst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel (dual lsst T’)"]
setopssst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel (dual lsst T’)"]
unlabel_append[of A "dual lsst T’"]
image_Un[of pair "setopssst (unlabel A)" "setopssst (unlabel T’)"]
SMP_union[of "trms lsst A" "trms lsst T’"]
SMP_union[of "pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel A)" "pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel T’)"]
by argo+
have 1: "SMP (trms lsst T’) ⊆ SMP M"
proof (intro SMP_subset_I ballI)
fix t show "t ∈ trms lsst T’ =⇒ ?P t"
using trmssst_wt_subst_ex[OF σα_wt σα_wf, of t "unlabel (transaction_strand T)"]
unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"] step.hyps(2)
unfolding T’_def M_def by auto
qed
have 2: "SMP (pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel T’)) ⊆ SMP N"
proof (intro SMP_subset_I ballI)
fix t show "t ∈ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel T’) =⇒ ?Q t"
using setopssst_wt_subst_ex[OF σα_wt σα_wf, of t "unlabel (transaction_strand T)"]
unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"] step.hyps(2)
unfolding T’_def N_def by auto
qed
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have "SMP (trms lsst (A@dual lsst T’)) ⊆ SMP M"
"SMP (pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel (A@dual lsst T’))) ⊆ SMP N"
using 0 1 2 IH by blast+
thus ?case unfolding T’_def M_def N_def by blast
qed (simp add: setopssst_def)
thus "?A A" "?B A" by metis+
qed
lemma reachable_constraints_no_Pair_fun:
assumes A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
shows "Pair /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ SMP (trms lsst A))"
using A
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
define T’ where "T’ ≡ dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
have T_adm: "admissible_transaction T" using step.hyps(2) P unfolding list_all_iff by blast
have σα_wt: "wtsubst (σ ◦s α)"
using protocol_transaction_vars_TAtom_typed(3) P(1) step.hyps(2)
transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_wt[OF step.hyps(3,4)]
by fast




have 0: "SMP (trms lsst (A@T’)) = SMP (trms lsst A) ∪ SMP (trms lsst T’)"
using SMP_union[of "trms lsst A" "trms lsst T’"]
unlabel_append[of A T’] trmssst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel T’"]
by simp
have 1: "wf trms (trms lsst T’)"
using reachable_constraints_wf trms[OF _ reachable_constraints.step[OF step.hyps]]
admissible_transactions_wf trms P
trmssst_append[of "unlabel A"] unlabel_append[of A]
unfolding T’_def by force
have 2: "Pair /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (subst_range (σ ◦s α)))"
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range’[OF step.hyps(3,4)] by force




hence "Pair /∈ funs_term t"
when t: "t ∈ trmssst (unlabel (transaction_strand T) ·sst σ ◦s α)" for t
using 2 trmssst_funs_term_cases[OF t]
by force
hence 3: "Pair /∈ funs_term t" when t: "t ∈ trms lsst T’" for t
using t unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
trmssst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq[of "transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α"]
unfolding T’_def by metis
have "∃ a. Γv x = TAtom a" when "x ∈ vars_transaction T" for x
using that protocol_transaction_vars_TAtom_typed(1) P step.hyps(2)
by fast
hence "∃ a. Γv x = TAtom a" when "x ∈ varssst (unlabel (transaction_strand T) ·sst σ ◦s α)" for x
using wt_subst_fvset_termtype_subterm[OF _ σα_wt σα_wf, of x "vars_transaction T"]
varssst_subst_cases[OF that]
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by fastforce
hence "∃ a. Γv x = TAtom a" when "x ∈ vars lsst T’" for x
using that unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
varssst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq[of "transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α"]
unfolding T’_def
by simp
hence "∃ a. Γv x = TAtom a" when "x ∈ fvset (trms lsst T’)" for x
using that fv_trmssst_subset(1) by fast
hence "Pair /∈ funs_term (Γ (Var x))" when "x ∈ fvset (trms lsst T’)" for x
using that by fastforce
moreover have "Pair ∈ funs_term s"
when s: "Ana s = (K, M)" "Pair ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ set K)"
for s::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term" and K M
proof (cases s)
case (Fun f S) thus ?thesis using s Ana_Fu_keys_not_pairs[of _ S K M] by (cases f) force+
qed (use s in simp)
ultimately have "Pair /∈ funs_term t" when t: "t ∈ SMP (trms lsst T’)" for t
using t 3 SMP_funs_term[OF t _ _ 1, of Pair] funs_term_type_iff by fastforce
thus ?case using 0 step.IH(1) unfolding T’_def by blast
qed simp
lemma reachable_constraints_setops_form:
assumes A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and t: "t ∈ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel A)"
shows "∃ c s. t = pair (c, Fun (Set s) []) ∧ Γ c = TAtom Value"
using A t
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
have T_adm: "admissible_transaction T" when "T ∈ set P" for T





when "T ∈ set P" for T
using T_adm[OF that] unfolding admissible_transaction_def by simp_all
have T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T" when "T ∈ set P" for T
using T_adm[OF that] unfolding admissible_transaction_def by blast
have σα_wt: "wtsubst (σ ◦s α)"
using protocol_transaction_vars_TAtom_typed(3) P(1) step.hyps(2)
transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_wt[OF step.hyps(3,4)]
by fast




show ?case using step.IH
proof (cases "t ∈ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel A)")
case False
hence "t ∈ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel (transaction_strand T) ·sst σ ◦s α)"
using step.prems setopssst_append unlabel_append
setopssst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq[of "transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α"]
unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
by fastforce
then obtain t’ δ where t’:
"t’ ∈ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
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"wtsubst δ" "wf trms (subst_range δ)" "t = t’ · δ"
using setopssst_wt_subst_ex[OF σα_wt σα_wf] by blast
then obtain s s’ where s: "t’ = pair (s,s’)"
using setopssst_are_pairs by fastforce
moreover have "InSet ac s s’ = InSet Assign s s’ ∨ InSet ac s s’ = InSet Check s s’" for ac
by (cases ac) simp_all
ultimately have "∃ n. s = Var (Var Value, n)" "∃ u. s’ = Fun (Set u) []"
using t’(1) setopssst_member_iff[of s s’ "unlabel (transaction_strand T)"]
pair_in_pair_image_iff[of s s’]
transaction_inserts_are_Value_vars[
OF T_valid[OF step.hyps(2)] T_adm’(3)[OF step.hyps(2)], of s s’]
transaction_deletes_are_Value_vars[
OF T_valid[OF step.hyps(2)] T_adm’(3)[OF step.hyps(2)], of s s’]
transaction_selects_are_Value_vars[
OF T_valid[OF step.hyps(2)] T_adm’(1)[OF step.hyps(2)], of s s’]
transaction_inset_checks_are_Value_vars[
OF T_valid[OF step.hyps(2)] T_adm’(2)[OF step.hyps(2)], of s s’]
transaction_notinset_checks_are_Value_vars[
OF T_valid[OF step.hyps(2)] T_adm’(2)[OF step.hyps(2)], of _ _ _ s s’]
by metis+
then obtain ss n where ss: "t = pair (δ (Var Value, n), Fun (Set ss) [])"
using t’(4) s unfolding pair_def by force
have "Γ (δ (Var Value, n)) = TAtom Value" "wf trm (δ (Var Value, n))"
using t’(2) wt_subst_trm’’[OF t’(2), of "Var (Var Value, n)"] apply simp
using t’(3) by (cases "(Var Value, n) ∈ subst_domain δ") auto
thus ?thesis using ss by blast
qed simp
qed (simp add: setopssst_def)
lemma reachable_constraints_setops_type:
fixes t::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term"
assumes A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and t: "t ∈ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel A)"
shows "Γ t = TComp Pair [TAtom Value, TAtom SetType]"
proof -
obtain s c where s: "t = pair (c, Fun (Set s) [])" "Γ c = TAtom Value"
using reachable_constraints_setops_form[OF A P t] by moura
hence "(Fun (Set s) []::(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term) ∈ trms lsst A"
using t setopssst_member_iff[of c "Fun (Set s) []" "unlabel A"]
by force
hence "wf trm (Fun (Set s) []::(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term)"
using reachable_constraints_wf(2) P A
unfolding admissible_transaction_def admissible_transaction_terms_def by blast
hence "arity (Set s) = 0" unfolding wf trm_def by simp
thus ?thesis using s unfolding pair_def by fastforce
qed
lemma reachable_constraints_setops_same_type_if_unifiable:
assumes A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
shows "∀ s ∈ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel A). ∀ t ∈ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel A).
(∃ δ. Unifier δ s t) −→ Γ s = Γ t"
( is "?P A")
using reachable_constraints_setops_type[OF A P] by simp
lemma reachable_constraints_setops_unfiable_if_wt_instance_unifiable:
assumes A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
shows "∀ s ∈ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel A). ∀ t ∈ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel A).
(∃σ ϑ %. wtsubst σ ∧ wtsubst ϑ ∧ wf trms (subst_range σ) ∧ wf trms (subst_range ϑ) ∧
Unifier % (s · σ) (t · ϑ))
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−→ (∃ δ. Unifier δ s t)"
proof (intro ballI impI)
fix s t assume st: "s ∈ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel A)" "t ∈ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel A)" and
"∃σ ϑ %. wtsubst σ ∧ wtsubst ϑ ∧ wf trms (subst_range σ) ∧ wf trms (subst_range ϑ) ∧
Unifier % (s · σ) (t · ϑ)"
then obtain σ ϑ % where σ:
"wtsubst σ" "wtsubst ϑ" "wf trms (subst_range σ)" "wf trms (subst_range ϑ)"
"Unifier % (s · σ) (t · ϑ)"
by moura
obtain fs ft cs ct where c:
"s = pair (cs, Fun (Set fs) [])" "t = pair (ct, Fun (Set ft) [])"
"Γ cs = TAtom Value" "Γ ct = TAtom Value"
using reachable_constraints_setops_form[OF A P st(1)]
reachable_constraints_setops_form[OF A P st(2)]
by moura
have "cs ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)" "ct ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)"
using c(1,2) setops_subterm_trms[OF st(1), of cs] setops_subterm_trms[OF st(2), of ct]
Fun_param_is_subterm[of cs "args s"] Fun_param_is_subterm[of ct "args t"]
unfolding pair_def by simp_all
moreover have
"∀ T ∈ set P. wellformed_transaction T"
"∀ T ∈ set P. wf trms’ arity (trms_transaction T)"
using P unfolding admissible_transaction_def admissible_transaction_terms_def by fast+
ultimately have *: "wf trm cs" "wf trm ct"
using reachable_constraints_wf(2)[OF _ _ A] wf_trms_subterms by blast+
have "(∃ x. cs = Var x) ∨ (∃ c d. cs = Fun c [])"
using const_type_inv_wf c(3) *(1) by (cases cs) auto
moreover have "(∃ x. ct = Var x) ∨ (∃ c d. ct = Fun c [])"
using const_type_inv_wf c(4) *(2) by (cases ct) auto
ultimately show "∃ δ. Unifier δ s t"
using reachable_constraints_setops_form[OF A P] reachable_constraints_setops_type[OF A P] st σ c




"M ≡ ⋃ T ∈ set P. trms_transaction T"





"∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
"∀ T ∈ set P. list_all tfrsstp (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
and A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
shows "tfrsst (unlabel A)"
using A
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
define T’ where "T’ ≡ dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
have P’:
"∀ T ∈ set P. ∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
"∀ T ∈ set P. wf trms (trms_transaction T)"
using P(1) protocol_transaction_vars_TAtom_typed(3) admissible_transactions_wf trms
by blast+
have AT’_reach: "A@T’ ∈ reachable_constraints P"
using reachable_constraints.step[OF step.hyps] unfolding T’_def by metis
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have σα_wt: "wtsubst (σ ◦s α)"
using P’(1) step.hyps(2) transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_wt[OF step.hyps(3,4)]
by fast




have σα_bvars_disj: "bvars lsst (transaction_strand T) ∩ range_vars (σ ◦s α) = {}"
by (rule transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_vars_disj(4)[OF step.hyps(3,4,2)])
have wf_trms_M: "wf trms M"
using admissible_transactions_wf trms P(1)
unfolding M(1) by blast
have "tfrset (trms lsst (A@T’))"
using reachable_constraints_SMP_subset(1)[OF AT’_reach P’(1)]
tfr_subset(3)[OF M(4), of "trms lsst (A@T’)"]
SMP_SMP_subset[of M N] SMP_I’[OF wf_trms_M M(5,2)]
unfolding M(1) by blast
moreover have "∀ p. Ana (pair p) = ([],[])" unfolding pair_def by auto
ultimately have 1: "tfrset (trms lsst (A@T’) ∪ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel (A@T’)))"





have "list_all tfrsstp (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
using step.hyps(2) P(2) tfrsstp_is_comp_tfrsstp
unfolding comp_tfrsst_def tfrsst_def by fastforce
hence "list_all tfrsstp (unlabel T’)"
using tfrsstp_all_wt_subst_apply[OF _ σα_wt σα_wf σα_bvars_disj]
dual lsst_tfrsstp[of "transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α"]
unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
unfolding T’_def by argo
hence 2: "list_all tfrsstp (unlabel (A@T’))"
using step.IH unlabel_append
unfolding tfrsst_def by auto
have "tfrsst (unlabel (A@T’))" using 1 2 by (metis tfrsst_def)




"M ≡ ⋃ T ∈ set P. trms_transaction T ∪ pair’ Pair ‘ setops_transaction T"





"∀ T ∈ set P. ∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
"∀ T ∈ set P. wf trms’ arity (trms_transaction T)"
"∀ T ∈ set P. list_all tfrsstp (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
and A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
shows "tfrsst (unlabel A)"
using A
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
define T’ where "T’ ≡ dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
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have AT’_reach: "A@T’ ∈ reachable_constraints P"
using reachable_constraints.step[OF step.hyps] unfolding T’_def by metis
have σα_wt: "wtsubst (σ ◦s α)"
using P(1) step.hyps(2) transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_wt[OF step.hyps(3,4)]
by fast




have σα_bvars_disj: "bvars lsst (transaction_strand T) ∩ range_vars (σ ◦s α) = {}"
by (rule transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_vars_disj(4)[OF step.hyps(3,4,2)])
have wf_trms_M: "wf trms M"
using P(2) setopssst_wf trms(2) unfolding M(1) pair_code wf trms_code[symmetric] by fast
have "SMP (trms lsst (A@T’)) ⊆ SMP M" "SMP (pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel (A@T’))) ⊆ SMP M"
using reachable_constraints_SMP_subset[OF AT’_reach P(1)]
SMP_mono[of "
⋃
T ∈ set P. trms_transaction T" M]
SMP_mono[of "
⋃
T ∈ set P. pair ‘ setops_transaction T" M]
unfolding M(1) pair_code[symmetric] by blast+
hence 1: "tfrset (trms lsst (A@T’) ∪ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel (A@T’)))"
using tfr_subset(3)[OF M(4), of "trms lsst (A@T’) ∪ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel (A@T’))"]
SMP_union[of "trms lsst (A@T’)" "pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel (A@T’))"]
SMP_SMP_subset[of M N] SMP_I’[OF wf_trms_M M(5,2)]
by blast
have "list_all tfrsstp (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
using step.hyps(2) P(3) tfrsstp_is_comp_tfrsstp
unfolding comp_tfrsst_def tfrsst_def by fastforce
hence "list_all tfrsstp (unlabel T’)"
using tfrsstp_all_wt_subst_apply[OF _ σα_wt σα_wf σα_bvars_disj]
dual lsst_tfrsstp[of "transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α"]
unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
unfolding T’_def by argo
hence 2: "list_all tfrsstp (unlabel (A@T’))"
using step.IH unlabel_append
unfolding tfrsst_def by auto
have "tfrsst (unlabel (A@T’))" using 1 2 by (metis tfrsst_def)




"M ≡ ⋃ T ∈ set P. trms_transaction T ∪ pair’ Pair ‘ setops_transaction T"





"∀ T ∈ set P. wellformed_transaction T"
"∀ T ∈ set P. wf trms’ arity (trms_transaction T)"
"∀ T ∈ set P. ∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
"∀ T ∈ set P. list_all tfrsstp (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
and A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
shows "typing_condsst (unlabel A)"
using reachable_constraints_wf[OF P(1,2) A] reachable_constraints_tfr’[OF M P(3,2,4) A]
unfolding typing_condsst_def by blast
context
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begin
private lemma reachable_constraints_par_comp lsst_aux:
fixes P
defines "Ts ≡ concat (map transaction_strand P)"
assumes P_fresh_wf: "∀ T ∈ set P. ∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
( is "∀ T ∈ set P. ?fresh_wf T")
and A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
shows "∀ b ∈ set (dual lsst A). ∃ a ∈ set Ts. ∃ δ. b = a ·lsstp δ ∧
wtsubst δ ∧ wf trms (subst_range δ) ∧
(∀ t ∈ subst_range δ. (∃ x. t = Var x) ∨ (∃ c. t = Fun c []))"
( is "∀ b ∈ set (dual lsst A). ∃ a ∈ set Ts. ?P b a")
using A
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
define Q where "Q ≡ ?P"
define ϑ where "ϑ ≡ σ ◦s α"
let ?R = "λA Ts. ∀ b ∈ set A. ∃ a ∈ set Ts. Q b a"
have T_fresh_wf: "?fresh_wf T" using step.hyps(2) P_fresh_wf by blast
have "wtsubst ϑ" "wf trms (subst_range ϑ)"
"∀ t ∈ subst_range ϑ. (∃ x. t = Var x) ∨ (∃ c. t = Fun c [])"
using wt_subst_compose[






unfolding ϑ_def by metis+
hence "?R (dual lsst (dual lsst (transaction_strand T)) ·lsst ϑ) (transaction_strand T)"
using dual lsst_self_inverse[of "transaction_strand T"]
by (auto simp add: Q_def subst_apply_labeled_stateful_strand_def)
hence "?R (dual lsst (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))) (transaction_strand T)"
by (metis dual lsst_subst)
hence "?R (dual lsst (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst ϑ))) Ts"
using step.hyps(2) unfolding Ts_def dual lsst_def by fastforce




defines "f ≡ λM. {t · δ | t δ. t ∈ M ∧ wtsubst δ ∧ wf trms (subst_range δ) ∧ fv (t · δ) = {}}"
and "Ts ≡ concat (map transaction_strand P)"
assumes P_pc: "comp_par_comp lsst public arity Ana Γ Pair Ts M S"
and P_wf: "∀ T ∈ set P. ∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
and A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
shows "par_comp lsst A ((f (set S)) - {m. intruder_synth {} m})"
using par_comp lsst_if_comp_par_comp lsst’[OF P_pc, of "dual lsst A", THEN par_comp lsst_dual lsst]
reachable_constraints_par_comp lsst_aux[OF P_wf A, unfolded Ts_def[symmetric]]
unfolding f_def dual lsst_self_inverse by fast
end
lemma reachable_constraints_par_comp_constr:
fixes P f S
defines "f ≡ λM. {t · δ | t δ. t ∈ M ∧ wtsubst δ ∧ wf trms (subst_range δ) ∧ fv (t · δ) = {}}"
and "Ts ≡ concat (map transaction_strand P)"
and "Sec ≡ (f (set S)) - {m. intruder_synth {} m}"
and "M ≡ ⋃ T ∈ set P. trms_transaction T ∪ pair’ Pair ‘ setops_transaction T"
assumes M:
"has_all_wt_instances_of Γ M N"
"finite N"
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"∀ T ∈ set P. wellformed_transaction T"
"∀ T ∈ set P. wf trms’ arity (trms_transaction T)"
"∀ T ∈ set P. ∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
"∀ T ∈ set P. list_all tfrsstp (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
"comp_par_comp lsst public arity Ana Γ Pair Ts M_fun S"
and A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and I: "constraint_model I A"
shows "∃ Iτ. welltyped_constraint_model Iτ A ∧
((∀ n. welltyped_constraint_model Iτ (proj n A)) ∨
(∃A’. prefix A’ A ∧ strand_leaks lsst A’ Sec Iτ))"
proof -
have I’: "constr_sem_stateful I (unlabel A)" "interpretationsubst I"
using I unfolding constraint_model_def by blast+
show ?thesis
using reachable_constraints_par_comp lsst[OF P(5,3)[unfolded Ts_def] A]
reachable_constraints_typing_condsst[OF M_def M P(1,2,3,4) A]
par_comp_constr_stateful[OF _ _ I’, of Sec]









"term_variants P (Var x) = [Var x]"
| "term_variants P (Fun f T) = (
let S = product_lists (map (term_variants P) T)
in map (Fun f) S@concat (map (λg. map (Fun g) S) (P f)))"
inductive term_variants_pred where
term_variants_Var:
"term_variants_pred P (Var x) (Var x)"
| term_variants_P:
" [[length T = length S;
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ term_variants_pred P (T ! i) (S ! i); g ∈ set (P f) ]]
=⇒ term_variants_pred P (Fun f T) (Fun g S)"
| term_variants_Fun:
" [[length T = length S;
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ term_variants_pred P (T ! i) (S ! i) ]]
=⇒ term_variants_pred P (Fun f T) (Fun f S)"
lemma term_variants_pred_inv:
assumes "term_variants_pred P (Fun f T) (Fun h S)"
shows "length T = length S"
and "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ term_variants_pred P (T ! i) (S ! i)"
and "f 6= h =⇒ h ∈ set (P f)"
using assms by (auto elim: term_variants_pred.cases)
lemma term_variants_pred_inv’:
assumes "term_variants_pred P (Fun f T) t"
shows "is_Fun t"
and "length T = length (args t)"
and "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ term_variants_pred P (T ! i) (args t ! i)"
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and "f 6= the_Fun t =⇒ the_Fun t ∈ set (P f)"
and "P ≡ (λ_. [])(g := [h]) =⇒ f 6= the_Fun t =⇒ f = g ∧ the_Fun t = h"
using assms by (auto elim: term_variants_pred.cases)
lemma term_variants_pred_inv’’:
assumes "term_variants_pred P t (Fun f T)"
shows "is_Fun t"
and "length T = length (args t)"
and "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ term_variants_pred P (args t ! i) (T ! i)"
and "f 6= the_Fun t =⇒ f ∈ set (P (the_Fun t))"
and "P ≡ (λ_. [])(g := [h]) =⇒ f 6= the_Fun t =⇒ f = h ∧ the_Fun t = g"
using assms by (auto elim: term_variants_pred.cases)
lemma term_variants_pred_inv_Var:
"term_variants_pred P (Var x) t ←→ t = Var x"
"term_variants_pred P t (Var x) ←→ t = Var x"
by (auto intro: term_variants_Var elim: term_variants_pred.cases)
lemma term_variants_pred_inv_const:
"term_variants_pred P (Fun c []) t ←→ ((∃ g ∈ set (P c). t = Fun g []) ∨ (t = Fun c []))"
by (auto intro: term_variants_P term_variants_Fun elim: term_variants_pred.cases)
lemma term_variants_pred_refl: "term_variants_pred P t t"
by (induct t) (auto intro: term_variants_pred.intros)
lemma term_variants_pred_refl_inv:
assumes st: "term_variants_pred P s t"
and P: "∀ f. ∀ g ∈ set (P f). f = g"
shows "s = t"
using st P
proof (induction s t rule: term_variants_pred.induct)
case (term_variants_Var P x) thus ?case by blast
next
case (term_variants_P T S P g f)
hence "T ! i = S ! i" when i: "i < length T" for i using i by blast
hence "T = S" using term_variants_P.hyps(1) by (simp add: nth_equalityI)
thus ?case using term_variants_P.prems term_variants_P.hyps(3) by fast
next
case (term_variants_Fun T S P f)
hence "T ! i = S ! i" when i: "i < length T" for i using i by blast
hence "T = S" using term_variants_Fun.hyps(1) by (simp add: nth_equalityI)
thus ?case by fast
qed
lemma term_variants_pred_const:
assumes "b ∈ set (P a)"
shows "term_variants_pred P (Fun a []) (Fun b [])"
using term_variants_P[of "[]" "[]"] assms by simp
lemma term_variants_pred_const_cases:
"P a 6= [] =⇒ term_variants_pred P (Fun a []) t ←→
(t = Fun a [] ∨ (∃ b ∈ set (P a). t = Fun b []))"
"P a = [] =⇒ term_variants_pred P (Fun a []) t ←→ t = Fun a []"
using term_variants_pred_inv_const[of P] by auto
lemma term_variants_pred_param:
assumes "term_variants_pred P t s"
and fg: "f = g ∨ g ∈ set (P f)"
shows "term_variants_pred P (Fun f (S@t#T)) (Fun g (S@s#T))"
proof -
have 1: "length (S@t#T) = length (S@s#T)" by simp
have "term_variants_pred P (T ! i) (T ! i)" "term_variants_pred P (S ! i) (S ! i)" for i
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by (metis term_variants_pred_refl)+
hence 2: "term_variants_pred P ((S@t#T) ! i) ((S@s#T) ! i)" for i
by (simp add: assms nth_Cons’ nth_append)
show ?thesis by (metis term_variants_Fun[OF 1 2] term_variants_P[OF 1 2] fg)
qed
lemma term_variants_pred_Cons:
assumes t: "term_variants_pred P t s"
and T: "term_variants_pred P (Fun f T) (Fun f S)"
and fg: "f = g ∨ g ∈ set (P f)"
shows "term_variants_pred P (Fun f (t#T)) (Fun g (s#S))"
proof -
have 1: "length (t#T) = length (s#S)"
and "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ term_variants_pred P (T ! i) (S ! i)"
using term_variants_pred_inv[OF T] by simp_all
hence 2: "
∧
i. i < length (t#T) =⇒ term_variants_pred P ((t#T) ! i) ((s#S) ! i)"
by (metis t One_nat_def diff_less length_Cons less_Suc_eq less_imp_diff_less nth_Cons’
zero_less_Suc)
show ?thesis using 1 2 fg by (auto intro: term_variants_pred.intros)
qed
lemma term_variants_pred_dense:
fixes P Q::"’a set" and fs gs::"’a list"
defines "P_fs x ≡ if x ∈ P then fs else []"
and "P_gs x ≡ if x ∈ P then gs else []"
and "Q_fs x ≡ if x ∈ Q then fs else []"
assumes ut: "term_variants_pred P_fs u t"
and g: "g ∈ Q" "g ∈ set gs"
shows "∃ s. term_variants_pred P_gs u s ∧ term_variants_pred Q_fs s t"
proof -
define F where "F ≡ λ(P::’a set) (fs::’a list) x. if x ∈ P then fs else []"
show ?thesis using ut g P_fs_def unfolding P_gs_def Q_fs_def
proof (induction P_fs u t arbitrary: g gs rule: term_variants_pred.induct)
case (term_variants_Var P h x) thus ?case
by (auto intro: term_variants_pred.term_variants_Var)
next
case (term_variants_P T S P’ h’ h g gs)
note hyps = term_variants_P.hyps(1,2,4,5,6,7)
note IH = term_variants_P.hyps(3)
have "∃ s. term_variants_pred (F P gs) (T ! i) s ∧ term_variants_pred (F Q fs) s (S ! i)"
when i: "i < length T" for i
using IH[OF i hyps(4,5,6)] unfolding F_def by presburger
then obtain U where U:
"length T = length U" "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ term_variants_pred (F P gs) (T ! i) (U ! i)"
"length U = length S" "
∧
i. i < length U =⇒ term_variants_pred (F Q fs) (U ! i) (S ! i)"
using hyps(1) Skolem_list_nth[of _ "λi s. term_variants_pred (F P gs) (T ! i) s ∧
term_variants_pred (F Q fs) s (S ! i)"]
by moura
show ?case
using term_variants_pred.term_variants_P[OF U(1,2), of g h]
term_variants_pred.term_variants_P[OF U(3,4), of h’ g]
hyps(3)[unfolded hyps(6)] hyps(4,5)
unfolding F_def by force
next
case (term_variants_Fun T S P’ h’ g gs)
note hyps = term_variants_Fun.hyps(1,2,4,5,6)
note IH = term_variants_Fun.hyps(3)
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have "∃ s. term_variants_pred (F P gs) (T ! i) s ∧ term_variants_pred (F Q fs) s (S ! i)"
when i: "i < length T" for i
using IH[OF i hyps(3,4,5)] unfolding F_def by presburger
then obtain U where U:
"length T = length U" "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ term_variants_pred (F P gs) (T ! i) (U ! i)"
"length U = length S" "
∧
i. i < length U =⇒ term_variants_pred (F Q fs) (U ! i) (S ! i)"
using hyps(1) Skolem_list_nth[of _ "λi s. term_variants_pred (F P gs) (T ! i) s ∧









assumes ut: "term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(a := [b])) u t"
shows "∃ s. term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(a := [c])) u s ∧
term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(c := [b])) s t"
using ut term_variants_pred_dense[of "{a}" "[b]" u t c "{c}" "[c]"]
unfolding fun_upd_def by simp
lemma term_variants_pred_eq_case:
fixes t s::"(’a,’b) term"
assumes "term_variants_pred P t s" "∀ f ∈ funs_term t. P f = []"
shows "t = s"
using assms
proof (induction P t s rule: term_variants_pred.induct)
case (term_variants_Fun T S P f) thus ?case
using subtermeq_imp_funs_term_subset[OF Fun_param_in_subterms[OF nth_mem], of _ T f]
nth_equalityI[of T S]
by blast
qed (simp_all add: term_variants_pred_refl)
lemma term_variants_pred_subst:
assumes "term_variants_pred P t s"
shows "term_variants_pred P (t · δ) (s · δ)"
using assms
proof (induction P t s rule: term_variants_pred.induct)
case (term_variants_P T S P f g)
have 1: "length (map (λt. t · δ) T) = length (map (λt. t · δ) S)"
using term_variants_P.hyps
by simp
have 2: "term_variants_pred P ((map (λt. t · δ) T) ! i) ((map (λt. t · δ) S) ! i)"




using term_variants_pred.term_variants_P[OF 1 2 term_variants_P.hyps(3)]
by fastforce
next
case (term_variants_Fun T S P f)
have 1: "length (map (λt. t · δ) T) = length (map (λt. t · δ) S)"
using term_variants_Fun.hyps
by simp
have 2: "term_variants_pred P ((map (λt. t · δ) T) ! i) ((map (λt. t · δ) S) ! i)"
when "i < length (map (λt. t · δ) T)" for i
using term_variants_Fun that
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by fastforce
show ?case
using term_variants_pred.term_variants_Fun[OF 1 2]
by fastforce
qed (simp add: term_variants_pred_refl)
lemma term_variants_pred_subst’:
fixes t s::"(’a,’b) term" and δ::"(’a,’b) subst"
assumes "term_variants_pred P (t · δ) s"
and "∀ x ∈ fv t ∪ fv s. (∃ y. δ x = Var y) ∨ (∃ f. δ x = Fun f [] ∧ P f = [])"
shows "∃ u. term_variants_pred P t u ∧ s = u · δ"
using assms
proof (induction P "t · δ" s arbitrary: t rule: term_variants_pred.induct)
case (term_variants_Var P x g) thus ?case using term_variants_pred_refl by fast
next
case (term_variants_P T S P g f) show ?case
proof (cases t)




case (Fun h U)
hence 1: "h = f" "T = map (λs. s · δ) U" "length U = length T"
using term_variants_P.hyps(5) by simp_all
hence 2: "T ! i = U ! i · δ" when "i < length T" for i
using that by simp
have "∀ x ∈ fv (U ! i) ∪ fv (S ! i). (∃ y. δ x = Var y) ∨ (∃ f. δ x = Fun f [] ∧ P f = [])"
when "i < length U" for i
using that Fun term_variants_P.prems term_variants_P.hyps(1) 1(3)
by force
hence IH: "∀ i < length U. ∃ u. term_variants_pred P (U ! i) u ∧ S ! i = u · δ"
by (metis 1(3) term_variants_P.hyps(3)[OF _ 2])
have "∃ V. length U = length V ∧ S = map (λv. v · δ) V ∧
(∀ i < length U. term_variants_pred P (U ! i) (V ! i))"
using term_variants_P.hyps(1) 1(3) subst_term_list_obtain[OF IH] by metis
then obtain V where V: "length U = length V" "S = map (λv. v · δ) V"
"
∧
i. i < length U =⇒ term_variants_pred P (U ! i) (V ! i)"
by moura
have "term_variants_pred P (Fun f U) (Fun g V)"
by (metis term_variants_pred.term_variants_P[OF V(1,3) term_variants_P.hyps(4)])
moreover have "Fun g S = Fun g V · δ" using V(2) by simp
ultimately show ?thesis using term_variants_P.hyps(1,4) Fun 1 by blast
qed
next
case (term_variants_Fun T S P f t) show ?case
proof (cases t)
case (Var x)
hence "T = []" "P f = []" using term_variants_Fun.hyps(4) term_variants_Fun.prems by fastforce+
thus ?thesis using term_variants_pred_refl Var term_variants_Fun.hyps(1,4) by fastforce
next
case (Fun h U)
hence 1: "h = f" "T = map (λs. s · δ) U" "length U = length T"
using term_variants_Fun.hyps(4) by simp_all
hence 2: "T ! i = U ! i · δ" when "i < length T" for i
using that by simp
have "∀ x ∈ fv (U ! i) ∪ fv (S ! i). (∃ y. δ x = Var y) ∨ (∃ f. δ x = Fun f [] ∧ P f = [])"
when "i < length U" for i
using that Fun term_variants_Fun.prems term_variants_Fun.hyps(1) 1(3)
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by force
hence IH: "∀ i < length U. ∃ u. term_variants_pred P (U ! i) u ∧ S ! i = u · δ"
by (metis 1(3) term_variants_Fun.hyps(3)[OF _ 2 ])
have "∃ V. length U = length V ∧ S = map (λv. v · δ) V ∧
(∀ i < length U. term_variants_pred P (U ! i) (V ! i))"
using term_variants_Fun.hyps(1) 1(3) subst_term_list_obtain[OF IH] by metis
then obtain V where V: "length U = length V" "S = map (λv. v · δ) V"
"
∧
i. i < length U =⇒ term_variants_pred P (U ! i) (V ! i)"
by moura
have "term_variants_pred P (Fun f U) (Fun f V)"
by (metis term_variants_pred.term_variants_Fun[OF V(1,3)])
moreover have "Fun f S = Fun f V · δ" using V(2) by simp





shows "term_variants_pred P t s ←→ s ∈ set (term_variants P t)"
( is "?A t s ←→ ?B t s")
proof
define U where "U ≡ λP (T::(’a,’b) term list). product_lists (map (term_variants P) T)"
have a:
"g ∈ set (P f) =⇒ set (map (Fun g) (U P T)) ⊆ set (term_variants P (Fun f T))"
"set (map (Fun f) (U P T)) ⊆ set (term_variants P (Fun f T))"
for f P g and T::"(’a,’b) term list"
using term_variants.simps(2)[of P f T]
unfolding U_def Let_def by auto
have b: "∃ S ∈ set (U P T). s = Fun f S ∨ (∃ g ∈ set (P f). s = Fun g S)"
when "s ∈ set (term_variants P (Fun f T))" for P T f s
using that by (cases "P f") (auto simp add: U_def Let_def)
have c: "length T = length S" when "S ∈ set (U P T)" for S P T
using that unfolding U_def
by (simp add: in_set_product_lists_length)
show "?A t s =⇒ ?B t s"
proof (induction P t s rule: term_variants_pred.induct)
case (term_variants_P T S P g f)
note hyps = term_variants_P.hyps
note IH = term_variants_P.IH
have "S ∈ set (U P T)"
using IH hyps(1) product_lists_in_set_nth’[of _ S]
unfolding U_def by simp
thus ?case using a(1)[of _ P, OF hyps(3)] by auto
next
case (term_variants_Fun T S P f)
note hyps = term_variants_Fun.hyps
note IH = term_variants_Fun.IH
have "S ∈ set (U P T)"
using IH hyps(1) product_lists_in_set_nth’[of _ S]
unfolding U_def by simp
thus ?case using a(2)[of f P T] by (cases "P f") auto
qed (simp add: term_variants_Var)
show "?B t s =⇒ ?A t s"
proof (induction P t arbitrary: s rule: term_variants.induct)
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case (2 P f T)
obtain S where S:
"s = Fun f S ∨ (∃ g ∈ set (P f). s = Fun g S)"
"S ∈ set (U P T)" "length T = length S"
using c b[OF "2.prems"] by moura
have "∀ i < length T. term_variants_pred P (T ! i) (S ! i)"
using "2.IH" S product_lists_in_set_nth by (fastforce simp add: U_def)
thus ?case using S by (auto intro: term_variants_pred.intros)
qed (simp add: term_variants_Var)
qed
lemma term_variants_pred_finite:
"finite {s. term_variants_pred P t s}"
using term_variants_pred_iff_in_term_variants[of P t]
by simp
lemma term_variants_pred_fv_eq:
assumes "term_variants_pred P s t"
shows "fv s = fv t"
using assms
by (induct rule: term_variants_pred.induct)
(metis, metis fv_eq_FunI, metis fv_eq_FunI)
lemma ( in intruder_model) term_variants_pred_wf_trms:
assumes "term_variants_pred P s t"
and "
∧
f g. g ∈ set (P f) =⇒ arity f = arity g"
and "wf trm s"
shows "wf trm t"
using assms
apply (induction rule: term_variants_pred.induct, simp)
by (metis (no_types) wf_trmI wf_trm_arity in_set_conv_nth wf_trm_param_idx)+
lemma term_variants_pred_funs_term:
assumes "term_variants_pred P s t"
and "f ∈ funs_term t"
shows "f ∈ funs_term s ∨ (∃ g ∈ funs_term s. f ∈ set (P g))"
using assms
proof (induction rule: term_variants_pred.induct)
case (term_variants_P T S P g h) thus ?case
proof (cases "f = g")
case False
then obtain s where "s ∈ set S" "f ∈ funs_term s"
using funs_term_subterms_eq(1)[of "Fun g S"] term_variants_P.prems by auto
thus ?thesis
using term_variants_P.IH term_variants_P.hyps(1) in_set_conv_nth[of s S] by force
qed simp
next
case (term_variants_Fun T S P h) thus ?case
proof (cases "f = h")
case False
then obtain s where "s ∈ set S" "f ∈ funs_term s"
using funs_term_subterms_eq(1)[of "Fun h S"] term_variants_Fun.prems by auto
thus ?thesis





2.5 Term Implication (Term Implication)




2.5.1 Single Term Implications
definition timpl_apply_term ("〈_ -- _〉〈_〉") where
"〈a -- b〉〈t〉 ≡ term_variants ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])) t"
definition timpl_apply_terms ("〈_ -- _〉〈_〉set") where




i. i < length T =⇒ S ! i ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈T ! i〉"
and "length T = length S"
shows "Fun f S ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈Fun f T〉"





i. i < length T =⇒ S ! i ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈T ! i〉"
and "length T = length S"
shows "Fun (Abs b) S ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈Fun (Abs a) T〉"
using assms(1) term_variants_P[OF assms(2), of "(λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])" "Abs b" "Abs a"]
unfolding timpl_apply_term_def term_variants_pred_iff_in_term_variants[symmetric]
by fastforce
lemma timpl_apply_refl: "t ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈t〉"
unfolding timpl_apply_term_def
by (metis term_variants_pred_refl term_variants_pred_iff_in_term_variants)
lemma timpl_apply_const: "Fun (Abs b) [] ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈Fun (Abs a) []〉"
using term_variants_pred_iff_in_term_variants term_variants_pred_const
unfolding timpl_apply_term_def by auto
lemma timpl_apply_const’:
"c = a =⇒ set 〈a -- b〉〈Fun (Abs c) []〉 = {Fun (Abs b) [], Fun (Abs c) []}"
"c 6= a =⇒ set 〈a -- b〉〈Fun (Abs c) []〉 = {Fun (Abs c) []}"
using term_variants_pred_const_cases[of "(λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])" "Abs c"]
term_variants_pred_iff_in_term_variants[of "(λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])"]
unfolding timpl_apply_term_def by auto
lemma timpl_apply_term_subst:
"s ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈t〉 =⇒ s · δ ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈t · δ〉"
by (metis term_variants_pred_iff_in_term_variants term_variants_pred_subst timpl_apply_term_def)
lemma timpl_apply_inv:
assumes "Fun h S ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈Fun f T〉"
shows "length T = length S"
and "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ S ! i ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈T ! i〉"
and "f 6= h =⇒ f = Abs a ∧ h = Abs b"
using assms term_variants_pred_iff_in_term_variants[of "(λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])"]
unfolding timpl_apply_term_def




assumes "s ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈Fun f T〉"
shows "∃ g S. s = Fun g S"
proof -
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have *: "term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])) (Fun f T) s"
using assms term_variants_pred_iff_in_term_variants[of "(λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])"]
unfolding timpl_apply_term_def by force
show ?thesis using term_variants_pred.cases[OF *, of ?thesis] by fastforce
qed
lemma timpl_apply_term_Var_iff:
"Var x ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈t〉 ←→ t = Var x"
using term_variants_pred_inv_Var term_variants_pred_iff_in_term_variants
unfolding timpl_apply_term_def by metis
2.5.2 Term Implication Closure
inductive set timpl_closure for t TI where
FP: "t ∈ timpl_closure t TI"
| TI: " [[u ∈ timpl_closure t TI; (a,b) ∈ TI; term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])) u s ]]
=⇒ s ∈ timpl_closure t TI"
definition "timpl_closure_set M TI ≡ (⋃ t ∈ M. timpl_closure t TI)"
inductive set timpl_closure’_step for TI where
" [[(a,b) ∈ TI; term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])) t s ]]
=⇒ (t,s) ∈ timpl_closure’_step TI"
definition "timpl_closure’ TI ≡ (timpl_closure’_step TI)∗"
definition comp_timpl_closure where
"comp_timpl_closure FP TI ≡
let f = λX. FP ∪ (⋃ x ∈ X. ⋃ (a,b) ∈ TI. set 〈a -- b〉〈x〉)
in while (λX. f X 6= X) f {}"
definition comp_timpl_closure_list where
"comp_timpl_closure_list FP TI ≡
let f = λX. remdups (concat (map (λx. concat (map (λ(a,b). 〈a -- b〉〈x〉) TI)) X))
in while (λX. set (f X) 6= set X) f FP"
lemma timpl_closure_setI:
"t ∈ M =⇒ t ∈ timpl_closure_set M TI"
unfolding timpl_closure_set_def by (auto intro: timpl_closure.FP)
lemma timpl_closure_set_empty_timpls:
"timpl_closure t {} = {t}" ( is "?A = ?B")
proof (intro subset_antisym subsetI)
fix s show "s ∈ ?A =⇒ s ∈ ?B"
by (induct s rule: timpl_closure.induct) auto
qed (simp add: timpl_closure.FP)
lemmas timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union = meta_eq_to_obj_eq[OF timpl_closure_set_def]
lemma term_variants_pred_eq_case_Abs:
fixes a b
defines "P ≡ (λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])"
assumes "term_variants_pred P t s" "∀ f ∈ funs_term s. ¬is_Abs f"
shows "t = s"
using assms(2,3) P_def
proof (induction P t s rule: term_variants_pred.induct)
case (term_variants_Fun T S f)
have "¬is_Abs h" when i: "i < length S" and h: "h ∈ funs_term (S ! i)" for i h
using i h term_variants_Fun.hyps(4) by auto
hence "T ! i = S ! i" when i: "i < length T" for i using i term_variants_Fun.hyps(1,3) by auto
hence "T = S" using term_variants_Fun.hyps(1) nth_equalityI[of T S] by fast
thus ?case using term_variants_Fun.hyps(1) by blast
qed (simp_all add: term_variants_pred_refl)
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lemma timpl_closure’_step_inv:
assumes "(t,s) ∈ timpl_closure’_step TI"
obtains a b where "(a,b) ∈ TI" "term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])) t s"
using assms by (auto elim: timpl_closure’_step.cases)
lemma timpl_closure_mono:
assumes "TI ⊆ TI’"
shows "timpl_closure t TI ⊆ timpl_closure t TI’"
proof
fix s show "s ∈ timpl_closure t TI =⇒ s ∈ timpl_closure t TI’"
apply (induct rule: timpl_closure.induct)
using assms by (auto intro: timpl_closure.intros)
qed
lemma timpl_closure_set_mono:
assumes "M ⊆ M’" "TI ⊆ TI’"
shows "timpl_closure_set M TI ⊆ timpl_closure_set M’ TI’"
using assms(1) timpl_closure_mono[OF assms(2)] unfolding timpl_closure_set_def by fast
lemma timpl_closure_idem:
"timpl_closure_set (timpl_closure t TI) TI = timpl_closure t TI" ( is "?A = ?B")
proof
have "s ∈ timpl_closure t TI"
when "s ∈ timpl_closure u TI" "u ∈ timpl_closure t TI"
for s u
using that
by (induction rule: timpl_closure.induct)
(auto intro: timpl_closure.intros)
thus "?A ⊆ ?B" unfolding timpl_closure_set_def by blast
show "?B ⊆ ?A"
unfolding timpl_closure_set_def
by (blast intro: timpl_closure.FP)
qed
lemma timpl_closure_set_idem:
"timpl_closure_set (timpl_closure_set M TI) TI = timpl_closure_set M TI"
using timpl_closure_idem[of _ TI]unfolding timpl_closure_set_def by auto
lemma timpl_closure_set_mono_timpl_closure_set:
assumes N: "N ⊆ timpl_closure_set M TI"
shows "timpl_closure_set N TI ⊆ timpl_closure_set M TI"
using timpl_closure_set_mono[OF N, of TI TI] timpl_closure_set_idem[of M TI]
by simp
lemma timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’:
"s ∈ timpl_closure t TI ←→ (t,s) ∈ timpl_closure’ TI"
proof
show "s ∈ timpl_closure t TI =⇒ (t,s) ∈ timpl_closure’ TI"
unfolding timpl_closure’_def
by (induct rule: timpl_closure.induct)
(auto intro: rtrancl_into_rtrancl timpl_closure’_step.intros)
show "(t,s) ∈ timpl_closure’ TI =⇒ s ∈ timpl_closure t TI"
unfolding timpl_closure’_def





assumes "TI ⊆ TI’"
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shows "timpl_closure’ TI ⊆ timpl_closure’ TI’"
using timpl_closure_mono[OF assms]
timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’[of _ _ TI]
timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’[of _ _ TI’]
by fast
lemma timpl_closureton_is_timpl_closure:
"timpl_closure_set {t} TI = timpl_closure t TI"
by (simp add: timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union)
lemma timpl_closure’_timpls_trancl_subset:
"timpl_closure’ (c+) ⊆ timpl_closure’ c"
unfolding timpl_closure’_def
proof
fix s t::"((’a,’b,’c) prot_fun,’d) term"
show "(s,t) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step (c+))∗ =⇒ (s,t) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step c)∗"
proof (induction rule: rtrancl_induct)
case (step u t)
obtain a b where ab:
"(a,b) ∈ c+" "term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])) u t"
using step.hyps(2) timpl_closure’_step_inv by blast
hence "(u,t) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step c)∗"
proof (induction arbitrary: t rule: trancl_induct)
case (step d e)
obtain s where s:
"term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs d])) u s"
"term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs d := [Abs e])) s t"
using term_variants_pred_dense’[OF step.prems, of "Abs d"] by blast
have "(u,s) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step c)∗"
"(s,t) ∈ timpl_closure’_step c"
using step.hyps(2) s(2) step.IH[OF s(1)]
by (auto intro: timpl_closure’_step.intros)
thus ?case by simp
qed (auto intro: timpl_closure’_step.intros)




"timpl_closure’ {(a,b) ∈ c+. a 6= b} ⊆ timpl_closure’ c"
using timpl_closure’_timpls_trancl_subset
timpl_closure’_mono[of "{(a,b) ∈ c+. a 6= b}" "c+"]
by fast
lemma timpl_closure_set_timpls_trancl_subset:
"timpl_closure_set M (c+) ⊆ timpl_closure_set M c"
using timpl_closure’_timpls_trancl_subset[of c]
timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’[of _ _ c]





"timpl_closure_set M {(a,b) ∈ c+. a 6= b} ⊆ timpl_closure_set M c"
using timpl_closure’_timpls_trancl_subset’[of c]
timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’[of _ _ c]
timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’[of _ _ "{(a,b) ∈ c+. a 6= b}"]
timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union[of M c]
timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union[of M "{(a,b) ∈ c+. a 6= b}"]
by fastforce
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lemma timpl_closure’_timpls_trancl_supset’:
"timpl_closure’ c ⊆ timpl_closure’ {(a,b) ∈ c+. a 6= b}"
unfolding timpl_closure’_def
proof
let ?cl = "{(a,b) ∈ c+. a 6= b}"
fix s t::"((’e,’f,’c) prot_fun,’g) term"
show "(s,t) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step c)∗ =⇒ (s,t) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step ?cl)∗"
proof (induction rule: rtrancl_induct)
case (step u t)
obtain a b where ab:
"(a,b) ∈ c" "term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])) u t"
using step.hyps(2) timpl_closure’_step_inv by blast
hence "(a,b) ∈ c+" by simp
hence "(u,t) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step ?cl)∗" using ab(2)
proof (induction arbitrary: t rule: trancl_induct)
case (base d) show ?case
proof (cases "a = d")
case True thus ?thesis
using base term_variants_pred_refl_inv[of _ u t]
by force
next
case False thus ?thesis




case (step d e)
obtain s where s:
"term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs d])) u s"
"term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs d := [Abs e])) s t"
using term_variants_pred_dense’[OF step.prems, of "Abs d"] by blast
show ?case
proof (cases "d = e")
case True
thus ?thesis




hence "(u,s) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step ?cl)∗"
"(s,t) ∈ timpl_closure’_step ?cl"
using step.hyps(2) s(2) step.IH[OF s(1)]
by (auto intro: timpl_closure’_step.intros)
thus ?thesis by simp
qed
qed




"timpl_closure’ c ⊆ timpl_closure’ (c+)"
using timpl_closure’_timpls_trancl_supset’[of c]
timpl_closure’_mono[of "{(a,b) ∈ c+. a 6= b}" "c+"]
by fast
lemma timpl_closure’_timpls_trancl_eq:
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lemma timpl_closure’_timpls_trancl_eq’:




"timpl_closure’ (c∗) ⊆ timpl_closure’ c"
unfolding timpl_closure’_def
proof
fix s t::"((’a,’b,’c) prot_fun,’d) term"
show "(s,t) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step (c∗))∗ =⇒ (s,t) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step c)∗"
proof (induction rule: rtrancl_induct)
case (step u t)
obtain a b where ab:
"(a,b) ∈ c∗" "term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])) u t"
using step.hyps(2) timpl_closure’_step_inv by blast
hence "(u,t) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step c)∗"
proof (induction arbitrary: t rule: rtrancl_induct)
case base
hence "u = t" using term_variants_pred_refl_inv by fastforce
thus ?case by simp
next
case (step d e)
obtain s where s:
"term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs d])) u s"
"term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs d := [Abs e])) s t"
using term_variants_pred_dense’[OF step.prems, of "Abs d"] by blast
have "(u,s) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step c)∗"
"(s,t) ∈ timpl_closure’_step c"
using step.hyps(2) s(2) step.IH[OF s(1)]
by (auto intro: timpl_closure’_step.intros)
thus ?case by simp
qed




"timpl_closure’ c ⊆ timpl_closure’ (c∗)"
unfolding timpl_closure’_def
proof
fix s t::"((’e,’f,’c) prot_fun,’g) term"
show "(s,t) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step c)∗ =⇒ (s,t) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step (c∗))∗"
proof (induction rule: rtrancl_induct)
case (step u t)
obtain a b where ab:
"(a,b) ∈ c" "term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])) u t"
using step.hyps(2) timpl_closure’_step_inv by blast
hence "(a,b) ∈ c∗" by simp
hence "(u,t) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step (c∗))∗" using ab(2)
proof (induction arbitrary: t rule: rtrancl_induct)
case (base t) thus ?case using term_variants_pred_refl_inv[of _ u t] by fastforce
next
case (step d e)
obtain s where s:
"term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs d])) u s"
"term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs d := [Abs e])) s t"
using term_variants_pred_dense’[OF step.prems, of "Abs d"] by blast
show ?case
proof (cases "d = e")
case True
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thus ?thesis




hence "(u,s) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step (c∗))∗"
"(s,t) ∈ timpl_closure’_step (c∗)"
using step.hyps(2) s(2) step.IH[OF s(1)]
by (auto intro: timpl_closure’_step.intros)
thus ?thesis by simp
qed
qed








"timpl_closure t (c+) = timpl_closure t c"
using timpl_closure’_timpls_trancl_eq[of c]
timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’[of _ _ c]
timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’[of _ _ "c+"]
by fastforce
lemma timpl_closure_set_timpls_trancl_eq:






"timpl_closure_set M {(a,b) ∈ c+. a 6= b} = timpl_closure_set M c"
using timpl_closure’_timpls_trancl_eq’[of c]
timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’[of _ _ c]
timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’[of _ _ "{(a,b) ∈ c+. a 6= b}"]
timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union[of M c]
timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union[of M "{(a,b) ∈ c+. a 6= b}"]
by fastforce
lemma timpl_closure_Var_in_iff:
"Var x ∈ timpl_closure t TI ←→ t = Var x" ( is "?A ←→ ?B")
proof
have "s ∈ timpl_closure t TI =⇒ s = Var x =⇒ s = t" for s
apply (induction rule: timpl_closure.induct)
by (simp, metis term_variants_pred_inv_Var(2))
thus "?A =⇒ ?B" by blast
qed (blast intro: timpl_closure.FP)
lemma timpl_closure_set_Var_in_iff:
"Var x ∈ timpl_closure_set M TI ←→ Var x ∈ M"
unfolding timpl_closure_set_def by (simp add: timpl_closure_Var_in_iff[of x _ TI])
lemma timpl_closure_Var_inv:
assumes "t ∈ timpl_closure (Var x) TI"
shows "t = Var x"
using assms
proof (induction rule: timpl_closure.induct)
case (TI u a b s) thus ?case using term_variants_pred_inv_Var by fast
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qed simp
lemma timpls_Un_mono: "mono (λX. FP ∪ (⋃ x ∈ X. ⋃ (a,b) ∈ TI. set 〈a -- b〉〈x〉))"
by (auto intro!: monoI)
lemma timpl_closure_set_lfp:
fixes M TI
defines "f ≡ λX. M ∪ (⋃ x ∈ X. ⋃ (a,b) ∈ TI. set 〈a -- b〉〈x〉)"
shows "lfp f = timpl_closure_set M TI"
proof
note 0 = timpls_Un_mono[of M TI, unfolded f_def[symmetric]]
let ?N = "timpl_closure_set M TI"
show "lfp f ⊆ ?N"
proof (induction rule: lfp_induct)
case 2 thus ?case
proof
fix t assume "t ∈ f (lfp f ∩ ?N)"
hence "t ∈ M ∨ t ∈ (⋃ x ∈ ?N. ⋃ (a,b) ∈ TI. set 〈a -- b〉〈x〉)" ( is "?A ∨ ?B")
unfolding f_def by blast
thus "t ∈ ?N"
proof
assume ?B
then obtain s a b where s: "s ∈ ?N" "(a,b) ∈ TI" "t ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈s〉" by moura
thus ?thesis
using term_variants_pred_iff_in_term_variants[of "(λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])" s]
unfolding timpl_closure_set_def timpl_apply_term_def
by (auto intro: timpl_closure.intros)
qed (auto simp add: timpl_closure_set_def intro: timpl_closure.intros)
qed
qed (rule 0)
have "t ∈ lfp f" when t: "t ∈ timpl_closure s TI" and s: "s ∈ M" for t s
using t
proof (induction t rule: timpl_closure.induct)
case (TI u a b v) thus ?case
using term_variants_pred_iff_in_term_variants[of "(λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])"]
lfp_fixpoint[OF 0]
unfolding timpl_apply_term_def f_def by fastforce
qed (use s lfp_fixpoint[OF 0] f_def in blast)
thus "?N ⊆ lfp f" unfolding timpl_closure_set_def by blast
qed
lemma timpl_closure_set_supset:
assumes "∀ t ∈ FP. t ∈ closure"
and "∀ t ∈ closure. ∀ (a,b) ∈ TI. ∀ s ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈t〉. s ∈ closure"
shows "timpl_closure_set FP TI ⊆ closure"
proof -
have "t ∈ closure" when t: "t ∈ timpl_closure s TI" and s: "s ∈ FP" for t s
using t
proof (induction rule: timpl_closure.induct)
case FP thus ?case using s assms(1) by blast
next
case (TI u a b s’) thus ?case
using assms(2) term_variants_pred_iff_in_term_variants[of "(λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])"]
unfolding timpl_apply_term_def by fastforce
qed
thus ?thesis unfolding timpl_closure_set_def by blast
qed
lemma timpl_closure_set_supset’:
assumes "∀ t ∈ FP. ∀ (a,b) ∈ TI. ∀ s ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈t〉. s ∈ FP"
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shows "timpl_closure_set FP TI ⊆ FP"
using timpl_closure_set_supset[OF _ assms] by blast
lemma timpl_closure’_param:
assumes "(t,s) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"
and fg: "f = g ∨ (∃ a b. (a,b) ∈ c ∧ f = Abs a ∧ g = Abs b)"
shows "(Fun f (S@t#T), Fun g (S@s#T)) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"
using assms(1) unfolding timpl_closure’_def
proof (induction rule: rtrancl_induct)
case base thus ?case
proof (cases "f = g")
case False
then obtain a b where ab: "(a,b) ∈ c" "f = Abs a" "g = Abs b"
using fg by moura
show ?thesis





case (step u s)
obtain a b where ab: "(a,b) ∈ c" "term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])) u s"
using timpl_closure’_step_inv[OF step.hyps(2)] by blast
have "(Fun g (S@u#T), Fun g (S@s#T)) ∈ timpl_closure’_step c"
using ab(1) term_variants_pred_param[OF ab(2), of g g S T]
by (auto simp add: timpl_closure’_def intro: timpl_closure’_step.intros)
thus ?case using rtrancl_into_rtrancl[OF step.IH] fg by blast
qed
lemma timpl_closure’_param’:
assumes "(t,s) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"
shows "(Fun f (S@t#T), Fun f (S@s#T)) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"




i. i < length T =⇒ (T ! i, S ! i) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"
and len: "length T = length S"
and fg: "f = g ∨ (∃ a b. (a,b) ∈ c+ ∧ f = Abs a ∧ g = Abs b)"
shows "(Fun f T, Fun g S) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"
proof -
have aux: "(Fun f T, Fun g (take n S@drop n T)) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"




have "(T ! n, T ! n) ∈ timpl_closure’ c" when n: "n < length T" for n
using n unfolding timpl_closure’_def by simp
hence "(Fun f T, Fun g T) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"
proof (cases "f = g")
case False
then obtain a b where ab: "(a, b) ∈ c+" "f = Abs a" "g = Abs b"
using fg by moura
show ?thesis
using timpl_closure’_step.intros[OF ab(1), of "Fun f T" "Fun g T"] ab(2,3)
term_variants_P[OF _ term_variants_pred_refl[of "(λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])"],
of T g f]
timpl_closure’_timpls_trancl_eq
unfolding timpl_closure’_def
by (metis fun_upd_same list.set_intros(1) r_into_rtrancl)
qed (simp add: timpl_closure’_def)
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hence IH’: "(Fun f T, Fun g (take n S@drop n T)) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"
and n: "n < length T" "n < length S"
by (simp_all add: len)
obtain T1 T2 where T: "T = T1@T ! n#T2" "length T1 = n"
using length_prefix_ex’[OF n(1)] by auto
obtain S1 S2 where S: "S = S1@S ! n#S2" "length S1 = n"
using length_prefix_ex’[OF n(2)] by auto
have "take n S@drop n T = S1@T ! n#T2" "take (Suc n) S@drop (Suc n) T = S1@S ! n#T2"
using n T S append_eq_conv_conj
by (metis, metis (no_types, hide_lams) Cons_nth_drop_Suc append.assoc append_Cons
append_Nil take_Suc_conv_app_nth)
moreover have "(T ! n, S ! n) ∈ timpl_closure’ c" using IH Suc.prems by simp
ultimately show ?case
using timpl_closure’_param IH’(1)
by (metis (no_types, lifting) timpl_closure’_def rtrancl_trans)
qed





i. i < length T =⇒ (T ! i, S ! i) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"
and len: "length T = length S"
shows "(Fun f T, Fun f S) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"
using timpl_closure_FunI[OF IH len] by simp
lemma timpl_closure_FunI2:
fixes f g::"(’a, ’b, ’c) prot_fun"
assumes IH: "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ ∃ u. (T!i, u) ∈ timpl_closure’ c ∧ (S!i, u) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"
and len: "length T = length S"
and fg: "f = g ∨ (∃ a b d. (a, d) ∈ c+ ∧ (b, d) ∈ c+ ∧ f = Abs a ∧ g = Abs b)"
shows "∃ h U. (Fun f T, Fun h U) ∈ timpl_closure’ c ∧ (Fun g S, Fun h U) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"
proof -
let ?P = "λi u. (T ! i, u) ∈ timpl_closure’ c ∧ (S ! i, u) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"
define U where "U ≡ map (λi. SOME u. ?P i u) [0..<length T]"
have U1: "length U = length T"
unfolding U_def by auto
have U2: "(T ! i, U ! i) ∈ timpl_closure’ c ∧ (S ! i, U ! i) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"
when i: "i < length U" for i
using i someI_ex[of "?P i"] IH[of i] U1 len
unfolding U_def by simp
show ?thesis
proof (cases "f = g")
case False
then obtain a b d where abd: "(a, d) ∈ c+" "(b, d) ∈ c+" "f = Abs a" "g = Abs b"
using fg by moura
define h::"(’a, ’b, ’c) prot_fun" where "h = Abs d"
have "f = h ∨ (∃ a b. (a, b) ∈ c+ ∧ f = Abs a ∧ h = Abs b)"
"g = h ∨ (∃ a b. (a, b) ∈ c+ ∧ g = Abs a ∧ h = Abs b)"
using abd unfolding h_def by blast+
thus ?thesis by (metis timpl_closure_FunI len U1 U2)
qed (metis timpl_closure_FunI’ len U1 U2)
qed
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lemma timpl_closure_FunI3:
fixes f g::"(’a, ’b, ’c) prot_fun"
assumes IH: "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ ∃ u. (T!i, u) ∈ timpl_closure’ c ∧ (S!i, u) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"
and len: "length T = length S"
and fg: "f = g ∨ (∃ a b d. (a, d) ∈ c ∧ (b, d) ∈ c ∧ f = Abs a ∧ g = Abs b)"
shows "∃ h U. (Fun f T, Fun h U) ∈ timpl_closure’ c ∧ (Fun g S, Fun h U) ∈ timpl_closure’ c"
using timpl_closure_FunI2[OF IH len] fg unfolding timpl_closure’_timpls_trancl_eq by blast
lemma timpl_closure_fv_eq:
assumes "s ∈ timpl_closure t T"
shows "fv s = fv t"
using assms
by (induct rule: timpl_closure.induct)
(metis, metis term_variants_pred_fv_eq)
lemma ( in stateful_protocol_model) timpl_closure_subst:
assumes t: "wf trm t" "∀ x ∈ fv t. ∃ a. Γv x = TAtom (Atom a)"
and δ: "wtsubst δ" "wf trms (subst_range δ)"
shows "timpl_closure (t · δ) T = timpl_closure t T ·set δ"
proof
have "s ∈ timpl_closure t T ·set δ"
when "s ∈ timpl_closure (t · δ) T" for s
using that
proof (induction s rule: timpl_closure.induct)
case FP thus ?case using timpl_closure.FP[of t T] by simp
next
case (TI u a b s)
then obtain u’ where u’: "u’ ∈ timpl_closure t T" "u = u’ · δ" by moura
have u’_fv: "∀ x ∈ fv u’. ∃ a. Γv x = TAtom (Atom a)"
using timpl_closure_fv_eq[OF u’(1)] t(2) by simp
hence u_fv: "∀ x ∈ fv u. ∃ a. Γv x = TAtom (Atom a)"
using u’(2) wt_subst_trm’’[OF δ(1)] wt_subst_const_fv_type_eq[OF _ δ(1,2), of u’]
by fastforce
have "∀ x ∈ fv u’ ∪ fv s. (∃ y. δ x = Var y) ∨ (∃ f. δ x = Fun f [] ∧ Abs a 6= f)"
proof (intro ballI)
fix x assume x: "x ∈ fv u’ ∪ fv s"
then obtain c where c: "Γv x = TAtom (Atom c)"
using u’_fv u_fv term_variants_pred_fv_eq[OF TI.hyps(3)]
by blast
show "(∃ y. δ x = Var y) ∨ (∃ f. δ x = Fun f [] ∧ Abs a 6= f)"
proof (cases "δ x")
case (Fun f T)
hence **: "Γ (Fun f T) = TAtom (Atom c)" and "wf trm (Fun f T)"
using c wt_subst_trm’’[OF δ(1), of "Var x"] δ(2)
by fastforce+
hence "δ x = Fun f []" using Fun const_type_inv_wf by metis
thus ?thesis using ** by force
qed metis
qed
hence *: "∀ x ∈ fv u’ ∪ fv s.
(∃ y. δ x = Var y) ∨ (∃ f. δ x = Fun f [] ∧ ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])) f = [])"
by fastforce
obtain s’ where s’: "term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])) u’ s’" "s = s’ · δ"
using term_variants_pred_subst’[OF _ *] u’(2) TI.hyps(3)
by blast
show ?case using timpl_closure.TI[OF u’(1) TI.hyps(2) s’(1)] s’(2) by blast
qed
thus "timpl_closure (t · δ) T ⊆ timpl_closure t T ·set δ" by fast
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have "s ∈ timpl_closure (t · δ) T"
when s: "s ∈ timpl_closure t T ·set δ" for s
proof -
obtain s’ where s’: "s’ ∈ timpl_closure t T" "s = s’ · δ" using s by moura
have "s’ · δ ∈ timpl_closure (t · δ) T" using s’(1)
proof (induction s’ rule: timpl_closure.induct)
case FP thus ?case using timpl_closure.FP[of "t · δ" T] by simp
next
case (TI u’ a b s’) show ?case




thus ?thesis using s’(2) by metis
qed
thus "timpl_closure t T ·set δ ⊆ timpl_closure (t · δ) T" by fast
qed
lemma ( in stateful_protocol_model) timpl_closure_subst_subset:
assumes t: "t ∈ M"
and M: "wf trms M" "∀ x ∈ fvset M. ∃ a. Γv x = TAtom (Atom a)"
and δ: "wtsubst δ" "wf trms (subst_range δ)" "ground (subst_range δ)" "subst_domain δ ⊆ fvset M"
and M_supset: "timpl_closure t T ⊆ M"
shows "timpl_closure (t · δ) T ⊆ M ·set δ"
proof -
have t’: "wf trm t" "∀ x ∈ fv t. ∃ a. Γv x = TAtom (Atom a)" using t M by auto
show ?thesis using timpl_closure_subst[OF t’ δ(1,2), of T] M_supset by blast
qed
lemma ( in stateful_protocol_model) timpl_closure_set_subst_subset:
assumes M: "wf trms M" "∀ x ∈ fvset M. ∃ a. Γv x = TAtom (Atom a)"
and δ: "wtsubst δ" "wf trms (subst_range δ)" "ground (subst_range δ)" "subst_domain δ ⊆ fvset M"
and M_supset: "timpl_closure_set M T ⊆ M"
shows "timpl_closure_set (M ·set δ) T ⊆ M ·set δ"
using timpl_closure_subst_subset[OF _ M δ, of _ T] M_supset






Ms) T = (
⋃







assumes "s ∈ timpl_closure_set (⋃ {M ·set δ | δ. P δ}) T"
shows "∃ δ. P δ ∧ s ∈ timpl_closure_set (M ·set δ) T"
using assms timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union[of "(
⋃




assumes "s ∈ timpl_closure_set {t · δ | δ. P δ} T"
shows "∃ δ. P δ ∧ s ∈ timpl_closure_set {t · δ} T"




assumes "(s, t) ∈ timpl_closure’ TI"
shows "(∃ x. s = Var x ∧ t = Var x) ∨ (∃ f g S T. s = Fun f S ∧ t = Fun g T ∧ length S = length T)"
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using assms unfolding timpl_closure’_def
proof (induction rule: rtrancl_induct)
case base thus ?case by (cases s) auto
next
case (step t u)
obtain a b where ab: "(a, b) ∈ TI" "term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])) t u"
using timpl_closure’_step_inv[OF step.hyps(2)] by blast
show ?case using step.IH
proof
assume "∃ x. s = Var x ∧ t = Var x"
thus ?case using step.hyps(2) term_variants_pred_inv_Var ab by fastforce
next
assume "∃ f g S T. s = Fun f S ∧ t = Fun g T ∧ length S = length T"
then obtain f g S T where st: "s = Fun f S" "t = Fun g T" "length S = length T" by moura
thus ?case





assumes "(s, t) ∈ timpl_closure’ TI"
shows "(∃ x. s = Var x ∧ t = Var x) ∨
(∃ f g S T. s = Fun f S ∧ t = Fun g T ∧ length S = length T ∧
(∀ i < length T. (S ! i, T ! i) ∈ timpl_closure’ TI) ∧
(f 6= g −→ is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ (the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ TI+))"
( is "?A s t ∨ ?B s t (timpl_closure’ TI)")
using assms unfolding timpl_closure’_def
proof (induction rule: rtrancl_induct)
case base thus ?case by (cases s) auto
next
case (step t u)
obtain a b where ab: "(a, b) ∈ TI" "term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])) t u"
using timpl_closure’_step_inv[OF step.hyps(2)] by blast
show ?case using step.IH
proof
assume "?A s t"
thus ?case using step.hyps(2) term_variants_pred_inv_Var ab by fastforce
next
assume "?B s t ((timpl_closure’_step TI)∗)"
then obtain f g S T where st:
"s = Fun f S" "t = Fun g T" "length S = length T"
"
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ (S ! i, T ! i) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step TI)∗"
"f 6= g =⇒ is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ (the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ TI+"
by moura
obtain h U where u:
"u = Fun h U" "length T = length U"
"
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])) (T ! i) (U ! i)"
"g 6= h =⇒ is_Abs g ∧ is_Abs h ∧ (the_Abs g, the_Abs h) ∈ TI+"
using ab(2) st(2) r_into_trancl[OF ab(1)]
term_variants_pred_inv’(1,2,3,4)[of "(λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])" g T u]
term_variants_pred_inv’(5)[of "(λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])" g T u "Abs a" "Abs b"]
unfolding is_Abs_def the_Abs_def by force
have "(S ! i, U ! i) ∈ (timpl_closure’_step TI)∗" when i: "i < length U" for i
using u(2) i rtrancl.rtrancl_into_rtrancl[OF
st(4)[of i] timpl_closure’_step.intros[OF ab(1) u(3)[of i]]]
by argo
moreover have "length S = length U" using st u by argo
moreover have "is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs h ∧ (the_Abs f, the_Abs h) ∈ TI+" when fh: "f 6= h"
using fh st u by fastforce
ultimately show ?case using st(1) u(1) by blast
qed
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qed
lemma timpl_closure’_inv’’:
assumes "(Fun f S, Fun g T) ∈ timpl_closure’ TI"
shows "length S = length T"
and "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ (S ! i, T ! i) ∈ timpl_closure’ TI"
and "f 6= g =⇒ is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ (the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ TI+"
using assms timpl_closure’_inv’ by auto
lemma timpl_closure_Fun_inv:
assumes "s ∈ timpl_closure (Fun f T) TI"
shows "∃ g S. s = Fun g S"
using assms timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’ timpl_closure’_inv
by fastforce
lemma timpl_closure_Fun_inv’:
assumes "Fun g S ∈ timpl_closure (Fun f T) TI"
shows "length S = length T"
and "
∧
i. i < length S =⇒ S ! i ∈ timpl_closure (T ! i) TI"
and "f 6= g =⇒ is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ (the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ TI+"
using assms timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’
by (metis timpl_closure’_inv’’(1), metis timpl_closure’_inv’’(2), metis timpl_closure’_inv’’(3))
lemma timpl_closure_Fun_not_Var[simp]:
"Fun f T /∈ timpl_closure (Var x) TI"
using timpl_closure_Var_inv by fast
lemma timpl_closure_Var_not_Fun[simp]:
"Var x /∈ timpl_closure (Fun f T) TI"
using timpl_closure_Fun_inv by fast
lemma ( in stateful_protocol_model) timpl_closure_wf_trms:
assumes m: "wf trm m"
shows "wf trms (timpl_closure m TI)"
proof
fix t assume "t ∈ timpl_closure m TI"
thus "wf trm t"
proof (induction t rule: timpl_closure.induct)
case TI thus ?case using term_variants_pred_wf_trms by force
qed (rule m)
qed
lemma ( in stateful_protocol_model) timpl_closure_set_wf_trms:
assumes M: "wf trms M"
shows "wf trms (timpl_closure_set M TI)"
proof
fix t assume "t ∈ timpl_closure_set M TI"
then obtain m where "t ∈ timpl_closure m TI" "m ∈ M" "wf trm m"
using M timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union by blast
thus "wf trm t" using timpl_closure_wf_trms by blast
qed
lemma timpl_closure_Fu_inv:
assumes "t ∈ timpl_closure (Fun (Fu f) T) TI"
shows "∃ S. length S = length T ∧ t = Fun (Fu f) S"
using assms
proof (induction t rule: timpl_closure.induct)
case (TI u a b s)
then obtain U where U: "length U = length T" "u = Fun (Fu f) U"
by moura
hence *: "term_variants_pred ((λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])) (Fun (Fu f) U) s"
using TI.hyps(3) by meson
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show ?case




assumes "Fun (Fu f) T ∈ timpl_closure t TI"
shows "∃ S. length S = length T ∧ t = Fun (Fu f) S"
using assms
proof (induction "Fun (Fu f) T" arbitrary: T rule: timpl_closure.induct)
case (TI u a b)
obtain g U where U:
"u = Fun g U" "length U = length T"
"Fu f 6= g =⇒ Abs a = g ∧ Fu f = Abs b"
using term_variants_pred_inv’’[OF TI.hyps(4)] by fastforce
have g: "g = Fu f" using U(3) by blast
show ?case using TI.hyps(2)[OF U(1)[unfolded g]] U(2) by auto
qed simp
lemma timpl_closure_no_Abs_eq:
assumes "t ∈ timpl_closure s TI"
and "∀ f ∈ funs_term t. ¬is_Abs f"
shows "t = s"
using assms
proof (induction t rule: timpl_closure.induct)
case (TI t a b s) thus ?case





assumes "t ∈ timpl_closure_set FP TI"
and "∀ f ∈ funs_term t. ¬is_Abs f"
shows "t ∈ FP"




(funs_term ‘ (timpl_closure t TI)) ⊆ funs_term t ∪ Abs ‘ snd ‘ TI"
( is "?A ⊆ ?B ∪ ?C")
proof
fix f assume "f ∈ ?A"
then obtain s where "s ∈ timpl_closure t TI" "f ∈ funs_term s" by moura
thus "f ∈ ?B ∪ ?C"
proof (induction s rule: timpl_closure.induct)
case (TI u a b s)
have "Abs b ∈ Abs ‘ snd ‘ TI" using TI.hyps(2) by force






(funs_term ‘ (timpl_closure_set FP TI)) ⊆ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ FP) ∪ Abs ‘ snd ‘ TI"




defines "absc ≡ λa. Fun (Abs a) []"
assumes OCC1: "∀ t ∈ FP. ∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ f ∈ Abs ‘ OCC"
and OCC2: "snd ‘ TI ⊆ OCC"
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shows "∀ t ∈ timpl_closure_set FP TI. ∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ f ∈ Abs ‘ OCC" ( is ?A)
and "∀ t ∈ absc ‘ OCC. ∀ (a,b) ∈ TI. ∀ s ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈t〉. s ∈ absc ‘ OCC" ( is ?B)
proof -
let ?F = "
⋃
(funs_term ‘ FP)"
let ?G = "Abs ‘ snd ‘ TI"
show ?A
proof (intro ballI impI)
fix t f assume t: "t ∈ timpl_closure_set FP TI" and f: "f ∈ funs_term t" "is_Abs f"
hence "f ∈ ?F ∨ f ∈ ?G" using timpl_closure_set_funs_term_subset[of FP TI] by auto
thus "f ∈ Abs ‘ OCC"
proof
assume "f ∈ ?F" thus ?thesis using OCC1 f(2) by fast
next
assume "f ∈ ?G" thus ?thesis using OCC2 by auto
qed
qed
{ fix s t a b
assume t: "t ∈ absc ‘ OCC"
and ab: "(a, b) ∈ TI"
and s: "s ∈ set 〈a -- b〉〈t〉"
obtain c where c: "t = absc c" "c ∈ OCC" using t by moura
hence "s = absc b ∨ s = absc c"
using ab s timpl_apply_const’[of c a b] unfolding absc_def by auto
moreover have "b ∈ OCC" using ab OCC2 by auto
ultimately have "s ∈ absc ‘ OCC" using c(2) by blast
} thus ?B by blast
qed
lemma ( in stateful_protocol_model) intruder_synth_timpl_closure_set:
fixes M::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_terms" and t::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term"
assumes "M `c t"
and "s ∈ timpl_closure t TI"
shows "timpl_closure_set M TI `c s"
using assms
proof (induction t arbitrary: s rule: intruder_synth_induct)
case (AxiomC t)
hence "s ∈ timpl_closure_set M TI"
using timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union[of M TI]
by blast
thus ?case by simp
next
case (ComposeC T f)
obtain g S where s: "s = Fun g S"
using timpl_closure_Fun_inv[OF ComposeC.prems] by moura
hence s’:
"f = g" "length S = length T"
"
∧
i. i < length S =⇒ S ! i ∈ timpl_closure (T ! i) TI"
using timpl_closure_Fun_inv’[of g S f T TI] ComposeC.prems ComposeC.hyps(2)
unfolding is_Abs_def by fastforce+
have "timpl_closure_set M TI `c u" when u: "u ∈ set S" for u
using ComposeC.IH u s’(2,3) in_set_conv_nth[of _ T] in_set_conv_nth[of u S] by auto
thus ?case
using s s’(1,2) ComposeC.hyps(1,2) intruder_synth.ComposeC[of S g "timpl_closure_set M TI"]
by argo
qed
lemma ( in stateful_protocol_model) intruder_synth_timpl_closure’:
fixes M::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_terms" and t::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term"
assumes "timpl_closure_set M TI `c t"
and "s ∈ timpl_closure t TI"
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shows "timpl_closure_set M TI `c s"
by (metis intruder_synth_timpl_closure_set[OF assms] timpl_closure_set_idem)
lemma timpl_closure_set_absc_subset_in:
defines "absc ≡ λa. Fun (Abs a) []"
assumes A: "timpl_closure_set (absc ‘ A) TI ⊆ absc ‘ A"
and a: "a ∈ A" "(a,b) ∈ TI+"
shows "b ∈ A"
proof -
have "timpl_closure (absc a) (TI+) ⊆ absc ‘ A"
using a(1) A timpl_closure_timpls_trancl_eq
unfolding timpl_closure_set_def by fast
thus ?thesis
using timpl_closure.TI[OF timpl_closure.FP[of "absc a"] a(2), of "absc b"]
term_variants_P[of "[]" "[]" "(λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])" "Abs b" "Abs a"]
unfolding absc_def by auto
qed





"in_trancl TI a b = (
if (a,b) ∈ set TI then True
else list_ex (λ(c,d). c = a ∧ in_trancl (removeAll (c,d) TI) d b) TI)"
definition in_rtrancl where
"in_rtrancl TI a b ≡ a = b ∨ in_trancl TI a b"
declare in_trancl.simps[simp del]
fun timpls_transformable_to where
"timpls_transformable_to TI (Var x) (Var y) = (x = y)"
| "timpls_transformable_to TI (Fun f T) (Fun g S) = (
(f = g ∨ (is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ (the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ set TI)) ∧
list_all2 (timpls_transformable_to TI) T S)"
| "timpls_transformable_to _ _ _ = False"
fun timpls_transformable_to’ where
"timpls_transformable_to’ TI (Var x) (Var y) = (x = y)"
| "timpls_transformable_to’ TI (Fun f T) (Fun g S) = (
(f = g ∨ (is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ in_trancl TI (the_Abs f) (the_Abs g))) ∧
list_all2 (timpls_transformable_to’ TI) T S)"
| "timpls_transformable_to’ _ _ _ = False"
fun equal_mod_timpls where
"equal_mod_timpls TI (Var x) (Var y) = (x = y)"
| "equal_mod_timpls TI (Fun f T) (Fun g S) = (
(f = g ∨ (is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧
((the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ set TI ∨
(the_Abs g, the_Abs f) ∈ set TI ∨
(∃ ti ∈ set TI. (the_Abs f, snd ti) ∈ set TI ∧ (the_Abs g, snd ti) ∈ set TI)))) ∧
list_all2 (equal_mod_timpls TI) T S)"
| "equal_mod_timpls _ _ _ = False"
fun intruder_synth_mod_timpls where
"intruder_synth_mod_timpls M TI (Var x) = List.member M (Var x)"
| "intruder_synth_mod_timpls M TI (Fun f T) = (
(list_ex (λt. timpls_transformable_to TI t (Fun f T)) M) ∨
(public f ∧ length T = arity f ∧ list_all (intruder_synth_mod_timpls M TI) T))"
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fun intruder_synth_mod_timpls’ where
"intruder_synth_mod_timpls’ M TI (Var x) = List.member M (Var x)"
| "intruder_synth_mod_timpls’ M TI (Fun f T) = (
(list_ex (λt. timpls_transformable_to’ TI t (Fun f T)) M) ∨
(public f ∧ length T = arity f ∧ list_all (intruder_synth_mod_timpls’ M TI) T))"
fun intruder_synth_mod_eq_timpls where
"intruder_synth_mod_eq_timpls M TI (Var x) = (Var x ∈ M)"
| "intruder_synth_mod_eq_timpls M TI (Fun f T) = (
(∃ t ∈ M. equal_mod_timpls TI t (Fun f T)) ∨
(public f ∧ length T = arity f ∧ list_all (intruder_synth_mod_eq_timpls M TI) T))"
definition analyzed_closed_mod_timpls where
"analyzed_closed_mod_timpls M TI ≡
let f = list_all (intruder_synth_mod_timpls M TI);
g = λt. if f (fst (Ana t)) then f (snd (Ana t))
else ∀ s ∈ comp_timpl_closure {t} (set TI). case Ana s of (K,R) ⇒ f K −→ f R
in list_all g M"
definition analyzed_closed_mod_timpls’ where
"analyzed_closed_mod_timpls’ M TI ≡
let f = list_all (intruder_synth_mod_timpls’ M TI);
g = λt. if f (fst (Ana t)) then f (snd (Ana t))
else ∀ s ∈ comp_timpl_closure {t} (set TI). case Ana s of (K,R) ⇒ f K −→ f R
in list_all g M"
definition analyzed_closed_mod_timpls_alt where
"analyzed_closed_mod_timpls_alt M TI timpl_cl_witness ≡
let f = λR. ∀ r ∈ set R. intruder_synth_mod_timpls M TI r;
N = {t ∈ set M. f (fst (Ana t))};
N’ = set M - N
in (∀ t ∈ N. f (snd (Ana t))) ∧
(N’ 6= {} −→ (N’ ∪ (⋃ x∈timpl_cl_witness. ⋃ (a,b)∈set TI. set 〈a -- b〉〈x〉) ⊆ timpl_cl_witness))
∧
(∀ s ∈ timpl_cl_witness. case Ana s of (K,R) ⇒ f K −→ f R)"
lemma in_trancl_closure_iff_in_trancl_fun:
"(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+ ←→ in_trancl TI a b" ( is "?A TI a b ←→ ?B TI a b")
proof
show "?A TI a b =⇒ ?B TI a b"
proof (induction rule: trancl_induct)
case (step c d)
show ?case using step.IH step.hyps(2)
proof (induction TI a c rule: in_trancl.induct)
case (1 TI a b) thus ?case using in_trancl.simps
by (smt Bex_set case_prodE case_prodI member_remove prod.sel(2) remove_code(1))
qed
qed (metis in_trancl.simps)
show "?B TI a b =⇒ ?A TI a b"
proof (induction TI a b rule: in_trancl.induct)
case (1 TI a b)
let ?P = "λTI a b c d. in_trancl (List.removeAll (c,d) TI) d b"
have *: "∃ (c,d) ∈ set TI. c = a ∧ ?P TI a b c d" when "(a,b) /∈ set TI"
using that "1.prems" list_ex_iff[of _ TI] in_trancl.simps[of TI a b]
by auto
show ?case
proof (cases "(a,b) ∈ set TI")
case False
hence "∃ (c,d) ∈ set TI. c = a ∧ ?P TI a b c d" using * by blast
then obtain d where d: "(a,d) ∈ set TI" "?P TI a b a d" by blast
have "(d,b) ∈ (set (removeAll (a,d) TI))+" using "1.IH"[OF False d(1)] d(2) by blast
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moreover have "set (removeAll (a,d) TI) ⊆ set TI" by simp
ultimately have "(d,b) ∈ (set TI)+" using trancl_mono by blast





"(a,b) ∈ (set TI)∗ ←→ in_rtrancl TI a b"
by (metis rtrancl_eq_or_trancl in_trancl_closure_iff_in_trancl_fun in_rtrancl_def)
lemma in_trancl_mono:
assumes "set TI ⊆ set TI’"
and "in_trancl TI a b"
shows "in_trancl TI’ a b"
by (metis assms in_trancl_closure_iff_in_trancl_fun trancl_mono)
lemma equal_mod_timpls_refl:
"equal_mod_timpls TI t t"
proof (induction t)
case (Fun f T) thus ?case
using list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "equal_mod_timpls TI" T T] by force
qed simp
lemma equal_mod_timpls_inv_Var:
"equal_mod_timpls TI (Var x) t =⇒ t = Var x" ( is "?A =⇒ ?C")
"equal_mod_timpls TI t (Var x) =⇒ t = Var x" ( is "?B =⇒ ?C")
proof -
show "?A =⇒ ?C" by (cases t) auto
show "?B =⇒ ?C" by (cases t) auto
qed
lemma equal_mod_timpls_inv:
assumes "equal_mod_timpls TI (Fun f T) (Fun g S)"
shows "length T = length S"
and "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ equal_mod_timpls TI (T ! i) (S ! i)"
and "f 6= g =⇒ (is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ (
(the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ set TI ∨ (the_Abs g, the_Abs f) ∈ set TI ∨
(∃ ti ∈ set TI. (the_Abs f, snd ti) ∈ set TI ∧
(the_Abs g, snd ti) ∈ set TI)))"
using assms list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "equal_mod_timpls TI" T S]
by (auto elim: equal_mod_timpls.cases)
lemma equal_mod_timpls_inv’:
assumes "equal_mod_timpls TI (Fun f T) t"
shows "is_Fun t"
and "length T = length (args t)"
and "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ equal_mod_timpls TI (T ! i) (args t ! i)"
and "f 6= the_Fun t =⇒ (is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs (the_Fun t) ∧ (
(the_Abs f, the_Abs (the_Fun t)) ∈ set TI ∨
(the_Abs (the_Fun t), the_Abs f) ∈ set TI ∨
(∃ ti ∈ set TI. (the_Abs f, snd ti) ∈ set TI ∧
(the_Abs (the_Fun t), snd ti) ∈ set TI)))"
and "¬is_Abs f =⇒ f = the_Fun t"
using assms list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "equal_mod_timpls TI" T]
by (cases t; auto)+
lemma equal_mod_timpls_if_term_variants:
fixes s t::"((’a, ’b, ’c) prot_fun, ’d) term" and a b::"’c set"
defines "P ≡ (λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])"
assumes st: "term_variants_pred P s t"
and ab: "(a,b) ∈ set TI"
shows "equal_mod_timpls TI s t"
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using st P_def
proof (induction rule: term_variants_pred.induct)
case (term_variants_P T S f) thus ?case
using ab list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "equal_mod_timpls TI" T S]
in_trancl_closure_iff_in_trancl_fun[of _ _ TI]
by auto
next
case (term_variants_Fun T S f) thus ?case
using ab list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "equal_mod_timpls TI" T S]




assumes "set TI ⊆ set TI’"
and "equal_mod_timpls TI s t"
shows "equal_mod_timpls TI’ s t"
using assms
proof (induction TI s t rule: equal_mod_timpls.induct)
case (2 TI f T g S)
have *: "f = g ∨ (is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ ((the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ set TI ∨
(the_Abs g, the_Abs f) ∈ set TI ∨
(∃ ti ∈ set TI. (the_Abs f, snd ti) ∈ set TI ∧
(the_Abs g, snd ti) ∈ set TI)))"
"list_all2 (equal_mod_timpls TI) T S"
using "2.prems" by simp_all
show ?case
using "2.IH" "2.prems"(1) list.rel_mono_strong[OF *(2)] *(1) in_trancl_mono[of TI TI’]
by (metis (no_types, lifting) equal_mod_timpls.simps(2) set_rev_mp)
qed auto
lemma equal_mod_timpls_refl_minus_eq:
"equal_mod_timpls TI s t ←→ equal_mod_timpls (filter (λ(a,b). a 6= b) TI) s t"
( is "?A ←→ ?B")
proof
show ?A when ?B using that equal_mod_timpls_mono[of "filter (λ(a,b). a 6= b) TI" TI] by auto
show ?B when ?A using that
proof (induction TI s t rule: equal_mod_timpls.induct)
case (2 TI f T g S)
define TI’ where "TI’ ≡ filter (λ(a,b). a 6= b) TI"
let ?P = "λX Y. f = g ∨ (is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ ((the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ set X ∨
(the_Abs g, the_Abs f) ∈ set X ∨ (∃ ti ∈ set Y.
(the_Abs f, snd ti) ∈ set X ∧ (the_Abs g, snd ti) ∈ set X)))"
have *: "?P TI TI" "list_all2 (equal_mod_timpls TI) T S"
using "2.prems" by simp_all
have "?P TI’ TI"
using *(1) unfolding TI’_def is_Abs_def by auto
hence "?P TI’ TI’"
by (metis (no_types, lifting) snd_conv)
moreover have "list_all2 (equal_mod_timpls TI’) T S"
using *(2) "2.IH" list.rel_mono_strong unfolding TI’_def by blast




"timpls_transformable_to TI t t" ( is ?A)
"timpls_transformable_to’ TI t t" ( is ?B)
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by (induct t) (auto simp add: list_all2_conv_all_nth)
lemma timpls_transformable_to_inv_Var:
"timpls_transformable_to TI (Var x) t =⇒ t = Var x" ( is "?A =⇒ ?C")
"timpls_transformable_to TI t (Var x) =⇒ t = Var x" ( is "?B =⇒ ?C")
"timpls_transformable_to’ TI (Var x) t =⇒ t = Var x" ( is "?A’ =⇒ ?C")
"timpls_transformable_to’ TI t (Var x) =⇒ t = Var x" ( is "?B’ =⇒ ?C")
by (cases t; auto)+
lemma timpls_transformable_to_inv:
assumes "timpls_transformable_to TI (Fun f T) (Fun g S)"
shows "length T = length S"
and "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ timpls_transformable_to TI (T ! i) (S ! i)"
and "f 6= g =⇒ (is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ (the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ set TI)"
using assms list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "timpls_transformable_to TI" T S] by auto
lemma timpls_transformable_to’_inv:
assumes "timpls_transformable_to’ TI (Fun f T) (Fun g S)"
shows "length T = length S"
and "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ timpls_transformable_to’ TI (T ! i) (S ! i)"
and "f 6= g =⇒ (is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ in_trancl TI (the_Abs f) (the_Abs g))"
using assms list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "timpls_transformable_to’ TI" T S] by auto
lemma timpls_transformable_to_inv’:
assumes "timpls_transformable_to TI (Fun f T) t"
shows "is_Fun t"
and "length T = length (args t)"
and "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ timpls_transformable_to TI (T ! i) (args t ! i)"
and "f 6= the_Fun t =⇒ (
is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs (the_Fun t) ∧ (the_Abs f, the_Abs (the_Fun t)) ∈ set TI)"
and "¬is_Abs f =⇒ f = the_Fun t"
using assms list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "timpls_transformable_to TI" T]
by (cases t; auto)+
lemma timpls_transformable_to’_inv’:
assumes "timpls_transformable_to’ TI (Fun f T) t"
shows "is_Fun t"
and "length T = length (args t)"
and "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ timpls_transformable_to’ TI (T ! i) (args t ! i)"
and "f 6= the_Fun t =⇒ (
is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs (the_Fun t) ∧ in_trancl TI (the_Abs f) (the_Abs (the_Fun t)))"
and "¬is_Abs f =⇒ f = the_Fun t"
using assms list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "timpls_transformable_to’ TI" T]
by (cases t; auto)+
lemma timpls_transformable_to_size_eq:
fixes s t::"((’b, ’c, ’a) prot_fun, ’d) term"
shows "timpls_transformable_to TI s t =⇒ size s = size t" ( is "?A =⇒ ?C")
and "timpls_transformable_to’ TI s t =⇒ size s = size t" ( is "?B =⇒ ?C")
proof -
have *: "size_list size T = size_list size S"
when "length T = length S" "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ size (T ! i) = size (S ! i)"
for S T::"((’b, ’c, ’a) prot_fun, ’d) term list"
using that
proof (induction T arbitrary: S)
case (Cons x T’)
then obtain y S’ where y: "S = y#S’" by (cases S) auto
hence "size_list size T’ = size_list size S’" "size x = size y"
using Cons.prems Cons.IH[of S’] by force+
thus ?case using y by simp
qed simp
show ?C when ?A using that
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proof (induction rule: timpls_transformable_to.induct)
case (2 TI f T g S)
hence "length T = length S" "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ size (T ! i) = size (S ! i)"
using timpls_transformable_to_inv(1,2)[of TI f T g S] by auto
thus ?case using *[of S T] by simp
qed simp_all
show ?C when ?B using that
proof (induction rule: timpls_transformable_to.induct)
case (2 TI f T g S)
hence "length T = length S" "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ size (T ! i) = size (S ! i)"
using timpls_transformable_to’_inv(1,2)[of TI f T g S] by auto




fixes s t::"((’a, ’b, ’c) prot_fun, ’d) term" and a b::"’c set"
defines "P ≡ (λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])"
assumes st: "term_variants_pred P s t"
and ab: "(a,b) ∈ set TI"
shows "timpls_transformable_to TI s t"
using st P_def
proof (induction rule: term_variants_pred.induct)
case (term_variants_P T S f) thus ?case
using ab list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "timpls_transformable_to TI" T S]
by auto
next
case (term_variants_Fun T S f) thus ?case




fixes s t::"((’a, ’b, ’c) prot_fun, ’d) term" and a b::"’c set"
defines "P ≡ (λ_. [])(Abs a := [Abs b])"
assumes st: "term_variants_pred P s t"
and ab: "(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+"
shows "timpls_transformable_to’ TI s t"
using st P_def
proof (induction rule: term_variants_pred.induct)
case (term_variants_P T S f) thus ?case
using ab list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "timpls_transformable_to’ TI" T S]
in_trancl_closure_iff_in_trancl_fun[of _ _ TI]
by auto
next
case (term_variants_Fun T S f) thus ?case
using ab list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "timpls_transformable_to’ TI" T S]




assumes TI_trancl: "∀ (a,b) ∈ (set TI)+. a 6= b −→ (a,b) ∈ set TI"
and st: "timpls_transformable_to TI s t"
and tu: "timpls_transformable_to TI t u"
shows "timpls_transformable_to TI s u"
using st tu
proof (induction s arbitrary: t u)
case (Var x) thus ?case using tu timpls_transformable_to_inv_Var(1) by fast
next
case (Fun f T)
obtain g S where t:
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"t = Fun g S" "length T = length S"
"
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ timpls_transformable_to TI (T ! i) (S ! i)"
"f 6= g =⇒ is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ (the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ set TI"
using timpls_transformable_to_inv’[OF Fun.prems(1)] TI_trancl by moura
obtain h U where u:
"u = Fun h U" "length S = length U"
"
∧
i. i < length S =⇒ timpls_transformable_to TI (S ! i) (U ! i)"
"g 6= h =⇒ is_Abs g ∧ is_Abs h ∧ (the_Abs g, the_Abs h) ∈ set TI"
using timpls_transformable_to_inv’[OF Fun.prems(2)[unfolded t(1)]] TI_trancl by moura
have "list_all2 (timpls_transformable_to TI) T U"
using t(1,2,3) u(1,2,3) Fun.IH
list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "timpls_transformable_to TI" T S]
list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "timpls_transformable_to TI" S U]
list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "timpls_transformable_to TI" T U]
by force
moreover have "(the_Abs f, the_Abs h) ∈ set TI"
when "(the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ set TI" "(the_Abs g, the_Abs h) ∈ set TI"
"f 6= h" "is_Abs f" "is_Abs h"
using that(3,4,5) TI_trancl trancl_into_trancl[OF r_into_trancl[OF that(1)] that(2)]
unfolding is_Abs_def the_Abs_def
by force
hence "is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs h ∧ (the_Abs f, the_Abs h) ∈ set TI"
when "f 6= h"
using that TI_trancl t(4) u(4) by fast
ultimately show ?case using t(1) u(1) by force
qed
lemma timpls_transformable_to’_trans:
assumes st: "timpls_transformable_to’ TI s t"
and tu: "timpls_transformable_to’ TI t u"
shows "timpls_transformable_to’ TI s u"
using st tu
proof (induction s arbitrary: t u)
case (Var x) thus ?case using tu timpls_transformable_to_inv_Var(3) by fast
next
case (Fun f T)
note 0 = in_trancl_closure_iff_in_trancl_fun[of _ _ TI]
obtain g S where t:
"t = Fun g S" "length T = length S"
"
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ timpls_transformable_to’ TI (T ! i) (S ! i)"
"f 6= g =⇒ is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ (the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ (set TI)+"
using timpls_transformable_to’_inv’[OF Fun.prems(1)] 0 by moura
obtain h U where u:
"u = Fun h U" "length S = length U"
"
∧
i. i < length S =⇒ timpls_transformable_to’ TI (S ! i) (U ! i)"
"g 6= h =⇒ is_Abs g ∧ is_Abs h ∧ (the_Abs g, the_Abs h) ∈ (set TI)+"
using timpls_transformable_to’_inv’[OF Fun.prems(2)[unfolded t(1)]] 0 by moura
have "list_all2 (timpls_transformable_to’ TI) T U"
using t(1,2,3) u(1,2,3) Fun.IH
list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "timpls_transformable_to’ TI" T S]
list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "timpls_transformable_to’ TI" S U]
list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "timpls_transformable_to’ TI" T U]
by force
moreover have "(the_Abs f, the_Abs h) ∈ (set TI)+"
when "(the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ (set TI)+" "(the_Abs g, the_Abs h) ∈ (set TI)+"
using that by simp
hence "is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs h ∧ (the_Abs f, the_Abs h) ∈ (set TI)+"
when "f 6= h"
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by (metis that t(4) u(4))
ultimately show ?case using t(1) u(1) 0 by force
qed
lemma timpls_transformable_to_mono:
assumes "set TI ⊆ set TI’"
and "timpls_transformable_to TI s t"
shows "timpls_transformable_to TI’ s t"
using assms
proof (induction TI s t rule: timpls_transformable_to.induct)
case (2 TI f T g S)
have *: "f = g ∨ (is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ (the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ set TI)"
"list_all2 (timpls_transformable_to TI) T S"
using "2.prems" by simp_all
show ?case
using "2.IH" "2.prems"(1) list.rel_mono_strong[OF *(2)] *(1) in_trancl_mono[of TI TI’]
by (metis (no_types, lifting) timpls_transformable_to.simps(2) set_rev_mp)
qed auto
lemma timpls_transformable_to’_mono:
assumes "set TI ⊆ set TI’"
and "timpls_transformable_to’ TI s t"
shows "timpls_transformable_to’ TI’ s t"
using assms
proof (induction TI s t rule: timpls_transformable_to’.induct)
case (2 TI f T g S)
have *: "f = g ∨ (is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ in_trancl TI (the_Abs f) (the_Abs g))"
"list_all2 (timpls_transformable_to’ TI) T S"
using "2.prems" by simp_all
show ?case
using "2.IH" "2.prems"(1) list.rel_mono_strong[OF *(2)] *(1) in_trancl_mono[of TI TI’]
by (metis (no_types, lifting) timpls_transformable_to’.simps(2))
qed auto
lemma timpls_transformable_to_refl_minus_eq:
"timpls_transformable_to TI s t ←→ timpls_transformable_to (filter (λ(a,b). a 6= b) TI) s t"
( is "?A ←→ ?B")
proof
let ?TI’ = "λTI. filter (λ(a,b). a 6= b) TI"
show ?A when ?B using that timpls_transformable_to_mono[of "?TI’ TI" TI] by auto
show ?B when ?A using that
proof (induction TI s t rule: timpls_transformable_to.induct)
case (2 TI f T g S)
have *: "f = g ∨ (is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ (the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ set TI)"
"list_all2 (timpls_transformable_to TI) T S"
using "2.prems" by simp_all
have "f = g ∨ (is_Abs f ∧ is_Abs g ∧ (the_Abs f, the_Abs g) ∈ set (?TI’ TI))"
using *(1) unfolding is_Abs_def by auto
moreover have "list_all2 (timpls_transformable_to (?TI’ TI)) T S"
using *(2) "2.IH" list.rel_mono_strong by blast




assumes "set TI’ = {(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+. a 6= b}"
shows "timpls_transformable_to TI’ s t ←→ t ∈ timpl_closure s (set TI)" ( is "?A s t ←→ ?B s t")
proof
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show "?A s t =⇒ ?B s t" using assms
proof (induction s t rule: timpls_transformable_to.induct)
case (2 TI f T g S)
note prems = "2.prems"
note IH = "2.IH"
have 1: "length T = length S" "∀ i<length T. timpls_transformable_to TI’ (T ! i) (S ! i)"
using prems(1) list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "timpls_transformable_to TI’" T S] by simp_all
note 2 = timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’
note 3 = in_set_conv_nth[of _ T] in_set_conv_nth[of _ S]
have 4: "timpl_closure’ (set TI’) = timpl_closure’ (set TI)"
using timpl_closure’_timpls_trancl_eq’[of "set TI"] prems(2) by simp
have IH’: "(T ! i, S ! i) ∈ timpl_closure’ (set TI’)" when i: "i < length S" for i
proof -
have "timpls_transformable_to TI’ (T ! i) (S ! i)" using i 1 by presburger
hence "S ! i ∈ timpl_closure (T ! i) (set TI)"
using IH[of "T ! i" "S ! i"] i 1(1) prems(2) by force
thus ?thesis using 2[of "S ! i" "T ! i" "set TI"] 4 by blast
qed
have 5: "f = g ∨ (∃ a b. (a, b) ∈ (set TI’)+ ∧ f = Abs a ∧ g = Abs b)"
using prems(1) the_Abs_def[of f] the_Abs_def[of g] is_Abs_def[of f] is_Abs_def[of g]
by fastforce
show ?case using 2 4 timpl_closure_FunI[OF IH’ 1(1) 5] 1(1) by auto
qed (simp_all add: timpl_closure.FP)
show "?B s t =⇒ ?A s t"
proof (induction t rule: timpl_closure.induct)
case (TI u a b v) show ?case
proof (cases "a = b")
case True thus ?thesis using TI.hyps(3) TI.IH term_variants_pred_refl_inv by fastforce
next
case False
hence 1: "timpls_transformable_to TI’ u v"
using TI.hyps(2) assms timpls_transformable_to_if_term_variants[OF TI.hyps(3), of TI’]
by blast
have 2: "(c,d) ∈ set TI’" when cd: "(c,d) ∈ (set TI’)+" "c 6= d" for c d
proof -
let ?cl = "λX. {(a,b) ∈ X+. a 6= b}"
have "?cl (set TI’) = ?cl (?cl (set TI))" using assms by presburger
hence "set TI’ = ?cl (set TI’)" using assms trancl_minus_refl_idem[of "set TI"] by argo
thus ?thesis using cd by blast
qed
show ?thesis using timpls_transformable_to_trans[OF _ TI.IH 1] 2 by blast
qed
qed (use timpls_transformable_to_refl in fast)
qed
lemma timpls_transformable_to’_iff_in_timpl_closure:
"timpls_transformable_to’ TI s t ←→ t ∈ timpl_closure s (set TI)" ( is "?A s t ←→ ?B s t")
proof
show "?A s t =⇒ ?B s t"
proof (induction s t rule: timpls_transformable_to’.induct)
case (2 TI f T g S)
note prems = "2.prems"
note IH = "2.IH"
have 1: "length T = length S" "∀ i<length T. timpls_transformable_to’ TI (T ! i) (S ! i)"
using prems list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "timpls_transformable_to’ TI" T S] by simp_all
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note 2 = timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’
note 3 = in_set_conv_nth[of _ T] in_set_conv_nth[of _ S]
have IH’: "(T ! i, S ! i) ∈ timpl_closure’ (set TI)" when i: "i < length S" for i
proof -
have "timpls_transformable_to’ TI (T ! i) (S ! i)" using i 1 by presburger
hence "S ! i ∈ timpl_closure (T ! i) (set TI)" using IH[of "T ! i" "S ! i"] i 1(1) by force
thus ?thesis using 2[of "S ! i" "T ! i" "set TI"] by blast
qed
have 4: "f = g ∨ (∃ a b. (a, b) ∈ (set TI)+ ∧ f = Abs a ∧ g = Abs b)"
using prems the_Abs_def[of f] the_Abs_def[of g] is_Abs_def[of f] is_Abs_def[of g]
in_trancl_closure_iff_in_trancl_fun[of _ _ TI]
by auto
show ?case using 2 timpl_closure_FunI[OF IH’ 1(1) 4] 1(1) by auto
qed (simp_all add: timpl_closure.FP)
show "?B s t =⇒ ?A s t"
proof (induction t rule: timpl_closure.induct)




qed (use timpls_transformable_to_refl(2) in fast)
qed
lemma equal_mod_timpls_iff_ex_in_timpl_closure:
assumes "set TI’ = {(a,b) ∈ TI+. a 6= b}"
shows "equal_mod_timpls TI’ s t ←→ (∃ u. u ∈ timpl_closure s TI ∧ u ∈ timpl_closure t TI)"
( is "?A s t ←→ ?B s t")
proof
show "?A s t =⇒ ?B s t" using assms
proof (induction s t rule: equal_mod_timpls.induct)
case (2 TI’ f T g S)
note prems = "2.prems"
note IH = "2.IH"
have 1: "length T = length S" "∀ i<length T. equal_mod_timpls (TI’) (T ! i) (S ! i)"
using prems list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "equal_mod_timpls TI’" T S] by simp_all
note 2 = timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’
note 3 = in_set_conv_nth[of _ T] in_set_conv_nth[of _ S]
have 4: "timpl_closure’ (set TI’) = timpl_closure’ TI"
using timpl_closure’_timpls_trancl_eq’[of TI] prems
by simp
have IH: "∃ u. (T ! i, u) ∈ timpl_closure’ TI ∧ (S ! i, u) ∈ timpl_closure’ TI"
when i: "i < length S" for i
proof -
have "equal_mod_timpls TI’ (T ! i) (S ! i)" using i 1 by presburger
hence "∃ u. u ∈ timpl_closure (T ! i) TI ∧ u ∈ timpl_closure (S ! i) TI"
using IH[of "T ! i" "S ! i"] i 1(1) prems by force
thus ?thesis using 4 unfolding 2 by blast
qed
let ?P = "λG. f = g ∨ (∃ a b. (a, b) ∈ G ∧ f = Abs a ∧ g = Abs b) ∨
(∃ a b. (a, b) ∈ G ∧ f = Abs b ∧ g = Abs a) ∨
(∃ a b c. (a, c) ∈ G ∧ (b, c) ∈ G ∧ f = Abs a ∧ g = Abs b)"
have "?P (set TI’)"
128
2.5 Term Implication (Term Implication)
using prems the_Abs_def[of f] the_Abs_def[of g] is_Abs_def[of f] is_Abs_def[of g]
by fastforce
hence "?P (TI+)" unfolding prems by blast
hence "?P (rtrancl TI)" by (metis (no_types, lifting) trancl_into_rtrancl)
hence 5: "f = g ∨ (∃ a b c. (a, c) ∈ TI∗ ∧ (b, c) ∈ TI∗ ∧ f = Abs a ∧ g = Abs b)" by blast
show ?case
using timpl_closure_FunI3[OF _ 1(1) 5] IH 1(1)
unfolding timpl_closure’_timpls_rtrancl_eq 2
by auto
qed (use timpl_closure.FP in auto)
show "?A s t" when B: "?B s t"
proof -
obtain u where u: "u ∈ timpl_closure s TI" "u ∈ timpl_closure t TI"
using B by moura
thus ?thesis using assms
proof (induction u arbitrary: s t rule: term.induct)
case (Var x s t) thus ?case
using timpl_closure_Var_in_iff[of x s TI]
timpl_closure_Var_in_iff[of x t TI]
equal_mod_timpls.simps(1)[of TI’ x x]
by blast
next
case (Fun f U s t)
obtain g S where s:
"s = Fun g S" "length U = length S"
"
∧
i. i < length U =⇒ U ! i ∈ timpl_closure (S ! i) TI"
"g 6= f =⇒ is_Abs g ∧ is_Abs f ∧ (the_Abs g, the_Abs f) ∈ TI+"
using Fun.prems(1) timpl_closure_Fun_inv’[of f U _ _ TI]
by (cases s) auto
obtain h T where t:
"t = Fun h T" "length U = length T"
"
∧
i. i < length U =⇒ U ! i ∈ timpl_closure (T ! i) TI"
"h 6= f =⇒ is_Abs h ∧ is_Abs f ∧ (the_Abs h, the_Abs f) ∈ TI+"
using Fun.prems(2) timpl_closure_Fun_inv’[of f U _ _ TI]
by (cases t) auto
have g: "(the_Abs g, the_Abs f) ∈ set TI’" "is_Abs f" "is_Abs g" when neq_f: "g 6= f"
proof -
obtain ga fa where a: "g = Abs ga" "f = Abs fa"
using s(4)[OF neq_f] unfolding is_Abs_def by presburger
hence "the_Abs g 6= the_Abs f" using neq_f by simp
thus "(the_Abs g, the_Abs f) ∈ set TI’" "is_Abs f" "is_Abs g"
using s(4)[OF neq_f] Fun.prems by blast+
qed
have h: "(the_Abs h, the_Abs f) ∈ set TI’" "is_Abs f" "is_Abs h" when neq_f: "h 6= f"
proof -
obtain ha fa where a: "h = Abs ha" "f = Abs fa"
using t(4)[OF neq_f] unfolding is_Abs_def by presburger
hence "the_Abs h 6= the_Abs f" using neq_f by simp
thus "(the_Abs h, the_Abs f) ∈ set TI’" "is_Abs f" "is_Abs h"
using t(4)[OF neq_f] Fun.prems by blast+
qed
have "equal_mod_timpls TI’ (S ! i) (T ! i)"
when i: "i < length U" for i
using i Fun.IH s(1,2,3) t(1,2,3) nth_mem[OF i] Fun.prems by meson
hence "list_all2 (equal_mod_timpls TI’) S T"
using list_all2_conv_all_nth[of "equal_mod_timpls TI’" S T] s(2) t(2) by presburger
thus ?case using s(1) t(1) g h by fastforce
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private inductive timpls_transformable_to_pred where
Var: "timpls_transformable_to_pred A (Var x) (Var x)"
| Fun: " [[¬is_Abs f; length T = length S;∧
i. i < length T =⇒ timpls_transformable_to_pred A (T ! i) (S ! i) ]]
=⇒ timpls_transformable_to_pred A (Fun f T) (Fun f S)"
| Abs: "b ∈ A =⇒ timpls_transformable_to_pred A (Fun (Abs a) []) (Fun (Abs b) [])"
private lemma timpls_transformable_to_pred_inv_Var:
assumes "timpls_transformable_to_pred A (Var x) t"
shows "t = Var x"
using assms by (auto elim: timpls_transformable_to_pred.cases)
private lemma timpls_transformable_to_pred_inv:
assumes "timpls_transformable_to_pred A (Fun f T) t"
shows "is_Fun t"
and "length T = length (args t)"
and "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ timpls_transformable_to_pred A (T ! i) (args t ! i)"
and "¬is_Abs f =⇒ f = the_Fun t"
and "is_Abs f =⇒ (is_Abs (the_Fun t) ∧ the_Abs (the_Fun t) ∈ A)"
using assms by (auto elim!: timpls_transformable_to_pred.cases[of A])
private lemma timpls_transformable_to_pred_finite_aux1:
assumes f: "¬is_Abs f"
shows "{s. timpls_transformable_to_pred A (Fun f T) s} ⊆
(λS. Fun f S) ‘ {S. length T = length S ∧
(∀ s ∈ set S. ∃ t ∈ set T. timpls_transformable_to_pred A t s)}"
( is "?B ⊆ ?C")
proof
fix s assume s: "s ∈ ?B"
hence *: "timpls_transformable_to_pred A (Fun f T) s" by blast
obtain S where S:
"s = Fun f S" "length T = length S" "
∧
i. i < length T =⇒ timpls_transformable_to_pred A (T ! i)
(S ! i)"
using f timpls_transformable_to_pred_inv[OF *] unfolding the_Abs_def is_Abs_def by auto
have "∀ s∈set S. ∃ t∈set T. timpls_transformable_to_pred A t s" using S(2,3) in_set_conv_nth by metis
thus "s ∈ ?C" using S(1,2) by blast
qed
private lemma timpls_transformable_to_pred_finite_aux2:
"{s. timpls_transformable_to_pred A (Fun (Abs a) []) s} ⊆ (λb. Fun (Abs b) []) ‘ A" ( is "?B ⊆ ?C")
proof
fix s assume s: "s ∈ ?B"
hence *: "timpls_transformable_to_pred A (Fun (Abs a) []) s" by blast
obtain b where b: "s = Fun (Abs b) []" "b ∈ A"
using timpls_transformable_to_pred_inv[OF *] unfolding the_Abs_def is_Abs_def by auto
thus "s ∈ ?C" by blast
qed
private lemma timpls_transformable_to_pred_finite:
fixes t::"((’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_fun, ’a) term"
assumes A: "finite A"
and t: "wf trm t"
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have "{s::((’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_fun, ’a) term. timpls_transformable_to_pred A (Var x) s} = {Var x}"
by (auto intro: timpls_transformable_to_pred.Var elim: timpls_transformable_to_pred_inv_Var)
thus ?case by simp
next
case (Fun f T)
have IH: "finite {s. timpls_transformable_to_pred A t s}" when t: "t ∈ set T" for t
using Fun.IH[OF t] wf_trm_param[OF Fun.prems t] by blast
show ?case
proof (cases "is_Abs f")
case True
then obtain a where a: "f = Abs a" unfolding is_Abs_def by presburger
hence "T = []" using wf_trm_arity[OF Fun.prems] by simp_all
hence "{a. timpls_transformable_to_pred A (Fun f T) a} ⊆ (λb. Fun (Abs b) []) ‘ A"
using timpls_transformable_to_pred_finite_aux2[of A a] a by auto
thus ?thesis using A finite_subset by fast
next
case False thus ?thesis





assumes s: "timpls_transformable_to TI t s"
and t: "wf trm t" "∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ the_Abs f ∈ A"
shows "timpls_transformable_to_pred (A ∪ fst ‘ (set TI)+ ∪ snd ‘ (set TI)+) t s"
using s t
proof (induction rule: timpls_transformable_to.induct)
case (2 TI f T g S)
let ?A = "A ∪ fst ‘ (set TI)+ ∪ snd ‘ (set TI)+"
note prems = "2.prems"
note IH = "2.IH"
note 0 = timpls_transformable_to_inv[OF prems(1)]
have 1: "T = []" "S = []" when f: "f = Abs a" for a
using f wf_trm_arity[OF prems(2)] 0(1) by simp_all
have "∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ the_Abs f ∈ A" when t: "t ∈ set T" for t
using t prems(3) funs_term_subterms_eq(1)[of "Fun f T"] by blast
hence 2: "timpls_transformable_to_pred ?A (T ! i) (S ! i)"
when i: "i < length T" for i
using i IH 0(1,2) wf_trm_param[OF prems(2)]
by (metis (no_types) in_set_conv_nth)
have 3: "the_Abs f ∈ ?A" when f: "is_Abs f" using prems(3) f by force
show ?case
proof (cases "f = g")
case True
note fg = True
show ?thesis
proof (cases "is_Abs f")
case True
then obtain a where a: "f = Abs a" unfolding is_Abs_def by moura
thus ?thesis using fg 1[OF a] timpls_transformable_to_pred.Abs[of a ?A a] 3 by simp
qed (use fg timpls_transformable_to_pred.Fun[OF _ 0(1) 2, of f] in blast)
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next
case False
then obtain a b where ab: "f = Abs a" "g = Abs b" "(a, b) ∈ (set TI)+"
using 0(3) in_trancl_closure_iff_in_trancl_fun[of _ _ TI]
unfolding is_Abs_def the_Abs_def by fastforce
hence "a ∈ ?A" "b ∈ ?A" by force+
thus ?thesis using timpls_transformable_to_pred.Abs ab(1,2) 1[OF ab(1)] by metis
qed
qed (simp_all add: timpls_transformable_to_pred.Var)
private lemma timpls_transformable_to_pred_if_timpls_transformable_to’:
assumes s: "timpls_transformable_to’ TI t s"
and t: "wf trm t" "∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ the_Abs f ∈ A"
shows "timpls_transformable_to_pred (A ∪ fst ‘ (set TI)+ ∪ snd ‘ (set TI)+) t s"
using s t
proof (induction rule: timpls_transformable_to.induct)
case (2 TI f T g S)
let ?A = "A ∪ fst ‘ (set TI)+ ∪ snd ‘ (set TI)+"
note prems = "2.prems"
note IH = "2.IH"
note 0 = timpls_transformable_to’_inv[OF prems(1)]
have 1: "T = []" "S = []" when f: "f = Abs a" for a
using f wf_trm_arity[OF prems(2)] 0(1) by simp_all
have "∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ the_Abs f ∈ A" when t: "t ∈ set T" for t
using t prems(3) funs_term_subterms_eq(1)[of "Fun f T"] by blast
hence 2: "timpls_transformable_to_pred ?A (T ! i) (S ! i)"
when i: "i < length T" for i
using i IH 0(1,2) wf_trm_param[OF prems(2)]
by (metis (no_types) in_set_conv_nth)
have 3: "the_Abs f ∈ ?A" when f: "is_Abs f" using prems(3) f by force
show ?case
proof (cases "f = g")
case True
note fg = True
show ?thesis
proof (cases "is_Abs f")
case True
then obtain a where a: "f = Abs a" unfolding is_Abs_def by moura
thus ?thesis using fg 1[OF a] timpls_transformable_to_pred.Abs[of a ?A a] 3 by simp
qed (use fg timpls_transformable_to_pred.Fun[OF _ 0(1) 2, of f] in blast)
next
case False
then obtain a b where ab: "f = Abs a" "g = Abs b" "(a, b) ∈ (set TI)+"
using 0(3) in_trancl_closure_iff_in_trancl_fun[of _ _ TI]
unfolding is_Abs_def the_Abs_def by fastforce
hence "a ∈ ?A" "b ∈ ?A" by force+
thus ?thesis using timpls_transformable_to_pred.Abs ab(1,2) 1[OF ab(1)] by metis
qed
qed (simp_all add: timpls_transformable_to_pred.Var)
private lemma timpls_transformable_to_pred_if_equal_mod_timpls:
assumes s: "equal_mod_timpls TI t s"
and t: "wf trm t" "∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ the_Abs f ∈ A"
shows "timpls_transformable_to_pred (A ∪ fst ‘ (set TI)+ ∪ snd ‘ (set TI)+) t s"
using s t
proof (induction rule: equal_mod_timpls.induct)
case (2 TI f T g S)
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let ?A = "A ∪ fst ‘ (set TI)+ ∪ snd ‘ (set TI)+"
note prems = "2.prems"
note IH = "2.IH"
note 0 = equal_mod_timpls_inv[OF prems(1)]
have 1: "T = []" "S = []" when f: "f = Abs a" for a
using f wf_trm_arity[OF prems(2)] 0(1) by simp_all
have "∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ the_Abs f ∈ A" when t: "t ∈ set T" for t
using t prems(3) funs_term_subterms_eq(1)[of "Fun f T"] by blast
hence 2: "timpls_transformable_to_pred ?A (T ! i) (S ! i)"
when i: "i < length T" for i
using i IH 0(1,2) wf_trm_param[OF prems(2)]
by (metis (no_types) in_set_conv_nth)
have 3: "the_Abs f ∈ ?A" when f: "is_Abs f" using prems(3) f by force
show ?case
proof (cases "f = g")
case True
note fg = True
show ?thesis
proof (cases "is_Abs f")
case True
then obtain a where a: "f = Abs a" unfolding is_Abs_def by moura
thus ?thesis using fg 1[OF a] timpls_transformable_to_pred.Abs[of a ?A a] 3 by simp
qed (use fg timpls_transformable_to_pred.Fun[OF _ 0(1) 2, of f] in blast)
next
case False
then obtain a b where ab: "f = Abs a" "g = Abs b"
"(a, b) ∈ (set TI)+ ∨ (b, a) ∈ (set TI)+ ∨
(∃ ti ∈ set TI. (a, snd ti) ∈ (set TI)+ ∧ (b, snd ti) ∈ (set TI)+)"
using 0(3) in_trancl_closure_iff_in_trancl_fun[of _ _ TI]
unfolding is_Abs_def the_Abs_def by fastforce
hence "a ∈ ?A" "b ∈ ?A" by force+
thus ?thesis using timpls_transformable_to_pred.Abs ab(1,2) 1[OF ab(1)] by metis
qed
qed (simp_all add: timpls_transformable_to_pred.Var)
lemma timpls_transformable_to_finite:
assumes t: "wf trm t"
shows "finite {s. timpls_transformable_to TI t s}" ( is ?P)
and "finite {s. timpls_transformable_to’ TI t s}" ( is ?Q)
proof -
let ?A = "the_Abs ‘ {f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f} ∪ fst ‘ (set TI)+ ∪ snd ‘ (set TI)+"
have 0: "finite ?A" by auto
have 1: "{s. timpls_transformable_to TI t s} ⊆ {s. timpls_transformable_to_pred ?A t s}"
using timpls_transformable_to_pred_if_timpls_transformable_to[OF _ t] by auto
have 2: "{s. timpls_transformable_to’ TI t s} ⊆ {s. timpls_transformable_to_pred ?A t s}"
using timpls_transformable_to_pred_if_timpls_transformable_to’[OF _ t] by auto
show ?P using timpls_transformable_to_pred_finite[OF 0 t] finite_subset[OF 1] by blast
show ?Q using timpls_transformable_to_pred_finite[OF 0 t] finite_subset[OF 2] by blast
qed
lemma equal_mod_timpls_finite:
assumes t: "wf trm t"
shows "finite {s. equal_mod_timpls TI t s}"
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proof -
let ?A = "the_Abs ‘ {f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f} ∪ fst ‘ (set TI)+ ∪ snd ‘ (set TI)+"
have 0: "finite ?A" by auto
have 1: "{s. equal_mod_timpls TI t s} ⊆ {s. timpls_transformable_to_pred ?A t s}"
using timpls_transformable_to_pred_if_equal_mod_timpls[OF _ t] by auto




fixes t::"((’fun, ’atom, ’sets) prot_fun, ’a) term" and TI TI’
assumes "set TI’ = {(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+. a 6= b}"
shows "intruder_synth_mod_timpls M TI’ t ←→ timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI) `c t"
( is "?C t ←→ ?D t")
proof -
have *: "(∃ m ∈ M. timpls_transformable_to TI’ m t) ←→ t ∈ timpl_closure_set M (set TI)"
when "set TI’ = {(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+. a 6= b}"
for M TI TI’ and t::"((’fun, ’atom, ’sets) prot_fun, ’a) term"
using timpls_transformable_to_iff_in_timpl_closure[OF that]
timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union[of M "set TI"]
timpl_closure_set_timpls_trancl_eq[of M "set TI"]
timpl_closure_set_timpls_trancl_eq’[of M "set TI"]
by auto
show "?C t ←→ ?D t"
proof
show "?C t =⇒ ?D t" using assms
proof (induction t arbitrary: M TI TI’ rule: intruder_synth_mod_timpls.induct)
case (1 M TI’ x)
hence "Var x ∈ timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI)"
using timpl_closure.FP member_def unfolding timpl_closure_set_def by force
thus ?case by simp
next
case (2 M TI f T)
show ?case
proof (cases "∃ m ∈ set M. timpls_transformable_to TI’ m (Fun f T)")
case True thus ?thesis
using "2.prems" *[of TI’ TI "set M" "Fun f T"]




hence "¬(list_ex (λt. timpls_transformable_to TI’ t (Fun f T)) M)"
unfolding list_ex_iff by blast
hence "public f" "length T = arity f" "list_all (intruder_synth_mod_timpls M TI’) T"
using "2.prems"(1) by force+
thus ?thesis using "2.IH"[OF _ _ "2.prems"(2)] unfolding list_all_iff by force
qed
qed
show "?D t =⇒ ?C t"
proof (induction t rule: intruder_synth_induct)
case (AxiomC t) thus ?case
using timpl_closure_set_Var_in_iff[of _ "set M" "set TI"] *[OF assms, of "set M" t]
by (cases t rule: term.exhaust) (force simp add: member_def list_ex_iff)+
next
case (ComposeC T f) thus ?case
using list_all_iff[of "intruder_synth_mod_timpls M TI’" T]
intruder_synth_mod_timpls.simps(2)[of M TI’ f T]
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fixes t::"((’fun, ’atom, ’sets) prot_fun, ’a) term" and TI
shows "intruder_synth_mod_timpls’ M TI t ←→ timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI) `c t"
( is "?A t ←→ ?B t")
proof -
have *: "(∃ m ∈ M. timpls_transformable_to’ TI m t) ←→ t ∈ timpl_closure_set M (set TI)"
for M TI and t::"((’fun, ’atom, ’sets) prot_fun, ’a) term"
using timpls_transformable_to’_iff_in_timpl_closure[of TI _ t]
timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union[of M "set TI"]
by blast+
show "?A t ←→ ?B t"
proof
show "?A t =⇒ ?B t"
proof (induction t arbitrary: M TI rule: intruder_synth_mod_timpls’.induct)
case (1 M TI x)
hence "Var x ∈ timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI)"
using timpl_closure.FP List.member_def[of M] unfolding timpl_closure_set_def by auto
thus ?case by simp
next
case (2 M TI f T)
show ?case
proof (cases "∃ m ∈ set M. timpls_transformable_to’ TI m (Fun f T)")
case True thus ?thesis
using "2.prems" *[of "set M" TI "Fun f T"]




hence "public f" "length T = arity f" "list_all (intruder_synth_mod_timpls’ M TI) T"
using "2.prems" list_ex_iff[of _ M] by force+
thus ?thesis




show "?B t =⇒ ?A t"
proof (induction t rule: intruder_synth_induct)
case (AxiomC t) thus ?case
using AxiomC timpl_closure_set_Var_in_iff[of _ "set M" "set TI"] *[of "set M" TI t]
list_ex_iff[of _ M] List.member_def[of M]
by (cases t rule: term.exhaust) force+
next
case (ComposeC T f) thus ?case
using list_all_iff[of "intruder_synth_mod_timpls’ M TI" T]






fixes t::"((’fun, ’atom, ’sets) prot_fun, ’a) term" and TI
defines "cl ≡ λTI. {(a,b) ∈ TI+. a 6= b}"
shows "set TI’ = {(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+. a 6= b} =⇒
intruder_synth_mod_eq_timpls M TI’ t ←→
(∃ s ∈ timpl_closure t (set TI). timpl_closure_set M (set TI) `c s)"
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( is "?Q TI TI’ =⇒ ?C t ←→ ?D t")
proof -
have **: "(∃ m ∈ M. equal_mod_timpls TI’ m t) ←→
(∃ s ∈ timpl_closure t (set TI). s ∈ timpl_closure_set M (set TI))"
when Q: "?Q TI TI’"
for M TI TI’ and t::"((’fun, ’atom, ’sets) prot_fun, ’a) term"
using equal_mod_timpls_iff_ex_in_timpl_closure[OF Q]
timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union[of M "set TI"]
timpl_closure_set_timpls_trancl_eq’[of M "set TI"]
by fastforce
show "?C t ←→ ?D t" when Q: "?Q TI TI’"
proof
show "?C t =⇒ ?D t" using Q
proof (induction t arbitrary: M TI rule: intruder_synth_mod_eq_timpls.induct)
case (1 M TI’ x M TI)
hence "Var x ∈ timpl_closure_set M (set TI)" "Var x ∈ timpl_closure (Var x) (set TI)"
using timpl_closure.FP unfolding timpl_closure_set_def by auto
thus ?case by force
next
case (2 M TI’ f T M TI)
show ?case
proof (cases "∃ m ∈ M. equal_mod_timpls TI’ m (Fun f T)")
case True thus ?thesis
using **[OF "2.prems"(2), of M "Fun f T"]




hence f: "public f" "length T = arity f" "list_all (intruder_synth_mod_eq_timpls M TI’) T"
using "2.prems" by force+
let ?sy = "intruder_synth (timpl_closure_set M (set TI))"
have IH: "∃ u ∈ timpl_closure (T ! i) (set TI). ?sy u"
when i: "i < length T" for i
using "2.IH"[of _ M TI] f(3) nth_mem[OF i] "2.prems"(2)
unfolding list_all_iff by blast
define S where "S ≡ map (λu. SOME v. v ∈ timpl_closure u (set TI) ∧ ?sy v) T"
have S1: "length T = length S"
unfolding S_def by simp
have S2: "S ! i ∈ timpl_closure (T ! i) (set TI)"
"timpl_closure_set M (set TI) `c S ! i"
when i: "i < length S" for i
using i IH someI_ex[of "λv. v ∈ timpl_closure (T ! i) (set TI) ∧ ?sy v"]
unfolding S_def by auto
have "Fun f S ∈ timpl_closure (Fun f T) (set TI)"
using timpl_closure_FunI[of T S "set TI" f f] S1 S2(1)
unfolding timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’ by presburger
thus ?thesis
by (metis intruder_synth.ComposeC[of S f] f(1,2) S1 S2(2) in_set_conv_nth[of _ S])
qed
qed
show "?C t" when D: "?D t"
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proof -
obtain s where "timpl_closure_set M (set TI) `c s" "s ∈ timpl_closure t (set TI)"
using D by moura
thus ?thesis
proof (induction s arbitrary: t rule: intruder_synth_induct)
case (AxiomC s t)
note 1 = timpl_closure_set_Var_in_iff[of _ M "set TI"] timpl_closure_Var_inv[of s _ "set TI"]
note 2 = **[OF Q, of M]
show ?case
proof (cases t)
case Var thus ?thesis using 1 AxiomC by auto
next
case Fun thus ?thesis using 2 AxiomC by auto
qed
next
case (ComposeC T f t)
obtain g S where gS:
"t = Fun g S" "length S = length T"
"∀ i < length T. T ! i ∈ timpl_closure (S ! i) (set TI)"
"g 6= f =⇒ is_Abs g ∧ is_Abs f ∧ (the_Abs g, the_Abs f) ∈ (set TI)+"
using ComposeC.prems(1) timpl_closure’_inv’[of t "Fun f T" "set TI"]
timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’[of _ _ "set TI"]
by fastforce
have IH: "intruder_synth_mod_eq_timpls M TI’ u" when u: "u ∈ set S" for u
by (metis u gS(2,3) ComposeC.IH in_set_conv_nth)
note 0 = list_all_iff[of "intruder_synth_mod_eq_timpls M TI’" S]
intruder_synth_mod_eq_timpls.simps(2)[of M TI’ g S]
have "f = g" using ComposeC.hyps gS(4) unfolding is_Abs_def by fastforce






assumes t: "wf trm t"
shows "finite (timpl_closure t (set TI))"
using timpls_transformable_to’_iff_in_timpl_closure[of TI t]
timpls_transformable_to_finite[OF t, of TI]
by auto
lemma timpl_closure_set_finite:
fixes TI::"(’sets set × ’sets set) list"
assumes M_finite: "finite M"
and M_wf: "wf trms M"
shows "finite (timpl_closure_set M (set TI))"
using timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union[of M "set TI"]
timpl_closure_finite[of _ TI] M_finite M_wf finite
by auto
lemma comp_timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure_set:
fixes M and TI::"(’sets set × ’sets set) list"
assumes M_finite: "finite M"
and M_wf: "wf trms M"
shows "comp_timpl_closure M (set TI) = timpl_closure_set M (set TI)"
using lfp_while’’[OF timpls_Un_mono[of M "set TI"]]
timpl_closure_set_finite[OF M_finite M_wf]
timpl_closure_set_lfp[of M "set TI"]
unfolding comp_timpl_closure_def Let_def by presburger
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assumes f: "arityf f = length T" "arityf f > 0" "Anaf f = (K, R)"
and i: "i < length R"
and M: "timpl_closure_set M TI `c T ! (R ! i)"
and m: "Fun (Fu f) T ∈ M"
and t: "Fun (Fu f) S ∈ timpl_closure (Fun (Fu f) T) TI"
shows "timpl_closure_set M TI `c S ! (R ! i)"
proof -
have "R ! i < length T" using i Anaf_assm2_alt[OF f(3)] f(1) by simp
thus ?thesis





assumes M: "∀ s ∈ set (snd (Ana m)). timpl_closure_set M TI `c s"
and m: "m ∈ M"
and t: "t ∈ timpl_closure m TI"
and s: "s ∈ set (snd (Ana t))"
shows "timpl_closure_set M TI `c s"
proof -
obtain f S K N where fS: "t = Fun (Fu f) S" "arityf f = length S" "0 < arityf f"
and Ana_f: "Anaf f = (K, N)"
and Ana_t: "Ana t = (K ·list (!) S, map ((!) S) N)"
using Ana_nonempty_inv[of t] s by fastforce
then obtain T where T: "m = Fun (Fu f) T" "length T = length S"
using t timpl_closure_Fu_inv’[of f S m TI]
by moura
hence Ana_m: "Ana m = (K ·list (!) T, map ((!) T) N)"
using fS(2,3) Ana_f by auto
obtain i where i: "i < length N" "s = S ! (N ! i)"
using s[unfolded fS(1)] Ana_t[unfolded fS(1)] T(2)
in_set_conv_nth[of s "map (λi. S ! i) N"]
by auto
hence "timpl_closure_set M TI `c T ! (N ! i)"




OF fS(2)[unfolded T(2)[symmetric]] fS(3) Ana_f





fixes M::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term list"
assumes TI’: "set TI’ = {(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+. a 6= b}"
and M_wf: "wf trms (set M)"
shows "analyzed_closed_mod_timpls M TI’ ←→ analyzed (timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI))"
( is "?A ←→ ?B")
proof
let ?C = "∀ t ∈ timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI).
analyzed_in t (timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI))"
let ?P = "λT. ∀ t ∈ set T. timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI) `c t"
let ?Q = "λt. ∀ s ∈ comp_timpl_closure {t} (set TI’). case Ana s of (K, R) ⇒ ?P K −→ ?P R"
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note defs = analyzed_closed_mod_timpls_def analyzed_in_code
note 0 = intruder_synth_mod_timpls_is_synth_timpl_closure_set[OF TI’, of M]
note 1 = timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union[of _ "set TI"]
have 2: "comp_timpl_closure {t} (set TI’) = timpl_closure_set {t} (set TI)"
when t: "t ∈ set M" "wf trm t" for t




hence 3: "comp_timpl_closure {t} (set TI’) ⊆ timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI)"
when t: "t ∈ set M" "wf trm t" for t
using t timpl_closure_set_mono[of "{t}" "set M"]
by fast





fix t assume t: "t ∈ set M"
show "if ?P (fst (Ana t)) then ?P (snd (Ana t)) else ?Q t" ( is ?R)
proof (cases "?P (fst (Ana t))")
case True
hence "?P (snd (Ana t))"
using C timpl_closure_setI[OF t, of "set TI"] prod.exhaust_sel
unfolding analyzed_in_def by blast
thus ?thesis using True by simp
next
case False
have "?Q t" using 3[OF t] C M_wf t unfolding analyzed_in_def by auto
thus ?thesis using False by argo
qed
qed
thus ?A when B: ?B using B analyzed_is_all_analyzed_in by metis
have ?C when A: ?A unfolding analyzed_in_def Let_def
proof (intro ballI allI impI; elim conjE)
fix t K T s
assume t: "t ∈ timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI)"
and s: "s ∈ set T"
and Ana_t: "Ana t = (K, T)"
and K: "∀ k ∈ set K. timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI) `c k"
obtain m where m: "m ∈ set M" "t ∈ timpl_closure m (set TI)"
using timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union t by moura
show "timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI) `c s"
proof (cases "∀ k ∈ set (fst (Ana m)). timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI) `c k")
case True




















moreover have "comp_timpl_closure {m} (set TI’) = timpl_closure m (set TI)"
using 2[OF m(1)] timpl_closureton_is_timpl_closure M_wf m(1)
by blast
ultimately show ?thesis
using m(2) K s Ana_t
unfolding Let_def by auto
qed
qed
thus ?B when A: ?A using A analyzed_is_all_analyzed_in by metis
qed
lemma analyzed_closed_mod_timpls’_is_analyzed_timpl_closure_set:
fixes M::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term list"
assumes M_wf: "wf trms (set M)"
shows "analyzed_closed_mod_timpls’ M TI ←→ analyzed (timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI))"
( is "?A ←→ ?B")
proof
let ?C = "∀ t ∈ timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI). analyzed_in t (timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI))"
let ?P = "λT. ∀ t ∈ set T. timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI) `c t"
let ?Q = "λt. ∀ s ∈ comp_timpl_closure {t} (set TI). case Ana s of (K, R) ⇒ ?P K −→ ?P R"
note defs = analyzed_closed_mod_timpls’_def analyzed_in_code
note 0 = intruder_synth_mod_timpls’_is_synth_timpl_closure_set[of M TI]
note 1 = timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union[of _ "set TI"]
have 2: "comp_timpl_closure {t} (set TI) = timpl_closure_set {t} (set TI)"
when t: "t ∈ set M" "wf trm t" for t
using t timpl_closure_set_timpls_trancl_eq[of "{t}" "set TI"]
comp_timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure_set[of "{t}"]
by blast
hence 3: "comp_timpl_closure {t} (set TI) ⊆ timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI)"
when t: "t ∈ set M" "wf trm t" for t
using t timpl_closure_set_mono[of "{t}" "set M"]
by fast





fix t assume t: "t ∈ set M"
show "if ?P (fst (Ana t)) then ?P (snd (Ana t)) else ?Q t" ( is ?R)
proof (cases "?P (fst (Ana t))")
case True
hence "?P (snd (Ana t))"
using C timpl_closure_setI[OF t, of "set TI"] prod.exhaust_sel
unfolding analyzed_in_def by blast
thus ?thesis using True by simp
next
case False
have "?Q t" using 3[OF t] C M_wf t unfolding analyzed_in_def by auto
thus ?thesis using False by argo
qed
qed
thus ?A when B: ?B using B analyzed_is_all_analyzed_in by metis
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have ?C when A: ?A unfolding analyzed_in_def Let_def
proof (intro ballI allI impI; elim conjE)
fix t K T s
assume t: "t ∈ timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI)"
and s: "s ∈ set T"
and Ana_t: "Ana t = (K, T)"
and K: "∀ k ∈ set K. timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI) `c k"
obtain m where m: "m ∈ set M" "t ∈ timpl_closure m (set TI)"
using timpl_closure_set_is_timpl_closure_union t by moura
show "timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI) `c s"
proof (cases "∀ k ∈ set (fst (Ana m)). timpl_closure_set (set M) (set TI) `c k")
case True


















moreover have "comp_timpl_closure {m} (set TI) = timpl_closure m (set TI)"
using 2[OF m(1)] timpl_closureton_is_timpl_closure M_wf m(1)
by blast
ultimately show ?thesis
using m(2) K s Ana_t
unfolding Let_def by auto
qed
qed













2 Stateful Protocol Verification
abbreviation pubval_terms::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_terms" where
"pubval_terms ≡ {t. ∃ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Val f ∧ public f}"
abbreviation abs_terms::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_terms" where





⇒ bool" ("〈_;_〉 `GSMP _" 50)
where
"〈M; T〉 `GSMP t ≡ intruder_deduct_restricted M (λt. t ∈ GSMP T - (pubval_terms ∪ abs_terms)) t"
lemma intruder_deduct_GSMP_induct[consumes 1, case_names AxiomH ComposeH DecomposeH]:
assumes "〈M; T〉 `GSMP t" "∧t. t ∈ M =⇒ P M t"
"
∧
S f. [[length S = arity f; public f;∧
s. s ∈ set S =⇒ 〈M; T〉 `GSMP s;∧
s. s ∈ set S =⇒ P M s;
Fun f S ∈ GSMP T - (pubval_terms ∪ abs_terms)
]] =⇒ P M (Fun f S)"
"
∧
t K T’ t i. [[〈M; T〉 `GSMP t; P M t; Ana t = (K, T’); ∧k. k ∈ set K =⇒ 〈M; T〉 `GSMP k;∧
k. k ∈ set K =⇒ P M k; t i ∈ set T’ ]] =⇒ P M t i"
shows "P M t"
proof -
let ?Q = "λt. t ∈ GSMP T - (pubval_terms ∪ abs_terms)"
show ?thesis





assumes "t · ϑ ∈ pubval_terms" "ϑ ‘ fv t ∩ pubval_terms = {}"
shows "t ∈ pubval_terms"
using assms(1,2)
proof (induction t)
case (Fun f T)
let ?P = "λf. is_Val f ∧ public f"
from Fun show ?case
proof (cases "?P f")
case False
then obtain t where t: "t ∈ set T" "t · ϑ ∈ pubval_terms"
using Fun.prems by auto
hence "ϑ ‘ fv t ∩ pubval_terms = {}" using Fun.prems(2) by auto




assumes "t · ϑ ∈ abs_terms" "ϑ ‘ fv t ∩ abs_terms = {}"
shows "t ∈ abs_terms"
using assms(1,2)
proof (induction t)
case (Fun f T)
let ?P = "λf. is_Abs f"
from Fun show ?case
proof (cases "?P f")
case False
then obtain t where t: "t ∈ set T" "t · ϑ ∈ abs_terms"
using Fun.prems by auto
hence "ϑ ‘ fv t ∩ abs_terms = {}" using Fun.prems(2) by auto
thus ?thesis using Fun.IH[OF t] t(1) by auto
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assumes "t · ϑ ∈ pubval_terms" "∀ n. Val (n,True) /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (ϑ ‘ fv t))"
shows "t ∈ pubval_terms"
proof -
have "¬public f"
when fs: "f ∈ funs_term s" "s ∈ subtermsset (ϑ ‘ fv t)" "is_Val f"
for f s
proof -
obtain T where T: "Fun f T ∈ subterms s" using funs_term_Fun_subterm[OF fs(1)] by moura
hence "Fun f T ∈ subtermsset (ϑ ‘ fv t)" using fs(2) in_subterms_subset_Union by blast
thus ?thesis using assms(2) funs_term_Fun_subterm’[of f T] fs(3) by (cases f) force+
qed
thus ?thesis using pubval_terms_subst[OF assms(1)] by force
qed
lemma abs_terms_subst’:
assumes "t · ϑ ∈ abs_terms" "∀ n. Abs n /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (ϑ ‘ fv t))"
shows "t ∈ abs_terms"
proof -
have "¬is_Abs f" when fs: "f ∈ funs_term s" "s ∈ subtermsset (ϑ ‘ fv t)" for f s
proof -
obtain T where T: "Fun f T ∈ subterms s" using funs_term_Fun_subterm[OF fs(1)] by moura
hence "Fun f T ∈ subtermsset (ϑ ‘ fv t)" using fs(2) in_subterms_subset_Union by blast
thus ?thesis using assms(2) funs_term_Fun_subterm’[of f T] by (cases f) auto
qed
thus ?thesis using abs_terms_subst[OF assms(1)] by force
qed
lemma pubval_terms_subst_range_disj:
"subst_range ϑ ∩ pubval_terms = {} =⇒ ϑ ‘ fv t ∩ pubval_terms = {}"
proof (induction t)
case (Var x) thus ?case by (cases "x ∈ subst_domain ϑ") auto
qed auto
lemma abs_terms_subst_range_disj:
"subst_range ϑ ∩ abs_terms = {} =⇒ ϑ ‘ fv t ∩ abs_terms = {}"
proof (induction t)
case (Var x) thus ?case by (cases "x ∈ subst_domain ϑ") auto
qed auto
lemma pubval_terms_subst_range_comp:
assumes "subst_range ϑ ∩ pubval_terms = {}" "subst_range δ ∩ pubval_terms = {}"
shows "subst_range (ϑ ◦s δ) ∩ pubval_terms = {}"
proof -
{ fix t f assume t:
"t ∈ subst_range (ϑ ◦s δ)" "f ∈ funs_term t" "is_Val f" "public f"
then obtain x where x: "(ϑ ◦s δ) x = t" by auto
have "ϑ x /∈ pubval_terms" using assms(1) by (cases "ϑ x ∈ subst_range ϑ") force+
hence "(ϑ ◦s δ) x /∈ pubval_terms"
using assms(2) pubval_terms_subst[of "ϑ x" δ] pubval_terms_subst_range_disj
by (metis (mono_tags, lifting) subst_compose_def)
hence False using t(2,3,4) x by blast
} thus ?thesis by fast
qed
lemma pubval_terms_subst_range_comp’:
assumes "(ϑ ‘ X) ∩ pubval_terms = {}" "(δ ‘ fvset (ϑ ‘ X)) ∩ pubval_terms = {}"
shows "((ϑ ◦s δ) ‘ X) ∩ pubval_terms = {}"
proof -
{ fix t f assume t:
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"t ∈ (ϑ ◦s δ) ‘ X" "f ∈ funs_term t" "is_Val f" "public f"
then obtain x where x: "(ϑ ◦s δ) x = t" "x ∈ X" by auto
have "ϑ x /∈ pubval_terms" using assms(1) x(2) by force
moreover have "fv (ϑ x) ⊆ fvset (ϑ ‘ X)" using x(2) by (auto simp add: fv_subset)
hence "δ ‘ fv (ϑ x) ∩ pubval_terms = {}" using assms(2) by auto
ultimately have "(ϑ ◦s δ) x /∈ pubval_terms"
using pubval_terms_subst[of "ϑ x" δ]
by (metis (mono_tags, lifting) subst_compose_def)
hence False using t(2,3,4) x by blast
} thus ?thesis by fast
qed
lemma abs_terms_subst_range_comp:
assumes "subst_range ϑ ∩ abs_terms = {}" "subst_range δ ∩ abs_terms = {}"
shows "subst_range (ϑ ◦s δ) ∩ abs_terms = {}"
proof -
{ fix t f assume t: "t ∈ subst_range (ϑ ◦s δ)" "f ∈ funs_term t" "is_Abs f"
then obtain x where x: "(ϑ ◦s δ) x = t" by auto
have "ϑ x /∈ abs_terms" using assms(1) by (cases "ϑ x ∈ subst_range ϑ") force+
hence "(ϑ ◦s δ) x /∈ abs_terms"
using assms(2) abs_terms_subst[of "ϑ x" δ] abs_terms_subst_range_disj
by (metis (mono_tags, lifting) subst_compose_def)
hence False using t(2,3) x by blast
} thus ?thesis by fast
qed
lemma abs_terms_subst_range_comp’:
assumes "(ϑ ‘ X) ∩ abs_terms = {}" "(δ ‘ fvset (ϑ ‘ X)) ∩ abs_terms = {}"
shows "((ϑ ◦s δ) ‘ X) ∩ abs_terms = {}"
proof -
{ fix t f assume t:
"t ∈ (ϑ ◦s δ) ‘ X" "f ∈ funs_term t" "is_Abs f"
then obtain x where x: "(ϑ ◦s δ) x = t" "x ∈ X" by auto
have "ϑ x /∈ abs_terms" using assms(1) x(2) by force
moreover have "fv (ϑ x) ⊆ fvset (ϑ ‘ X)" using x(2) by (auto simp add: fv_subset)
hence "δ ‘ fv (ϑ x) ∩ abs_terms = {}" using assms(2) by auto
ultimately have "(ϑ ◦s δ) x /∈ abs_terms"
using abs_terms_subst[of "ϑ x" δ]
by (metis (mono_tags, lifting) subst_compose_def)
hence False using t(2,3) x by blast





fixes δ::"((’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_fun, nat, (’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_var) gsubst"
and α::"nat × bool ⇒ ’sets set"
assumes "Anaf f = (K,T)"
shows "(K ·list δ) ·αlist α = K ·list (λn. δ n ·α α)"
proof -
{ fix k assume "k ∈ set K"
hence "k ∈ subtermsset (set K)" by force
hence "k · δ ·α α = k · (λn. δ n ·α α)"
proof (induction k)
case (Fun g S)
have "
∧
s. s ∈ set S =⇒ s · δ ·α α = s · (λn. δ n ·α α)"
using Fun.IH in_subterms_subset_Union[OF Fun.prems] Fun_param_in_subterms[of _ S g]
by (meson contra_subsetD)
thus ?case using Anaf_assm1_alt[OF assms Fun.prems] by (cases g) auto
qed simp
} thus ?thesis unfolding abs_apply_list_def by force
qed
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private lemma Ana_abs_aux2:
fixes α::"nat × bool ⇒ ’sets set"
and K::"((’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_fun, nat) term list"
and M::"nat list"
and T::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term list"
assumes "∀ i ∈ fvset (set K) ∪ set M. i < length T"
and "(K ·list (!) T) ·αlist α = K ·list (λn. T ! n ·α α)"
shows "(K ·list (!) T) ·αlist α = K ·list (!) (map (λs. s ·α α) T)" ( is "?A1 = ?A2")
and "(map ((!) T) M) ·αlist α = map ((!) (map (λs. s ·α α) T)) M" ( is "?B1 = ?B2")
proof -
have "T ! i ·α α = (map (λs. s ·α α) T) ! i" when "i ∈ fvset (set K)" for i
using that assms(1) by auto
hence "k · (λi. T ! i ·α α) = k · (λi. (map (λs. s ·α α) T) ! i)" when "k ∈ set K" for k
using that term_subst_eq_conv[of k "λi. T ! i ·α α" "λi. (map (λs. s ·α α) T) ! i"]
by auto
thus "?A1 = ?A2" using assms(2) by (force simp add: abs_apply_terms_def)
have "T ! i ·α α = map (λs. s ·α α) T ! i" when "i ∈ set M" for i
using that assms(1) by auto
thus "?B1 = ?B2" by (force simp add: abs_apply_list_def)
qed
private lemma Ana_abs_aux1_set:
fixes δ::"((’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_fun, nat, (’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_var) gsubst"
and α::"nat × bool ⇒ ’sets set"
assumes "Anaf f = (K,T)"
shows "(set K ·set δ) ·αset α = set K ·set (λn. δ n ·α α)"
proof -
{ fix k assume "k ∈ set K"
hence "k ∈ subtermsset (set K)" by force
hence "k · δ ·α α = k · (λn. δ n ·α α)"
proof (induction k)
case (Fun g S)
have "
∧
s. s ∈ set S =⇒ s · δ ·α α = s · (λn. δ n ·α α)"
using Fun.IH in_subterms_subset_Union[OF Fun.prems] Fun_param_in_subterms[of _ S g]
by (meson contra_subsetD)
thus ?case using Anaf_assm1_alt[OF assms Fun.prems] by (cases g) auto
qed simp
} thus ?thesis unfolding abs_apply_terms_def by force
qed
private lemma Ana_abs_aux2_set:
fixes α::"nat × bool ⇒ ’sets set"
and K::"((’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_fun, nat) terms"
and M::"nat set"
and T::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term list"
assumes "∀ i ∈ fvset K ∪ M. i < length T"
and "(K ·set (!) T) ·αset α = K ·set (λn. T ! n ·α α)"
shows "(K ·set (!) T) ·αset α = K ·set (!) (map (λs. s ·α α) T)" ( is "?A1 = ?A2")
and "((!) T ‘ M) ·αset α = (!) (map (λs. s ·α α) T) ‘ M" ( is "?B1 = ?B2")
proof -
have "T ! i ·α α = (map (λs. s ·α α) T) ! i" when "i ∈ fvset K" for i
using that assms(1) by auto
hence "k · (λi. T ! i ·α α) = k · (λi. (map (λs. s ·α α) T) ! i)" when "k ∈ K" for k
using that term_subst_eq_conv[of k "λi. T ! i ·α α" "λi. (map (λs. s ·α α) T) ! i"]
by auto
thus "?A1 = ?A2" using assms(2) by (force simp add: abs_apply_terms_def)
have "T ! i ·α α = map (λs. s ·α α) T ! i" when "i ∈ M" for i
using that assms(1) by auto
thus "?B1 = ?B2" by (force simp add: abs_apply_terms_def)
qed
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lemma Ana_abs:
fixes t::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term"
assumes "Ana t = (K, T)"
shows "Ana (t ·α α) = (K ·αlist α, T ·αlist α)"
using assms
proof (induction t rule: Ana.induct)
case (1 f S)
obtain K’ T’ where *: "Anaf f = (K’,T’)" by moura
show ?case using 1
proof (cases "arityf f = length S ∧ arityf f > 0")
case True
hence "K = K’ ·list (!) S" "T = map ((!) S) T’"
and **: "arityf f = length (map (λs. s ·α α) S)" "arityf f > 0"
using 1 * by auto
hence "K ·αlist α = K’ ·list (!) (map (λs. s ·α α) S)"
"T ·αlist α = map ((!) (map (λs. s ·α α) S)) T’"
using Anaf_assm2_alt[OF *] Ana_abs_aux2[OF _ Ana_abs_aux1[OF *], of T’ S α]
unfolding abs_apply_list_def
by auto
moreover have "Fun (Fu f) S ·α α = Fun (Fu f) (map (λs. s ·α α) S)" by simp
ultimately show ?thesis using Ana_Fu_intro[OF ** *] by metis
qed (auto simp add: abs_apply_list_def)
qed (simp_all add: abs_apply_list_def)
end
lemma deduct_FP_if_deduct:
fixes M IK FP::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_terms"
assumes IK: "IK ⊆ GSMP M - (pubval_terms ∪ abs_terms)" "∀ t ∈ IK ·αset α. FP `c t"
and t: "IK ` t" "t ∈ GSMP M - (pubval_terms ∪ abs_terms)"
shows "FP ` t ·α α"
proof -
let ?P = "λf. is_Val f −→ ¬public f"
let ?GSMP = "GSMP M - (pubval_terms ∪ abs_terms)"
have 1: "∀ m ∈ IK. m ∈ ?GSMP"
using IK(1) by blast
have 2: "∀ t t’. t ∈ ?GSMP −→ t’ v t −→ t’ ∈ ?GSMP"
proof (intro allI impI)
fix t t’ assume t: "t ∈ ?GSMP" "t’ v t"
hence "t’ ∈ GSMP M" using ground_subterm unfolding GSMP_def by auto
moreover have "¬public f"
when "f ∈ funs_term t" "is_Val f" for f
using t(1) that by auto
hence "¬public f"
when "f ∈ funs_term t’" "is_Val f" for f
using that subtermeq_imp_funs_term_subset[OF t(2)] by auto
moreover have "¬is_Abs f" when "f ∈ funs_term t" for f using t(1) that by auto
hence "¬is_Abs f" when "f ∈ funs_term t’" for f
using that subtermeq_imp_funs_term_subset[OF t(2)] by auto
ultimately show "t’ ∈ ?GSMP" by simp
qed
have 3: "∀ t K T k. t ∈ ?GSMP −→ Ana t = (K, T) −→ k ∈ set K −→ k ∈ ?GSMP"
proof (intro allI impI)
fix t K T k assume t: "t ∈ ?GSMP" "Ana t = (K, T)" "k ∈ set K"
hence "k ∈ GSMP M" using GSMP_Ana_key by blast
moreover have "∀ f ∈ funs_term t. ?P f" using t(1) by auto
with t(2,3) have "∀ f ∈ funs_term k. ?P f"
proof (induction t arbitrary: k rule: Ana.induct)
case 1 thus ?case by (metis Ana_Fu_keys_not_pubval_terms surj_pair)
qed auto
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moreover have "∀ f ∈ funs_term t. ¬is_Abs f" using t(1) by auto
with t(2,3) have "∀ f ∈ funs_term k. ¬is_Abs f"
proof (induction t arbitrary: k rule: Ana.induct)
case 1 thus ?case by (metis Ana_Fu_keys_not_abs_terms surj_pair)
qed auto
ultimately show "k ∈ ?GSMP" by simp
qed
have "〈IK; M〉 `GSMP t"
unfolding intruder_deduct_GSMP_def
by (rule restricted_deduct_if_deduct’[OF 1 2 3 t])
thus ?thesis
proof (induction t rule: intruder_deduct_GSMP_induct)
case (AxiomH t)
show ?case using IK(2) abs_in[OF AxiomH.hyps] by force
next
case (ComposeH T f)
have *: "Fun f T ·α α = Fun f (map (λt. t ·α α) T)"
using ComposeH.hyps(2,4)
by (cases f) auto




using intruder_deduct.Compose[OF ** ComposeH.hyps(2)] ComposeH.IH(1) *
by auto
next
case (DecomposeH t K T’ t i)
have *: "Ana (t ·α α) = (K ·αlist α, T’ ·αlist α)"
using Ana_abs[OF DecomposeH.hyps(2)]
by metis
have **: "t i ·α α ∈ set (T’ ·αlist α)"
using DecomposeH.hyps(4) abs_in abs_list_set_is_set_abs_set[of T’]
by auto
have ***: "FP ` k"
when k: "k ∈ set (K ·αlist α)" for k
proof -
obtain k’ where k’: "k’ ∈ set K" "k = k’ ·α α"
by (metis (no_types) k abs_apply_terms_def imageE abs_list_set_is_set_abs_set)
show "FP ` k"
using DecomposeH.IH k’ by blast
qed
show ?case






2.6.2 Computing and Checking Term Implications and Messages
context stateful_protocol_model
begin
abbreviation (input) "absc s ≡ (Fun (Abs s) []::(’fun, ’atom, ’sets) prot_term)"
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fun absdbupd where
"absdbupd [] _ a = a"
| "absdbupd (insert〈Var y, Fun (Set s) T〉#D) x a = (
if x = y then absdbupd D x (insert s a) else absdbupd D x a)"
| "absdbupd (delete〈Var y, Fun (Set s) T〉#D) x a = (
if x = y then absdbupd D x (a - {s}) else absdbupd D x a)"
| "absdbupd (_#D) x a = absdbupd D x a"
lemma absdbupd_cons_cases:
"absdbupd (insert〈Var x, Fun (Set s) T〉#D) x d = absdbupd D x (insert s d)"
"absdbupd (delete〈Var x, Fun (Set s) T〉#D) x d = absdbupd D x (d - {s})"
"t 6= Var x ∨ (@ s T. u = Fun (Set s) T) =⇒ absdbupd (insert〈t,u〉#D) x d = absdbupd D x d"
"t 6= Var x ∨ (@ s T. u = Fun (Set s) T) =⇒ absdbupd (delete〈t,u〉#D) x d = absdbupd D x d"
proof -
assume *: "t 6= Var x ∨ (@ s T. u = Fun (Set s) T)"
let ?P = "absdbupd (insert〈t,u〉#D) x d = absdbupd D x d"
let ?Q = "absdbupd (delete〈t,u〉#D) x d = absdbupd D x d"
{ fix y f T assume "t = Fun f T ∨ u = Var y" hence ?P ?Q by auto
} moreover {
fix y f T assume "t = Var y" "u = Fun f T" hence ?P using * by (cases f) auto
} moreover {
fix y f T assume "t = Var y" "u = Fun f T" hence ?Q using * by (cases f) auto
} ultimately show ?P ?Q by (metis term.exhaust)+
qed simp_all
lemma absdbupd_filter: "absdbupd S x d = absdbupd (filter is_Update S) x d"
by (induction S x d rule: absdbupd.induct) simp_all
lemma absdbupd_append:
"absdbupd (A@B) x d = absdbupd B x (absdbupd A x d)"
proof (induction A arbitrary: d)
case (Cons a A) thus ?case
proof (cases a)
case (Insert t u) thus ?thesis
proof (cases "t 6= Var x ∨ (@ s T. u = Fun (Set s) T)")
case False
then obtain s T where "t = Var x" "u = Fun (Set s) T" by moura
thus ?thesis by (simp add: Insert Cons.IH absdbupd_cons_cases(1))
qed (simp_all add: Cons.IH absdbupd_cons_cases(3))
next
case (Delete t u) thus ?thesis
proof (cases "t 6= Var x ∨ (@ s T. u = Fun (Set s) T)")
case False
then obtain s T where "t = Var x" "u = Fun (Set s) T" by moura
thus ?thesis by (simp add: Delete Cons.IH absdbupd_cons_cases(2))




assumes T: "wellformed_transaction T"
shows "absdbupd (unlabel (transaction_strand T)) = absdbupd (unlabel (transaction_updates T))"
proof -
define S0 where "S0 ≡ unlabel (transaction_strand T)"
define S1 where "S1 ≡ unlabel (transaction_receive T)"
define S2 where "S2 ≡ unlabel (transaction_selects T)"
define S3 where "S3 ≡ unlabel (transaction_checks T)"
define S4 where "S4 ≡ unlabel (transaction_updates T)"
define S5 where "S5 ≡ unlabel (transaction_send T)"
note S_defs = S0_def S1_def S2_def S3_def S4_def S5_def
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using T unfolding wellformed_transaction_def S_defs by metis+
have "filter is_Update S1 = []"
"filter is_Update S2 = []"
"filter is_Update S3 = []"
"filter is_Update S4 = S4"
"filter is_Update S5 = []"
using list_all_filter_nil[OF 0(1), of is_Update]
list_all_filter_nil[OF 0(2), of is_Update]
list_all_filter_nil[OF 0(3), of is_Update]
list_all_filter_eq[OF 0(4)]
list_all_filter_nil[OF 0(5), of is_Update]
by blast+
moreover have "S0 = S1@S2@S3@S4@S5"
unfolding S_defs transaction_strand_def unlabel_def by auto
ultimately have "filter is_Update S0 = S4"









(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_var ⇒ ’sets set,
(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_var ⇒ ’sets set]
⇒ (((’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_var × ’sets set) list) list"
where
"abs_substs_set [] _ _ _ = [[]]"
| "abs_substs_set (x#xs) as posconstrs negconstrs = (
let bs = filter (λa. posconstrs x ⊆ a ∧ a ∩ negconstrs x = {}) as
in concat (map (λb. map (λδ. (x, b)#δ) (abs_substs_set xs as posconstrs negconstrs)) bs))"
definition abs_substs_fun::




"abs_substs_fun δ x = (case find (λb. fst b = x) δ of Some (_,a) ⇒ a | None ⇒ {})"
lemmas abs_substs_set_induct = abs_substs_set.induct[case_names Nil Cons]
fun transaction_poschecks_comp::
"((’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_fun, (’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_var) stateful_strand
⇒ ((’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_var ⇒ ’sets set)"
where
"transaction_poschecks_comp [] = (λ_. {})"
| "transaction_poschecks_comp (〈_: Var x ∈ Fun (Set s) []〉#T) = (
let f = transaction_poschecks_comp T in f(x := insert s (f x)))"
| "transaction_poschecks_comp (_#T) = transaction_poschecks_comp T"
fun transaction_negchecks_comp::
"((’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_fun, (’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_var) stateful_strand
⇒ ((’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_var ⇒ ’sets set)"
where
"transaction_negchecks_comp [] = (λ_. {})"
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| "transaction_negchecks_comp (〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉#T) = (
let f = transaction_negchecks_comp T in f(x := insert s (f x)))"
| "transaction_negchecks_comp (_#T) = transaction_negchecks_comp T"
definition transaction_check_pre where
"transaction_check_pre FP TI T δ ≡
let C = set (unlabel (transaction_checks T));
S = set (unlabel (transaction_selects T));
xs = fv_listsst (unlabel (transaction_strand T));
ϑ = λδ x. if fst x = TAtom Value then (absc ◦ δ) x else Var x
in (∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). δ x = {}) ∧
(∀ t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_receive T). intruder_synth_mod_timpls FP TI (t · ϑ δ)) ∧
(∀ u ∈ S ∪ C.
(is_InSet u −→ (
let x = the_elem_term u; s = the_set_term u
in (is_Var x ∧ is_Fun_Set s) −→ the_Set (the_Fun s) ∈ δ (the_Var x))) ∧
((is_NegChecks u ∧ bvarssstp u = [] ∧ the_eqs u = [] ∧ length (the_ins u) = 1) −→ (
let x = fst (hd (the_ins u)); s = snd (hd (the_ins u))
in (is_Var x ∧ is_Fun_Set s) −→ the_Set (the_Fun s) /∈ δ (the_Var x))))"
definition transaction_check_post where
"transaction_check_post FP TI T δ ≡
let xs = fv_listsst (unlabel (transaction_strand T));
ϑ = λδ x. if fst x = TAtom Value then (absc ◦ δ) x else Var x;
u = λδ x. absdbupd (unlabel (transaction_updates T)) x (δ x)
in (∀ x ∈ set xs - set (transaction_fresh T). δ x 6= u δ x −→ List.member TI (δ x, u δ x)) ∧




(’sets set × ’sets set) list,
(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_transaction]
⇒ (((’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_var × ’sets set) list) list"
where
"transaction_check_comp FP OCC TI T ≡
let S = unlabel (transaction_strand T);
C = unlabel (transaction_selects T@transaction_checks T);
xs = filter (λx. x /∈ set (transaction_fresh T) ∧ fst x = TAtom Value) (fv_listsst S);
posconstrs = transaction_poschecks_comp C;
negconstrs = transaction_negchecks_comp C;
pre_check = transaction_check_pre FP TI T








"transaction_check FP OCC TI T ≡
list_all (λδ. transaction_check_post FP TI T (abs_substs_fun δ)) (transaction_check_comp FP OCC TI T)"
lemma abs_subst_fun_cons:
"abs_substs_fun ((x,b)#δ) = (abs_substs_fun δ)(x := b)"
unfolding abs_substs_fun_def by fastforce
lemma abs_substs_cons:
assumes "δ ∈ set (abs_substs_set xs as poss negs)" "b ∈ set as" "poss x ⊆ b" "b ∩ negs x = {}"
shows "(x,b)#δ ∈ set (abs_substs_set (x#xs) as poss negs)"
using assms by auto
150
2.6 Stateful Protocol Verification (Stateful Protocol Verification)
lemma abs_substs_cons’:
assumes δ: "δ ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (abs_substs_set xs as poss negs)"
and b: "b ∈ set as" "poss x ⊆ b" "b ∩ negs x = {}"
shows "δ(x := b) ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (abs_substs_set (x#xs) as poss negs)"
proof -
obtain ϑ where ϑ: "δ = abs_substs_fun ϑ" "ϑ ∈ set (abs_substs_set xs as poss negs)"
using δ by moura
have "abs_substs_fun ((x, b)#ϑ) ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (abs_substs_set (x#xs) as poss negs)"
using abs_substs_cons[OF ϑ(2) b] by blast
thus ?thesis
using ϑ(1) abs_subst_fun_cons[of x b ϑ] by argo
qed
lemma abs_substs_has_all_abs:
assumes "∀ x. x ∈ set xs −→ δ x ∈ set as"
and "∀ x. x ∈ set xs −→ poss x ⊆ δ x"
and "∀ x. x ∈ set xs −→ δ x ∩ negs x = {}"
and "∀ x. x /∈ set xs −→ δ x = {}"
shows "δ ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (abs_substs_set xs as poss negs)"
using assms
proof (induction xs arbitrary: δ)
case (Cons x xs)
define ϑ where "ϑ ≡ λy. if y ∈ set xs then δ y else {}"
have "ϑ ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (abs_substs_set xs as poss negs)"
using Cons.prems Cons.IH by (simp add: ϑ_def)
moreover have "δ x ∈ set as" "poss x ⊆ δ x" "δ x ∩ negs x = {}"
using Cons.prems(1,2,3) by fastforce+
ultimately have 0: "ϑ(x := δ x) ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (abs_substs_set (x#xs) as poss negs)"
by (metis abs_substs_cons’)
have "δ = ϑ(x := δ x)"
proof
fix y show "δ y = (ϑ(x := δ x)) y"
proof (cases "y ∈ set (x#xs)")
case False thus ?thesis using Cons.prems(4) by (fastforce simp add: ϑ_def)
qed (auto simp add: ϑ_def)
qed
thus ?case by (metis 0)
qed (auto simp add: abs_substs_fun_def)
lemma abs_substs_abss_bounded:
assumes "δ ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (abs_substs_set xs as poss negs)"
and "x ∈ set xs"
shows "δ x ∈ set as"
and "poss x ⊆ δ x"
and "δ x ∩ negs x = {}"
using assms
proof (induct xs as poss negs arbitrary: δ rule: abs_substs_set_induct)
case (Cons y xs as poss negs)
{ case 1 thus ?case using Cons.hyps(1) unfolding abs_substs_fun_def by fastforce }
{ case 2 thus ?case
proof (cases "x = y")
case False
then obtain δ’ where δ’:
"δ’ ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (abs_substs_set xs as poss negs)" "δ’ x = δ x"
using 2 unfolding abs_substs_fun_def by force
moreover have "x ∈ set xs" using 2(2) False by simp
moreover have "∃ b. b ∈ set as ∧ poss y ⊆ b ∧ b ∩ negs y = {}"
using 2 False by auto
ultimately show ?thesis using Cons.hyps(2) by fastforce
qed (auto simp add: abs_substs_fun_def)
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}
{ case 3 thus ?case
proof (cases "x = y")
case False
then obtain δ’ where δ’:
"δ’ ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (abs_substs_set xs as poss negs)" "δ’ x = δ x"
using 3 unfolding abs_substs_fun_def by force
moreover have "x ∈ set xs" using 3(2) False by simp
moreover have "∃ b. b ∈ set as ∧ poss y ⊆ b ∧ b ∩ negs y = {}"
using 3 False by auto
ultimately show ?thesis using Cons.hyps(3) by fastforce
qed (auto simp add: abs_substs_fun_def)
}
qed (simp_all add: abs_substs_fun_def)
lemma transaction_poschecks_comp_unfold:
"transaction_poschecks_comp C x = {s. ∃ a. 〈a: Var x ∈ Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set C}"
proof (induction C)
case (Cons c C) thus ?case
proof (cases "∃ a y s. c = 〈a: Var y ∈ Fun (Set s) []〉")
case True
then obtain a y s where c: "c = 〈a: Var y ∈ Fun (Set s) []〉" by moura
define f where "f ≡ transaction_poschecks_comp C"
have "transaction_poschecks_comp (c#C) = f(y := insert s (f y))"
using c by (simp add: f_def Let_def)
moreover have "f x = {s. ∃ a. 〈a: Var x ∈ Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set C}"
using Cons.IH unfolding f_def by blast
ultimately show ?thesis using c by auto
next
case False
hence "transaction_poschecks_comp (c#C) = transaction_poschecks_comp C" ( is ?P)
using transaction_poschecks_comp.cases[of "c#C" ?P] by force




assumes "x /∈ fvsst C"
shows "transaction_poschecks_comp C x = {}"
using assms transaction_poschecks_comp_unfold[of C x] by fastforce
lemma transaction_negchecks_comp_unfold:
"transaction_negchecks_comp C x = {s. 〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set C}"
proof (induction C)
case (Cons c C) thus ?case
proof (cases "∃ y s. c = 〈Var y not in Fun (Set s) []〉")
case True
then obtain y s where c: "c = 〈Var y not in Fun (Set s) []〉" by moura
define f where "f ≡ transaction_negchecks_comp C"
have "transaction_negchecks_comp (c#C) = f(y := insert s (f y))"
using c by (simp add: f_def Let_def)
moreover have "f x = {s. 〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set C}"
using Cons.IH unfolding f_def by blast
ultimately show ?thesis using c by auto
next
case False
hence "transaction_negchecks_comp (c#C) = transaction_negchecks_comp C" ( is ?P)
using transaction_negchecks_comp.cases[of "c#C" ?P]
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by force




assumes "x /∈ fvsst C"
shows "transaction_negchecks_comp C x = {}"
using assms transaction_negchecks_comp_unfold[of C x] by fastforce
lemma transaction_check_preI[intro]:
fixes T
defines "ϑ ≡ λδ x. if fst x = TAtom Value then (absc ◦ δ) x else Var x"
and "S ≡ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T))"
and "C ≡ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))"
assumes a0: "∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). δ x = {}"
and a1: "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T). fst x = TAtom Value −→ δ x ∈ set OCC"
and a2: "∀ t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_receive T). intruder_synth_mod_timpls FP TI (t · ϑ δ)"
and a3: "∀ a x s. 〈a: Var x ∈ Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S ∪ C −→ s ∈ δ x"
and a4: "∀ x s. 〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S ∪ C −→ s /∈ δ x"
shows "transaction_check_pre FP TI T δ"
proof -
let ?P = "λu. is_InSet u −→ (
let x = the_elem_term u; s = the_set_term u
in (is_Var x ∧ is_Fun_Set s) −→ the_Set (the_Fun s) ∈ δ (the_Var x))"
let ?Q = "λu. (is_NegChecks u ∧ bvarssstp u = [] ∧ the_eqs u = [] ∧ length (the_ins u) = 1) −→ (
let x = fst (hd (the_ins u)); s = snd (hd (the_ins u))
in (is_Var x ∧ is_Fun_Set s) −→ the_Set (the_Fun s) /∈ δ (the_Var x))"
have 1: "?P u" when u: "u ∈ S ∪ C" for u
apply (unfold Let_def, intro impI, elim conjE)
using u a3 Fun_Set_InSet_iff[of u] by metis
have 2: "?Q u" when u: "u ∈ S ∪ C" for u
apply (unfold Let_def, intro impI, elim conjE)
using u a4 Fun_Set_NotInSet_iff[of u] by metis
show ?thesis
using a0 a1 a2 1 2 fv_listsst_is_fvsst[of "unlabel (transaction_strand T)"]




assumes T: "transaction_check_pre FP TI T δ"
and u: "u = 〈a: Var x ∈ Fun (Set s) []〉"
"u ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T)) ∪ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))"
shows "s ∈ δ x"
proof -
have "is_InSet u −→ is_Var (the_elem_term u) ∧ is_Fun_Set (the_set_term u) −→
the_Set (the_Fun (the_set_term u)) ∈ δ (the_Var (the_elem_term u))"
using T u unfolding transaction_check_pre_def Let_def by blast
thus ?thesis using Fun_Set_InSet_iff[of u a x s] u by argo
qed
lemma transaction_check_pre_NotInSetE:
assumes T: "transaction_check_pre FP TI T δ"
and u: "u = 〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉"
"u ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T)) ∪ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))"
shows "s /∈ δ x"
proof -
have "is_NegChecks u ∧ bvarssstp u = [] ∧ the_eqs u = [] ∧ length (the_ins u) = 1 −→
153
2 Stateful Protocol Verification
is_Var (fst (hd (the_ins u))) ∧ is_Fun_Set (snd (hd (the_ins u))) −→
the_Set (the_Fun (snd (hd (the_ins u)))) /∈ δ (the_Var (fst (hd (the_ins u))))"
using T u unfolding transaction_check_pre_def Let_def by blast
thus ?thesis using Fun_Set_NotInSet_iff[of u x s] u by argo
qed
lemma transaction_check_compI[intro]:
assumes T: "transaction_check_pre FP TI T δ"
and T_adm: "admissible_transaction T"
and x1: "∀ x. (x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T) ∧ fst x = TAtom Value)
−→ δ x ∈ set OCC"
and x2: "∀ x. (x /∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T) ∨ fst x 6= TAtom Value)
−→ δ x = {}"
shows "δ ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (transaction_check_comp FP OCC TI T)"
proof -
define S where "S ≡ unlabel (transaction_strand T)"
define C where "C ≡ unlabel (transaction_selects T@transaction_checks T)"
define C’ where "C’ ≡ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T)) ∪
set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))"
let ?xs = "fv_listsst S"
define poss where "poss ≡ transaction_poschecks_comp C"
define negs where "negs ≡ transaction_negchecks_comp C"
define ys where "ys ≡ filter (λx. x /∈ set (transaction_fresh T) ∧ fst x = TAtom Value) ?xs"
have C_C’_eq: "set C = C’"
using unlabel_append[of "transaction_selects T" "transaction_checks T"]
unfolding C_def C’_def by simp
have ys: "{x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T). fst x = TAtom Value} = set ys"
using fv_listsst_is_fvsst[of S]
unfolding ys_def S_def by force
have "δ x ∈ set OCC"
when x: "x ∈ set ys" for x
using x1 x ys by blast
moreover have "δ x = {}"
when x: "x /∈ set ys" for x
using x2 x ys by blast
moreover have "poss x ⊆ δ x" when x: "x ∈ set ys" for x
proof -
have "s ∈ δ x" when u: "u = 〈a: Var x ∈ Fun (Set s) []〉" "u ∈ C’" for u a s
using T u transaction_check_pre_InSetE[of FP TI T δ]
unfolding C’_def by blast
thus ?thesis
using transaction_poschecks_comp_unfold[of C x] C_C’_eq
unfolding poss_def by blast
qed
moreover have "δ x ∩ negs x = {}" when x: "x ∈ set ys" for x
proof (cases "x ∈ fvsst C")
case True
hence "s /∈ δ x" when u: "u = 〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉" "u ∈ C’" for u s
using T u transaction_check_pre_NotInSetE[of FP TI T δ]
unfolding C’_def by blast
thus ?thesis
using transaction_negchecks_comp_unfold[of C x] C_C’_eq
unfolding negs_def by blast
next
case False
hence "negs x = {}"
using x C_C’_eq transaction_negchecks_comp_notin_fv_empty
unfolding negs_def by blast
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thus ?thesis by blast
qed
ultimately have "δ ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (abs_substs_set ys OCC poss negs)"











defines "S ≡ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T))"
and "C ≡ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))"
assumes T_adm: "admissible_transaction T"
and a1: "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T). fst x = TAtom Value −→ (∀ s.
select〈Var x, Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S −→ s ∈ α x)"
and a2: "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T). fst x = TAtom Value −→ (∀ s.
〈Var x in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ C −→ s ∈ α x)"
and a3: "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T). fst x = TAtom Value −→ (∀ s.
〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ C −→ s /∈ α x)"
shows "∀ a x s. 〈a: Var x ∈ Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S ∪ C −→ s ∈ α x" ( is ?A)
and "∀ x s. 〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S ∪ C −→ s /∈ α x" ( is ?B)
proof -
have T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
and T_adm_S: "admissible_transaction_selects T"
and T_adm_C: "admissible_transaction_checks T"
using T_adm unfolding admissible_transaction_def by blast+
note * = admissible_transaction_strand_step_cases(2,3)[OF T_adm]
have 1: "fst x = TAtom Value" "x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T)"
when x: "〈a: Var x ∈ Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S ∪ C" for a x s
using * x unfolding S_def C_def by fast+
have 2: "fst x = TAtom Value" "x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T)"
when x: "〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S ∪ C" for x s
using * x unfolding S_def C_def by fast+
have 3: "select〈Var x, Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S"
when x: "select〈Var x, Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S ∪ C" for x s
using * x unfolding S_def C_def by fast
have 4: "〈Var x in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ C"
when x: "〈Var x in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S ∪ C" for x s
using * x unfolding S_def C_def by fast
have 5: "〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ C"
when x: "〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S ∪ C" for x s
using * x unfolding S_def C_def by fast
show ?A
proof (intro allI impI)
fix a x s assume u: "〈a: Var x ∈ Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S ∪ C"
thus "s ∈ α x" using 1 3 4 a1 a2 by (cases a) metis+
qed
show ?B
proof (intro allI impI)
fix x s assume u: "〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S ∪ C"
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defines "ϑ ≡ λδ x. if fst x = TAtom Value then (absc ◦ δ) x else Var x"
and "S ≡ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T))"
and "C ≡ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))"
assumes T_adm: "admissible_transaction T"
and a1: "∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). α x = {}"
and a2: "∀ t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_receive T). intruder_synth_mod_timpls FP TI (t · ϑ α)"
and a3: "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T). ∀ s.
select〈Var x, Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S −→ s ∈ α x"
and a4: "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T). ∀ s.
〈Var x in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ C −→ s ∈ α x"
and a5: "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T). ∀ s.
〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ C −→ s /∈ α x"
and a6: "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T).
fst x = TAtom Value −→ α x ∈ set OCC"
shows "∃ δ ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (transaction_check_comp FP OCC TI T). ∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T.
fst x = TAtom Value −→ α x = δ x"
proof -
let ?xs = "fv_listsst (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
let ?ys = "filter (λx. x /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)) ?xs"
define α’ where "α’ ≡ λx.
if x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T) ∧ fst x = TAtom Value
then α x
else {}"
have T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
using T_adm unfolding admissible_transaction_def by blast
have ϑα_Fun: "is_Fun (t · ϑ α) ←→ is_Fun (t · ϑ α’)" for t
unfolding α’_def ϑ_def
by (induct t) auto
have "∀ t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_receive T). intruder_synth_mod_timpls FP TI (t · ϑ α’)"
proof (intro ballI impI)
fix t assume t: "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_receive T)"
have 1: "intruder_synth_mod_timpls FP TI (t · ϑ α)"
using t a2
by auto
obtain r where r:
"r ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T))"
"t ∈ trmssstp r"
using t by auto
hence "r = receive〈t〉"
using wellformed_transaction_unlabel_cases(1)[OF T_valid]
by fastforce
hence 2: "fv t ⊆ fv lsst (transaction_receive T)" using r by force
have "fv t ⊆ fv_transaction T"
by (metis (no_types, lifting) 2 transaction_strand_def sst_vars_append_subset(1)
unlabel_append subset_Un_eq sup.bounded_iff)
moreover have "fv t ∩ set (transaction_fresh T) = {}"
using 2 T_valid varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel (transaction_receive T)"]
unfolding wellformed_transaction_def
by fast
ultimately have "ϑ α x = ϑ α’ x" when "x ∈ fv t" for x
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using that unfolding α’_def ϑ_def by fastforce
hence 3: "t · ϑ α = t · ϑ α’"
using term_subst_eq by blast
show "intruder_synth_mod_timpls FP TI (t · ϑ α’)" using 1 3 by simp
qed
moreover have
"∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T). fst x = TAtom Value −→ (∀ s.
select〈Var x, Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S −→ s ∈ α’ x)"
"∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T). fst x = TAtom Value −→ (∀ s.
〈Var x in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ C −→ s ∈ α’ x)"
"∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T). fst x = TAtom Value −→ (∀ s.
〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ C −→ s /∈ α’ x)"
using a3 a4 a5
unfolding α’_def ϑ_def S_def C_def
by meson+
hence "∀ a x s. 〈a: Var x ∈ Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S ∪ C −→ s ∈ α’ x"
"∀ x s. 〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ S ∪ C −→ s /∈ α’ x"
using transaction_check_comp_in_aux[OF T_adm, of α’]
unfolding S_def C_def
by fast+
ultimately have 4: "transaction_check_pre FP TI T α’"
using a6 transaction_check_preI[of T α’ OCC FP TI]
unfolding α’_def ϑ_def S_def C_def by simp
have 5: "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T. fst x = TAtom Value −→ α x = α’ x"
using a1 by (auto simp add: α’_def)
have 6: "α’ ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (transaction_check_comp FP OCC TI T)"
using transaction_check_compI[OF 4 T_adm] a6
unfolding α’_def
by auto




2.6.3 Automatically Checking Protocol Security in a Typed Model
context stateful_protocol_model
begin
definition abs_intruder_knowledge ("αik") where
"αik S I ≡ (ik lsst S ·set I) ·αset α0 (db lsst S I)"
definition abs_value_constants ("αvals") where
"αvals S I ≡ {t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst S) ·set I. ∃ n. t = Fun (Val n) []} ·αset α0 (db lsst S I)"
definition abs_term_implications ("αti") where
"αti A T σ α I ≡ {(s,t) | s t x.
s 6= t ∧ x ∈ fv_transaction T ∧ x /∈ set (transaction_fresh T) ∧
Fun (Abs s) [] = (σ ◦s α) x · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I) ∧
Fun (Abs t) [] = (σ ◦s α) x · I ·α α0 (db lsst (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)) I)}"
lemma abs_intruder_knowledge_append:
"αik (A@B) I =
(ik lsst A ·set I) ·αset α0 (db lsst (A@B) I) ∪
(ik lsst B ·set I) ·αset α0 (db lsst (A@B) I)"
by (metis unlabel_append abs_set_union image_Un iksst_append abs_intruder_knowledge_def)
lemma abs_value_constants_append:
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fixes A B::"(’a,’b,’c,’d) prot_strand"
shows "αvals (A@B) I =
{t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A) ·set I. ∃ n. t = Fun (Val n) []} ·αset α0 (db lsst (A@B) I) ∪
{t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst B) ·set I. ∃ n. t = Fun (Val n) []} ·αset α0 (db lsst (A@B) I)"
proof -
define a0 where "a0 ≡ α0 (dbsst (unlabel (A@B)) I)"
define M where "M ≡ λa::(’a,’b,’c,’d) prot_strand.
{t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst a) ·set I. ∃ n. t = Fun (Val n) []}"
have "M (A@B) = M A ∪ M B"
using unlabel_append[of A B] trmssst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel B"]
image_Un[of "λx. x · I" "subtermsset (trms lsst A)" "subtermsset (trms lsst B)"]
unfolding M_def by force
hence "M (A@B) ·αset a0 = (M A ·αset a0) ∪ (M B ·αset a0)" by (simp add: abs_set_union)




assumes "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
shows "subst_range α ∩ pubval_terms = {}" ( is ?A)
and "subst_range α ∩ abs_terms = {}" ( is ?B)
proof -
{ fix t assume "t ∈ subst_range α"
then obtain x where "t = Var x"
using transaction_renaming_subst_is_renaming[OF assms]
by force
hence "t /∈ pubval_terms" "t /∈ abs_terms" by simp_all




assumes "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
shows "subst_range σ ∩ pubval_terms = {}" ( is ?A)
and "subst_range σ ∩ abs_terms = {}" ( is ?B)
proof -
{ fix t assume "t ∈ subst_range σ"
then obtain n where "t = Fun (Val (n,False)) []"
using assms unfolding transaction_fresh_subst_def
by force
hence "t /∈ pubval_terms" "t /∈ abs_terms" by simp_all
} thus ?A ?B by auto
qed
lemma reachable_constraints_no_pubconsts_abss:
assumes "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. ∀ n. Val (n,True) /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ trms_transaction T)"
"∀ T ∈ set P. ∀ n. Abs n /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ trms_transaction T)"
"∀ T ∈ set P. ∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
"∀ T ∈ set P. bvars lsst (transaction_strand T) = {}"
and I: "interpretationsubst I" "wtsubst I" "wf trms (subst_range I)"
"∀ n. Val (n,True) /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (I ‘ fv lsst A))"
"∀ n. Abs n /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (I ‘ fv lsst A))"
shows "trms lsst A ·set I ⊆ GSMP (
⋃
T ∈ set P. trms_transaction T) - (pubval_terms ∪ abs_terms)"
( is "?A ⊆ ?B")
using assms(1) I(4,5)
proof (induction A rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case (step A T σ α)
define trms_P where "trms_P ≡ (⋃ T ∈ set P. trms_transaction T)"
define T’ where "T’ ≡ transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α"
have I’: "∀ n. Val (n,True) /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (I ‘ fv lsst A))"
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"∀ n. Abs n /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (I ‘ fv lsst A))"
using step.prems fvsst_append[of "unlabel A"] unlabel_append[of A]
by auto
have "wtsubst (σ ◦s α)"
using transaction_renaming_subst_wt[OF step.hyps(4)]
transaction_fresh_subst_wt[OF step.hyps(3)]
by (metis step.hyps(2) P(3) wt_subst_compose)
hence "wtsubst (rm_vars (set X) (σ ◦s α))" for X
using wt_subst_rm_vars[of "σ ◦s α" "set X"]
by metis
hence wt: "wtsubst ((rm_vars (set X) (σ ◦s α)) ◦s I)" for X
using I(2) wt_subst_compose by fast




hence wftrms: "wf trms (subst_range ((rm_vars (set X) (σ ◦s α)) ◦s I))" for X
using wf_trms_subst_compose[OF wf_trms_subst_rm_vars’ I(3)] by fast
have "trms lsst (dual lsst T’) ·set I ⊆ ?B"
proof
fix t assume "t ∈ trms lsst (dual lsst T’) ·set I"
hence "t ∈ trms lsst T’ ·set I" using trmssst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq by blast
then obtain s X where s:
"s ∈ trms_transaction T"
"t = s · rm_vars (set X) (σ ◦s α) ◦s I"
"set X ⊆ bvars_transaction T"
using trmssst_unlabel_subst’’ unfolding T’_def by blast
define ϑ where "ϑ ≡ rm_vars (set X) (σ ◦s α)"
have 1: "s ∈ trms_P" using step.hyps(2) s(1) unfolding trms_P_def by auto
have s_nin: "s /∈ pubval_terms" "s /∈ abs_terms"
using 1 P(1,2) funs_term_Fun_subterm
unfolding trms_P_def is_Val_def is_Abs_def
by fastforce+
have 2: "(I ‘ fv lsst (A@dual lsst T’)) ∩ pubval_terms = {}"
"(I ‘ fv lsst (A@dual lsst T’)) ∩ abs_terms = {}"
"subst_range (σ ◦s α) ∩ pubval_terms = {}"
"subst_range (σ ◦s α) ∩ abs_terms = {}"
"subst_range ϑ ∩ pubval_terms = {}"
"subst_range ϑ ∩ abs_terms = {}"
"(ϑ ‘ fv s) ∩ pubval_terms = {}"
"(ϑ ‘ fv s) ∩ abs_terms = {}"
unfolding T’_def ϑ_def
using step.prems funs_term_Fun_subterm
apply (fastforce simp add: is_Val_def,









have "(I ‘ fv (s · ϑ)) ∩ pubval_terms = {}"
"(I ‘ fv (s · ϑ)) ∩ abs_terms = {}"
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proof -
have "ϑ = σ ◦s α" "bvars_transaction T = {}" "vars lsst T’ = fv lsst T’"
using s(3) P(4) step.hyps(2) rm_vars_empty
varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel T’"]
bvarssst_subst[of "unlabel (transaction_strand T)" "σ ◦s α"]
unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
unfolding ϑ_def T’_def by simp_all
hence "fv (s · ϑ) ⊆ fv lsst T’"
using trmssst_fv_subst_subset[OF s(1), of ϑ] unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" ϑ]
unfolding T’_def by auto
moreover have "fv lsst T’ ⊆ fv lsst (A@dual lsst T’)"
using fvsst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel (dual lsst T’)"]
unlabel_append[of A "dual lsst T’"]
fvsst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq[of T’]
by simp_all
hence "I ‘ fv lsst T’ ∩ pubval_terms = {}" "I ‘ fv lsst T’ ∩ abs_terms = {}"
using 2(1,2) by blast+
ultimately show "(I ‘ fv (s · ϑ)) ∩ pubval_terms = {}" "(I ‘ fv (s · ϑ)) ∩ abs_terms = {}"
by blast+
qed
hence σαI_disj: "((ϑ ◦s I) ‘ fv s) ∩ pubval_terms = {}"
"((ϑ ◦s I) ‘ fv s) ∩ abs_terms = {}"
using pubval_terms_subst_range_comp’[of ϑ "fv s" I]
abs_terms_subst_range_comp’[of ϑ "fv s" I]
2(7,8)
by (simp_all add: subst_apply_fv_unfold)
have 3: "t /∈ pubval_terms" "t /∈ abs_terms"
using s(2) s_nin σαI_disj
pubval_terms_subst[of s "rm_vars (set X) (σ ◦s α) ◦s I"]
pubval_terms_subst_range_disj[of "rm_vars (set X) (σ ◦s α) ◦s I" s]
abs_terms_subst[of s "rm_vars (set X) (σ ◦s α) ◦s I"]
abs_terms_subst_range_disj[of "rm_vars (set X) (σ ◦s α) ◦s I" s]
unfolding ϑ_def
by blast+
have "t ∈ SMP trms_P" "fv t = {}"
by (metis s(2) SMP.Substitution[OF SMP.MP[OF 1] wt wftrms, of X],
metis s(2) subst_subst_compose[of s "rm_vars (set X) (σ ◦s α)" I]
interpretation_grounds[OF I(1), of "s · rm_vars (set X) (σ ◦s α)"])
hence 4: "t ∈ GSMP trms_P" unfolding GSMP_def by simp
show "t ∈ ?B" using 3 4 by (auto simp add: trms_P_def)
qed
thus ?case
using step.IH[OF I’] trmssst_append[of "unlabel A"] unlabel_append[of A]
image_Un[of "λx. x · I" "trms lsst A"]
by (simp add: T’_def)
qed simp
lemma αti_covers_α0_aux:
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and T: "T ∈ set P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
and σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and t: "t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)"
"t = Fun (Val n) [] ∨ t = Var x"
and neq:
"t · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I) 6=
t · I ·α α0 (db lsst (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)) I)"
shows "∃ y ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T).
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t · I = (σ ◦s α) y · I ∧ Γv y = TAtom Value"
proof -
let ?A’ = "A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
let ?B = "unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T))"
let ?B’ = "?B ·sst σ ◦s α"
let ?B’’ = "unlabel (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
have I_interp: "interpretationsubst I"
and I_wt: "wtsubst I"
and I_wf: "wf trms (subst_range I)"
by (metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def,
metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def,
metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def)
have T_adm: "admissible_transaction T"
using T P(1) by blast
hence T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
unfolding admissible_transaction_def by blast
have T_adm_upds: "admissible_transaction_updates T"
by (metis P(1) T admissible_transaction_def)
have T_fresh_vars_value_typed: "∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
using T P(1) protocol_transaction_vars_TAtom_typed(3)[of T] P(1) by simp
have wt_σα: "wtsubst (σ ◦s α)"
using wt_subst_compose transaction_fresh_subst_wt[OF σ T_fresh_vars_value_typed]
transaction_renaming_subst_wt[OF α]
by blast
have A_wf trms: "wf trms (trms lsst A)"
by (metis reachable_constraints_wf trms admissible_transactions_wf trms P(1) A_reach)
hence t_wf: "wf trm t" using t by auto
have A_no_val_bvars: "¬TAtom Value v Γv x"
when "x ∈ bvars lsst A" for x
using P(1) reachable_constraints_no_bvars A_reach
varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel A"] that
unfolding admissible_transaction_def by fast
have x’: "x ∈ vars lsst A" when "t = Var x"
using that t by (simp add: var_subterm_trmssst_is_varssst)
have "∃ f ∈ funs_term (t · I). is_Val f"
using abs_eq_if_no_Val neq by metis
hence "∃ n T. Fun (Val n) T v t · I"
using funs_term_Fun_subterm
unfolding is_Val_def by fast
hence "TAtom Value v Γ (Var x)" when "t = Var x"
using wt_subst_trm’’[OF I_wt, of "Var x"] that
subtermeq_imp_subtermtypeeq[of "t · I"] wf_trm_subst[OF I_wf, of t] t_wf
by fastforce
hence x_val: "Γv x = TAtom Value" when "t = Var x"
using reachable_constraints_vars_TAtom_typed[OF A_reach P x’] that
by fastforce
hence x_fv: "x ∈ fv lsst A" when "t = Var x" using x’
using reachable_constraints_Value_vars_are_fv[OF A_reach P x’] that
by blast
then obtain m where m: "t · I = Fun (Val m) []"
using constraint_model_Value_term_is_Val[
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hence 0: "α0 (db lsst A I) m 6= α0 (dbsst (unlabel A@?B’’) I) m"
using neq by (simp add: unlabel_def)
have t_val: "Γ t = TAtom Value" using x_val t by force
obtain u s where s: "t · I = u · I" "insert〈u,s〉 ∈ set ?B’ ∨ delete〈u,s〉 ∈ set ?B’"
using to_abs_neq_imp_db_update[OF 0] m
by (metis (no_types, lifting) dual lsst_subst subst_lsst_unlabel)
then obtain u’ s’ where s’:
"u = u’ · σ ◦s α" "s = s’ · σ ◦s α"
"insert〈u’,s’〉 ∈ set ?B ∨ delete〈u’,s’〉 ∈ set ?B"
using stateful_strand_step_subst_inv_cases(4,5)
by blast
hence s’’: "insert〈u’,s’〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T)) ∨
delete〈u’,s’〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
using dual lsst_unlabel_steps_iff(4,5)[of u’ s’ "transaction_strand T"]
by simp_all
then obtain y where y: "y ∈ fv_transaction T" "u’ = Var y"
using transaction_inserts_are_Value_vars[OF T_valid T_adm_upds, of u’ s’]
transaction_deletes_are_Value_vars[OF T_valid T_adm_upds, of u’ s’]
stateful_strand_step_fv_subset_cases(4,5)[of u’ s’ "unlabel (transaction_strand T)"]
by auto
hence 1: "t · I = (σ ◦s α) y · I" using y s(1) s’(1) by (metis subst_apply_term.simps(1))
have 2: "y /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)" when "(σ ◦s α) y · I 6= σ y"
using transaction_fresh_subst_grounds_domain[OF σ, of y] subst_compose[of σ α y] that
by (auto simp add: subst_ground_ident)
have 3: "y /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)" when "(σ ◦s α) y · I ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)"
using 2 that σ unfolding transaction_fresh_subst_def by fastforce
have 4: "∀ x ∈ fv lsst A. Γv x = TAtom Value −→
(∃ B. prefix B A ∧ x /∈ fv lsst B ∧ I x ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst B))"
by (metis welltyped_constraint_model_prefix[OF I]
constraint_model_Value_var_in_constr_prefix[OF A_reach _ P])
have 5: "Γv y = TAtom Value"
using 1 t_val
wt_subst_trm’’[OF wt_σα, of "Var y"]
wt_subst_trm’’[OF I_wt, of t]
wt_subst_trm’’[OF I_wt, of "(σ ◦s α) y"]
by (auto simp del: subst_subst_compose)
have "y /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
proof (cases "t = Var x")
case True
hence *: "I x = Fun (Val m) []" "x ∈ fv lsst A" "I x = (σ ◦s α) y · I"
using m t(1) 1 x_fv x’ by (force, blast, force)
obtain B where B: "prefix B A" "I x ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst B)"
using *(2) 4 x_val[OF True] by fastforce
hence "∀ t ∈ subst_range σ. t /∈ subtermsset (trms lsst B)"
using transaction_fresh_subst_range_fresh(1)[OF σ] trmssst_unlabel_prefix_subset(1)[of B]
unfolding prefix_def by fast
thus ?thesis using *(1,3) B(2) 2 by (metis subst_imgI term.distinct(1))
next
case False
hence "t · I ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)" using t by simp
thus ?thesis using 1 3 by argo
qed
thus ?thesis using 1 5 y(1) by fast
qed
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lemma αti_covers_α0_Var:
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and T: "T ∈ set P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
and σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and x: "x ∈ fv lsst A"
shows "I x ·α α0 (db lsst (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)) I) ∈
timpl_closure_set {I x ·α α0 (db lsst A I)} (αti A T σ α I)"
proof -
define a0 where "a0 ≡ α0 (db lsst A I)"
define a0’ where "a0’ ≡ α0 (db lsst (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)) I)"
define a3 where "a3 ≡ αti A T σ α I"
have A_wf trms: "wf trms (trms lsst A)"
by (metis reachable_constraints_wf trms admissible_transactions_wf trms P(1) A_reach)
have T_adm: "admissible_transaction T" by (metis P(1) T)
have I_interp: "interpretationsubst I"
and I_wt: "wtsubst I"
and I_wf trms: "wf trms (subst_range I)"
by (metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def,
metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def,
metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def)
have "Γv x = Var Value ∨ (∃ a. Γv x = Var (prot_atom.Atom a))"
using reachable_constraints_vars_TAtom_typed[OF A_reach P, of x]
x varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel A"]
by auto
hence "I x ·α a0’ ∈ timpl_closure_set {I x ·α a0} a3"
proof
assume x_val: "Γv x = TAtom Value"
show "I x ·α a0’ ∈ timpl_closure_set {I x ·α a0} a3"
proof (cases "I x ·α a0 = I x ·α a0’")
case False
hence "∃ y ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T).
I x = (σ ◦s α) y · I ∧ Γv y = TAtom Value"
using αti_covers_α0_aux[OF A_reach T I σ α P fvsst_is_subterm_trmssst[OF x], of _ x]
unfolding a0_def a0’_def
by fastforce
then obtain y where y:
"y ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T)"
"I x = (σ ◦s α) y · I"
"I x ·α a0 = (σ ◦s α) y · I ·α a0"
"I x ·α a0’ = (σ ◦s α) y · I ·α a0’"
"Γv y = TAtom Value"
by metis
then obtain n where n: "(σ ◦s α) y · I = Fun (Val (n,False)) []"
using Γv_TAtom’’(2)[of y] x x_val
transaction_var_becomes_Val[
OF reachable_constraints.step[OF A_reach T σ α] I σ α P T, of y]
by force
have "a0 (n,False) 6= a0’ (n,False)"
"y ∈ fv_transaction T"
"y /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
"absc (a0 (n,False)) = (σ ◦s α) y · I ·α a0"
"absc (a0’ (n,False)) = (σ ◦s α) y · I ·α a0’"
using y n False by force+
hence 1: "(a0 (n,False), a0’ (n,False)) ∈ a3"
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unfolding a0_def a0’_def a3_def abs_term_implications_def
by blast
have 2: "I x ·α a0’ ∈ set 〈a0 (n,False) -- a0’ (n,False)〉〈I x ·α a0〉"
using y n timpl_apply_const by auto
show ?thesis
using timpl_closure.TI[OF timpl_closure.FP 1] 2
term_variants_pred_iff_in_term_variants[
of "(λ_. [])(Abs (a0 (n, False)) := [Abs (a0’ (n, False))])"]
unfolding timpl_closure_set_def timpl_apply_term_def
by auto
qed (auto intro: timpl_closure_setI)
next
assume "∃ a. Γv x = TAtom (Atom a)"
then obtain a where x_atom: "Γv x = TAtom (Atom a)" by moura
obtain f T where fT: "I x = Fun f T"
using interpretation_grounds[OF I_interp, of "Var x"]
by (cases "I x") auto
have fT_atom: "Γ (Fun f T) = TAtom (Atom a)"
using wt_subst_trm’’[OF I_wt, of "Var x"] x_atom fT
by simp
have T: "T = []"
using fT wf_trm_subst[OF I_wf trms, of "Var x"] const_type_inv_wf[OF fT_atom]
by fastforce
have f: "¬is_Val f" using fT_atom unfolding is_Val_def by auto
have "I x ·α b = I x" for b
using T fT abs_term_apply_const(2)[OF f]
by auto
thus "I x ·α a0’ ∈ timpl_closure_set {I x ·α a0} a3"
by (auto intro: timpl_closure_setI)
qed
thus ?thesis by (metis a0_def a0’_def a3_def)
qed
lemma αti_covers_α0_Val:
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and T: "T ∈ set P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
and σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and n: "Fun (Val n) [] ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)"
shows "Fun (Val n) [] ·α α0 (db lsst (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)) I) ∈
timpl_closure_set {Fun (Val n) [] ·α α0 (db lsst A I)} (αti A T σ α I)"
proof -
define T’ where "T’ ≡ dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
define a0 where "a0 ≡ α0 (db lsst A I)"
define a0’ where "a0’ ≡ α0 (db lsst (A@T’) I)"
define a3 where "a3 ≡ αti A T σ α I"
have A_wf trms: "wf trms (trms lsst A)"
by (metis reachable_constraints_wf trms admissible_transactions_wf trms P(1) A_reach)
have T_adm: "admissible_transaction T" by (metis P(1) T)
have "Fun (Abs (a0’ n)) [] ∈ timpl_closure_set {Fun (Abs (a0 n)) []} a3"
proof (cases "a0 n = a0’ n")
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case False
then obtain x where x:
"x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T)" "Fun (Val n) [] = (σ ◦s α) x · I"
using αti_covers_α0_aux[OF A_reach T I σ α P n]
by (fastforce simp add: a0_def a0’_def T’_def)
hence "absc (a0 n) = (σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0" "absc (a0’ n) = (σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0’" by simp_all
hence 1: "(a0 n, a0’ n) ∈ a3"
using False x(1)
unfolding a0_def a0’_def a3_def abs_term_implications_def T’_def
by blast
show ?thesis
using timpl_apply_Abs[of "[]" "[]" "a0 n" "a0’ n"]
timpl_closure.TI[OF timpl_closure.FP[of "Fun (Abs (a0 n)) []" a3] 1]
term_variants_pred_iff_in_term_variants[of "(λ_. [])(Abs (a0 n) := [Abs (a0’ n)])"]
unfolding timpl_closure_set_def timpl_apply_term_def
by force
qed (auto intro: timpl_closure_setI)
thus ?thesis by (simp add: a0_def a0’_def a3_def T’_def)
qed
lemma αti_covers_α0_ik:
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and T: "T ∈ set P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
and σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and t: "t ∈ ik lsst A"
shows "t · I ·α α0 (db lsst (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)) I) ∈
timpl_closure_set {t · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I)} (αti A T σ α I)"
proof -
define a0 where "a0 ≡ α0 (db lsst A I)"
define a0’ where "a0’ ≡ α0 (db lsst (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)) I)"
define a3 where "a3 ≡ αti A T σ α I"
let ?U = "λT a. map (λs. s · I ·α a) T"
have A_wf trms: "wf trms (trms lsst A)"
by (metis reachable_constraints_wf trms admissible_transactions_wf trms P(1) A_reach)
have T_adm: "admissible_transaction T" by (metis P(1) T)
have "t ∈ subtermsset (ik lsst A)" "wf trm t" using A_wf trms t iksst_trmssst_subset by force+
hence "∀ t0 ∈ subterms t. t0 · I ·α a0’ ∈ timpl_closure_set {t0 · I ·α a0} a3"
proof (induction t)
case (Var x) thus ?case
using αti_covers_α0_Var[OF A_reach T I σ α P, of x]
iksst_var_is_fv[of x "unlabel A"] varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel A"]
by (simp add: a0_def a0’_def a3_def)
next
case (Fun f S)
have IH: "∀ t0 ∈ subterms t. t0 · I ·α a0’ ∈ timpl_closure_set {t0 · I ·α a0} a3"
when "t ∈ set S" for t
using that Fun.prems(1) wf_trm_param[OF Fun.prems(2)] Fun.IH
by (meson in_subterms_subset_Union params_subterms subsetCE)
hence "t ·α a0’ ∈ timpl_closure_set {t ·α a0} a3"
when "t ∈ set (map (λs. s · I) S)" for t
using that by auto
hence "t ·α a0’ ∈ timpl_closure (t ·α a0) a3"
when "t ∈ set (map (λs. s · I) S)" for t
using that timpl_closureton_is_timpl_closure by auto
hence "(t ·α a0, t ·α a0’) ∈ timpl_closure’ a3"
when "t ∈ set (map (λs. s · I) S)" for t
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using that timpl_closure_is_timpl_closure’ by auto
hence IH’: "((?U S a0) ! i, (?U S a0’) ! i) ∈ timpl_closure’ a3"
when "i < length (map (λs. s · I ·α a0) S)" for i
using that by auto
show ?case
proof (cases "∃ n. f = Val n")
case True
then obtain n where "Fun f S = Fun (Val n) []"
using Fun.prems(2) unfolding wf trm_def by force
moreover have "Fun f S ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)"
using iksst_trmssst_subset Fun.prems(1) by blast
ultimately show ?thesis
using αti_covers_α0_Val[OF A_reach T I σ α P]
by (simp add: a0_def a0’_def a3_def)
next
case False
hence "Fun f S · I ·α a = Fun f (map (λt. t · I ·α a) S)" for a by (cases f) simp_all
hence "(Fun f S · I ·α a0, Fun f S · I ·α a0’) ∈ timpl_closure’ a3"
using timpl_closure_FunI[OF IH’]
by simp




thus ?thesis using IH by simp
qed
qed
thus ?thesis by (simp add: a0_def a0’_def a3_def)
qed
lemma transaction_prop1:
assumes "δ ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (transaction_check_comp FP OCC TI T)"
and "x ∈ fv_transaction T"
and "x /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
and "δ x 6= absdbupd (unlabel (transaction_updates T)) x (δ x)"
and "transaction_check FP OCC TI T"
and TI:
"set TI = {(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+. a 6= b}"
shows "(δ x, absdbupd (unlabel (transaction_updates T)) x (δ x)) ∈ (set TI)+"
proof -
let ?upd = "λx. absdbupd (unlabel (transaction_updates T)) x (δ x)"
have 0: "fv_transaction T = set (fv_listsst (unlabel (transaction_strand T)))"
by (metis fv_listsst_is_fvsst[of "unlabel (transaction_strand T)"])




have "(δ x, ?upd x) ∈ set TI ←→ (δ x, ?upd x) ∈ (set TI)+"
using TI using assms(4) by blast
thus ?thesis
using assms(2,3,4) 0 1 in_trancl_closure_iff_in_trancl_fun[of _ _ TI]
unfolding transaction_check_post_def List.member_def
by (metis (no_types, lifting) DiffI)
qed
lemma transaction_prop2:
assumes δ: "δ ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (transaction_check_comp FP OCC TI T)"
and x: "x ∈ fv_transaction T" "fst x = TAtom Value"
and T_check: "transaction_check FP OCC TI T"
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and T_adm: "admissible_transaction T"
and FP:
"analyzed (timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI))"
"wf trms (set FP)"
and OCC:
"∀ t ∈ timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI). ∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ f ∈ Abs ‘ set OCC"
"timpl_closure_set (absc ‘ set OCC) (set TI) ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC"
and TI:
"set TI = {(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+. a 6= b}"
shows "x /∈ set (transaction_fresh T) =⇒ δ x ∈ set OCC" ( is "?A’ =⇒ ?A")
and "absdbupd (unlabel (transaction_updates T)) x (δ x) ∈ set OCC" ( is ?B)
proof -
let ?xs = "fv_listsst (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
let ?ys = "filter (λx. x /∈ set (transaction_fresh T) ∧ fst x = TAtom Value) ?xs"
let ?C = "unlabel (transaction_selects T@transaction_checks T)"
let ?poss = "transaction_poschecks_comp ?C"
let ?negs = "transaction_negchecks_comp ?C"
let ?δupd = "λy. absdbupd (unlabel (transaction_updates T)) y (δ y)"
have T_wf: "wellformed_transaction T"
and T_occ: "admissible_transaction_occurs_checks T"
using T_adm by (metis admissible_transaction_def)+
have 0: "{x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T). fst x = TAtom Value} = set ?ys"
using fv_listsst_is_fvsst[of "unlabel (transaction_strand T)"]
by force
have 1: "transaction_check_pre FP TI T δ"
using δ unfolding transaction_check_comp_def Let_def by fastforce
have 2: "transaction_check_post FP TI T δ"
using δ T_check unfolding transaction_check_def list_all_iff by blast
have 3: "δ ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (abs_substs_set ?ys OCC ?poss ?negs)"
using δ unfolding transaction_check_comp_def Let_def by force
show A: ?A when ?A’ using that 0 3 x abs_substs_abss_bounded by blast
have 4: "x ∈ fv lsst (transaction_updates T) ∪ fv lsst (transaction_send T)"
when x’: "x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
using T_wf x’ unfolding wellformed_transaction_def by fast
have "intruder_synth_mod_timpls FP TI (occurs (absc (?δupd x)))"
when x’: "x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
using 2 x’ x T_occ
unfolding transaction_check_post_def admissible_transaction_occurs_checks_def
by fastforce
hence "timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI) `c occurs (absc (?δupd x))"
when x’: "x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
using x’ intruder_synth_mod_timpls_is_synth_timpl_closure_set[
OF TI, of FP "occurs (absc (?δupd x))"]
by argo
hence "Abs (?δupd x) ∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI))"
when x’: "x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
using x’ ideduct_synth_priv_fun_in_ik[
of "timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI)" "occurs (absc (?δupd x))"]
by simp
hence "∃ t ∈ timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI). Abs (?δupd x) ∈ funs_term t"
when x’: "x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
using x’ by force
hence 5: "?δupd x ∈ set OCC" when x’: "x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
using x’ OCC by fastforce
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have 6: "?δupd x ∈ set OCC" when x’: "x /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
proof (cases "δ x = ?δupd x")
case False
hence "(δ x, ?δupd x) ∈ (set TI)+" "δ x ∈ set OCC"
using A 2 x’ x TI




thus ?thesis using timpl_closure_set_absc_subset_in[OF OCC(2)] by blast
qed (simp add: A x’ x(1))
show ?B by (metis 5 6)
qed
lemma transaction_prop3:
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and T: "T ∈ set P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
and σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and FP:
"analyzed (timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI))"
"wf trms (set FP)"
"∀ t ∈ αik A I. timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI) `c t"
and OCC:
"∀ t ∈ timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI). ∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ f ∈ Abs ‘ set OCC"
"timpl_closure_set (absc ‘ set OCC) (set TI) ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC"
"αvals A I ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC"
and TI:
"set TI = {(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+. a 6= b}"
and P:
"∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
shows "∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). (σ ◦s α) x · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I) = absc {}" ( is ?A)
and "∀ t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_receive T).
intruder_synth_mod_timpls FP TI (t · (σ ◦s α) · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I))" ( is ?B)
and "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T).
∀ s. select〈Var x,Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T))
−→ (∃ ss. (σ ◦s α) x · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I) = absc ss ∧ s ∈ ss)" ( is ?C)
and "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T).
∀ s. 〈Var x in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))
−→ (∃ ss. (σ ◦s α) x · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I) = absc ss ∧ s ∈ ss)" ( is ?D)
and "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T).
∀ s. 〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))
−→ (∃ ss. (σ ◦s α) x · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I) = absc ss ∧ s /∈ ss)" ( is ?E)
and "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value −→
(σ ◦s α) x · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I) ∈ absc ‘ set OCC" ( is ?F)
proof -
let ?T’ = "dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
define a0 where "a0 ≡ α0 (db lsst A I)"
define a0’ where "a0’ ≡ α0 (db lsst (A@?T’) I)"
define fv_AT’ where "fv_AT’ ≡ fv lsst (A@?T’)"
have T_adm: "admissible_transaction T"
using T P(1) by blast
hence T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
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using T_adm unfolding admissible_transaction_def by simp_all
have I’: "interpretationsubst I" "wtsubst I" "wf trms (subst_range I)"
"∀ n. Val (n,True) /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (I ‘ fv lsst A))"
"∀ n. Abs n /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (I ‘ fv lsst A))"
"∀ n. Val (n,True) /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (I ‘ fv_AT’))"
"∀ n. Abs n /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ (I ‘ fv_AT’))"
using I admissible_transaction_occurs_checks_prop’[
OF A_reach welltyped_constraint_model_prefix[OF I] P]
admissible_transaction_occurs_checks_prop’[
OF reachable_constraints.step[OF A_reach T σ α] I P]
unfolding welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def is_Val_def is_Abs_def fv_AT’_def
by fastforce+
have P’: "∀ T ∈ set P. ∀ n. Val (n,True) /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ trms_transaction T)"
"∀ T ∈ set P. ∀ n. Abs n /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ trms_transaction T)"
"∀ T ∈ set P. ∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"






hence T_no_pubconsts: "∀ n. Val (n,True) /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ trms_transaction T)"
and T_no_abss: "∀ n. Abs n /∈ ⋃ (funs_term ‘ trms_transaction T)"
and T_fresh_vars_value_typed: "∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
and T_fv_const_typed: "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T. Γv x = TAtom Value ∨ (∃ a. Γv x = TAtom (Atom a))"
using T by simp_all
have wt_σαI: "wtsubst (σ ◦s α ◦s I)"
using I’(2) wt_subst_compose transaction_fresh_subst_wt[OF σ T_fresh_vars_value_typed]
transaction_renaming_subst_wt[OF α]
by blast
have 1: "(σ ◦s α) y · I = σ y" when "y ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)" for y
using transaction_fresh_subst_grounds_domain[OF σ that] subst_compose[of σ α y]
by (simp add: subst_ground_ident)
have 2: "(σ ◦s α) y · I /∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)" when "y ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)" for y
using 1[OF that] that σ unfolding transaction_fresh_subst_def by auto
have 3: "∀ x ∈ fv lsst A. Γv x = TAtom Value −→
(∃ B. prefix B A ∧ x /∈ fv lsst B ∧ I x ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst B))"
by (metis welltyped_constraint_model_prefix[OF I]
constraint_model_Value_var_in_constr_prefix[OF A_reach _ P])
have 4: "∃ n. (σ ◦s α) y · I = Fun (Val n) []"
when "y ∈ fv_transaction T" "Γv y = TAtom Value" for y
using transaction_var_becomes_Val[OF reachable_constraints.step[OF A_reach T σ α] I σ α P T]
that T_fv_const_typed Γv_TAtom’’[of y]
by metis
have I_is_T_model: "strand_sem_stateful (ik lsst A ·set I) (set (db lsst A I)) (unlabel ?T’) I"
using I unlabel_append[of A ?T’] dbsst_set_is_dbupdsst[of "unlabel A" I "[]"]
strand_sem_append_stateful[of "{}" "{}" "unlabel A" "unlabel ?T’" I]
by (simp add: welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def dbsst_def)
have T_rcv_no_val_bvars: "bvars lsst (transaction_receive T) ∩ subst_domain (σ ◦s α) = {}"
using transaction_no_bvars[OF T_adm] bvars_transaction_unfold[of T] by blast
show ?A
proof
fix y assume y: "y ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
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then obtain yn where yn: "(σ ◦s α) y · I = Fun (Val yn) []" "Fun (Val yn) [] ∈ subst_range σ"
by (metis transaction_fresh_subst_sends_to_val’[OF σ])
{ — since y is fresh (σ ◦s α) y · I cannot be part of the database state of I A
fix t’ s assume t’: "insert〈t’,s〉 ∈ set (unlabel A)" "t’ · I = Fun (Val yn) []"
then obtain z where t’_z: "t’ = Var z" using 2[OF y] yn(1) by (cases t’) auto
hence z: "z ∈ fv lsst A" "I z = (σ ◦s α) y · I" using t’ yn(1) by force+
hence z’: "Γv z = TAtom Value"
by (metis Γ.simps(1) Γ_consts_simps(2) t’(2) t’_z wt_subst_trm’’ I’(2))
obtain B where B: "prefix B A" "I z ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst B)" using z z’ 3 by fastforce
hence "∀ t ∈ subst_range σ. t /∈ subtermsset (trms lsst B)"
using transaction_fresh_subst_range_fresh(1)[OF σ] trmssst_unlabel_prefix_subset(1)[of B]
unfolding prefix_def by fast
hence False using B(2) 1[OF y] z yn(1) by (metis subst_imgI term.distinct(1))
} hence "@ s. ((σ ◦s α) y · I, s) ∈ set (db lsst A I)"
using dbsst_in_cases[of "(σ ◦s α) y · I" _ "unlabel A" I "[]"] yn(1)
by (force simp add: dbsst_def)
thus "(σ ◦s α) y · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I) = absc {}"
using to_abs_empty_iff_notin_db[of yn "db’ lsst A I []"] yn(1)




fix t assume t: "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_receive T)"
hence t_in_T: "t ∈ trms_transaction T"
using trmssst_unlabel_prefix_subset(1)[of "transaction_receive T"]
unfolding transaction_strand_def by fast
have t_rcv: "receive〈t · σ ◦s α〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
using subst_lsst_unlabel_member[of "receive〈t〉" "transaction_receive T" "σ ◦s α"]
wellformed_transaction_unlabel_cases(1)[OF T_valid] trmssst_in[OF t]
by fastforce
hence *: "ik lsst A ·set I ` t · σ ◦s α · I"
using wellformed_transaction_sem_receives[OF T_valid I_is_T_model]
by simp
have t_fv: "fv (t · σ ◦s α) ⊆ fv_AT’"
using fvsst_append[of "unlabel A"] unlabel_append[of A]
fvsst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq[of "transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α"]
t_rcv fv_transaction_subst_unfold[of T " σ ◦s α"]
unfolding fv_AT’_def by force
have **: "∀ t ∈ (ik lsst A ·set I) ·αset a0. timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI) `c t"
using FP(3) by (auto simp add: a0_def abs_intruder_knowledge_def)
note lms1 = pubval_terms_subst[OF _ pubval_terms_subst_range_disj[
OF transaction_fresh_subst_has_no_pubconsts_abss(1)[OF σ], of t]]
pubval_terms_subst[OF _ pubval_terms_subst_range_disj[
OF transaction_renaming_subst_has_no_pubconsts_abss(1)[OF α], of "t · σ"]]
note lms2 = abs_terms_subst[OF _ abs_terms_subst_range_disj[
OF transaction_fresh_subst_has_no_pubconsts_abss(2)[OF σ], of t]]
abs_terms_subst[OF _ abs_terms_subst_range_disj[
OF transaction_renaming_subst_has_no_pubconsts_abss(2)[OF α], of "t · σ"]]
have "t ∈ (⋃ T∈set P. trms_transaction T)" "fv (t · σ ◦s α · I) = {}"
using t_in_T T interpretation_grounds[OF I’(1)] by fast+
moreover have "wf trms (subst_range (σ ◦s α ◦s I))"
using wf_trm_subst_rangeI[of σ, OF transaction_fresh_subst_is_wf_trm[OF σ]]
wf_trm_subst_rangeI[of α, OF transaction_renaming_subst_is_wf_trm[OF α]]
wf_trms_subst_compose[of σ α, THEN wf_trms_subst_compose[OF _ I’(3)]]
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by blast
moreover
have "t /∈ pubval_terms"
using t_in_T T_no_pubconsts funs_term_Fun_subterm
unfolding is_Val_def by fastforce
hence "t · σ ◦s α /∈ pubval_terms"
using lms1
by auto
hence "t · σ ◦s α · I /∈ pubval_terms"
using I’(6) t_fv pubval_terms_subst’[of "t · σ ◦s α" I]
by auto
moreover have "t /∈ abs_terms"
using t_in_T T_no_abss funs_term_Fun_subterm
unfolding is_Abs_def by force
hence "t · σ ◦s α /∈ abs_terms"
using lms2
by auto
hence "t · σ ◦s α · I /∈ abs_terms"
using I’(7) t_fv abs_terms_subst’[of "t · σ ◦s α" I]
by auto
ultimately have ***:
"t · σ ◦s α · I ∈ GSMP (⋃ T∈set P. trms_transaction T) - (pubval_terms ∪ abs_terms)"
using SMP.Substitution[OF SMP.MP[of t "
⋃
T∈set P. trms_transaction T"], of "σ ◦s α ◦s I"]
subst_subst_compose[of t "σ ◦s α" I] wt_σαI
unfolding GSMP_def by fastforce
have "∀ T∈set P. bvars_transaction T = {}"
using transaction_no_bvars P unfolding list_all_iff by blast
hence ****:
"ik lsst A ·set I ⊆ GSMP (
⋃
T∈set P. trms_transaction T) - (pubval_terms ∪ abs_terms)"
using reachable_constraints_no_pubconsts_abss[OF A_reach P’ _ I’(1,2,3,4,5)]
iksst_trmssst_subset[of "unlabel A"]
by blast
show "intruder_synth_mod_timpls FP TI (t · σ ◦s α · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I))"
using deduct_FP_if_deduct[OF **** ** * ***] deducts_eq_if_analyzed[OF FP(1)]
intruder_synth_mod_timpls_is_synth_timpl_closure_set[OF TI, of FP]
unfolding a0_def by force
qed
show ?C
proof (intro ballI allI impI)
fix y s
assume y: "y ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T)"
and s: "select〈Var y, Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T))"
hence "select〈Var y, Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
unfolding transaction_strand_def unlabel_def by auto
hence y_val: "Γv y = TAtom Value"
using transaction_selects_are_Value_vars[OF T_valid T_adm’(1)]
by fastforce
have "select〈(σ ◦s α) y, Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T ·lsst (σ ◦s α)))"
using subst_lsst_unlabel_member[OF s]
by fastforce
hence "((σ ◦s α) y · I, Fun (Set s) []) ∈ set (db lsst A I)"
using wellformed_transaction_sem_selects[
OF T_valid I_is_T_model,
of "(σ ◦s α) y" "Fun (Set s) []"]
by simp
thus "∃ ss. (σ ◦s α) y · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I) = absc ss ∧ s ∈ ss"
using to_abs_alt_def[of "db lsst A I"] 4[of y] y y_val by auto
qed
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show ?D
proof (intro ballI allI impI)
fix y s
assume y: "y ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T)"
and s: "〈Var y in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))"
hence "〈Var y in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
unfolding transaction_strand_def unlabel_def by auto
hence y_val: "Γv y = TAtom Value"
using transaction_inset_checks_are_Value_vars[OF T_valid T_adm’(2)]
by fastforce
have "〈(σ ◦s α) y in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T ·lsst (σ ◦s α)))"
using subst_lsst_unlabel_member[OF s]
by fastforce
hence "((σ ◦s α) y · I, Fun (Set s) []) ∈ set (db lsst A I)"
using wellformed_transaction_sem_pos_checks[
OF T_valid I_is_T_model,
of "(σ ◦s α) y" "Fun (Set s) []"]
by simp
thus "∃ ss. (σ ◦s α) y · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I) = absc ss ∧ s ∈ ss"
using to_abs_alt_def[of "db lsst A I"] 4[of y] y y_val by auto
qed
show ?E
proof (intro ballI allI impI)
fix y s
assume y: "y ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T)"
and s: "〈Var y not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))"
hence "〈Var y not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
unfolding transaction_strand_def unlabel_def by auto
hence y_val: "Γv y = TAtom Value"
using transaction_notinset_checks_are_Value_vars[OF T_valid T_adm’(2)]
by fastforce
have "〈(σ ◦s α) y not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_checks T ·lsst (σ ◦s α)))"
using subst_lsst_unlabel_member[OF s]
by fastforce
hence "((σ ◦s α) y · I, Fun (Set s) []) /∈ set (db lsst A I)"
using wellformed_transaction_sem_neg_checks(2)[
OF T_valid I_is_T_model,
of "[]" "(σ ◦s α) y" "Fun (Set s) []"]
by simp
moreover have "list_all admissible_transaction_updates P"




moreover have "list_all wellformed_transaction P"
using P(1) Ball_set[of P "admissible_transaction"] Ball_set[of P wellformed_transaction]
unfolding admissible_transaction_def
by blast
ultimately have "((σ ◦s α) y · I, Fun (Set s) S) /∈ set (db lsst A I)" for S
using reachable_constraints_db lsst_set_args_empty[OF A_reach]
unfolding admissible_transaction_updates_def
by auto
thus "∃ ss. (σ ◦s α) y · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I) = absc ss ∧ s /∈ ss"
using to_abs_alt_def[of "db lsst A I"] 4[of y] y y_val by auto
qed
show ?F
proof (intro ballI impI)
fix y assume y: "y ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T)" "Γv y = TAtom Value"
then obtain yn where yn: "(σ ◦s α) y · I = Fun (Val yn) []" using 4 by moura
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hence y_abs: "(σ ◦s α) y · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I) = Fun (Abs (α0 (db lsst A I) yn)) []" by simp
have *: "∀ r ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T)). ∃ x s. r = select〈Var x, Fun (Set s) []〉"
using admissible_transaction_strand_step_cases(2)[OF T_adm] by fast
have "y ∈ fv lsst (transaction_receive T) ∨ y ∈ fv lsst (transaction_selects T)"
using wellformed_transaction_fv_in_receives_or_selects[OF T_valid] y by blast
thus "(σ ◦s α) y · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I) ∈ absc ‘ set OCC"
proof
assume "y ∈ fv lsst (transaction_receive T)"
then obtain t where t: "receive〈t〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_receive T))" "y ∈ fv t"
using wellformed_transaction_unlabel_cases(1)[OF T_valid]
by (force simp add: unlabel_def)
have **: "(σ ◦s α) y · I ∈ subterms (t · σ ◦s α ◦s I)"
"timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI) `c t · σ ◦s α · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I)"
using fv_subterms_substI[OF t(2), of "σ ◦s α ◦s I"] subst_compose[of "σ ◦s α" I y]
subterms_subst_subset[of "σ ◦s α ◦s I" t] receives_covered t(1)
unfolding intruder_synth_mod_timpls_is_synth_timpl_closure_set[OF TI, symmetric]
by auto
have "Abs (α0 (db lsst A I) yn) ∈
⋃
(funs_term ‘ (timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI)))"
using y_abs abs_subterms_in[OF **(1), of "α0 (db lsst A I)"]
ideduct_synth_priv_fun_in_ik[
OF **(2) funs_term_Fun_subterm’[of "Abs (α0 (db lsst A I) yn)" "[]"]]
by force
hence "(σ ◦s α) y · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I) ∈ subtermsset (timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI))"
using y_abs wf_trms_subterms[OF timpl_closure_set_wf_trms[OF FP(2), of "set TI"]]
funs_term_Fun_subterm[of "Abs (α0 (db lsst A I) yn)"]
unfolding wf trm_def by fastforce
hence "funs_term ((σ ◦s α) y · I ·α α0 (db lsst A I))
⊆ (⋃ t ∈ timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI). funs_term t)"
using funs_term_subterms_eq(2)[of "timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI)"] by blast
thus ?thesis using y_abs OCC(1) by fastforce
next
assume "y ∈ fv lsst (transaction_selects T)"
then obtain l s where "(l,select〈Var y, Fun (Set s) []〉) ∈ set (transaction_selects T)"
using * by (auto simp add: unlabel_def)
then obtain U where U:
"prefix (U@[(l,select〈Var y, Fun (Set s) []〉)]) (transaction_selects T)"
using in_set_conv_decomp[of "(l, select〈Var y,Fun (Set s) []〉)" "transaction_selects T"]
by (auto simp add: prefix_def)
hence "select〈Var y, Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T))"
by (force simp add: prefix_def unlabel_def)
hence "select〈(σ ◦s α) y, Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
using subst_lsst_unlabel_member
by fastforce
hence "(Fun (Val yn) [], Fun (Set s) []) ∈ set (db lsst A I)"
using yn wellformed_transaction_sem_selects[
OF T_valid I_is_T_model, of "(σ ◦s α) y" "Fun (Set s) []"]
by fastforce
hence "Fun (Val yn) [] ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A) ·set I"
using dbsst_in_cases[of "Fun (Val yn) []"]
by (fastforce simp add: dbsst_def)
thus ?thesis
using OCC(3) yn abs_in[of "Fun (Val yn) []" _ "α0 (db lsst A I)"]
unfolding abs_value_constants_def
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assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and T: "T ∈ set P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
and σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and P: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and x: "x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
and y: "y ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T)" "Γv y = TAtom Value"
shows "(σ ◦s α) x · I /∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (A ·lsst I))" ( is ?A)
and "(σ ◦s α) y · I ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (A ·lsst I))" ( is ?B)
proof -
let ?T’ = "dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
from I have I’: "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
using welltyped_constraint_model_prefix by auto
have T_P_addm: "admissible_transaction T’" when T’: "T’ ∈ set P " for T’
by (meson T’ P)
have T_adm: "admissible_transaction T"
by (metis (full_types) P T)
from T_adm have T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
unfolding admissible_transaction_def by blast
have be: "bvars lsst A = {}"
using T_P_addm A_reach reachable_constraints_no_bvars transaction_no_bvars(2) by blast
have T_no_bvars: "fv_transaction T = vars_transaction T"
using transaction_no_bvars[OF T_adm] by simp
have I_wt: "wtsubst I" by (metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def)
obtain xn where xn: "σ x = Fun (Val xn) []"
using σ x unfolding transaction_fresh_subst_def by force
then have xnxn: "(σ ◦s α) x = Fun (Val xn) []"
unfolding subst_compose_def by auto
from xn xnxn have a0: "(σ ◦s α) x · I = Fun (Val xn) []"
by auto
have b0: "Γv x = TAtom Value"
using P x T protocol_transaction_vars_TAtom_typed(3)
by metis
note 0 = a0 b0
have xT: "x ∈ fv_transaction T"
using x transaction_fresh_vars_subset[OF T_valid]
by fast
have σ_x_nin_A: "σ x /∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)"
proof -
have "σ x ∈ subst_range σ"
by (metis σ transaction_fresh_subst_sends_to_val x)
moreover
have "(∀ t ∈ subst_range σ. t /∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A))"
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have *: "y /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
using assms by auto
have **: "y ∈ fv lsst (transaction_receive T) ∨ y ∈ fv lsst (transaction_selects T)"
using * y wellformed_transaction_fv_in_receives_or_selects[OF T_valid]
by blast
have y_fv: "y ∈ fv_transaction T" using y fv_transaction_unfold by blast
have y_val: "fst y = TAtom Value" using y(2) Γv_TAtom’’(2) by blast
have "list_all (λx. fst x = Var Value) (transaction_fresh T)"
using x T_adm unfolding admissible_transaction_def by fast
hence x_val: "fst x = TAtom Value" using x unfolding list_all_iff by blast
have "σ x · I /∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (A ·lsst I))"
proof (rule ccontr)
assume "¬σ x · I /∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (A ·lsst I))"
then have a: "σ x · I ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (A ·lsst I))"
by auto
then have σ_x_I_in_A: "σ x · I ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A) ·set I"
using reachable_constraints_subterms_subst[OF A_reach I’ P] by blast
have "∃ u. u ∈ fv lsst A ∧ I u = σ x"
proof -
from σ_x_I_in_A have "∃ tu. tu ∈ ⋃ (subterms ‘ (trms lsst A)) ∧ tu · I = σ x · I"
by force
then obtain tu where tu: "tu ∈ ⋃ (subterms ‘ (trms lsst A)) ∧ tu · I = σ x · I"
by auto
then have "tu 6= σ x"
using σ_x_nin_A by auto
moreover
have "tu · I = σ x"
using tu by (simp add: xn)
ultimately
have "∃ u. tu = Var u"
unfolding xn by (cases tu) auto
then obtain u where "tu = Var u"
by auto
have "u ∈ fv lsst A ∧ I u = σ x"
proof -
have "u ∈ vars lsst A"
using 〈tu = Var u 〉 tu var_subterm_trmssst_is_varssst by fastforce
then have "u ∈ fv lsst A"
using be varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel A"] by blast
moreover
have "I u = σ x"





then show "∃ u. u ∈ fv lsst A ∧ I u = σ x"
by metis
qed
then obtain u where u:
"u ∈ fv lsst A" "I u = σ x"
by auto
then have u_TA: "Γv u = TAtom Value"
using P(1) T x_val Γv_TAtom’’(2)[of x]
wt_subst_trm’’[OF I_wt, of "Var u"] wt_subst_trm’’[of σ "Var x"]
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transaction_fresh_subst_wt[OF σ] protocol_transaction_vars_TAtom_typed(3)
by force
have "∃ B. prefix B A ∧ u /∈ fv lsst B ∧ I u ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst B)"
using u u_TA
by (metis welltyped_constraint_model_prefix[OF I]
constraint_model_Value_var_in_constr_prefix[OF A_reach _ P])




(subterms ‘ trms lsst xs) ⊆
⋃
(subterms ‘ trms lsst ys)"
when "prefix xs ys"
for xs ys::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_strand"
using that subtermsset_mono trmssst_mono unlabel_mono set_mono_prefix by metis
ultimately have "I u ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)"
by blast
then have "σ x ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)"
using u by auto
then show "False"
using σ_x_nin_A by auto
qed
then show ?A
unfolding subst_compose_def xn by auto
from ** show ?B
proof
define T’ where "T’ ≡ transaction_receive T"
define ϑ where "ϑ ≡ σ ◦s α"
assume y: "y ∈ fv lsst (transaction_receive T)"
hence "Var y ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst T’)" by (metis T’_def fvsst_is_subterm_trmssst)
then obtain z where z: "z ∈ set (unlabel T’)" "Var y ∈ subtermsset (trmssstp z)"
by (induct T’) auto
have "is_Receive z"
using T_adm Ball_set[of "unlabel T’" is_Receive] z(1)
unfolding admissible_transaction_def wellformed_transaction_def T’_def
by blast
then obtain ty where "z = receive〈ty〉" by (cases z) auto
hence ty: "receive〈ty · ϑ〉 ∈ set (unlabel (T’ ·lsst ϑ))" "ϑ y ∈ subterms (ty · ϑ)"
using z subst_mono unfolding subst_apply_labeled_stateful_strand_def unlabel_def by force+
hence y_deduct: "ik lsst A ·set I ` ty · ϑ · I"
using transaction_receive_deduct[OF T_adm _ σ α]
by (metis I T’_def ϑ_def welltyped_constraint_model_def)
obtain zn where zn: "(σ ◦s α) y · I = Fun (Val (zn, False)) []"
using transaction_var_becomes_Val[
OF reachable_constraints.step[OF A_reach T σ α] I σ α P T, of y]
transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_range(2)[OF σ α *]
y_fv y_val
by (metis subst_apply_term.simps(1))
have "(σ ◦s α) y · I ∈ subtermsset (ik lsst A ·set I)"
using private_fun_deduct_in_ik[OF y_deduct, of "Val (zn, False)"]
by (metis ϑ_def ty(2) zn subst_mono public.simps(3) snd_eqD)
thus ?B
using iksst_subst[of "unlabel A" I] unlabel_subst[of A I]
subtermsset_mono[OF iksst_trmssst_subset[of "unlabel (A ·lsst I)"]]
by fastforce
next
assume y’: "y ∈ fv lsst (transaction_selects T)"
then obtain s where s: "select〈Var y,s〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T))"
"fst y = TAtom Value"
using admissible_transaction_strand_step_cases(1,2)[OF T_adm] by fastforce
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obtain z zn where zn: "(σ ◦s α) y = Var z" "I z = Fun (Val zn) []"
using transaction_var_becomes_Val[
OF reachable_constraints.step[OF A_reach T σ α] I σ α P T]






n s. select〈Var (TAtom Value, n), Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T))
=⇒ (α (TAtom Value, n) · I, Fun (Set s) []) ∈ set (db lsst A I)"
using transaction_selects_db[OF T_adm _ σ α] I
unfolding welltyped_constraint_model_def by auto
have "∃ n. y = (Var Value, n)"






then have "is_Fun_Set (the_set_term (select〈Var y,s〉))"
using s unfolding admissible_transaction_selects_def
by auto




obtain n ss where nss: "y = (TAtom Value, n)" "s = Fun (Set ss) []"
by auto
then have "select〈Var (TAtom Value, n), Fun (Set ss) []〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_selects T))"
using s by auto
then have in_db: "(α (TAtom Value, n) · I, Fun (Set ss) []) ∈ set (db lsst A I)"
using transaction_selects_db_here[of n ss] by auto
have "(I z, s) ∈ set (db lsst A I)"
proof -
have "(α y · I, s) ∈ set (db lsst A I)"
using in_db nss by auto
moreover
have "α y = Var z"
using zn
by (metis (no_types, hide_lams) σ subst_compose_def subst_imgI subst_to_var_is_var
term.distinct(1) transaction_fresh_subst_def var_comp(2))
then have "α y · I = I z"
by auto
ultimately
show "(I z, s) ∈ set (db lsst A I)"
by auto
qed
then have "∃ t’ s’. insert〈t’,s’〉 ∈ set (unlabel A) ∧ I z = t’ · I ∧ s = s’ · I"
using dbsst_in_cases[of "I z" s "unlabel A" I "[]"] unfolding dbsst_def by auto
then obtain t’ s’ where t’s’: "insert〈t’,s’〉 ∈ set (unlabel A) ∧ I z = t’ · I ∧ s = s’ · I"
by auto
then have "t’ ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)"
by force
then have "t’ · I ∈ (subtermsset (trms lsst A)) ·set I"
by auto
then have "I z ∈ (subtermsset (trms lsst A)) ·set I"
using t’s’ by auto
then have "I z ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (A ·lsst I))"
using reachable_constraints_subterms_subst[




2 Stateful Protocol Verification




fixes T σ α A I T’ a0 a0’ ϑ
defines "T’ ≡ dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
and "a0 ≡ α0 (db lsst A I)"
and "a0’ ≡ α0 (db lsst (A@T’) I)"
and "ϑ ≡ λδ x. if fst x = TAtom Value then (absc ◦ δ) x else Var x"
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and T: "T ∈ set P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I (A@T’)"
and σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and FP:
"analyzed (timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI))"
"wf trms (set FP)"
"∀ t ∈ αik A I. timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI) `c t"
and OCC:
"∀ t ∈ timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI). ∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ f ∈ Abs ‘ set OCC"
"timpl_closure_set (absc ‘ set OCC) (set TI) ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC"
"αvals A I ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC"
and TI:
"set TI = {(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+. a 6= b}"
and P:
"∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and step: "list_all (transaction_check FP OCC TI) P"
shows "∃ δ ∈ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (transaction_check_comp FP OCC TI T).
∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T. Γv x = TAtom Value −→
(σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0 = absc (δ x) ∧
(σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0’ = absc (absdbupd (unlabel (transaction_updates T)) x (δ x))"
proof -
define comp0 where "comp0 ≡ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (transaction_check_comp FP OCC TI T)"
define check0 where "check0 ≡ transaction_check FP OCC TI T"
define upd where "upd ≡ λδ x. absdbupd (unlabel (transaction_updates T)) x (δ x)"
define b0 where "b0 ≡ λx. THE b. absc b = (σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0"
note all_defs = comp0_def check0_def a0_def a0’_def upd_def b0_def ϑ_def T’_def
have ϑ_wt: "wtsubst (ϑ δ)" for δ
unfolding ϑ_def wtsubst_def
by fastforce
have A_wf trms: "wf trms (trms lsst A)"
by (metis reachable_constraints_wf trms admissible_transactions_wf trms P(1) A_reach)
have I_interp: "interpretationsubst I"
and I_wt: "wtsubst I"
and I_wf_trms: "wf trms (subst_range I)"
by (metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def,
metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def,
metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def)
have I_is_T_model: "strand_sem_stateful (ik lsst A ·set I) (set (db lsst A I)) (unlabel T’) I"
using I unlabel_append[of A T’] dbsst_set_is_dbupdsst[of "unlabel A" I "[]"]
strand_sem_append_stateful[of "{}" "{}" "unlabel A" "unlabel T’" I]
by (simp add: welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def dbsst_def)
have T_adm: "admissible_transaction T"
using T P(1) Ball_set[of P "admissible_transaction"]
by blast
hence T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
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unfolding admissible_transaction_def by blast
have T_no_bvars: "fv_transaction T = vars_transaction T" "bvars_transaction T = {}"
using transaction_no_bvars[OF T_adm] by simp_all
have T_vars_const_typed: "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T. Γv x = TAtom Value ∨ (∃ a. Γv x = TAtom (Atom a))"
and T_fresh_vars_value_typed: "∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
using T P protocol_transaction_vars_TAtom_typed(2,3)[of T] by simp_all
have wt_σαI: "wtsubst (σ ◦s α ◦s I)" and wt_σα: "wtsubst (σ ◦s α)"
using I_wt wt_subst_compose transaction_fresh_subst_wt[OF σ T_fresh_vars_value_typed]
transaction_renaming_subst_wt[OF α]
by blast+
have T_vars_vals: "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T. ∃ n. (σ ◦s α) x · I = Fun (Val (n, False)) []"
proof
fix x assume x: "x ∈ fv_transaction T"
show "∃ n. (σ ◦s α) x · I = Fun (Val (n, False)) []"
proof (cases "x ∈ subst_domain σ")
case True
then obtain n where "σ x = Fun (Val (n, False)) []"
using σ unfolding transaction_fresh_subst_def
by moura
thus ?thesis by (simp add: subst_compose_def)
next
case False
hence *: "(σ ◦s α) x = α x" by (auto simp add: subst_compose_def)
obtain y where y: "Γv x = Γv y" "α x = Var y"
using transaction_renaming_subst_wt[OF α]
transaction_renaming_subst_is_renaming[OF α]
by (metis Γ.simps(1) prod.exhaust wtsubst_def)
hence "y ∈ fv lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
using x * T_no_bvars(2) unlabel_subst[of "transaction_strand T" "σ ◦s α"]
fvsst_subst_fv_subset[of x "unlabel (transaction_strand T)" "σ ◦s α"]
by auto
hence "y ∈ fv lsst (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
using fvsst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq[of "transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α"]
fvsst_append[of "unlabel A"] unlabel_append[of A]
by auto
thus ?thesis
using x y * T P
constraint_model_Value_term_is_Val[





have T_vars_absc: "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T. ∃ !n. (σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0 = absc n"
using T_vars_vals by fastforce
hence "(absc ◦ b0) x = (σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0" when "x ∈ fv_transaction T" for x
using that unfolding b0_def by fastforce
hence T_vars_absc’: "t · (absc ◦ b0) = t · (σ ◦s α) · I ·α a0"
when "fv t ⊆ fv_transaction T" "@ n T. Fun (Val n) T ∈ subterms t" for t
using that(1) abs_term_subst_eq’[OF _ that(2), of "σ ◦s α ◦s I" a0 "absc ◦ b0"]
subst_compose[of "σ ◦s α" I] subst_subst_compose[of t "σ ◦s α" I]
by fastforce
have "∃ δ ∈ comp0. ∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T. fst x = TAtom Value −→ b0 x = δ x"
proof -
let ?S = "set (unlabel (transaction_selects T))"
let ?C = "set (unlabel (transaction_checks T))"
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let ?xs = "fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T)"
note * = transaction_prop3[OF A_reach T I[unfolded T’_def] σ α FP OCC TI P(1)]
have **:
"∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). b0 x = {}"




proof (intro ballI impI)
fix t assume t: "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_receive T)"
hence t’: "fv t ⊆ fv_transaction T" "@ n T. Fun (Val n) T ∈ subterms t"
using trms_transaction_unfold[of T] vars_transaction_unfold[of T]




have "intruder_synth_mod_timpls FP TI (t · (absc ◦ b0))"
using t(1) t’ *(2) T_vars_absc’
by (metis a0_def)
moreover have "(absc ◦ b0) x = (ϑ b0) x" when "x ∈ fv t" for x
using that T P admissible_transaction_Value_vars[of T]
〈fv t ⊆ fv_transaction T 〉 Γv_TAtom’’(2)[of x]
unfolding ϑ_def by fastforce
hence "t · (absc ◦ b0) = t · ϑ b0"
using term_subst_eq[of t "absc ◦ b0" "ϑ b0"] by argo
ultimately show "intruder_synth_mod_timpls FP TI (t · ϑ b0)"
using intruder_synth.simps[of "set FP"] by (cases "t · ϑ b0") metis+
qed
qed (simp add: *(1) a0_def b0_def)
have ***: "∀ x ∈ ?xs. ∀ s. select〈Var x,Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ ?S −→ s ∈ b0 x"
"∀ x ∈ ?xs. ∀ s. 〈Var x in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ ?C −→ s ∈ b0 x"
"∀ x ∈ ?xs. ∀ s. 〈Var x not in Fun (Set s) []〉 ∈ ?C −→ s /∈ b0 x"
"∀ x ∈ ?xs. fst x = TAtom Value −→ b0 x ∈ set OCC"
unfolding a0_def b0_def
using *(3,4) apply (force, force)
using *(5) apply force
using *(6) admissible_transaction_Value_vars[OF bspec[OF P T]] by force
show ?thesis




hence 1: "∃ δ ∈ comp0. ∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T.
fst x = TAtom Value −→ (σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0 = absc (δ x)"
using T_vars_absc unfolding b0_def a0_def by fastforce
obtain δ where δ:
"δ ∈ comp0" "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T. fst x = TAtom Value −→ (σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0 = absc (δ x)"
using 1 by moura
have 2: "ϑ x · I ·α α0 (db’ lsst (dual lsst (A ·lsst ϑ)) I D) = absc (absdbupd (unlabel A) x d)"
when "ϑ x · I ·α α0 D = absc d"
and "∀ t u. insert〈t,u〉 ∈ set (unlabel A) −→ (∃ y s. t = Var y ∧ u = Fun (Set s) [])"
and "∀ t u. delete〈t,u〉 ∈ set (unlabel A) −→ (∃ y s. t = Var y ∧ u = Fun (Set s) [])"
and "∀ y ∈ fv lsst A. ϑ x · I = ϑ y · I −→ x = y"
and "∀ y ∈ fv lsst A. ∃ n. ϑ y · I = Fun (Val n) []"
and x: "ϑ x · I = Fun (Val n) []"
and D: "∀ d ∈ set D. ∃ s. snd d = Fun (Set s) []"
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for A::"(’fun,’atom,’sets,’nat) prot_strand" and x ϑ D n d
using that(2,3,4,5)
proof (induction A rule: List.rev_induct)
case (snoc a A)
then obtain l b where a: "a = (l,b)" by (metis surj_pair)
have IH: "α0 (db’ lsst (dual lsst (A ·lsst ϑ)) I D) n = absdbupd (unlabel A) x d"
using snoc unlabel_append[of A "[a]"] a x
by (simp del: unlabel_append)
have b_prems: "∀ y ∈ fvsstp b. ϑ x · I = ϑ y · I −→ x = y"
"∀ y ∈ fvsstp b. ∃ n. ϑ y · I = Fun (Val n) []"
using snoc.prems(3,4) a by (simp_all add: unlabel_def)
have *: "filter is_Update (unlabel (dual lsst (A@[a] ·lsst ϑ))) =
filter is_Update (unlabel (dual lsst (A ·lsst ϑ)))"
"filter is_Update (unlabel (A@[a])) = filter is_Update (unlabel A)"
when "¬is_Update b"
using that a
by (cases b, simp_all add: dual lsst_def unlabel_def subst_apply_labeled_stateful_strand_def)+
note ** = IH a dual lsst_subst_append[of A "[a]" ϑ]
note *** = * absdbupd_filter[of "unlabel (A@[a])"]
absdbupd_filter[of "unlabel A"]
dbsst_filter[of "unlabel (dual lsst (A@[a] ·lsst ϑ))"]
dbsst_filter[of "unlabel (dual lsst (A ·lsst ϑ))"]
note **** = **(2,3) dual lsst_subst_snoc[of A a ϑ]
unlabel_append[of "dual lsst A ·lsst ϑ" "[dual lsstp a ·lsstp ϑ]"]
dbsst_append[of "unlabel (dual lsst A ·lsst ϑ)" "unlabel [dual lsstp a ·lsstp ϑ]" I D]
have "α0 (db’ lsst (dual lsst (A@[a] ·lsst ϑ)) I D) n = absdbupd (unlabel (A@[a])) x d" using ** ***
proof (cases b)
case (Insert t t’)
then obtain y s m where y: "t = Var y" "t’ = Fun (Set s) []" "ϑ y · I = Fun (Val m) []"
using snoc.prems(1) b_prems(2) a by (fastforce simp add: unlabel_def)
hence a’: "db’ lsst (dual lsst (A@[a] ·lsst ϑ)) I D =
List.insert ((Fun (Val m) [], Fun (Set s) [])) (db’ lsst (dual lsst A ·lsst ϑ) I D)"
"unlabel [dual lsstp a ·lsstp ϑ] = [insert〈ϑ y, Fun (Set s) []〉]"
"unlabel [a] = [insert〈Var y, Fun (Set s) []〉]"
using **** Insert by simp_all
show ?thesis
proof (cases "x = y")
case True
hence "ϑ x · I = ϑ y · I" by simp
hence "α0 (db’ lsst (dual lsst (A@[a] ·lsst ϑ)) I D) n =
insert s (α0 (db’ lsst (dual lsst (A ·lsst ϑ)) I D) n)"
by (metis (no_types, lifting) y(3) a’(1) x dual lsst_subst to_abs_list_insert’)
thus ?thesis using True IH a’(3) absdbupd_append[of "unlabel A"] by (simp add: unlabel_def)
next
case False
hence "ϑ x · I 6= ϑ y · I" using b_prems(1) y Insert by simp
hence "α0 (db’ lsst (dual lsst (A@[a] ·lsst ϑ)) I D) n = α0 (db’ lsst (dual lsst (A ·lsst ϑ)) I D) n"
by (metis (no_types, lifting) y(3) a’(1) x dual lsst_subst to_abs_list_insert)
thus ?thesis using False IH a’(3) absdbupd_append[of "unlabel A"] by (simp add: unlabel_def)
qed
next
case (Delete t t’)
then obtain y s m where y: "t = Var y" "t’ = Fun (Set s) []" "ϑ y · I = Fun (Val m) []"
using snoc.prems(2) b_prems(2) a by (fastforce simp add: unlabel_def)
hence a’: "db’ lsst (dual lsst (A@[a] ·lsst ϑ)) I D =
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List.removeAll ((Fun (Val m) [], Fun (Set s) [])) (db’ lsst (dual lsst A ·lsst ϑ) I D)"
"unlabel [dual lsstp a ·lsstp ϑ] = [delete〈ϑ y, Fun (Set s) []〉]"
"unlabel [a] = [delete〈Var y, Fun (Set s) []〉]"
using **** Delete by simp_all
have "∃ s S. snd d = Fun (Set s) []" when "d ∈ set (db’ lsst (dual lsst A ·lsst ϑ) I D)" for d
using snoc.prems(1,2) db lsst_dual lsst_set_ex[OF that _ _ D] by (simp add: unlabel_def)
moreover {
fix t::"(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term"
and D::"((’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term × (’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_term) list"
assume "∀ d ∈ set D. ∃ s. snd d = Fun (Set s) []"
hence "removeAll (t, Fun (Set s) []) D = filter (λd. @ S. d = (t, Fun (Set s) S)) D"
by (induct D) auto
} ultimately have a’’:
"List.removeAll ((Fun (Val m) [], Fun (Set s) [])) (db’ lsst (dual lsst A ·lsst ϑ) I D) =
filter (λd. @ S. d = (Fun (Val m) [], Fun (Set s) S)) (db’ lsst (dual lsst A ·lsst ϑ) I D)"
by simp
show ?thesis
proof (cases "x = y")
case True
hence "ϑ x · I = ϑ y · I" by simp
hence "α0 (db’ lsst (dual lsst (A@[a] ·lsst ϑ)) I D) n =
(α0 (db’ lsst (dual lsst (A ·lsst ϑ)) I D) n) - {s}"
using y(3) a’’ a’(1) x by (simp add: dual lsst_subst to_abs_list_remove_all’)
thus ?thesis using True IH a’(3) absdbupd_append[of "unlabel A"] by (simp add: unlabel_def)
next
case False
hence "ϑ x · I 6= ϑ y · I" using b_prems(1) y Delete by simp
hence "α0 (db’ lsst (dual lsst (A@[a] ·lsst ϑ)) I D) n = α0 (db’ lsst (dual lsst (A ·lsst ϑ)) I D) n"
by (metis (no_types, lifting) y(3) a’(1) x dual lsst_subst to_abs_list_remove_all)
thus ?thesis using False IH a’(3) absdbupd_append[of "unlabel A"] by (simp add: unlabel_def)
qed
qed simp_all
thus ?case by (simp add: x)
qed (simp add: that(1))
have 3: "x = y"
when xy: "(σ ◦s α) x · I = (σ ◦s α) y · I" "x ∈ fv_transaction T" "y ∈ fv_transaction T"
for x y
proof -
have "x /∈ set (transaction_fresh T) =⇒ y /∈ set (transaction_fresh T) =⇒ ?thesis"
using xy admissible_transaction_strand_sem_fv_ineq[OF T_adm I_is_T_model[unfolded T’_def]]
by fast
moreover {
assume *: "x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)" "y ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
then obtain xn yn where "σ x = Fun (Val xn) []" "σ y = Fun (Val yn) []"
by (metis transaction_fresh_subst_sends_to_val[OF σ])
hence "σ x = σ y" using that(1) by (simp add: subst_compose)
moreover have "inj_on σ (subst_domain σ)" "x ∈ subst_domain σ" "y ∈ subst_domain σ"
using * σ unfolding transaction_fresh_subst_def by auto
ultimately have ?thesis unfolding inj_on_def by blast
} moreover have False when "x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)" "y /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
using that(2) xy T_no_bvars admissible_transaction_Value_vars[OF bspec[OF P T], of y]
transaction_prop4[OF A_reach T I[unfolded T’_def] σ α P that(1), of y]
by auto
moreover have False when "x /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)" "y ∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
using that(1) xy T_no_bvars admissible_transaction_Value_vars[OF bspec[OF P T], of x]
transaction_prop4[OF A_reach T I[unfolded T’_def] σ α P that(2), of x]
by fastforce
ultimately show ?thesis by metis
qed
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have 4: "∃ y s. t = Var y ∧ u = Fun (Set s) []"
when "insert〈t,u〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))" for t u
using that admissible_transaction_strand_step_cases(4)[OF T_adm] T_valid
by blast
have 5: "∃ y s. t = Var y ∧ u = Fun (Set s) []"
when "delete〈t,u〉 ∈ set (unlabel (transaction_strand T))" for t u
using that admissible_transaction_strand_step_cases(4)[OF T_adm] T_valid
by blast
have 6: "∃ n. (σ ◦s α) y · I = Fun (Val (n, False)) []" when "y ∈ fv_transaction T" for y
using that by (simp add: T_vars_vals)
have "list_all wellformed_transaction P" "list_all admissible_transaction_updates P"
using P(1) Ball_set[of P "admissible_transaction"] Ball_set[of P wellformed_transaction]
Ball_set[of P admissible_transaction_updates]
unfolding admissible_transaction_def by fastforce+
hence 7: "∃ s. snd d = Fun (Set s) []" when "d ∈ set (db lsst A I)" for d
using that reachable_constraints_db lsst_set_args_empty[OF A_reach]
unfolding admissible_transaction_updates_def by (cases d) simp
have "(σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0’ = absc (upd δ x)"
when x: "x ∈ fv_transaction T" "fst x = TAtom Value" for x
proof -
have "(σ ◦s α) x · I ·α α0 (db’ lsst (dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)) I (db lsst A I))
= absc (absdbupd (unlabel (transaction_strand T)) x (δ x))"
using 2[of "σ ◦s α" x "db lsst A I" "δ x" "transaction_strand T"]
3[OF _ x(1)] 4 5 6[OF that(1)] 6 7 x δ(2)
unfolding all_defs by blast
thus ?thesis
using x dbsst_append[of "unlabel A"] absdbupd_wellformed_transaction[OF T_valid]
unfolding all_defs dbsst_def by force
qed
thus ?thesis using δ Γv_TAtom’’(2) unfolding all_defs by blast
qed
lemma transaction_prop6:
fixes T σ α A I T’ a0 a0’
defines "T’ ≡ dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
and "a0 ≡ α0 (db lsst A I)"
and "a0’ ≡ α0 (db lsst (A@T’) I)"
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and T: "T ∈ set P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I (A@T’)"
and σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and FP:
"analyzed (timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI))"
"wf trms (set FP)"
"∀ t ∈ αik A I. timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI) `c t"
and OCC:
"∀ t ∈ timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI). ∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ f ∈ Abs ‘ set OCC"
"timpl_closure_set (absc ‘ set OCC) (set TI) ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC"
"αvals A I ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC"
and TI:
"set TI = {(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+. a 6= b}"
and P:
"∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and step: "list_all (transaction_check FP OCC TI) P"
shows "∀ t ∈ timpl_closure_set (αik A I) (αti A T σ α I).
timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI) `c t" ( is ?A)
and "timpl_closure_set (αvals A I) (αti A T σ α I) ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC" ( is ?B)
and "∀ t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T). is_Fun (t · (σ ◦s α) · I ·α a0’) −→
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timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI) `c t · (σ ◦s α) · I ·α a0’" ( is ?C)
and "∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T. Γv x = TAtom Value −→
(σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0’ ∈ absc ‘ set OCC" ( is ?D)
proof -
define comp0 where "comp0 ≡ abs_substs_fun ‘ set (transaction_check_comp FP OCC TI T)"
define check0 where "check0 ≡ transaction_check FP OCC TI T"
define upd where "upd ≡ λδ x. absdbupd (unlabel (transaction_updates T)) x (δ x)"
define ϑ where "ϑ ≡ λδ x. if fst x = TAtom Value then (absc ◦ δ) x else Var x"
have T_adm: "admissible_transaction T" using T P(1) by metis
hence T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T" by (metis admissible_transaction_def)
have ϑ_prop: "ϑ σ x = absc (σ x)" when "Γv x = TAtom Value" for σ x
using that Γv_TAtom’’(2)[of x] unfolding ϑ_def by simp
have 0: "∃ δ ∈ comp0. ∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T. Γv x = TAtom Value −→
(σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0 = absc (δ x) ∧
(σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0’ = absc (upd δ x)"
using transaction_prop5[OF A_reach T I[unfolded T’_def] σ α FP OCC TI P step]
unfolding a0_def a0’_def T’_def upd_def comp0_def
by blast
have 1: "(δ x, upd δ x) ∈ (set TI)+"
when "δ ∈ comp0" "δ x 6= upd δ x" "x ∈ fv_transaction T" "x /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
for x δ
using T that step Ball_set[of P "transaction_check FP OCC TI"]
transaction_prop1[of δ FP OCC TI T x] TI
unfolding upd_def comp0_def
by blast
have 2: "upd δ x ∈ set OCC"
when "δ ∈ comp0" "x ∈ fv_transaction T" "fst x = TAtom Value" for x δ
using T that step Ball_set[of P "transaction_check FP OCC TI"]
T_adm FP OCC TI transaction_prop2[of δ FP OCC TI T x]
unfolding upd_def comp0_def
by blast+
obtain δ where δ:
"δ ∈ comp0"
"∀ x ∈ fv_transaction T. Γv x = TAtom Value −→
(σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0 = absc (δ x) ∧
(σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0’ = absc (upd δ x)"
using 0 by moura
have "∃ x. ab = (δ x, upd δ x) ∧ x ∈ fv_transaction T - set (transaction_fresh T) ∧ δ x 6= upd δ x"
when ab: "ab ∈ αti A T σ α I" for ab
proof -
obtain a b where ab’: "ab = (a,b)" by (metis surj_pair)
then obtain x where x:
"a 6= b" "x ∈ fv_transaction T" "x /∈ set (transaction_fresh T)"
"absc a = (σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0" "absc b = (σ ◦s α) x · I ·α a0’"
using ab unfolding abs_term_implications_def a0_def a0’_def T’_def by blast
hence "absc a = absc (δ x)" "absc b = absc (upd δ x)"
using δ(2) admissible_transaction_Value_vars[OF bspec[OF P T] x(2)]
by metis+
thus ?thesis using x ab’ by blast
qed
hence αti_TI_subset: "αti A T σ α I ⊆ {(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+. a 6= b}" using 1[OF δ(1)] by blast
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have "timpl_closure_set (timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI)) (αti A T σ α I) `c t"
when t: "t ∈ timpl_closure_set (αik A I) (αti A T σ α I)" for t




using ideduct_synth_mono[OF _ timpl_closure_set_mono[OF
subset_refl[of "timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI)"]
αti_TI_subset]]
timpl_closure_set_timpls_trancl_eq’[of "timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI)" "set TI"]
unfolding timpl_closure_set_idem
by force
have "timpl_closure_set (αvals A I) (αti A T σ α I) ⊆
timpl_closure_set (absc ‘ set OCC) {(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+. a 6= b}"
using timpl_closure_set_mono[OF _ αti_TI_subset] OCC(3) by blast
thus ?B using OCC(2) timpl_closure_set_timpls_trancl_subset’ by blast
have "transaction_check_post FP TI T δ"
using T δ(1) step
unfolding transaction_check_def comp0_def list_all_iff
by blast
hence 3: "timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI) `c t · ϑ (upd δ)"
when "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T)" "is_Fun (t · ϑ (upd δ))" for t
using that
unfolding transaction_check_post_def upd_def ϑ_def
intruder_synth_mod_timpls_is_synth_timpl_closure_set[OF TI, symmetric]
by meson
have 4: "∀ x ∈ fv t. (σ ◦s α ◦s I) x ·α a0’ = ϑ (upd δ) x"
when "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T)" for t
using wellformed_transaction_send_receive_fv_subset(2)[OF T_valid that]
δ(2) subst_compose[of "σ ◦s α" I] ϑ_prop
admissible_transaction_Value_vars[OF bspec[OF P T]]
by fastforce
have 5: "@ n T. Fun (Val n) T ∈ subterms t" when "t ∈ trms lsst (transaction_send T)" for t
using that transactions_have_no_Value_consts’[OF T_adm] trms_transaction_unfold[of T]
by blast
show ?D using 2[OF δ(1)] δ(2) Γv_TAtom’’(2) unfolding a0’_def T’_def by blast




assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and T: "T ∈ set P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α))"
and σ: "transaction_fresh_subst σ T A"
and α: "transaction_renaming_subst α P A"
and FP:
"analyzed (timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI))"
"wf trms (set FP)"
"∀ t ∈ αik A I. timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI) `c t"
"ground (set FP)"
and OCC:
"∀ t ∈ timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI). ∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ f ∈ Abs ‘ set OCC"
"timpl_closure_set (absc ‘ set OCC) (set TI) ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC"
"αvals A I ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC"
and TI:
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"set TI = {(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+. a 6= b}"
and P:
"∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and transactions_covered: "list_all (transaction_check FP OCC TI) P"
shows "∀ t ∈ αik (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)) I.
timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI) `c t" ( is ?A)
and "αvals (A@dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)) I ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC" ( is ?B)
proof -
note step_props = transaction_prop6[OF A_reach T I σ α FP(1,2,3) OCC TI P transactions_covered]
define T’ where "T’ ≡ dual lsst (transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α)"
define a0 where "a0 ≡ α0 (db lsst A I)"
define a0’ where "a0’ ≡ α0 (db lsst (A@T’) I)"
define vals where "vals ≡ λS::(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_constr.
{t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst S) ·set I. ∃ n. t = Fun (Val n) []}"
define vals_sym where "vals_sym ≡ λS::(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot_constr.
{t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst S). (∃ n. t = Fun (Val n) []) ∨ (∃ m. t = Var (TAtom Value,m))}"
have I_wt: "wtsubst I" by (metis I welltyped_constraint_model_def)
have I_grounds: "fv (t · I) = {}" for t
using I interpretation_grounds[of I]
unfolding welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def by auto
have T_fresh_vars_value_typed: "∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
using protocol_transaction_vars_TAtom_typed[OF bspec[OF P(1) T]] by simp_all
have wt_σαI: "wtsubst (σ ◦s α ◦s I)" and wt_σα: "wtsubst (σ ◦s α)"
using I_wt wt_subst_compose transaction_fresh_subst_wt[OF σ T_fresh_vars_value_typed]
transaction_renaming_subst_wt[OF α]
by blast+
have "∀ T∈set P. bvars_transaction T = {}"
using P unfolding list_all_iff admissible_transaction_def by metis
hence A_no_bvars: "bvars lsst A = {}"
using reachable_constraints_no_bvars[OF A_reach] by metis
have I_vals: "∃ n. I (TAtom Value, m) = Fun (Val n) []"
when "(TAtom Value, m) ∈ fv lsst A" for m
using constraint_model_Value_term_is_Val’[
OF A_reach welltyped_constraint_model_prefix[OF I] P(1)]
A_no_bvars varssst_is_fvsst_bvarssst[of "unlabel A"] that
by blast
have vals_sym_vals: "t · I ∈ vals A" when t: "t ∈ vals_sym A" for t
proof (cases t)
case (Var x)
then obtain m where *: "x = (TAtom Value,m)" using t unfolding vals_sym_def by blast
moreover have "t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)" using t unfolding vals_sym_def by blast
hence "t · I ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A) ·set I" "∃ n. I (Var Value, m) = Fun (Val n) []"
using Var * I_vals[of m] var_subterm_trmssst_is_varssst[of x "unlabel A"]
Γv_TAtom[of Value m] reachable_constraints_Value_vars_are_fv[OF A_reach P(1), of x]
by blast+
ultimately show ?thesis using Var unfolding vals_def by auto
next
case (Fun f T)
then obtain n where "f = Val n" "T = []" using t unfolding vals_sym_def by blast
moreover have "t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)" using t unfolding vals_sym_def by blast
hence "t · I ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A) ·set I" using Fun by blast
ultimately show ?thesis using Fun unfolding vals_def by auto
qed
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have vals_vals_sym: "∃ s. s ∈ vals_sym A ∧ t = s · I" when "t ∈ vals A" for t
using that constraint_model_Val_is_Value_term[OF I]
unfolding vals_def vals_sym_def by fast
have T_adm: "admissible_transaction T" and T_valid: "wellformed_transaction T"
apply (metis P(1) T)
using P(1) T Ball_set[of P "admissible_transaction"]
unfolding admissible_transaction_def by fastforce
have 0:
"αik (A@T’) I = (ik lsst A ·set I) ·αset a0’ ∪ (ik lsst T’ ·set I) ·αset a0’"
"αvals (A@T’) I = vals A ·αset a0’ ∪ vals T’ ·αset a0’"
by (metis abs_intruder_knowledge_append a0’_def,
metis abs_value_constants_append[of A T’ I] a0’_def vals_def)
have 1: "(ik lsst T’ ·set I) ·αset a0’ =
(trms lsst (transaction_send T) ·set (σ ◦s α) ·set I) ·αset a0’"
by (metis T’_def dual_transaction_ik_is_transaction_send’’[OF T_valid])
have 2: "bvars lsst (transaction_strand T) ∩ subst_domain σ = {}"
"bvars lsst (transaction_strand T) ∩ subst_domain α = {}"
using T_adm unfolding admissible_transaction_def
by blast+
have "vals T’ ⊆ (σ ◦s α) ‘ fv_transaction T ·set I"
proof
fix t assume "t ∈ vals T’"
then obtain s n where s:
"s ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst T’)" "t = s · I" "t = Fun (Val n) []"
unfolding vals_def by fast
then obtain u where u:
"u ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst (transaction_strand T))"
"s = u · (σ ◦s α)"
using transaction_fresh_subst_transaction_renaming_subst_trms[OF σ α 2]
trmssst_unlabel_dual lsst_eq[of "transaction_strand T ·lsst σ ◦s α"]
unfolding T’_def by blast
have *: "t = u · (σ ◦s α ◦s I)" by (metis subst_subst_compose s(2) u(2))
then obtain x where x: "u = Var x"
using s(3) transactions_have_no_Value_consts(1)[OF T_adm u(1)] by (cases u) force+
hence **: "x ∈ vars_transaction T"
by (metis u(1) var_subterm_trmssst_is_varssst)
have "Γv x = TAtom Value"
using * x s(3) wt_subst_trm’’[OF wt_σαI, of u]
by simp
thus "t ∈ (σ ◦s α) ‘ fv_transaction T ·set I"
using transaction_Value_vars_are_fv[OF T_adm **] x *
by (metis subst_comp_set_image rev_image_eqI subst_apply_term.simps(1))
qed
hence 3: "vals T’ ·αset a0’ ⊆ ((σ ◦s α) ‘ fv_transaction T ·set I) ·αset a0’"
by (simp add: abs_apply_terms_def image_mono)
have "t · I ·α a0’ ∈ timpl_closure_set (αik A I) (αti A T σ α I)"
when "t ∈ ik lsst A" for t
using that abs_in[OF imageI[OF that]]
αti_covers_α0_ik[OF A_reach T I σ α P(1)]
timpl_closure_set_mono[of "{t · I ·α a0}" "αik A I" "αti A T σ α I" "αti A T σ α I"]
unfolding a0_def a0’_def T’_def abs_intruder_knowledge_def by fast
hence A: "αik (A@T’) I ⊆
timpl_closure_set (αik A I) (αti A T σ α I) ∪
(trms lsst (transaction_send T) ·set (σ ◦s α) ·set I) ·αset a0’"
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using 0(1) 1 by (auto simp add: abs_apply_terms_def)
have "t · I ·α a0’ ∈ timpl_closure_set {t · I ·α a0} (αti A T σ α I)"
when t: "t ∈ vals_sym A" for t
proof -
have "(∃ n. t = Fun (Val n) [] ∧ t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)) ∨
(∃ n. t = Var (TAtom Value,n) ∧ (TAtom Value,n) ∈ fv lsst A)"
( is "?P ∨ ?Q")
using t var_subterm_trmssst_is_varssst[of _ "unlabel A"]
Γv_TAtom[of Value] reachable_constraints_Value_vars_are_fv[OF A_reach P(1)]




then obtain n where n: "t = Fun (Val n) []" "t ∈ subtermsset (trms lsst A)" by moura
thus ?thesis
using αti_covers_α0_Val[OF A_reach T I σ α P(1), of n]




using αti_covers_α0_Var[OF A_reach T I σ α P(1)]
unfolding a0_def a0’_def T’_def by fastforce
qed
qed
moreover have "t · I ·α a0 ∈ αvals A I"
when "t ∈ vals_sym A" for t
using that abs_in vals_sym_vals
unfolding a0_def abs_value_constants_def vals_sym_def vals_def
by (metis (mono_tags, lifting))
ultimately have "t · I ·α a0’ ∈ timpl_closure_set (αvals A I) (αti A T σ α I)"
when t: "t ∈ vals_sym A" for t
using t timpl_closure_set_mono[of "{t · I ·α a0}" "αvals A I" "αti A T σ α I" "αti A T σ α I"]
by blast
hence "t ·α a0’ ∈ timpl_closure_set (αvals A I) (αti A T σ α I)"
when t: "t ∈ vals A" for t
using vals_vals_sym[OF t] by blast
hence B: "αvals (A@T’) I ⊆
timpl_closure_set (αvals A I) (αti A T σ α I) ∪
((σ ◦s α) ‘ fv_transaction T ·set I) ·αset a0’"
using 0(2) 3
by (simp add: abs_apply_terms_def image_subset_iff)
have 4: "fv (t · σ ◦s α · I ·α a) = {}" for t a
using I_grounds[of "t · σ ◦s α"] abs_fv[of "t · σ ◦s α · I" a]
by argo
have "is_Fun (t · σ ◦s α · I ·α a0’)" for t
using 4[of t a0’] by force
thus ?A
using A step_props(1,3)
unfolding T’_def a0_def a0’_def abs_apply_terms_def
by blast
show ?B
using B step_props(2,4) admissible_transaction_Value_vars[OF bspec[OF P T]]
by (auto simp add: T’_def a0_def a0’_def abs_apply_terms_def)
qed
lemma reachable_constraints_covered:
assumes A_reach: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
and I: "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
and FP:
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"analyzed (timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI))"
"wf trms (set FP)"
"ground (set FP)"
and OCC:
"∀ t ∈ timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI). ∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ f ∈ Abs ‘ set OCC"
"timpl_closure_set (absc ‘ set OCC) (set TI) ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC"
and TI:
"set TI = {(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+. a 6= b}"
and P:
"∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and transactions_covered: "list_all (transaction_check FP OCC TI) P"
shows "∀ t ∈ αik A I. timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI) `c t"
and "αvals A I ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC"
using A_reach I
proof (induction rule: reachable_constraints.induct)
case init
{ case 1 show ?case by (simp add: abs_intruder_knowledge_def) }
{ case 2 show ?case by (simp add: abs_value_constants_def) }
next
case (step A T σ α)
{ case 1
hence "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
by (metis welltyped_constraint_model_prefix)
hence IH: "∀ t ∈ αik A I. timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI) `c t"
"αvals A I ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC"
using step.IH by metis+
show ?case
using reachable_constraints_covered_step[
OF step.hyps(1,2) "1.prems" step.hyps(3,4) FP(1,2) IH(1)




hence "welltyped_constraint_model I A"
by (metis welltyped_constraint_model_prefix)
hence IH: "∀ t ∈ αik A I. timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI) `c t"
"αvals A I ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC"
using step.IH by metis+
show ?case
using reachable_constraints_covered_step[
OF step.hyps(1,2) "2.prems" step.hyps(3,4) FP(1,2) IH(1)






assumes "∀ t ∈ IK ·αset a. FP `c t"
and "attack〈n〉 ∈ IK"
shows "attack〈n〉 ∈ FP"
proof -
have "attack〈n〉 ·α a ∈ IK ·αset a" by (rule abs_in[OF assms(2)])
hence "FP `c attack〈n〉 ·α a" using assms(1) by blast
moreover have "attack〈n〉 ·α a = attack〈n〉" by simp
ultimately have "FP `c attack〈n〉" by metis




assumes "attack〈n〉 ∈ timpl_closure_set FP TI"
shows "attack〈n〉 ∈ FP"
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proof -
have "∀ f ∈ funs_term (attack〈n〉). ¬is_Abs f" by auto




"analyzed (timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI))"
"wf trms (set FP)"
"ground (set FP)"
and OCC:
"∀ t ∈ timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI). ∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ f ∈ Abs ‘ set OCC"
"timpl_closure_set (absc ‘ set OCC) (set TI) ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC"
and TI:
"set TI = {(a,b) ∈ (set TI)+. a 6= b}"
and P:
"∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
and transactions_covered: "list_all (transaction_check FP OCC TI) P"
and attack_notin_FP: "attack〈n〉 /∈ set FP"
and A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
shows "@ I. welltyped_constraint_model I (A@[(l, send〈attack〈n〉〉)])" ( is "@ I. ?P I")
proof
assume "∃ I. ?P I"
then obtain I where I: "welltyped_constraint_model I (A@[(l, send〈attack〈n〉〉)])"
by moura
hence I’: "constr_sem_stateful I (unlabel (A@[(l, send〈attack〈n〉〉)]))"
"interpretationsubst I" "wf trms (subst_range I)" "wtsubst I"
unfolding welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def by metis+
have 0: "attack〈n〉 /∈ ik lsst A ·set I"
using welltyped_constraint_model_prefix[OF I]
reachable_constraints_covered(1)[OF A _ FP OCC TI P transactions_covered]
attack_in_fixpoint_if_attack_in_ik[
of "ik lsst A ·set I" "α0 (db lsst A I)" "timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI)" n]
attack_in_fixpoint_if_attack_in_timpl_closure_set
attack_notin_FP
unfolding abs_intruder_knowledge_def by blast
have 1: "ik lsst A ·set I ` attack〈n〉"
using I strand_sem_append_stateful[of "{}" "{}" "unlabel A" _ I]
unfolding welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def by force
have 2: "wf trms (ik lsst A ·set I)"
using reachable_constraints_wf trms[OF _ A] admissible_transactions_wf trms P(1)
iksst_trmssst_subset[of "unlabel A"] wf_trms_subst[OF I’(3)]
by fast
have 3: "∀ x ∈ fvset (ik lsst A). ¬TAtom AttackType v Γv x"
using reachable_constraints_vars_TAtom_typed[OF A P(1)]
fv_ik_subset_vars_sst’[of "unlabel A"]
by fastforce
have 4: "attack〈n〉 /∈ set (snd (Ana t)) ·set I" when t: "t ∈ subtermsset (ik lsst A)" for t
proof
assume "attack〈n〉 ∈ set (snd (Ana t)) ·set I"
then obtain s where s: "s ∈ set (snd (Ana t))" "s · I = attack〈n〉" by moura
obtain x where x: "s = Var x"
by (cases s) (use s reachable_constraints_no_Ana_Attack[OF A P(1) t] in auto)
have "x ∈ fv t" using x Ana_subterm’[OF s(1)] vars_iff_subtermeq by force
hence "x ∈ fvset (ik lsst A)" using t fv_subterms by fastforce
hence "Γv x 6= TAtom AttackType" using 3 by fastforce
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thus False using s(2) x wt_subst_trm’’[OF I’(4), of "Var x"] by fastforce
qed
have 5: "attack〈n〉 /∈ set (snd (Ana t))" when t: "t ∈ subtermsset (ik lsst A ·set I)" for t
proof
assume "attack〈n〉 ∈ set (snd (Ana t))"
then obtain s where s:
"s ∈ subtermsset (I ‘ fvset (ik lsst A))" "attack〈n〉 ∈ set (snd (Ana s))"
using Ana_subst_subterms_cases[OF t] 4 by fast
then obtain x where x: "x ∈ fvset (ik lsst A)" "s v I x" by moura
hence "I x ∈ subtermsset (ik lsst A ·set I)"
using var_is_subterm[of x] subterms_subst_subset’[of I "ik lsst A"]
by force
hence *: "wf trm (I x)" "wf trm s"




OF subtermeq_imp_subtermtypeeq[OF *(2) Ana_subterm’[OF s(2)]]
subtermeq_imp_subtermtypeeq[OF *(1) x(2)]]














"analyzed (timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI))"
"wf trms (set FP)"
"ground (set FP)"
and OCC:
"∀ t ∈ timpl_closure_set (set FP) (set TI). ∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ f ∈ Abs ‘ set OCC"
"timpl_closure_set (absc ‘ set OCC) (set TI) ⊆ absc ‘ set OCC"
and TI:









"∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
"∀ T ∈ set P. list_all tfrsstp (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
and transactions_covered: "list_all (transaction_check FP OCC TI) P"
and attack_notin_FP: "attack〈n〉 /∈ set FP"
and A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints P"
shows "@ I. constraint_model I (A@[(l, send〈attack〈n〉〉)])"
( is "@ I. ?P A I")
proof
assume "∃ I. ?P A I"
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then obtain I where I:
"interpretationsubst I" "wf trms (subst_range I)"
"constr_sem_stateful I (unlabel (A@[(l, send〈attack〈n〉〉)]))"
unfolding constraint_model_def by moura
let ?n = "[(l, send〈attack〈n〉〉)]"
let ?A = "A@?n"
have "∀ T ∈ set P. wellformed_transaction T"
"∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction_terms T"
using P(1) unfolding admissible_transaction_def by blast+
moreover have "∀ T ∈ set P. wf trms’ arity (trms_transaction T)"
using P(1) unfolding admissible_transaction_def admissible_transaction_terms_def by blast
ultimately have 0: "wfsst (unlabel A)" "tfrsst (unlabel A)" "wf trms (trms lsst A)"
using reachable_constraints_tfr[OF _ M P A] reachable_constraints_wf[OF _ _ A] by metis+
have 1: "wfsst (unlabel ?A)" "tfrsst (unlabel ?A)" "wf trms (trms lsst ?A)"
proof -
show "wfsst (unlabel ?A)"
using 0(1) wfsst_append_suffix’[of "{}" "unlabel A" "unlabel ?n"] unlabel_append[of A ?n]
by simp
show "wf trms (trms lsst ?A)"
using 0(3) trmssst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel ?n"] unlabel_append[of A ?n]
by fastforce
have "∀ t ∈ trms lsst ?n ∪ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel ?n). ∃ c. t = Fun c []"
"∀ t ∈ trms lsst ?n ∪ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel ?n). Ana t = ([],[])"
by (simp_all add: setopssst_def)
hence "tfrset (trms lsst A ∪ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel A) ∪
(trms lsst ?n ∪ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel ?n)))"
using 0(2) tfr_consts_mono unfolding tfrsst_def by blast
hence "tfrset (trms lsst (A@?n) ∪ pair ‘ setopssst (unlabel (A@?n)))"
using unlabel_append[of A ?n] trmssst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel ?n"]
setopssst_append[of "unlabel A" "unlabel ?n"]
by (simp add: setopssst_def)
thus "tfrsst (unlabel ?A)"
using 0(2) unlabel_append[of ?A ?n]
unfolding tfrsst_def by auto
qed
obtain Iτ where I’:
"welltyped_constraint_model Iτ ?A"
using stateful_typing_result[OF 1 I(1,3)]
by (metis welltyped_constraint_model_def constraint_model_def)
note a = FP OCC TI P(1) transactions_covered attack_notin_FP A
show False








"compute_fixpoint_fun’ P (n::nat option) enable_traces S0 ≡
let sy = intruder_synth_mod_timpls;
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FP’ = λS. fst (fst S);
TI’ = λS. snd (fst S);
OCC’ = λS. remdups (
(map (λt. the_Abs (the_Fun (args t ! 1)))
(filter (λt. is_Fun t ∧ the_Fun t = OccursFact) (FP’ S)))@
(map snd (TI’ S)));
equal_states = λS S’. set (FP’ S) = set (FP’ S’) ∧ set (TI’ S) = set (TI’ S’);
trace’ = λS. snd S;
close = λM f. let g = remdups ◦ f in while (λA. set (g A) 6= set A) g M;
close’ = λM f. let g = remdups ◦ f in while (λA. set (g A) 6= set A) g M;
trancl_minus_refl = λTI.
let aux = λts p. map (λq. (fst p,snd q)) (filter ((=) (snd p) ◦ fst) ts)
in filter (λp. fst p 6= snd p) (close’ TI (λts. concat (map (aux ts) ts)@ts));
snd_Ana = λN M TI. let N’ = filter (λt. ∀ k ∈ set (fst (Ana t)). sy M TI k) N in
filter (λt. ¬sy M TI t)
(concat (map (λt. filter (λs. s ∈ set (snd (Ana t))) (args t)) N’));
Ana_cl = λFP TI.
close FP (λM. (M@snd_Ana M M TI));
TI_cl = λFP TI.
close FP (λM. (M@filter (λt. ¬sy M TI t)
(concat (map (λm. concat (map (λ(a,b). 〈a -- b〉〈m〉) TI)) M))));
Ana_cl’ = λFP TI.
let N = λM. comp_timpl_closure_list (filter (λt. ∃ k∈set (fst (Ana t)). ¬sy M TI k) M) TI
in close FP (λM. M@snd_Ana (N M) M TI);
∆ = λS. transaction_check_comp (FP’ S) (OCC’ S) (TI’ S);
result = λS T δ.
let not_fresh = λx. x /∈ set (transaction_fresh T);
xs = filter not_fresh (fv_listsst (unlabel (transaction_strand T)));
u = λδ x. absdbupd (unlabel (transaction_strand T)) x (δ x)
in (remdups (filter (λt. ¬sy (FP’ S) (TI’ S) t)
(map (λt. the_msg t · (absc ◦ u δ))
(filter is_Send (unlabel (transaction_send T))))),
remdups (filter (λs. fst s 6= snd s) (map (λx. (δ x, u δ x)) xs)));
update_state = λS. if list_ex (λt. is_Fun t ∧ is_Attack (the_Fun t)) (FP’ S) then S
else let results = map (λT. map (λδ. result S T (abs_substs_fun δ)) (∆ S T)) P;
newtrace_flt = (λn. let x = results ! n; y = map fst x; z = map snd x
in set (concat y) - set (FP’ S) 6= {} ∨ set (concat z) - set (TI’ S) 6= {});
trace =
if enable_traces
then trace’ S@[filter newtrace_flt [0..<length results]]
else [];
U = concat results;
V = ((remdups (concat (map fst U)@FP’ S),
remdups (filter (λx. fst x 6= snd x) (concat (map snd U)@TI’ S))),
trace);
W = ((Ana_cl (TI_cl (FP’ V) (TI’ V)) (TI’ V),
trancl_minus_refl (TI’ V)),
trace’ V)
in if ¬equal_states W S then W
else ((Ana_cl’ (FP’ W) (TI’ W), TI’ W), trace’ W);
S = ((λh. case n of None ⇒ while (λS. ¬equal_states S (h S)) h | Some m ⇒ h ^^ m)
update_state S0)
in ((FP’ S, OCC’ S, TI’ S), trace’ S)"
definition compute_fixpoint_fun where
"compute_fixpoint_fun P ≡ fst (compute_fixpoint_fun’ P None False (([],[]),[]))"
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end
2.6.6 Locales for Protocols Proven Secure through Fixed-Point Coverage
type synonym (’f,’a,’s) fixpoint_triple =
"(’f,’a,’s) prot_term list × ’s set list × (’s set × ’s set) list"
context stateful_protocol_model
begin
definition "attack_notin_fixpoint (FPT::(’fun,’atom,’sets) fixpoint_triple) ≡
list_all (λt. ∀ f ∈ funs_term t. ¬is_Attack f) (fst FPT)"
definition "protocol_covered_by_fixpoint (FPT::(’fun,’atom,’sets) fixpoint_triple) P ≡
let (FP, OCC, TI) = FPT
in list_all (transaction_check FP OCC TI) P"
definition "analyzed_fixpoint (FPT::(’fun,’atom,’sets) fixpoint_triple) ≡
let (FP, _, TI) = FPT
in analyzed_closed_mod_timpls FP TI"
definition "wellformed_protocol’ (P::(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot) N ≡
list_all admissible_transaction P ∧
has_all_wt_instances_of Γ (
⋃
T ∈ set P. trms_transaction T) (set N) ∧
comp_tfrset arity Ana Γ N ∧
list_all (λT. list_all (comp_tfrsstp Γ Pair) (unlabel (transaction_strand T))) P"
definition "wellformed_protocol (P::(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot) ≡
let f = λM. remdups (concat (map subterms_list M@map (fst ◦ Ana) M));
N0 = remdups (concat (map (trms_listsst ◦ unlabel ◦ transaction_strand) P));
N = while (λA. set (f A) 6= set A) f N0
in wellformed_protocol’ P N"
definition "wellformed_fixpoint (FPT::(’fun,’atom,’sets) fixpoint_triple) ≡
let (FP, OCC, TI) = FPT; OCC’ = set OCC
in list_all (λt. wf trm’ arity t ∧ fv t = {}) FP ∧
list_all (λa. a ∈ OCC’) (map snd TI) ∧
list_all (λ(a,b). list_all (λ(c,d). b = c ∧ a 6= d −→ List.member TI (a,d)) TI) TI ∧
list_all (λp. fst p 6= snd p) TI ∧
list_all (λt. ∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ the_Abs f ∈ OCC’) FP"
lemma protocol_covered_by_fixpoint_I1[intro]:
assumes "list_all (protocol_covered_by_fixpoint FPT) P"
shows "protocol_covered_by_fixpoint FPT (concat P)"
using assms by (auto simp add: protocol_covered_by_fixpoint_def list_all_iff)
lemma protocol_covered_by_fixpoint_I2[intro]:
assumes "protocol_covered_by_fixpoint FPT P1"
and "protocol_covered_by_fixpoint FPT P2"
shows "protocol_covered_by_fixpoint FPT (P1@P2)"
using assms by (auto simp add: protocol_covered_by_fixpoint_def)
lemma protocol_covered_by_fixpoint_I3[intro]:
assumes "∀ T ∈ set P. ∀ δ::(’fun,’atom,’sets) prot_var ⇒ ’sets set.
transaction_check_pre FP TI T δ −→ transaction_check_post FP TI T δ"
shows "protocol_covered_by_fixpoint (FP,OCC,TI) P"
using assms
unfolding protocol_covered_by_fixpoint_def transaction_check_def transaction_check_comp_def









fixes P::"(’fun, ’atom, ’sets, ’lbl) prot_transaction list"
and FP_OCC_TI:: "(’fun, ’atom, ’sets) fixpoint_triple"
assumes attack_notin_fixpoint: "attack_notin_fixpoint FP_OCC_TI"
and transactions_covered: "protocol_covered_by_fixpoint FP_OCC_TI P"
and analyzed_fixpoint: "analyzed_fixpoint FP_OCC_TI"
and wellformed_protocol: "wellformed_protocol’ P N"
and wellformed_fixpoint: "wellformed_fixpoint FP_OCC_TI"
shows "∀A ∈ reachable_constraints P. @ I. constraint_model I (A@[(l, send〈attack〈n〉〉)])"
proof -
define FP where "FP ≡ let (FP,_,_) = FP_OCC_TI in FP"
define OCC where "OCC ≡ let (_,OCC,_) = FP_OCC_TI in OCC"
define TI where "TI ≡ let (_,_,TI) = FP_OCC_TI in TI"
have attack_notin_FP: "attack〈n〉 /∈ set FP"
using attack_notin_fixpoint[unfolded attack_notin_fixpoint_def]
unfolding list_all_iff FP_def by force
have 1: "∀ (a,b) ∈ set TI. ∀ (c,d) ∈ set TI. b = c ∧ a 6= d −→ (a,d) ∈ set TI"
using wellformed_fixpoint
unfolding wellformed_fixpoint_def wf trms_code[symmetric] Let_def TI_def
list_all_iff member_def case_prod_unfold
by auto
have 0: "wf trms (set FP)"
and 2: "∀ (a,b) ∈ set TI. a 6= b"
and 3: "snd ‘ set TI ⊆ set OCC"
and 4: "∀ t ∈ set FP. ∀ f ∈ funs_term t. is_Abs f −→ f ∈ Abs ‘ set OCC"
and 5: "ground (set FP)"
using wellformed_fixpoint
unfolding wellformed_fixpoint_def wf trm_code[symmetric] is_Abs_def the_Abs_def
list_all_iff Let_def case_prod_unfold set_map FP_def OCC_def TI_def
by (fast, fast, blast, fastforce, simp)
have 8: "finite (set N)"
and 9: "has_all_wt_instances_of Γ (
⋃
T ∈ set P. trms_transaction T) (set N)"
and 10: "tfrset (set N)"
and 11: "∀ T ∈ set P. list_all tfrsstp (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
and 12: "∀ T ∈ set P. admissible_transaction T"
using wellformed_protocol tfrset_if_comp_tfrset[of N]
unfolding Let_def list_all_iff wellformed_protocol_def wellformed_protocol’_def
wf trms_code[symmetric] tfrsstp_is_comp_tfrsstp[symmetric]
by fast+
have 13: "wf trms (set N)"
using wellformed_protocol
unfolding wellformed_protocol_def wellformed_protocol’_def
wf trm_code[symmetric] comp_tfrset_def list_all_iff
finite_SMP_representation_def
by blast
note TI0 = trancl_eqI’[OF 1 2]





note FP0 = this 0 5
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note OCC0 = funs_term_OCC_TI_subset(1)[OF 4 3]
timpl_closure_set_supset’[OF funs_term_OCC_TI_subset(2)[OF 4 3]]
note M0 = 9 8 10 13
have "list_all (transaction_check FP OCC TI) P"
using transactions_covered[unfolded protocol_covered_by_fixpoint_def]
unfolding FP_def OCC_def TI_def
by force
note P0 = 12 11 this attack_notin_FP




pm: stateful_protocol_model arityf aritys publicf Anaf Γf label_witness1 label_witness2
for arityf::"’fun ⇒ nat"
and aritys::"’sets ⇒ nat"
and publicf::"’fun ⇒ bool"
and Anaf::"’fun ⇒ (((’fun,’atom::finite,’sets) prot_fun, nat) term list × nat list)"




fixes P::"(’fun, ’atom, ’sets, ’lbl) prot_transaction list"
and FP_OCC_TI:: "(’fun, ’atom, ’sets) fixpoint_triple"
and P_SMP::"(’fun, ’atom, ’sets) prot_term list"
assumes attack_notin_fixpoint: "pm.attack_notin_fixpoint FP_OCC_TI"
and transactions_covered: "pm.protocol_covered_by_fixpoint FP_OCC_TI P"
and analyzed_fixpoint: "pm.analyzed_fixpoint FP_OCC_TI"
and wellformed_protocol: "pm.wellformed_protocol’ P P_SMP"
and wellformed_fixpoint: "pm.wellformed_fixpoint FP_OCC_TI"
begin
theorem protocol_secure:






pm: stateful_protocol_model arityf aritys publicf Anaf Γf label_witness1 label_witness2
for arityf::"’fun ⇒ nat"
and aritys::"’sets ⇒ nat"
and publicf::"’fun ⇒ bool"
and Anaf::"’fun ⇒ (((’fun,’atom::finite,’sets) prot_fun, nat) term list × nat list)"




fixes P::"(’fun, ’atom, ’sets, ’lbl) prot_transaction list"
and FP_OCC_TI:: "(’fun, ’atom, ’sets) fixpoint_triple"
assumes attack_notin_fixpoint’: "pm.attack_notin_fixpoint FP_OCC_TI"
and transactions_covered’: "pm.protocol_covered_by_fixpoint FP_OCC_TI P"
and analyzed_fixpoint’: "pm.analyzed_fixpoint FP_OCC_TI"
and wellformed_protocol’: "pm.wellformed_protocol P"
and wellformed_fixpoint’: "pm.wellformed_fixpoint FP_OCC_TI"
begin
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sublocale secure_stateful_protocol
arityf aritys publicf Anaf Γf label_witness1 label_witness2 P
FP_OCC_TI
"let f = λM. remdups (concat (map subterms_list M@map (fst ◦ pm.Ana) M));
N0 = remdups (concat (map (trms_listsst ◦ unlabel ◦ transaction_strand) P))
in while (λA. set (f A) 6= set A) f N0"
apply unfold_locales
using attack_notin_fixpoint’ transactions_covered’ analyzed_fixpoint’
wellformed_protocol’[unfolded pm.wellformed_protocol_def Let_def] wellformed_fixpoint’
unfolding Let_def by blast+
end
locale secure_stateful_protocol’’ =
pm: stateful_protocol_model arityf aritys publicf Anaf Γf label_witness1 label_witness2
for arityf::"’fun ⇒ nat"
and aritys::"’sets ⇒ nat"
and publicf::"’fun ⇒ bool"
and Anaf::"’fun ⇒ (((’fun,’atom::finite,’sets) prot_fun, nat) term list × nat list)"




fixes P::"(’fun, ’atom, ’sets, ’lbl) prot_transaction list"
assumes checks: "let FPT = pm.compute_fixpoint_fun P
in pm.attack_notin_fixpoint FPT ∧ pm.protocol_covered_by_fixpoint FPT P ∧
pm.analyzed_fixpoint FPT ∧ pm.wellformed_protocol P ∧ pm.wellformed_fixpoint FPT"
begin
sublocale secure_stateful_protocol’
arityf aritys publicf Anaf Γf label_witness1 label_witness2 P "pm.compute_fixpoint_fun P"
using checks[unfolded Let_def case_prod_unfold] by unfold_locales meson+
end
locale secure_stateful_protocol’’’ =
pm: stateful_protocol_model arityf aritys publicf Anaf Γf label_witness1 label_witness2
for arityf::"’fun ⇒ nat"
and aritys::"’sets ⇒ nat"
and publicf::"’fun ⇒ bool"
and Anaf::"’fun ⇒ (((’fun,’atom::finite,’sets) prot_fun, nat) term list × nat list)"




fixes P::"(’fun, ’atom, ’sets, ’lbl) prot_transaction list"
and FP_OCC_TI:: "(’fun, ’atom, ’sets) fixpoint_triple"
and P_SMP::"(’fun, ’atom, ’sets) prot_term list"
assumes checks’: "let P’ = P; FPT = FP_OCC_TI; P’_SMP = P_SMP
in pm.attack_notin_fixpoint FPT ∧
pm.protocol_covered_by_fixpoint FPT P’ ∧
pm.analyzed_fixpoint FPT ∧




arityf aritys publicf Anaf Γf label_witness1 label_witness2 P FP_OCC_TI P_SMP
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pm: stateful_protocol_model arityf aritys publicf Anaf Γf label_witness1 label_witness2
for arityf::"’fun ⇒ nat"
and aritys::"’sets ⇒ nat"
and publicf::"’fun ⇒ bool"
and Anaf::"’fun ⇒ (((’fun,’atom::finite,’sets) prot_fun, nat) term list × nat list)"




fixes P::"(’fun, ’atom, ’sets, ’lbl) prot_transaction list"
and FP_OCC_TI:: "(’fun, ’atom, ’sets) fixpoint_triple"
assumes checks’’: "let P’ = P; FPT = FP_OCC_TI
in pm.attack_notin_fixpoint FPT ∧






arityf aritys publicf Anaf Γf label_witness1 label_witness2 P FP_OCC_TI
using checks’’[unfolded Let_def case_prod_unfold] by unfold_locales meson+
end




"wellformed_composable_protocols (P::(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot list) N ≡
let
Ts = concat P;
steps = concat (map transaction_strand Ts);
MP0 =
⋃
T ∈ set Ts. trms_transaction T ∪ pair’ Pair ‘ setops_transaction T
in
list_all (wf trm’ arity) N ∧
has_all_wt_instances_of Γ MP0 (set N) ∧
comp_tfrset arity Ana Γ N ∧
list_all (comp_tfrsstp Γ Pair ◦ snd) steps ∧
list_all (λT. wellformed_transaction T) Ts ∧
list_all (λT. wf trms’ arity (trms_transaction T)) Ts ∧
list_all (λT. list_all (λx. Γv x = TAtom Value) (transaction_fresh T)) Ts"
definition composable_protocols where
"composable_protocols (P::(’fun,’atom,’sets,’lbl) prot list) Ms S ≡
let
Ts = concat P;
steps = concat (map transaction_strand Ts);
MP0 =
⋃
T ∈ set Ts. trms_transaction T ∪ pair’ Pair ‘ setops_transaction T;
M_fun = (λl. case find ((=) l ◦ fst) Ms of Some M ⇒ snd M | None ⇒ [])
in comp_par_comp lsst public arity Ana Γ Pair steps M_fun S"
lemma composable_protocols_par_comp_constr:
fixes S f
defines "f ≡ λM. {t · δ | t δ. t ∈ M ∧ wtsubst δ ∧ wf trms (subst_range δ) ∧ fv (t · δ) = {}}"
and "Sec ≡ (f (set S)) - {m. intruder_synth {} m}"
assumes Ps_pc: "wellformed_composable_protocols Ps N" "composable_protocols Ps Ms S"
shows "∀A ∈ reachable_constraints (concat Ps). ∀ I. constraint_model I A −→
(∃ Iτ. welltyped_constraint_model Iτ A ∧
((∀ n. welltyped_constraint_model Iτ (proj n A)) ∨
(∃A’. prefix A’ A ∧ strand_leaks lsst A’ Sec Iτ)))"
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( is "∀A ∈ _. ∀ _. _ −→ ?Q A I")
proof (intro allI ballI impI)
fix A I
assume A: "A ∈ reachable_constraints (concat Ps)" and I: "constraint_model I A"
let ?Ts = "concat Ps"
let ?steps = "concat (map transaction_strand ?Ts)"
let ?MP0 = "
⋃
T ∈ set ?Ts. trms_transaction T ∪ pair’ Pair ‘ setops_transaction T"
let ?M_fun = "λl. case find ((=) l ◦ fst) Ms of Some M ⇒ snd M | None ⇒ []"
have M:
"has_all_wt_instances_of Γ ?MP0 (set N)"
"finite (set N)" "tfrset (set N)" "wf trms (set N)"
using Ps_pc tfrset_if_comp_tfrset[of N]
unfolding composable_protocols_def wellformed_composable_protocols_def
Let_def list_all_iff wf trm_code[symmetric]
by fast+
have P:
"∀ T ∈ set ?Ts. wellformed_transaction T"
"∀ T ∈ set ?Ts. wf trms’ arity (trms_transaction T)"
"∀ T ∈ set ?Ts. ∀ x ∈ set (transaction_fresh T). Γv x = TAtom Value"
"∀ T ∈ set ?Ts. list_all tfrsstp (unlabel (transaction_strand T))"
"comp_par_comp lsst public arity Ana Γ Pair ?steps ?M_fun S"
using Ps_pc tfrsstp_is_comp_tfrsstp
unfolding wellformed_composable_protocols_def composable_protocols_def
Let_def list_all_iff unlabel_def wf trms_code[symmetric]
by (meson, meson, meson, fastforce, blast)
show "?Q A I"
using reachable_constraints_par_comp_constr[OF M P A I]






3 Trac Support and Automation













(rule UNIV_eq_I; (subst insert_iff)+; subst empty_iff; smt exhausts)+
method type_class_instance =
(intro_classes; auto simp add: type_class_instance_lemmata)
method protocol_model_subgoal =




































list_all_iff Let_def case_prod_unfold Product_Type.fst_conv Product_Type.snd_conv)
end



















datatype cMsg = cVar "string * string"
| cConst string




fun list_find p ts =
let
fun aux _ [] = NONE
| aux n (t::ts) =
if p t
then SOME (t,n)




fun map_prod f (a,b) = (f a, f b)
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fun list_product [] = [[]]
| list_product (xs::xss) =
List.concat (map (fn x => map (fn ys => x::ys) (list_product xss)) xs)
fun list_toString elem_toString xs =
let
fun aux [] = ""
| aux [x] = elem_toString x
| aux (x::y::xs) = elem_toString x ^ ", " ^ aux (y::xs)
in
"[" ^ aux xs ^ "]"
end
val list_to_str = list_toString (fn x => x)
fun list_triangle_product _ [] = []
| list_triangle_product f (x::xs) = map (f x) xs@list_triangle_product f xs
fun list_subseqs [] = [[]]
| list_subseqs (x::xs) = let val xss = list_subseqs xs in map (cons x) xss@xss end
fun list_intersect xs ys =
List.exists (fn x => member (op =) ys x) xs orelse
List.exists (fn y => member (op =) xs y) ys
fun list_partitions xs constrs =
let
val peq = eq_set (op =)
val pseq = eq_set peq
val psseq = eq_set pseq
fun illegal p q =
let
val pq = union (op =) p q




fun merges _ [] = []
| merges q (p::ps) =
if illegal p q then map (cons p) (merges q ps)
else (union (op =) p q::ps)::(map (cons p) (merges q ps))
fun merges_all [] = []
| merges_all (p::ps) = merges p ps@map (cons p) (merges_all ps)
fun step pss = fold (union pseq) (map merges_all pss) []
fun loop pss pssprev =
let val pss’ = step pss
in if psseq (pss,pss’) then pssprev else loop pss’ (union pseq pss’ pssprev)
end




fun mk_unique [] = []
| mk_unique (x::xs) = x::mk_unique(List.filter (fn y => y <> x) xs)
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fun list_rm_pair sel l x = filter (fn e => sel e <> x) l
fun list_minus list_rm l m = List.foldl (fn (a,b) => list_rm b a) l m
fun list_upto n =
let











type TypeDecl = string * string
datatype Msg = Var of string
| Const of string
| Fun of string * Msg list
| Attack
datatype VarType = EnumType of string
| ValueType
| Untyped
datatype cMsg = cVar of string * VarType
| cConst of string
| cFun of string * cMsg list
| cAttack
| cSet of string * cMsg list
| cAbs of (string * string list) list
| cOccursFact of cMsg
| cPrivFunSec
| cEnum of string
fun type_of et vt n =
case List.find (fn (v,_) => v = n) et of
SOME (_,t) => EnumType t
| NONE =>
if List.exists (fn v => v = n) vt
then ValueType
else Untyped
fun certifyMsg et vt (Var n) = cVar (n, type_of et vt n)
| certifyMsg _ _ (Const c) = cConst c
| certifyMsg et vt (Fun (f, ts)) = cFun (f, map (certifyMsg et vt) ts)
| certifyMsg _ _ Attack = cAttack
fun mk_Value_cVar x = cVar (x,ValueType)
val fv_Msg =
let
fun aux (Var x) = [x]
| aux (Fun (_,ts)) = List.concat (map aux ts)








fun aux (cVar x) = [x]
| aux (cFun (_,ts)) = List.concat (map aux ts)
| aux (cSet (_,ts)) = List.concat (map aux ts)
| aux (cOccursFact bs) = aux bs




fun subst_apply’ (delta:(string * VarType) -> cMsg) (t:cMsg) =
case t of
cVar x => delta x
| cFun (f,ts) => cFun (f, map (subst_apply’ delta) ts)
| cSet (s,ts) => cSet (s, map (subst_apply’ delta) ts)
| cOccursFact bs => cOccursFact (subst_apply’ delta bs)
| c => c
fun subst_apply (delta:(string * cMsg) list) =
subst_apply’ (fn (n,tau) => (
case List.find (fn x => fst x = n) delta of
SOME x => snd x








Consts of string list
| Union of string list
fun is_Consts t = case t of Consts _ => true | _ => false
fun the_Consts t = case t of Consts cs => cs | _ => error "Consts"
type type_spec = (string * type_spec_elem) list
type set_spec = (string * string)
fun extract_Consts (tspec:type_spec) =
(List.concat o map the_Consts o filter is_Consts o map snd) tspec
type funT = (string * string)
type fun_spec = {private: funT list, public: funT list}
type ruleT = (string * string list) * Trac_Term.Msg list * string list
type anaT = ruleT list
datatype prot_label = LabelN | LabelS
datatype action = RECEIVE of Trac_Term.Msg
| SEND of Trac_Term.Msg
| IN of Trac_Term.Msg * (string * Trac_Term.Msg list)
| NOTIN of Trac_Term.Msg * (string * Trac_Term.Msg list)
| NOTINANY of Trac_Term.Msg * string
| INSERT of Trac_Term.Msg * (string * Trac_Term.Msg list)
| DELETE of Trac_Term.Msg * (string * Trac_Term.Msg list)
| NEW of string
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| ATTACK
datatype cAction = cReceive of Trac_Term.cMsg
| cSend of Trac_Term.cMsg
| cInequality of Trac_Term.cMsg * Trac_Term.cMsg
| cInSet of Trac_Term.cMsg * Trac_Term.cMsg
| cNotInSet of Trac_Term.cMsg * Trac_Term.cMsg
| cNotInAny of Trac_Term.cMsg * string
| cInsert of Trac_Term.cMsg * Trac_Term.cMsg
| cDelete of Trac_Term.cMsg * Trac_Term.cMsg
| cNew of string
| cAssertAttack
type transaction_name = string * (string * string) list * (string * string) list
type transaction={transaction:transaction_name,actions:(prot_label * action) list}
type cTransaction={
transaction:transaction_name,
receive_actions:(prot_label * cAction) list,
checksingle_actions:(prot_label * cAction) list,
checkall_actions:(prot_label * cAction) list,
fresh_actions:(prot_label * cAction) list,
update_actions:(prot_label * cAction) list,
send_actions:(prot_label * cAction) list,
attack_actions:(prot_label * cAction) list}
fun mkTransaction transaction actions = {transaction=transaction,
actions=actions}:transaction
fun is_RECEIVE a = case a of RECEIVE _ => true | _ => false
fun is_SEND a = case a of SEND _ => true | _ => false
fun is_IN a = case a of IN _ => true | _ => false
fun is_NOTIN a = case a of NOTIN _ => true | _ => false
fun is_NOTINANY a = case a of NOTINANY _ => true | _ => false
fun is_INSERT a = case a of INSERT _ => true | _ => false
fun is_DELETE a = case a of DELETE _ => true | _ => false
fun is_NEW a = case a of NEW _ => true | _ => false
fun is_ATTACK a = case a of ATTACK => true | _ => false
fun the_RECEIVE a = case a of RECEIVE t => t | _ => error "RECEIVE"
fun the_SEND a = case a of SEND t => t | _ => error "SEND"
fun the_IN a = case a of IN t => t | _ => error "IN"
fun the_NOTIN a = case a of NOTIN t => t | _ => error "NOTIN"
fun the_NOTINANY a = case a of NOTINANY t => t | _ => error "NOTINANY"
fun the_INSERT a = case a of INSERT t => t | _ => error "INSERT"
fun the_DELETE a = case a of DELETE t => t | _ => error "DELETE"
fun the_NEW a = case a of NEW t => t | _ => error "FRESH"
fun maybe_the_RECEIVE a = case a of RECEIVE t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun maybe_the_SEND a = case a of SEND t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun maybe_the_IN a = case a of IN t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun maybe_the_NOTIN a = case a of NOTIN t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun maybe_the_NOTINANY a = case a of NOTINANY t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun maybe_the_INSERT a = case a of INSERT t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun maybe_the_DELETE a = case a of DELETE t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun maybe_the_NEW a = case a of NEW t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun is_Receive a = case a of cReceive _ => true | _ => false
fun is_Send a = case a of cSend _ => true | _ => false
fun is_Inequality a = case a of cInequality _ => true | _ => false
fun is_InSet a = case a of cInSet _ => true | _ => false
fun is_NotInSet a = case a of cNotInSet _ => true | _ => false
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fun is_NotInAny a = case a of cNotInAny _ => true | _ => false
fun is_Insert a = case a of cInsert _ => true | _ => false
fun is_Delete a = case a of cDelete _ => true | _ => false
fun is_Fresh a = case a of cNew _ => true | _ => false
fun is_Attack a = case a of cAssertAttack => true | _ => false
fun the_Receive a = case a of cReceive t => t | _ => error "Receive"
fun the_Send a = case a of cSend t => t | _ => error "Send"
fun the_Inequality a = case a of cInequality t => t | _ => error "Inequality"
fun the_InSet a = case a of cInSet t => t | _ => error "InSet"
fun the_NotInSet a = case a of cNotInSet t => t | _ => error "NotInSet"
fun the_NotInAny a = case a of cNotInAny t => t | _ => error "NotInAny"
fun the_Insert a = case a of cInsert t => t | _ => error "Insert"
fun the_Delete a = case a of cDelete t => t | _ => error "Delete"
fun the_Fresh a = case a of cNew t => t | _ => error "New"
fun maybe_the_Receive a = case a of cReceive t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun maybe_the_Send a = case a of cSend t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun maybe_the_Inequality a = case a of cInequality t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun maybe_the_InSet a = case a of cInSet t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun maybe_the_NotInSet a = case a of cNotInSet t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun maybe_the_NotInAny a = case a of cNotInAny t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun maybe_the_Insert a = case a of cInsert t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun maybe_the_Delete a = case a of cDelete t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun maybe_the_Fresh a = case a of cNew t => SOME t | _ => NONE
fun certifyAction et vt (lbl,SEND t) = (lbl,cSend (Trac_Term.certifyMsg et vt t))
| certifyAction et vt (lbl,RECEIVE t) = (lbl,cReceive (Trac_Term.certifyMsg et vt t))
| certifyAction et vt (lbl,IN (x,(s,ps))) = (lbl,cInSet
(Trac_Term.certifyMsg et vt x, Trac_Term.cSet (s, map (Trac_Term.certifyMsg et vt) ps)))
| certifyAction et vt (lbl,NOTIN (x,(s,ps))) = (lbl,cNotInSet
(Trac_Term.certifyMsg et vt x, Trac_Term.cSet (s, map (Trac_Term.certifyMsg et vt) ps)))
| certifyAction et vt (lbl,NOTINANY (x,s)) = (lbl,cNotInAny (Trac_Term.certifyMsg et vt x, s))
| certifyAction et vt (lbl,INSERT (x,(s,ps))) = (lbl,cInsert
(Trac_Term.certifyMsg et vt x, Trac_Term.cSet (s, map (Trac_Term.certifyMsg et vt) ps)))
| certifyAction et vt (lbl,DELETE (x,(s,ps))) = (lbl,cDelete
(Trac_Term.certifyMsg et vt x, Trac_Term.cSet (s, map (Trac_Term.certifyMsg et vt) ps)))
| certifyAction _ _ (lbl,NEW x) = (lbl,cNew x)
| certifyAction _ _ (lbl,ATTACK) = (lbl,cAssertAttack)
fun certifyTransaction (tr:transaction) =
let
val mk_cOccurs = Trac_Term.cOccursFact
fun mk_Value_cVar x = Trac_Term.cVar (x,Trac_Term.ValueType)
fun mk_cInequality x y = cInequality (mk_Value_cVar x, mk_Value_cVar y)
val mk_cInequalities = list_triangle_product mk_cInequality
val fresh_vals = map_filter (maybe_the_NEW o snd) (#actions tr)
val decl_vars = map fst (#2 (#transaction tr))
val neq_constrs = #3 (#transaction tr)
val _ = if List.exists (fn x => List.exists (fn y => x = y) fresh_vals) decl_vars
orelse List.exists (fn x => List.exists (fn y => x = y) decl_vars) fresh_vals
then error "the fresh and the declared variables must not overlap"
else ()
val _ = case List.find (fn (x,y) => x = y) neq_constrs of
SOME (x,y) => error ("illegal inequality constraint: " ^ x ^ " != " ^ y)
| NONE => ()
val nonfresh_vals = map fst (filter (fn x => snd x = "value") (#2 (#transaction tr)))
val enum_vars = filter (fn x => snd x <> "value") (#2 (#transaction tr))
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fun lblS t = (LabelS,t)
val cactions = map (certifyAction enum_vars (nonfresh_vals@fresh_vals)) (#actions tr)
val nonfresh_occurs = map (lblS o cReceive o mk_cOccurs o mk_Value_cVar) nonfresh_vals
val receives = filter (is_Receive o snd) cactions
val value_inequalities = map lblS (mk_cInequalities nonfresh_vals)
val checksingles = filter (fn (_,a) => is_InSet a orelse is_NotInSet a) cactions
val checkalls = filter (is_NotInAny o snd) cactions
val updates = filter (fn (_,a) => is_Insert a orelse is_Delete a) cactions
val fresh = filter (is_Fresh o snd) cactions
val sends = filter (is_Send o snd) cactions
val fresh_occurs = map (lblS o cSend o mk_cOccurs o mk_Value_cVar) fresh_vals
val attack_signals = filter (is_Attack o snd) cactions
in









fun subst_apply_action (delta:(string * Trac_Term.cMsg) list) (lbl:prot_label,a:cAction) =
let
val apply = Trac_Term.subst_apply delta
in
case a of
cReceive t => (lbl,cReceive (apply t))
| cSend t => (lbl,cSend (apply t))
| cInequality (x,y) => (lbl,cInequality (apply x, apply y))
| cInSet (x,s) => (lbl,cInSet (apply x, apply s))
| cNotInSet (x,s) => (lbl,cNotInSet (apply x, apply s))
| cNotInAny (x,s) => (lbl,cNotInAny (apply x, s))
| cInsert (x,s) => (lbl,cInsert (apply x, apply s))
| cDelete (x,s) => (lbl,cDelete (apply x, apply s))
| cNew x => (lbl,cNew x)
| cAssertAttack => (lbl,cAssertAttack)
end
fun subst_apply_actions delta =
map (subst_apply_action delta)






,transaction_spec:(string option * transaction list) list
,fixed_point: (Trac_Term.cMsg list * (string * string list) list list *
((string * string list) list * (string * string list) list) list) option
}
exception TypeError





3.3 Abstract Syntax for Trac Terms (trac term)
fun update_fun_public (fun_spec:fun_spec) public =
({public = public
,private = #private fun_spec
}):fun_spec
fun update_fun_private (fun_spec:fun_spec) private =












fun update_name (protocol_spec:protocol) name =
({name = name
,type_spec = #type_spec protocol_spec
,set_spec = #set_spec protocol_spec
,function_spec = #function_spec protocol_spec
,analysis_spec = #analysis_spec protocol_spec
,transaction_spec = #transaction_spec protocol_spec
,fixed_point = #fixed_point protocol_spec
}):protocol
fun update_sets (protocol_spec:protocol) set_spec =
({name = #name protocol_spec
,type_spec = #type_spec protocol_spec
,set_spec =
if has_duplicates (op =) (map fst set_spec)
then error "Multiple declarations of the same set family"
else set_spec
,function_spec = #function_spec protocol_spec
,analysis_spec = #analysis_spec protocol_spec
,transaction_spec = #transaction_spec protocol_spec
,fixed_point = #fixed_point protocol_spec
}):protocol
fun update_type_spec (protocol_spec:protocol) type_spec =
({name = #name protocol_spec
,type_spec =
if has_duplicates (op =) (map fst type_spec)
then error "Multiple declarations of the same enumeration type"
else type_spec
,set_spec = #set_spec protocol_spec
,function_spec = #function_spec protocol_spec
,analysis_spec = #analysis_spec protocol_spec
,transaction_spec = #transaction_spec protocol_spec
,fixed_point = #fixed_point protocol_spec
}):protocol
fun update_functions (protocol_spec:protocol) function_spec =
({name = #name protocol_spec
,type_spec = #type_spec protocol_spec
,set_spec = #set_spec protocol_spec
,function_spec = case function_spec of
SOME fs =>
if has_duplicates (op =) (map fst ((#public fs)@(#private fs)))
then error "Multiple declarations of the same constant or function symbol"
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else SOME fs
| NONE => NONE
,analysis_spec = #analysis_spec protocol_spec
,transaction_spec = #transaction_spec protocol_spec
,fixed_point = #fixed_point protocol_spec
}):protocol
fun update_analysis (protocol_spec:protocol) analysis_spec =
({name = #name protocol_spec
,type_spec = #type_spec protocol_spec
,set_spec = #set_spec protocol_spec
,function_spec = #function_spec protocol_spec
,analysis_spec =
if has_duplicates (op =) (map (#1 o #1) analysis_spec)
then error "Multiple analysis rules declared for the same function symbol"
else if List.exists (has_duplicates (op =)) (map (#2 o #1) analysis_spec)
then error "The heads of the analysis rules must be linear terms"
else if let fun f ((_,xs),ts,ys) =
subset (op =) (ys@List.concat (map Trac_Term.fv_Msg ts), xs)
in List.exists (not o f) analysis_spec end
then error "Variables occurring in the body of an analysis rule should also occur in its head"
else analysis_spec
,transaction_spec = #transaction_spec protocol_spec
,fixed_point = #fixed_point protocol_spec
}):protocol
fun update_transactions (prot_name:string option) (protocol_spec:protocol) transaction_spec =
({name = #name protocol_spec
,type_spec = #type_spec protocol_spec
,set_spec = #set_spec protocol_spec
,function_spec = #function_spec protocol_spec
,analysis_spec = #analysis_spec protocol_spec
,transaction_spec = (prot_name,transaction_spec)::(#transaction_spec protocol_spec)
,fixed_point = #fixed_point protocol_spec
}):protocol
fun update_fixed_point (protocol_spec:protocol) fixed_point =
({name = #name protocol_spec
,type_spec = #type_spec protocol_spec
,set_spec = #set_spec protocol_spec
,function_spec = #function_spec protocol_spec
,analysis_spec = #analysis_spec protocol_spec
















3.4 Parser for Trac FP definitions (trac fp parser)
ML〈
structure TracFpParser : sig
val parse_file: string -> (Trac_Term.cMsg) list
val parse_str: string -> (Trac_Term.cMsg) list
(* val term_of_trac: Trac_Term.cMsg -> term *)





TracLrValsFun(structure Token = LrParser.Token)
structure TracLex =
TracLexFun(structure Tokens = TracLrVals.Tokens)
structure TracParser =
Join(structure LrParser = LrParser
structure ParserData = TracLrVals.ParserData
structure Lex = TracLex)
fun invoke lexstream =
let fun print_error (s,i:(int * int * int),_) =
TextIO.output(TextIO.stdOut,
"Error, line .... " ^ (Int.toString (#1 i)) ^"."^(Int.toString (#2 i ))^ ", " ^ s ^ "\n")
in TracParser.parse(0,lexstream,print_error,())
end
fun parse_fp lexer = let
val dummyEOF = TracLrVals.Tokens.EOF((0,0,0),(0,0,0))
fun certify (m,t) = Trac_Term.certifyMsg t [] m
fun loop lexer =
let
val _ = (TracLex.UserDeclarations.pos := (0,0,0);())
val (res,lexer) = invoke lexer
val (nextToken,lexer) = TracParser.Stream.get lexer
in if TracParser.sameToken(nextToken,dummyEOF) then ((),res)
else loop lexer
end
in map certify (#2(loop lexer))
end
fun parse_file tracFile = let
val infile = TextIO.openIn tracFile
val lexer = TracParser.makeLexer (fn _ => case ((TextIO.inputLine) infile) of
SOME s => s




fun parse_str trac_fp_str = let
val parsed = Unsynchronized.ref false
fun input_string _ = if !parsed then "" else (parsed := true ;trac_fp_str)




fun attack fp = List.exists (fn e => e = cAttack) fp
(* fun term_of_trac (Trac_Term.cVar (n,t)) = @{const "cVar"}$(HOLogic.mk_tuple[HOLogic.mk_string n,
HOLogic.mk_string t])
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| term_of_trac (Trac_Term.cConst n) = @{const "cConst"}$HOLogic.mk_string n
| term_of_trac (Trac_Term.cFun (n,l)) = @{const "cFun"}
$(HOLogic.mk_tuple[HOLogic.mk_string n, HOLogic.mk_list @{typ "cMsg"}














structure TracProtocolParser : sig
val parse_file: string -> TracProtocol.protocol




TracTransactionLrValsFun(structure Token = LrParser.Token)
structure TracLex =
TracTransactionLexFun(structure Tokens = TracLrVals.Tokens)
structure TracParser =
Join(structure LrParser = LrParser
structure ParserData = TracLrVals.ParserData
structure Lex = TracLex)
fun invoke lexstream =
let fun print_error (s,i:(int * int * int),_) =
error("Error, line .... " ^ (Int.toString (#1 i)) ^"."^(Int.toString (#2 i ))^ ", " ^ s ^ "\n")
in TracParser.parse(0,lexstream,print_error,())
end
fun parse_fp lexer = let
val dummyEOF = TracLrVals.Tokens.EOF((0,0,0),(0,0,0))
fun loop lexer =
let
val _ = (TracLex.UserDeclarations.pos := (0,0,0);())
val (res,lexer) = invoke lexer
val (nextToken,lexer) = TracParser.Stream.get lexer





fun parse_file tracFile =
let
val infile = TextIO.openIn tracFile
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val lexer = TracParser.makeLexer (fn _ => case ((TextIO.inputLine) infile) of
SOME s => s
| NONE => "")
in
parse_fp lexer
handle LrParser.ParseError => TracProtocol.empty
end
fun parse_str str =
let
val parsed = Unsynchronized.ref false
fun input_string _ = if !parsed then "" else (parsed := true ;str)
val lexer = TracParser.makeLexer input_string
in
parse_fp lexer













and "trac_import" :: thy_decl
and "trac_trac" :: thy_decl
and "trac_import_trac" :: thy_decl
and "protocol_model_setup" :: thy_decl
and "protocol_security_proof" :: thy_decl
and "manual_protocol_model_setup" :: thy_decl
and "manual_protocol_security_proof" :: thy_decl
and "compute_fixpoint" :: thy_decl
and "compute_SMP" :: thy_decl
and "setup_protocol_model’" :: thy_decl
and "protocol_security_proof’" :: thy_decl
and "setup_protocol_checks" :: thy_decl
begin
ML 〈





fun protocol_model_interpretation_defs name =
let
fun f s =
(Binding.empty_atts:Attrib.binding, ((Binding.name s, NoSyn), name ^ "." ^ s))
in
(map f [
"public", "arity", "Ana", "Γ", "Γv", "timpls_transformable_to", "intruder_synth_mod_timpls",
"analyzed_closed_mod_timpls", "timpls_transformable_to’", "intruder_synth_mod_timpls’",
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"analyzed_closed_mod_timpls’", "admissible_transaction_terms", "admissible_transaction",








fun protocol_model_interpretation_params name =
let
fun f s = name ^ "_" ^ s
in
map SOME [f "arity", "λ_. 0", f "public", f "Ana", f "Γ", "0::nat", "1::nat"]
end
fun declare_thm_attr attribute name print lthy =
let
val arg = [(Facts.named name, [[Token.make_string (attribute, Position.none)]])]




fun declare_def_attr attribute name = declare_thm_attr attribute (name ^ "_def")
val declare_code_eqn = declare_def_attr "code"
val declare_protocol_check = declare_def_attr "protocol_checks"
fun declare_protocol_checks print =
declare_protocol_check "attack_notin_fixpoint" print #>
declare_protocol_check "protocol_covered_by_fixpoint" print #>
declare_protocol_check "analyzed_fixpoint" print #>
declare_protocol_check "wellformed_protocol’" print #>
declare_protocol_check "wellformed_protocol" print #>
declare_protocol_check "wellformed_fixpoint" print #>
declare_protocol_check "compute_fixpoint_fun" print
fun eval_define (name, raw_t) lthy =
let
val t = Code_Evaluation.dynamic_value_strict lthy (Syntax.read_term lthy raw_t)
val arg = ((Binding.name name, NoSyn), ((Binding.name (name ^ "_def"),[]), t))




fun eval_define_declare (name, raw_t) print =
eval_define (name, raw_t) ##> declare_code_eqn name print
val _ = Outer_Syntax.local_theory’ @{command_keyword "compute_fixpoint"}
"evaluate and define protocol fixpoint"
(Parse.name -- Parse.name >> (fn (protocol, fixpoint) => fn print =>
snd o eval_define_declare (fixpoint, "compute_fixpoint_fun " ^ protocol) print));
val _ = Outer_Syntax.local_theory’ @{command_keyword "compute_SMP"}
"evaluate and define a finite representation of the sub-message patterns of a protocol"
((Scan.optional (keyword 〈[ 〉 |-- Parse.name --| keyword 〈] 〉) "no_optimizations") --
Parse.name -- Parse.name >> (fn ((opt,protocol), smp) => fn print =>
let
val rmd = "List.remdups"
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val f = "Stateful_Strands.trms_listsst"
val g =
"(λT. " ^ f ^ " T@map (pair’ prot_fun.Pair) (Stateful_Strands.setops_listsst T))"
fun s trms =
"(" ^ rmd ^ " (List.concat (List.map (" ^ trms ^
" ◦ Labeled_Strands.unlabel ◦ transaction_strand) " ^ protocol ^ ")))"
val opt1 = "remove_superfluous_terms Γ"
val opt2 = "generalize_terms Γ is_Var"
val gsmp_opt =
"generalize_terms Γ (λt. is_Var t ∧ t 6= TAtom AttackType ∧ " ^
"t 6= TAtom SetType ∧ t 6= TAtom OccursSecType ∧ ¬is_Atom (the_Var t))"
val smp_fun = "SMP0 Ana Γ"
fun smp_fun’ opts =
"(λT. let T’ = (" ^ rmd ^ " ◦ " ^ opts ^ " ◦ " ^ smp_fun ^
") T in List.map (λt. t · Typed_Model.var_rename (Typed_Model.max_var_set " ^
"(Messages.fvset (set (T@T’))))) T’)"
val cmd =
if opt = "no_optimizations" then smp_fun ^ " " ^ s f
else if opt = "optimized"
then smp_fun’ (opt1 ^ " ◦ " ^ opt2) ^ " " ^ s f
else if opt = "GSMP"
then smp_fun’ (opt1 ^ " ◦ " ^ gsmp_opt) ^ " " ^ s g
else error ("Invalid option: " ^ opt)
in
snd o eval_define_declare (smp, cmd) print
end));
val _ = Outer_Syntax.local_theory’ @{command_keyword "setup_protocol_checks"}
"setup protocol checks"
(Parse.name -- Parse.name >> (fn (protocol_model, protocol_name) => fn print =>
let
val a1 = "coverage_check_intro_lemmata"
val a2 = "coverage_check_unfold_lemmata"
val a3 = "coverage_check_unfold_protocol_lemma"
in
declare_protocol_checks print #>
declare_thm_attr a1 (protocol_model ^ ".protocol_covered_by_fixpoint_intros") print #>
declare_def_attr a2 (protocol_model ^ ".protocol_covered_by_fixpoint") print #>




Outer_Syntax.local_theory_to_proof command keyword 〈setup_protocol_model’ 〉
"prove interpretation of protocol model locale into global theory"
(Parse.!!! (Parse.name -- Parse_Spec.locale_expression) >> (fn (prefix,expr) => fn lthy =>
let
fun f x y z = ([(x,(y,(Expression.Positional z,[])))],[])
val (a,(b,c)) = nth (fst expr) 0
val name = fst b
val _ = case c of (Expression.Named [],[]) => () | _ => error "Invalid arguments"
val pexpr = f a b (protocol_model_interpretation_params prefix)
val pdefs = protocol_model_interpretation_defs name
in
if name = ""
then error "No name given"
else Interpretation.global_interpretation_cmd pexpr pdefs lthy
end));
val _ =
Outer_Syntax.local_theory_to_proof’ command keyword 〈protocol_security_proof’ 〉
"prove interpretation of secure protocol locale into global theory"
(Parse.!!! (Parse.name -- Parse_Spec.locale_expression) >> (fn (prefix,expr) => fn print =>
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let
fun f x y z = ([(x,(y,(Expression.Positional z,[])))],[])
val (a,(b,c)) = nth (fst expr) 0
val d = case c of (Expression.Positional ps,[]) => ps | _ => error "Invalid arguments"
val pexpr = f a b (protocol_model_interpretation_params prefix@d)
in





structure ml_isar_wrapper = struct
fun define_constant_definition (constname, trm) lthy =
let
val arg = ((Binding.name constname, NoSyn), ((Binding.name (constname^"_def"),[]), trm))




fun define_constant_definition’ (constname, trm) print lthy =
let
val arg = ((Binding.name constname, NoSyn), ((Binding.name (constname^"_def"),[]), trm))
val ((_, (_ , thm)), lthy’) = Local_Theory.define arg lthy




fun define_simple_abbrev (constname, trm) lthy =
let
val arg = ((Binding.name constname, NoSyn), trm)




fun define_simple_type_synonym (name, typedecl) lthy =
let




fun define_simple_datatype (dt_tyargs, dt_name) constructors =
let
val options = Plugin_Name.default_filter
fun lift_c (tyargs, name) = (((Binding.empty, Binding.name name), map (fn t => (Binding.empty, t))
tyargs), NoSyn)
val c_spec = map lift_c constructors
val datatyp = ((map (fn ty => (NONE, ty)) dt_tyargs, Binding.name dt_name), NoSyn)
val dtspec =
((options,false),
[(((datatyp, c_spec), (Binding.empty, Binding.empty, Binding.empty)), [])])
in
BNF_FP_Def_Sugar.co_datatypes BNF_Util.Least_FP BNF_LFP.construct_lfp dtspec
end
fun define_simple_primrec pname precs lthy =
let
val rec_eqs = map (fn (lhs,rhs) => (((Binding.empty,[]), HOLogic.mk_Trueprop (HOLogic.mk_eq (lhs,rhs))),[],[]))
precs
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in
snd (BNF_LFP_Rec_Sugar.primrec false [] [(Binding.name pname, NONE, NoSyn)] rec_eqs lthy)
end
fun define_simple_fun pname precs lthy =
let
val rec_eqs = map (fn (lhs,rhs) => (((Binding.empty,[]), HOLogic.mk_Trueprop (HOLogic.mk_eq (lhs,rhs))),[],[]))
precs
in
Function_Fun.add_fun [(Binding.name pname, NONE, NoSyn)] rec_eqs Function_Common.default_config
lthy
end
fun prove_simple name stmt tactic lthy =
let





snd o Local_Theory.note ((Binding.name name, []), [thm])
end
fun prove_state_simple method proof_state =





structure trac_definitorial_package = struct







val publicN = "public"
val gammaN = "Γ"
val anaN = "Ana"
val valN = "val"
val timpliesN = "timplies"
val occursN = "occurs"
val enumN = "enum"
val priv_fun_secN = "PrivFunSec"
val secret_typeN = "SecretType"
val enum_typeN = "EnumType"
val other_pubconsts_typeN = "PubConstType"
val types = [enum_typeN, secret_typeN]
val special_funs = ["occurs", "zero", valN, priv_fun_secN]
fun mk_listT T = Type ("List.list", [T])
val mk_setT = HOLogic.mk_setT
val boolT = HOLogic.boolT
val natT = HOLogic.natT
val mk_tupleT = HOLogic.mk_tupleT
val mk_prodT = HOLogic.mk_prodT
val mk_set = HOLogic.mk_set
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val mk_list = HOLogic.mk_list
val mk_nat = HOLogic.mk_nat
val mk_eq = HOLogic.mk_eq
val mk_Trueprop = HOLogic.mk_Trueprop
val mk_tuple = HOLogic.mk_tuple
val mk_prod = HOLogic.mk_prod
fun mkN (a,b) = a^"_"^b
val info = Output.information
fun rm_special_funs sel l = list_minus (list_rm_pair sel) l special_funs
fun is_priv_fun (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) f = let
val funs = #private (Option.valOf (#function_spec trac))
in
(* not (List.find (fn g => fst g = f) funs = NONE) *)
List.exists (fn (g,n) => f = g andalso n <> "0") funs
end
fun full_name name lthy =
Local_Theory.full_name lthy (Binding.name name)
fun full_name’ n (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy = full_name (mkN (#name trac, n)) lthy
fun mk_prot_type name targs (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
Term.Type (full_name’ name trac lthy, targs)
val enum_constsT = mk_prot_type enum_constsN []
fun mk_enum_const a trac lthy =
Term.Const (full_name’ enum_constsN trac lthy ^ "." ^ a, enum_constsT trac lthy)
val databaseT = mk_prot_type setsN []
val funT = mk_prot_type funN []
val atomT = mk_prot_type atomN []
fun messageT (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
Term.Type ("Transactions.prot_term", [funT trac lthy, atomT trac lthy, databaseT trac lthy])
fun message_funT (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
Term.Type ("Transactions.prot_fun", [funT trac lthy, atomT trac lthy, databaseT trac lthy])
fun message_varT (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
Term.Type ("Transactions.prot_var", [funT trac lthy, atomT trac lthy, databaseT trac lthy])
fun message_term_typeT (trc:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
Term.Type ("Transactions.prot_term_type", [funT trc lthy, atomT trc lthy, databaseT trc lthy])
fun message_atomT (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
Term.Type ("Transactions.prot_atom", [atomT trac lthy])
fun messageT’ varT (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
Term.Type ("Term.term", [message_funT trac lthy, varT])
fun message_listT (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
mk_listT (messageT trac lthy)
fun message_listT’ varT (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
mk_listT (messageT’ varT trac lthy)
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fun absT (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
mk_setT (databaseT trac lthy)
fun abssT (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =





fun strand_stepT (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
Term.Type ("Stateful_Strands.stateful_strand_step",
[message_funT trac lthy, message_varT trac lthy])
fun labeled_strand_stepT (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
mk_prodT (strand_labelT, strand_stepT trac lthy)
fun prot_strandT (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
mk_listT (labeled_strand_stepT trac lthy)
fun prot_transactionT (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
Term.Type ("Transactions.prot_transaction",
[funT trac lthy, atomT trac lthy, databaseT trac lthy, natT])
val mk_star_label =
Term.Const ("Labeled_Strands.strand_label.LabelS", strand_labelT)
fun mk_prot_label (lbl:int) =
Term.Const ("Labeled_Strands.strand_label.LabelN", natT --> strand_labelT) $
mk_nat lbl
fun mk_labeled_step (label:term) (step:term) =
mk_prod (label, step)
fun mk_Send_step (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy (label:term) (msg:term) =
mk_labeled_step label
(Term.Const ("Stateful_Strands.stateful_strand_step.Send",
messageT trac lthy --> strand_stepT trac lthy) $ msg)
fun mk_Receive_step (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy (label:term) (msg:term) =
mk_labeled_step label
(Term.Const ("Stateful_Strands.stateful_strand_step.Receive",
messageT trac lthy --> strand_stepT trac lthy) $ msg)
fun mk_InSet_step (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy (label:term) (elem:term) (set:term) =
let




psT ---> strand_stepT trac lthy) $
Term.Const ("Strands_and_Constraints.poscheckvariant.Check", poscheckvariantT) $
elem $ set)
end
fun mk_NotInSet_step (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy (label:term) (elem:term) (set:term) =
let
val varT = message_varT trac lthy
val trm_prodT = mk_prodT (messageT trac lthy, messageT trac lthy)
val psT = [mk_listT varT, mk_listT trm_prodT, mk_listT trm_prodT]
in
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mk_labeled_step label
(Term.Const ("Stateful_Strands.stateful_strand_step.NegChecks",
psT ---> strand_stepT trac lthy) $
mk_list varT [] $
mk_list trm_prodT [] $
mk_list trm_prodT [mk_prod (elem,set)])
end
fun mk_Inequality_step (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy (label:term) (t1:term) (t2:term) =
let
val varT = message_varT trac lthy
val trm_prodT = mk_prodT (messageT trac lthy, messageT trac lthy)




psT ---> strand_stepT trac lthy) $
mk_list varT [] $
mk_list trm_prodT [mk_prod (t1,t2)] $
mk_list trm_prodT [])
end
fun mk_Insert_step (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy (label:term) (elem:term) (set:term) =
mk_labeled_step label
(Term.Const ("Stateful_Strands.stateful_strand_step.Insert",
[messageT trac lthy, messageT trac lthy] ---> strand_stepT trac lthy) $
elem $ set)
fun mk_Delete_step (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy (label:term) (elem:term) (set:term) =
mk_labeled_step label
(Term.Const ("Stateful_Strands.stateful_strand_step.Delete",
[messageT trac lthy, messageT trac lthy] ---> strand_stepT trac lthy) $
elem $ set)
fun mk_Transaction (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 =
let
val varT = message_varT trac lthy
val msgT = messageT trac lthy
val var_listT = mk_listT varT
val msg_listT = mk_listT msgT
val trT = prot_transactionT trac lthy
(* val decl_elemT = mk_prodT (varT, mk_listT msgT)
val declT = mk_listT decl_elemT *)
val stepT = labeled_strand_stepT trac lthy
val strandT = prot_strandT trac lthy
val strandsT = mk_listT strandT
val paramsT = [(* declT, *)var_listT, strandT, strandT, strandT, strandT, strandT]
in
Term.Const ("Transactions.prot_transaction.Transaction", paramsT ---> trT) $
(* mk_list decl_elemT [] $ *)
(if null S4 then mk_list varT []
else (Term.Const (@{const_name "map"}, [msgT --> varT, msg_listT] ---> var_listT) $
Term.Const (@{const_name "the_Var"}, msgT --> varT) $
mk_list msgT S4)) $
mk_list stepT S1 $
mk_list stepT [] $
(if null S3 then mk_list stepT S2
else (Term.Const (@{const_name "append"}, [strandT,strandT] ---> strandT) $
mk_list stepT S2 $
(Term.Const (@{const_name "concat"}, strandsT --> strandT) $ mk_list strandT S3))) $
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fun get_funs (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) =
let
fun append_sec fs = fs@[(priv_fun_secN, "0")]
val filter_funs = filter (fn (_,n) => n <> "0")
val filter_consts = filter (fn (_,n) => n = "0")
fun inc_ar (s,n) = (s, Int.toString (1+Option.valOf (Int.fromString n)))
in
case (#function_spec trac) of
NONE => ([],[],[])
| SOME ({public=pub, private=priv}) =>
let
val pub_symbols = rm_special_funs fst (pub@map inc_ar (filter_funs priv))
val pub_funs = filter_funs pub_symbols
val pub_consts = filter_consts pub_symbols





fun get_set_spec (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) =
mk_unique (map (fn (s,n) => (s,Option.valOf (Int.fromString n))) (#set_spec trac))
fun set_arity (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) s =
case List.find (fn x => fst x = s) (get_set_spec trac) of
SOME (_,n) => SOME n
| NONE => NONE
fun get_enums (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) =
mk_unique (TracProtocol.extract_Consts (#type_spec trac))
fun flatten_type_spec (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) =
let
fun find_type taus tau =
case List.find (fn x => fst x = tau) taus of
SOME x => snd x
| NONE => error ("Type " ^ tau ^ " has not been declared")




val es = map (find_type taus) ts
fun f es’ = mk_unique (List.concat (map TracProtocol.the_Consts es’))
in
if List.all TracProtocol.is_Consts es
then (s,TracProtocol.Consts (f es))
else (s,TracProtocol.Union ts)
end
| c => (s,c)
fun loop taus =
let
val taus’ = map (step taus) taus
in






val x = loop (#type_spec trac)
val errpre = "Couldn’t flatten the enumeration types: "
in
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if List.all (fn (_,e) => TracProtocol.is_Consts e) x
then
let
val y = map (fn (s,e) => (s,TracProtocol.the_Consts e)) x
in
if List.all (not o List.null o snd) y
then y
else error (errpre ^ "does every type have at least one value?")
end





fun is_attack_transaction (tr:TracProtocol.cTransaction) =
not (null (#attack_actions tr))
fun get_transaction_name (tr:TracProtocol.cTransaction) =
#1 (#transaction tr)
fun get_fresh_value_variables (tr:TracProtocol.cTransaction) =
map_filter (TracProtocol.maybe_the_Fresh o snd) (#fresh_actions tr)
fun get_nonfresh_value_variables (tr:TracProtocol.cTransaction) =
map fst (filter (fn x => snd x = "value") (#2 (#transaction tr)))
fun get_value_variables (tr:TracProtocol.cTransaction) =
get_nonfresh_value_variables tr@get_fresh_value_variables tr
fun get_enum_variables (tr:TracProtocol.cTransaction) =
mk_unique (filter (fn x => snd x <> "value") (#2 (#transaction tr)))
fun get_variable_restrictions (tr:TracProtocol.cTransaction) =
let
val enum_vars = get_enum_variables tr
val value_vars = get_value_variables tr
fun enum_member x = List.exists (fn y => x = fst y)
fun value_member x = List.exists (fn y => x = y)
fun aux [] = ([],[])
| aux ((a,b)::rs) =
if enum_member a enum_vars andalso enum_member b enum_vars
then let val (es,vs) = aux rs in ((a,b)::es,vs) end
else if value_member a value_vars andalso value_member b value_vars
then let val (es,vs) = aux rs in (es,(a,b)::vs) end
else error ("Ill-formed or ill-typed variable restriction: " ^ a ^ " != " ^ b)
in
aux (#3 (#transaction tr))
end
fun conv_enum_consts trac (t:Trac_Term.cMsg) =
let
open Trac_Term
val enums = get_enums trac
fun aux (cFun (f,ts)) =
if List.exists (fn x => x = f) enums
then if null ts
then cEnum f
else error ("Enum constant " ^ f ^ " should not have a parameter list")
else
cFun (f,map aux ts)
| aux (cConst c) =
if List.exists (fn x => x = c) enums
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then cEnum c
else cConst c
| aux (cSet (s,ts)) = cSet (s,map aux ts)
| aux (cOccursFact bs) = cOccursFact (aux bs)




fun val_to_abs_list vs =
let
open Trac_Term




| (cConst "0"::ts) => val_to_abs_list ts
| (cFun (s,ps)::ts) => (s, map aux ps)::val_to_abs_list ts
| (cSet (s,ps)::ts) => (s, map aux ps)::val_to_abs_list ts
| _ => error "Invalid val parameter list"
end
fun val_to_abs (t:Trac_Term.cMsg) =
let
open Trac_Term
fun aux t = case t of cEnum b => b | _ => error "Invalid val parameter list"
fun val_to_abs_list [] = []
| val_to_abs_list (cConst "0"::ts) = val_to_abs_list ts
| val_to_abs_list (cFun (s,ps)::ts) = (s, map aux ps)::val_to_abs_list ts
| val_to_abs_list (cSet (s,ps)::ts) = (s, map aux ps)::val_to_abs_list ts




if f = valN
then cAbs (val_to_abs_list ts)
else cFun (f,map val_to_abs ts)
| cSet (s,ts) =>
cSet (s,map val_to_abs ts)
| cOccursFact bs =>
cOccursFact (val_to_abs bs)
| t => t
end
fun occurs_enc t =
let
open Trac_Term
fun aux [cVar x] = cVar x
| aux [cAbs bs] = cAbs bs
| aux _ = error "Invalid occurs parameter list"
fun enc (cFun (f,ts)) = (
if f = occursN
then cOccursFact (aux ts)
else cFun (f,map enc ts))
| enc (cSet (s,ts)) =
cSet (s,map enc ts)
| enc (cOccursFact bs) =
cOccursFact (enc bs)
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fun priv_fun_enc trac (Trac_Term.cFun (f,ts)) = (
if is_priv_fun trac f andalso
(case ts of Trac_Term.cPrivFunSec::_ => false | _ => true)
then Trac_Term.cFun (f,Trac_Term.cPrivFunSec::map (priv_fun_enc trac) ts)
else Trac_Term.cFun (f,map (priv_fun_enc trac) ts))
| priv_fun_enc _ t = t
fun transform_cMsg trac =
priv_fun_enc trac o occurs_enc o val_to_abs o conv_enum_consts trac
fun check_no_vars_and_consts (fp:Trac_Term.cMsg list) =
let
open Trac_Term
fun aux (cVar _) = false
| aux (cConst _) = false
| aux (cFun (_,ts)) = List.all aux ts
| aux (cSet (_,ts)) = List.all aux ts
| aux (cOccursFact bs) = aux bs
| aux _ = true
in
if List.all aux fp
then fp
else error "There shouldn’t be any cVars and cConsts at this point in the fixpoint translation"
end
fun split_fp (fp:Trac_Term.cMsg list) =
let
open Trac_Term
fun fa t = case t of cFun (s,_) => s <> timpliesN | _ => true
fun fb (t,ts) = case t of cOccursFact (cAbs bs) => bs::ts | _ => ts
fun fc (cFun (s, [cAbs bs, cAbs cs]),ts) =
if s = timpliesN
then (bs,cs)::ts
else ts
| fc (_,ts) = ts
val eq = eq_set (fn ((s,xs),(t,ys)) => s = t andalso eq_set (op =) (xs,ys))
fun eq_pairs ((a,b),(c,d)) = eq (a,c) andalso eq (b,d)
val timplies_trancl =
let
fun trans_step ts =
let
fun aux (s,t) = map (fn (_,u) => (s,u)) (filter (fn (v,_) => eq (t,v)) ts)
in
distinct eq_pairs (filter (not o eq) (ts@List.concat (map aux ts)))
end
fun loop ts =
let
val ts’ = trans_step ts
in







val ti = List.foldl fc [] fp
in
(filter fa fp, distinct eq (List.foldl fb [] fp@map snd ti), timplies_trancl ti)
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end
fun mk_enum_substs trac (vars:(string * Trac_Term.VarType) list) =
let
open Trac_Term
val flat_type_spec = flatten_type_spec trac
val deltas =
let
fun f (s,EnumType tau) = (
case List.find (fn x => fst x = tau) flat_type_spec of
SOME x => map (fn c => (s,c)) (snd x)
| NONE => error ("Type " ^ tau ^ " was not found in the type specification"))
| f (s,_) = error ("Variable " ^ s ^ " is not of enum type")
in
list_product (map f vars)
end
in
map (fn d => map (fn (x,t) => (x,cEnum t)) d) deltas
end
fun ground_enum_variables trac (fp:Trac_Term.cMsg list) =
let
open Trac_Term
fun do_grounding t = map (fn d => subst_apply d t) (mk_enum_substs trac (fv_cMsg t))
in
List.concat (map do_grounding fp)
end
fun transform_fp trac (fp:Trac_Term.cMsg list) =
fp |> ground_enum_variables trac
|> map (transform_cMsg trac)
|> check_no_vars_and_consts
|> split_fp
fun database_to_hol (db:string * Trac_Term.cMsg list) (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
let
open Trac_Term
val errmsg = "Invalid database parameter"
fun mkN’ n = mkN (#name trac, n)
val s_prefix = full_name (mkN’ setsN) lthy ^ "."
val e_prefix = full_name (mkN’ enum_constsN) lthy ^ "."
val (s,es) = db
val tau = enum_constsT trac lthy
val databaseT = databaseT trac lthy
val a = Term.Const (s_prefix ^ s, map (fn _ => tau) es ---> databaseT)
fun param_to_hol (cVar (x,EnumType _)) = Term.Free (x, tau)
| param_to_hol (cVar (x,Untyped)) = Term.Free (x, tau)
| param_to_hol (cEnum e) = Term.Const (e_prefix ^ e, tau)
| param_to_hol (cConst c) = error (errmsg ^ ": cConst " ^ c)
| param_to_hol (cVar (x,ValueType)) = error (errmsg ^ ": cVar (" ^ x ^ ",ValueType)")
| param_to_hol _ = error errmsg
in
fold (fn e => fn b => b $ param_to_hol e) es a
end
fun abs_to_hol (bs:(string * string list) list) (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
let
val databaseT = databaseT trac lthy
fun db_params_to_cEnum (a,cs) = (a, map Trac_Term.cEnum cs)
in
mk_set databaseT (map (fn db => database_to_hol (db_params_to_cEnum db) trac lthy) bs)
end
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fun cMsg_to_hol (t:Trac_Term.cMsg) lbl varT var_map free_enum_var trac lthy =
let
open Trac_Term
val tT = messageT’ varT trac lthy
val fT = message_funT trac lthy
val enum_constsT = enum_constsT trac lthy
val tsT = message_listT’ varT trac lthy
val VarT = varT --> tT
val FunT = [fT, tsT] ---> tT
val absT = absT trac lthy
val databaseT = databaseT trac lthy
val AbsT = absT --> fT
val funT = funT trac lthy
val FuT = funT --> fT
val SetT = databaseT --> fT
val enumT = enum_constsT --> funT
val VarC = Term.Const (@{const_name "Var"}, VarT)
val FunC = Term.Const (@{const_name "Fun"}, FunT)
val NilC = Term.Const (@{const_name "Nil"}, tsT)
val prot_label = mk_nat lbl
fun full_name’’ n = full_name’ n trac lthy
fun mk_enum_const’ a = mk_enum_const a trac lthy
fun mk_prot_fun_trm f tau = Term.Const ("Transactions.prot_fun." ^ f, tau)
fun mk_enum_trm etrm =
mk_prot_fun_trm "Fu" FuT $ (Term.Const (full_name’’ funN ^ "." ^ enumN, enumT) $ etrm)
fun mk_Fu_trm f =
mk_prot_fun_trm "Fu" FuT $ Term.Const (full_name’’ funN ^ "." ^ f, funT)
fun c_to_h s = cMsg_to_hol s lbl varT var_map free_enum_var trac lthy





then FunC $ mk_enum_trm (Term.Free (fst x, enum_constsT)) $ NilC
else VarC $ var_map x








| cSet (s,ts) =>
FunC $




(mk_prot_fun_trm "Attack" (natT --> fT) $ prot_label) $
NilC
| cAbs bs =>
FunC $
(mk_prot_fun_trm "Abs" AbsT $ abs_to_hol bs trac lthy) $
NilC
| cOccursFact bs =>
FunC $
mk_prot_fun_trm "OccursFact" fT $
mk_list tT [
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mk_Fu_trm priv_fun_secN $
NilC
| cEnum a =>
FunC $
mk_enum_trm (mk_enum_const’ a) $
NilC
end
fun ground_cMsg_to_hol t lbl trac lthy =
cMsg_to_hol t lbl (message_varT trac lthy) (fn _ => error "Term not ground")
(fn _ => false) trac lthy
fun ana_cMsg_to_hol inc_vars t (ana_var_map:string list) =
let
open Trac_Term
fun var_map (x,Untyped) = (
case list_find (fn y => x = y) ana_var_map of
SOME (_,n) => if inc_vars then mk_nat (1+n) else mk_nat n
| NONE => error ("Analysis variable " ^ x ^ " not found"))
| var_map _ = error "Analysis variables must be untyped"
val lbl = 0 (* There’s no constants in analysis messages requiring labels anyway *)
in
cMsg_to_hol t lbl natT var_map (fn _ => false)
end
fun transaction_cMsg_to_hol t lbl (transaction_var_map:string list) trac lthy =
let
open Trac_Term
val varT = message_varT trac lthy
val atomT = message_atomT trac lthy
val term_typeT = message_term_typeT trac lthy
fun TAtom_Value_var n =
let
val a = Term.Const (@{const_name "Var"}, atomT --> term_typeT) $
Term.Const ("Transactions.prot_atom.Value", atomT)
in
HOLogic.mk_prod (a, mk_nat n)
end
fun var_map_err_prefix x =
"Transaction variable " ^ x ^ " should be value typed but is actually "
fun var_map (x,ValueType) = (
case list_find (fn y => x = y) transaction_var_map of
SOME (_,n) => TAtom_Value_var n
| NONE => error ("Transaction variable " ^ x ^ " not found"))
| var_map (x,EnumType e) = error (var_map_err_prefix x ^ "of enum type " ^ e)
| var_map (x,Untyped) = error (var_map_err_prefix x ^ "untyped")
in
cMsg_to_hol t lbl varT var_map (fn (_,t) => case t of EnumType _ => true | _ => false)
trac lthy
end
fun fp_triple_to_hol (fp,occ,ti) trac lthy =
let
val prot_label = 0
val tau_abs = absT trac lthy
val tau_fp_elem = messageT trac lthy
val tau_occ_elem = tau_abs
val tau_ti_elem = mk_prodT (tau_abs, tau_abs)
fun a_to_h bs = abs_to_hol bs trac lthy
fun c_to_h t = ground_cMsg_to_hol t prot_label trac lthy
val fp’ = mk_list tau_fp_elem (map c_to_h fp)
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val occ’ = mk_list tau_occ_elem (map a_to_h occ)
val ti’ = mk_list tau_ti_elem (map (mk_prod o map_prod a_to_h) ti)
in
mk_tuple [fp’, occ’, ti’]
end
fun abstract_over_enum_vars enum_vars enum_ineqs trm flat_type_spec trac lthy =
let
val enum_constsT = enum_constsT trac lthy
fun enumlistelemT n = mk_tupleT (replicate n enum_constsT)
fun enumlistT n = mk_listT (enumlistelemT n)
fun mk_enum_const’ a = mk_enum_const a trac lthy
fun absfreeprod xs trm =
let
val tau = enum_constsT
val tau_out = Term.fastype_of trm
fun absfree’ x = absfree (x,enum_constsT)
fun aux _ [] = trm
| aux _ [x] = absfree’ x trm
| aux len (x::y::xs) =
Term.Const (@{const_name "case_prod"},
[[tau,mk_tupleT (replicate (len-1) tau)] ---> tau_out,
mk_tupleT (replicate len tau)] ---> tau_out) $
absfree’ x (aux (len-1) (y::xs))
in
aux (length xs) xs
end
fun mk_enum_neq (a,b) = (HOLogic.mk_not o HOLogic.mk_eq)
(Term.Free (a, enum_constsT), Term.Free (b, enum_constsT))
fun mk_enum_neqs_list [] = Term.Const (@{const_name "True"}, HOLogic.boolT)
| mk_enum_neqs_list [x] = mk_enum_neq x
| mk_enum_neqs_list (x::y::xs) = HOLogic.mk_conj (mk_enum_neq x, mk_enum_neqs_list (y::xs))
val enum_types =
let
fun aux t =
if t = ""
then get_enums trac
else case List.find (fn (s,_) => t = s) flat_type_spec of
SOME (_,cs) => cs
| NONE => error ("Not an enum type: " ^ t ^ "?")
in




fun mk_enumlist ns = mk_list enum_constsT (map mk_enum_const’ ns)
fun aux _ [] = mk_enumlist []
| aux _ [ns] = mk_enumlist ns
| aux len (ns::ms::elists) =
Term.Const ("List.product", [enumlistT 1, enumlistT (len-1)] ---> enumlistT len) $
mk_enumlist ns $ aux (len-1) (ms::elists)
in
aux (length enum_types) enum_types
end
val absfp = absfreeprod (map fst enum_vars) trm
val eptrm = enumlist_product
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val typof = Term.fastype_of
val evseT = enumlistelemT (length enum_vars)
val evslT = enumlistT (length enum_vars)
val eneqs = absfreeprod (map fst enum_vars) (mk_enum_neqs_list enum_ineqs)
in
if null enum_vars
then mk_list (typof trm) [trm]
else if null enum_ineqs
then Term.Const(@{const_name "map"},
[typof absfp, typof eptrm] ---> mk_listT (typof trm)) $
absfp $ eptrm
else Term.Const(@{const_name "map"},
[typof absfp, typof eptrm] ---> mk_listT (typof trm)) $
absfp $ (Term.Const(@{const_name "filter"},
[evseT --> HOLogic.boolT, evslT] ---> evslT) $
eneqs $ eptrm)
end
fun mk_type_of_name lthy pname name ty_args
= Type(Local_Theory.full_name lthy (Binding.name (mkN(pname, name))), ty_args)
fun mk_mt_list t = Term.Const (@{const_name "Nil"}, mk_listT t)
fun name_of_typ (Type (s, _)) = s
| name_of_typ (TFree _) = error "name_of_type: unexpected TFree"
| name_of_typ (TVar _ ) = error "name_of_type: unexpected TVAR"
fun prove_UNIV name typ elems thmsN lthy =
let
val rhs = mk_set typ elems
val lhs = Const("Set.UNIV",mk_setT typ)
val stmt = mk_Trueprop (mk_eq (lhs,rhs))
val fq_tname = name_of_typ typ
fun inst_and_prove_enum thy =
let
val _ = writeln("Inst enum: "^name)
val lthy = Class.instantiation ([fq_tname], [], @{sort enum}) thy
val enum_eq = Const("Pure.eq",mk_listT typ --> mk_listT typ --> propT)
$Const(@{const_name "enum_class.enum"},mk_listT typ)
$(mk_list typ elems)
val ((_, (_, enum_def’)), lthy) = Specification.definition NONE [] []
((Binding.name ("enum_"^name),[]), enum_eq) lthy
val ctxt_thy = Proof_Context.init_global (Proof_Context.theory_of lthy)
val enum_def = singleton (Proof_Context.export lthy ctxt_thy) enum_def’
val enum_all_eq = Const("Pure.eq", boolT --> boolT --> propT)
$(Const(@{const_name "enum_class.enum_all"},(typ --> boolT) --> boolT)
$Free("P",typ --> boolT))
$(Const(@{const_name "list_all"},(typ --> boolT) --> (mk_listT typ) --> boolT)
$Free("P",typ --> boolT)$(mk_list typ elems))
val ((_, (_, enum_all_def’)), lthy) = Specification.definition NONE [] []
((Binding.name ("enum_all_"^name),[]), enum_all_eq) lthy
val ctxt_thy = Proof_Context.init_global (Proof_Context.theory_of lthy)
val enum_all_def = singleton (Proof_Context.export lthy ctxt_thy) enum_all_def’
val enum_ex_eq = Const("Pure.eq", boolT --> boolT --> propT)
$(Const(@{const_name "enum_class.enum_ex"},(typ --> boolT) --> boolT)
$Free("P",typ --> boolT))
$(Const(@{const_name "list_ex"},(typ --> boolT) --> (mk_listT typ) --> boolT)
$Free("P",typ --> boolT)$(mk_list typ elems))
val ((_, (_, enum_ex_def’)), lthy) = Specification.definition NONE [] []
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((Binding.name ("enum_ex_"^name),[]), enum_ex_eq) lthy
val ctxt_thy = Proof_Context.init_global (Proof_Context.theory_of lthy)
val enum_ex_def = singleton (Proof_Context.export lthy ctxt_thy) enum_ex_def’
in
Class.prove_instantiation_exit (fn ctxt =>
(Class.intro_classes_tac ctxt []) THEN
ALLGOALS (simp_tac (ctxt addsimps [Proof_Context.get_thm ctxt (name^"_UNIV"),
enum_def, enum_all_def, enum_ex_def]) )
)lthy
end
fun inst_and_prove_finite thy =
let
val lthy = Class.instantiation ([fq_tname], [], @{sort finite}) thy
in
Class.prove_instantiation_exit (fn ctxt =>
(Class.intro_classes_tac ctxt []) THEN




|> ml_isar_wrapper.prove_simple (name^"_UNIV") stmt









fun def_types (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
let
val pname = #name trac
val defname = mkN(pname, enum_constsN)
val _ = info(" Defining "^defname)
val tnames = get_enums trac
val types = map (fn x => ([],x)) tnames
in
([defname], ml_isar_wrapper.define_simple_datatype ([], defname) types lthy)
end
fun def_sets (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
let
val pname = #name trac
val defname = mkN(pname, setsN)
val _ = info (" Defining "^defname)
val sspec = get_set_spec trac
val tfqn = Local_Theory.full_name lthy (Binding.name (mkN(pname, enum_constsN)))
val ttyp = Type(tfqn, [])
val types = map (fn (x,n) => (replicate n ttyp,x)) sspec
in
lthy
|> ml_isar_wrapper.define_simple_datatype ([], defname) types
end
fun def_funs (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
let
val pname = #name trac
val (pub_f, pub_c, priv) = get_funs trac
val pub = pub_f@pub_c
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fun def_atom lthy =
let





fun define_atom_dt lthy =
let
val _ = info(" Defining "^def_atomname)
in
lthy
|> ml_isar_wrapper.define_simple_datatype ([], def_atomname) (map (fn x => ([],x)) types)
end
fun prove_UNIV_atom lthy =
let
val _ = info (" Proving "^def_atomname^"_UNIV")
val thmsN = [def_atomname^".exhaust"]
val fqn = Local_Theory.full_name lthy (Binding.name (mkN(pname, atomN)))
val typ = Type(fqn, [])
in
lthy







fun def_fun_dt lthy =
let
val def_funname = mkN(pname, funN)
val _ = info(" Defining "^def_funname)
val types = map (fn x => ([],x)) (map fst (pub@priv))
val ctyp = Type(Local_Theory.full_name lthy (Binding.name (mkN(pname, enum_constsN))), [])
in
ml_isar_wrapper.define_simple_datatype ([], def_funname) (types@[([ctyp],enumN)]) lthy
end
fun def_fun_arity lthy =
let
val fqn_name = Local_Theory.full_name lthy (Binding.name (mkN(pname, funN)))
val ctyp = Type(fqn_name, [])
fun mk_rec_eq name (fname,arity) = (Free(name,ctyp --> natT)
$Const(fqn_name^"."^fname,ctyp),
mk_nat((Option.valOf o Int.fromString) arity))
val name = mkN(pname, arityN)
val _ = info(" Defining "^name)
val ctyp’ = Type(Local_Theory.full_name lthy (Binding.name (mkN(pname, enum_constsN))), [])
in
ml_isar_wrapper.define_simple_fun name
((map (mk_rec_eq name) (pub@priv))@[
(Free(name, ctyp --> natT)
$(Const(fqn_name^"."^enumN, ctyp’ --> ctyp)$(Term.dummy_pattern ctyp’)),
mk_nat(0))]) lthy
end
fun def_public lthy =
let
val fqn_name = Local_Theory.full_name lthy (Binding.name (mkN(pname, funN)))
val ctyp = Type(fqn_name, [])
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fun mk_rec_eq name t fname = (Free(name, ctyp --> boolT)
$Const(fqn_name^"."^fname,ctyp), t)
val name = mkN(pname, publicN)
val _ = info(" Defining "^name)
val ctyp’ = Type(Local_Theory.full_name lthy (Binding.name (mkN(pname, enum_constsN))), [])
in
ml_isar_wrapper.define_simple_fun name
((map (mk_rec_eq name (@{term "False"})) (map fst priv))
@(map (mk_rec_eq name (@{term "True"})) (map fst pub))
@[(Free(name, ctyp --> boolT)
$(Const(fqn_name^"."^enumN, ctyp’ --> ctyp)$(Term.dummy_pattern ctyp’)),
@{term "True"})]) lthy
end
fun def_gamma lthy =
let
fun optionT t = Type (@{type_name "option"}, [t])
fun mk_Some t = Const (@{const_name "Some"}, t --> optionT t)
fun mk_None t = Const (@{const_name "None"}, optionT t)
val fqn_name = Local_Theory.full_name lthy (Binding.name (mkN(pname, funN)))
val ctyp = Type(fqn_name, [])
val atomFQN = Local_Theory.full_name lthy (Binding.name (mkN(pname, atomN)))
val atomT = Type(atomFQN, [])
fun mk_rec_eq name t fname = (Free(name, ctyp --> optionT atomT)
$Const(fqn_name^"."^fname,ctyp), t)
val name = mkN(pname, gammaN)
val _ = info(" Defining "^name)
val ctyp’ = Type(Local_Theory.full_name lthy (Binding.name (mkN(pname, enum_constsN))), [])
in
ml_isar_wrapper.define_simple_fun name
((map (mk_rec_eq name ((mk_Some atomT)$(Const(atomFQN^"."^secret_typeN, atomT)))) (map fst
priv))
@(map (mk_rec_eq name ((mk_Some atomT)$(Const(atomFQN^"."^other_pubconsts_typeN, atomT))))
(map fst pub_c))
@[(Free(name, ctyp --> optionT atomT)
$(Const(fqn_name^"."^enumN, ctyp’ --> ctyp)$(Term.dummy_pattern ctyp’)),
(mk_Some atomT)$(Const(atomFQN^"."^enum_typeN,atomT)))]
@(map (mk_rec_eq name (mk_None atomT)) (map fst pub_f)) ) lthy
end
fun def_ana lthy = let
val pname = #name trac
val (pub_f, pub_c, priv) = get_funs trac
val pub = pub_f@pub_c
val keyT = messageT’ natT trac lthy
val fqn_name = Local_Theory.full_name lthy (Binding.name (mkN(pname, funN)))
val ctyp = Type(fqn_name, [])
val ana_outputT = mk_prodT (mk_listT keyT, mk_listT natT)
val default_output = mk_prod (mk_list keyT [], mk_list natT [])
fun mk_ana_output ks rs = mk_prod (mk_list keyT ks, mk_list natT rs)
fun mk_rec_eq name t fname = (Free(name, ctyp --> ana_outputT)
$Term.Const(fqn_name^"."^fname,ctyp), t)
val name = mkN(pname, anaN)
val _ = info(" Defining "^name)
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val ctyp’ = Type(Local_Theory.full_name lthy (Binding.name (mkN(pname, enum_constsN))), [])
val ana_spec =
let
val toInt = Option.valOf o Int.fromString
fun ana_arity (f,n) = (if is_priv_fun trac f then (toInt n)-1 else toInt n)
fun check_valid_arity ((f,ps),ks,rs) =
case List.find (fn g => f = fst g) pub_f of
SOME (f’,n) =>
if length ps <> ana_arity (f’,n)
then error ("Invalid number of parameters in the analysis rule for " ^ f ^
" (expected " ^ Int.toString (ana_arity (f’,n)) ^
" but got " ^ Int.toString (length ps) ^ ")")
else ((f,ps),ks,rs)
| NONE => error (f ^ " is not a declared function symbol of arity greater than zero")
val transform_cMsg = transform_cMsg trac
val rm_special_funs = rm_special_funs (fn ((f,_),_,_) => f)
fun var_to_nat f xs x =
let
val n = snd (Option.valOf ((list_find (fn y => y = x) xs)))
in
if is_priv_fun trac f then mk_nat (1+n) else mk_nat n
end
fun c_to_h f xs t = ana_cMsg_to_hol (is_priv_fun trac f) t xs trac lthy
fun keys f ps ks = map (c_to_h f ps o transform_cMsg o Trac_Term.certifyMsg [] []) ks
fun results f ps rs = map (var_to_nat f ps) rs
fun aux ((f,ps),ks,rs) = (f, mk_ana_output (keys f ps ks) (results f ps rs))
in
map (aux o check_valid_arity) (rm_special_funs (#analysis_spec trac))
end
val other_funs =
filter (fn f => not (List.exists (fn g => f = g) (map fst ana_spec))) (map fst (pub@priv))
in
ml_isar_wrapper.define_simple_fun name
((map (fn (f,out) => mk_rec_eq name out f) ana_spec)
@(map (mk_rec_eq name default_output) other_funs)
@[(Free(name, ctyp --> ana_outputT)











fun define_term_model (trac:TracProtocol.protocol) lthy =
let
val _ = info("Defining term model")
in




fun define_fixpoint fp trac print lthy =
let
val fp_name = mkN (#name trac, "fixpoint")
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val _ = info("Defining fixpoint")
val _ = info(" Defining "^fp_name)
val fp_triple = transform_fp trac fp
val fp_triple_trm = fp_triple_to_hol fp_triple trac lthy
val trac = TracProtocol.update_fixed_point trac (SOME fp_triple)
in
(trac, #2 (ml_isar_wrapper.define_constant_definition’ (fp_name, fp_triple_trm) print lthy))
end
fun define_protocol print ((trac:TracProtocol.protocol), lthy) = let
val _ =
if length (#transaction_spec trac) > 1
then info("Defining protocols")
else info("Defining protocol")
val pname = #name trac
val flat_type_spec = flatten_type_spec trac
val mk_Transaction = mk_Transaction trac lthy
val mk_Send = mk_Send_step trac lthy
val mk_Receive = mk_Receive_step trac lthy
val mk_InSet = mk_InSet_step trac lthy
val mk_NotInSet = mk_NotInSet_step trac lthy
val mk_Inequality = mk_Inequality_step trac lthy
val mk_Insert = mk_Insert_step trac lthy
val mk_Delete = mk_Delete_step trac lthy
val star_label = mk_star_label
val prot_label = mk_prot_label
val certify_transation = TracProtocol.certifyTransaction
fun mk_tname i (tr:TracProtocol.transaction_name) =
let
val x = #1 tr
val y = case i of NONE => x | SOME n => mkN(n, x)
val z = mkN("transaction", y)
in mkN(pname, z)
end
fun def_transaction name_prefix prot_num (transaction:TracProtocol.cTransaction) lthy = let
val defname = mk_tname name_prefix (#transaction transaction)
val _ = info(" Defining "^defname)
val receives = #receive_actions transaction
val checkssingle = #checksingle_actions transaction
val checksall = #checkall_actions transaction
val updates = #update_actions transaction
val sends = #send_actions transaction
val fresh = get_fresh_value_variables transaction
val attack_signals = #attack_actions transaction
val nonfresh_value_vars = get_nonfresh_value_variables transaction
val value_vars = get_value_variables transaction
val enum_vars = get_enum_variables transaction
val (enum_ineqs, value_ineqs) = get_variable_restrictions transaction
val transform_cMsg = transform_cMsg trac
fun c_to_h trm = transaction_cMsg_to_hol (transform_cMsg trm) prot_num value_vars trac lthy
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val abstract_over_enum_vars = fn x => fn y => fn z =>
abstract_over_enum_vars x y z flat_type_spec trac lthy
fun mk_transaction_term (rcvs, chcksingle, chckall, upds, snds, frsh, atcks) =
let
open Trac_Term
fun action_filter f (lbl,a) = case f a of SOME x => SOME (lbl,x) | NONE => NONE
fun lbl_to_h (TracProtocol.LabelS) = star_label
| lbl_to_h (TracProtocol.LabelN) = prot_label prot_num
fun lbl_trm_to_h f (lbl,t) = f (lbl_to_h lbl) (c_to_h t)
val S1 = map (lbl_trm_to_h mk_Receive)
(map_filter (action_filter TracProtocol.maybe_the_Receive) rcvs)
val S2 =
let
fun aux (lbl,TracProtocol.cInequality (x,y)) =
SOME (mk_Inequality (lbl_to_h lbl) (c_to_h x) (c_to_h y))
| aux (lbl,TracProtocol.cInSet (e,s)) =
SOME (mk_InSet (lbl_to_h lbl) (c_to_h e) (c_to_h s))
| aux (lbl,TracProtocol.cNotInSet (e,s)) =
SOME (mk_NotInSet (lbl_to_h lbl) (c_to_h e) (c_to_h s))






fun arity s = case set_arity trac s of
SOME n => n
| NONE => error ("Not a set family: " ^ s)
fun mk_evs s = map (fn n => ("X" ^ Int.toString n, "")) (0 upto ((arity s) -1))
fun mk_trm (lbl,e,s) =
let
val ps = map (fn x => cVar (x,Untyped)) (map fst (mk_evs s))
in
mk_NotInSet (lbl_to_h lbl) (c_to_h e) (c_to_h (cSet (s,ps)))
end
fun mk_trms (lbl,(e,s)) =
abstract_over_enum_vars (mk_evs s) [] (mk_trm (lbl,e,s))
in
map mk_trms (map_filter (action_filter TracProtocol.maybe_the_NotInAny) chckall)
end
val S4 = map (c_to_h o mk_Value_cVar) frsh
val S5 =
let
fun aux (lbl,TracProtocol.cInsert (e,s)) =
SOME (mk_Insert (lbl_to_h lbl) (c_to_h e) (c_to_h s))
| aux (lbl,TracProtocol.cDelete (e,s)) =
SOME (mk_Delete (lbl_to_h lbl) (c_to_h e) (c_to_h s))
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val S6 =
let val snds’ = map_filter (action_filter TracProtocol.maybe_the_Send) snds
in map (lbl_trm_to_h mk_Send) (snds’@map (fn (lbl,_) => (lbl,cAttack)) atcks) end
in
abstract_over_enum_vars enum_vars enum_ineqs (mk_Transaction S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6)
end
fun def_trm trm print lthy =





val poschecks = map_filter (maybe_the_InSet o snd) checkssingle
val negchecks_single = map_filter (maybe_the_NotInSet o snd) checkssingle
val negchecks_all = map_filter (maybe_the_NotInAny o snd) checksall
fun aux’ (cVar (x,ValueType),s) (cVar (y,ValueType),t) =
if s = t then SOME (x,y) else NONE
| aux’ _ _ = NONE
fun aux (x,cSet (s,ps)) = SOME (
map_filter (aux’ (x,cSet (s,ps))) negchecks_single@
map_filter (aux’ (x,s)) negchecks_all
)
| aux _ = NONE
in
List.concat (map_filter aux poschecks)
end
val all_value_ineqs = mk_unique (value_ineqs@additional_value_ineqs)
val valvarsprod =
filter (fn p => not (List.exists (fn q => p = q orelse swap p = q) all_value_ineqs))
(list_triangle_product (fn x => fn y => (x,y)) nonfresh_value_vars)
val transaction_trm0 = mk_transaction_term
(receives, checkssingle, checksall, updates, sends, fresh, attack_signals)
in
if null valvarsprod
then def_trm transaction_trm0 print lthy
else let
val partitions = list_partitions nonfresh_value_vars all_value_ineqs
val ps = filter (not o null) (map (filter (fn x => length x > 1)) partitions)
fun mk_subst ps =
let
open Trac_Term
fun aux [] = NONE
| aux (x::xs) = SOME (map (fn y => (y,cVar (x,ValueType))) xs)
in
List.concat (map_filter aux ps)
end
fun apply d =
let
val ap = TracProtocol.subst_apply_actions d
fun f (TracProtocol.cInequality (x,y)) = x <> y
| f _ = true
val checksingle’ = filter (f o snd) (ap checkssingle)
in
(ap receives, checksingle’, ap checksall, ap updates, ap sends, fresh, attack_signals)
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end
val transaction_trms = transaction_trm0::map (mk_transaction_term o apply o mk_subst) ps
val transaction_typ = Term.fastype_of transaction_trm0
fun mk_concat_trm tau trms =
Term.Const (@{const_name "concat"}, mk_listT tau --> tau) $ mk_list tau trms
in





val prots = map (fn (n,pr) => map (fn tr => (n,tr)) pr) (#transaction_spec trac)
val lbls = list_upto (length prots)
val lbl_prots = List.concat (map (fn i => map (fn tr => (i,tr)) (nth prots i)) lbls)




fun def_protocols lthy = let
fun mk_prot_def (name,trm) lthy =
let val _ = info(" Defining "^name)
in #2 (ml_isar_wrapper.define_constant_definition’ (name,trm) print lthy)
end
val prots = #transaction_spec trac
val num_prots = length prots
val pdefname = mkN(pname, "protocol")
fun mk_tnames i =
let
val trs = case nth prots i of (j,prot) => map (fn tr => (j,tr)) prot
in map (fn (j,s) => full_name (mk_tname j (#transaction s)) lthy) trs
end
val tnames = List.concat (map mk_tnames (list_upto num_prots))
val pnames =
let
val f = fn i => (Int.toString i,nth prots i)
val g = fn (i,(n,_)) => case n of NONE => i | SOME m => m
val h = fn s => mkN (pdefname,s)
in map (h o g o f) (list_upto num_prots)
end
val trtyp = prot_transactionT trac lthy
val trstyp = mk_listT trtyp
fun mk_prot_trm names =
Term.Const (@{const_name "concat"}, mk_listT trstyp --> trstyp) $
mk_list trstyp (map (fn x => Term.Const (x, trstyp)) names)
val lthy =
if num_prots > 1
then fold (fn (i,pname) => mk_prot_def (pname, mk_prot_trm (mk_tnames i)))




3 Trac Support and Automation
val pnames’ = map (fn n => full_name n lthy) pnames
fun mk_prot_trm_with_star i =
let
fun f j =
if j = i
then Term.Const (nth pnames’ j, trstyp)
else (Term.Const (@{const_name "map"}, [trtyp --> trtyp, trstyp] ---> trstyp) $
Term.Const ("Transactions.transaction_star_proj", trtyp --> trtyp) $
Term.Const (nth pnames’ j, trstyp))
in
Term.Const (@{const_name "concat"}, mk_listT trstyp --> trstyp) $
mk_list trstyp (map f (list_upto num_prots))
end
val lthy =
if num_prots > 1
then fold (fn (i,pname) => mk_prot_def (pname, mk_prot_trm_with_star i))




mk_prot_def (pdefname, mk_prot_trm (if num_prots > 1 then pnames’ else tnames)) lthy
end
in





structure trac = struct
open Trac_Term
val info = Output.information
(* Define global configuration option "trac" *)
(* val trac_fp_compute_binary_cfg =
let
val (trac_fp_compute_path_config, trac_fp_compute_path_setup) =







val (trac_fp_compute_eval_config, trac_fp_compute_eval) =





type hide_tvar_tab = (TracProtocol.protocol) Symtab.table
fun trac_eq (a, a’) = (#name a) = (#name a’)
fun merge_trac_tab (tab,tab’) = Symtab.merge trac_eq (tab,tab’)
structure Data = Generic_Data
(
type T = hide_tvar_tab
val empty = Symtab.empty:hide_tvar_tab
val extend = I
fun merge(t1,t2) = merge_trac_tab (t1, t2)
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);
fun update p thy = Context.theory_of
((Data.map (fn tab => Symtab.update (#name p, p) tab) (Context.Theory thy)))
fun lookup name thy = (Symtab.lookup ((Data.get o Context.Theory) thy) name,thy)
fun mk_abs_filename thy filename =
let
val filename = Path.explode filename
val master_dir = Resources.master_directory thy
in
Path.implode (if (Path.is_absolute filename)
then filename
else Path.append master_dir filename)
end
(* fun exec {trac_path, error_detail} filename = let
open OS.FileSys OS.Process
val tmpname = tmpName()
val err_tmpname = tmpName()
fun plural 1 = "" | plural _ = "s"
val trac = case trac_path of
SOME s => s
| NONE => raise error ("trac_fp_compute_path not specified")
val cmdline = trac ^ " \"" ^ filename ^ "\" > " ^ tmpname ^ " 2> " ^ err_tmpname
in
if isSuccess (system cmdline) then (OS.FileSys.remove err_tmpname; tmpname)
else let val _ = OS.FileSys.remove tmpname
val (msg, rest) = File.read_lines (Path.explode err_tmpname) |> chop error_detail
val _ = OS.FileSys.remove err_tmpname
val _ = warning ("trac failed on " ^ filename ^ "\nCommand: " ^ cmdline ^
"\n\nOutput:\n" ^
cat_lines (msg @ (if null rest then [] else
["(... " ^ string_of_int (length rest) ^
" more line" ^ plural (length rest) ^ ")"])))
in raise error ("trac failed on " ^ filename) end
end *)
fun lookup_trac (pname:string) lthy =
Option.valOf (fst (lookup pname (Proof_Context.theory_of lthy)))
fun def_fp fp_str print (trac, lthy) =
let
val fp = TracFpParser.parse_str fp_str
val (trac,lthy) = trac_definitorial_package.define_fixpoint fp trac print lthy




fun def_fp_file filename print (trac, lthy) = let
val thy = Proof_Context.theory_of lthy
val abs_filename = mk_abs_filename thy filename
val fp = TracFpParser.parse_file abs_filename
val (trac,lthy) = trac_definitorial_package.define_fixpoint fp trac print lthy




fun def_fp_trac fp_filename print (trac, lthy) = let
open OS.FileSys OS.Process
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val _ = info("Checking protocol specification with trac.")
val thy = Proof_Context.theory_of lthy
(* val trac = Config.get_global thy trac_binary_cfg *)
val abs_filename = mk_abs_filename thy fp_filename
(* val fp_file = exec {error_detail=10, trac_path = SOME trac} abs_filename *)
(* val fp_raw = File.read (Path.explode fp_file) *)
val fp_raw = File.read (Path.explode abs_filename)
val fp = TracFpParser.parse_str fp_raw
(* val _ = OS.FileSys.remove fp_file *)
val _ = if TracFpParser.attack fp
then
error (" ATTACK found, skipping generating of Isabelle/HOL definitions.\n\n")
else
info(" No attack found, continue with generating Isabelle/HOL definitions.")
val (trac,lthy) = trac_definitorial_package.define_fixpoint fp trac print lthy




fun def_trac_term_model str lthy = let
val trac = TracProtocolParser.parse_str str
val lthy = Local_Theory.raw_theory (update trac) lthy




val def_trac_protocol = trac_definitorial_package.define_protocol
fun def_trac str print = def_trac_protocol print o def_trac_term_model str
fun def_trac_file filename print lthy = let
val trac_raw = File.read (Path.explode filename)
val (trac,lthy) = def_trac trac_raw print lthy




fun def_trac_fp_trac trac_str print lthy = let
open OS.FileSys OS.Process
val (trac,lthy) = def_trac trac_str print lthy
val tmpname = tmpName()
val _ = File.write (Path.explode tmpname) trac_str
val (trac,lthy) = def_fp_trac tmpname print (trac, lthy)
val _ = OS.FileSys.remove tmpname







val fileNameP = Parse.name -- Parse.name
val _ = Outer_Syntax.local_theory’ @{command_keyword "trac_import"}
"Import protocol and fixpoint from trac files."
(fileNameP >> (fn (trac_filename, fp_filename) => fn print =>
trac.def_trac_file trac_filename print #>
trac.def_fp_file fp_filename print #> snd));
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val _ = Outer_Syntax.local_theory’ @{command_keyword "trac_import_trac"}
"Import protocol from trac file and compute fixpoint with trac."
(fileNameP >> (fn (trac_filename, fp_filename) => fn print =>
trac.def_trac trac_filename print #> trac.def_fp_trac fp_filename print #> snd));
val _ = Outer_Syntax.local_theory’ @{command_keyword "trac_trac"}
"Define protocol using trac format and compute fixpoint with trac."
(Parse.cartouche >> (fn trac => fn print => trac.def_trac_fp_trac trac print));
val _ = Outer_Syntax.local_theory’ @{command_keyword "trac"}
"Define protocol and (optionally) fixpoint using trac format."
(Parse.cartouche -- Scan.optional Parse.cartouche "" >> (fn (trac,fp) => fn print =>
if fp = ""
then trac.def_trac trac print #> snd
else trac.def_trac trac print #> trac.def_fp fp print #> snd));
〉
ML〈
val name_prefix_parser = Parse.!!! (Parse.name --| Parse.$$$ ":" -- Parse.name)
(* Original definition (opt_evaluator) copied from value_command.ml *)
val opt_proof_method_choice =
Scan.optional (keyword 〈[ 〉 |-- Parse.name --| keyword 〈] 〉) "safe";
(* Original definition (locale_expression) copied from parse_spec.ML *)
val opt_defs_list = Scan.optional
(keyword 〈for 〉 |-- Scan.repeat1 Parse.name >>





opt_proof_method_choice -- name_prefix_parser -- opt_defs_list
fun protocol_model_setup_proof_state name prefix lthy =
let
fun f x y z = ([((x,Position.none),((y,true),(Expression.Positional z,[])))],[])
val _ = if name = "" then error "No name given" else ()
val pexpr = f "stateful_protocol_model" name (protocol_model_interpretation_params prefix)
val pdefs = protocol_model_interpretation_defs name




fun protocol_security_proof_proof_state manual_proof name prefix opt_defs print lthy =
let
fun f x y z = ([((x,Position.none),((y,true),(Expression.Positional z,[])))],[])
val _ = if name = "" then error "No name given" else ()
val num_defs = length opt_defs
val pparams = protocol_model_interpretation_params prefix
val default_defs = [prefix ^ "_" ^ "protocol", prefix ^ "_" ^ "fixpoint"]
fun g locale_name extra_params = f locale_name name (pparams@map SOME extra_params)
val (prot_fp_smp_names, pexpr) = if manual_proof
then (case num_defs of
0 => (default_defs, g "secure_stateful_protocol’" default_defs)
| 1 => (opt_defs, g "secure_stateful_protocol’’" opt_defs)
| 2 => (opt_defs, g "secure_stateful_protocol’" opt_defs)
| _ => (opt_defs, g "secure_stateful_protocol" opt_defs))
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else (case num_defs of
0 => (default_defs, g "secure_stateful_protocol’’’’" default_defs)
| 1 => (opt_defs, g "secure_stateful_protocol’’" opt_defs)
| 2 => (opt_defs, g "secure_stateful_protocol’’’’" opt_defs)
| _ => (opt_defs, g "secure_stateful_protocol’’’" opt_defs))
val proof_state = lthy |> declare_protocol_checks print





Outer_Syntax.local_theory command keyword 〈protocol_model_setup 〉
"prove interpretation of protocol model locale into global theory"
(name_prefix_parser >> (fn (name,prefix) => fn lthy =>
let
val proof_state = protocol_model_setup_proof_state name prefix lthy
val meth =
let
val m = "protocol_model_interpretation"
val _ = Output.information (
"Proving protocol model locale instance with proof method " ^ m)
in






Outer_Syntax.local_theory_to_proof command keyword 〈manual_protocol_model_setup 〉
"prove interpretation of protocol model locale into global theory"
(name_prefix_parser >> (fn (name,prefix) => fn lthy =>
let
val proof_state = protocol_model_setup_proof_state name prefix lthy
val subgoal_proof = " subgoal by protocol_model_subgoal\n"
val _ = Output.information ("Example proof:\n" ^











Outer_Syntax.local_theory’ command keyword 〈protocol_security_proof 〉
"prove interpretation of secure protocol locale into global theory"
(security_proof_locale_parser_with_method_choice >> (fn params => fn print => fn lthy =>
let
val ((opt_meth_level,(name,prefix)),opt_defs) = params
val (defs, proof_state) =
protocol_security_proof_proof_state false name prefix opt_defs print lthy
val num_defs = length defs
val meth =
let
val m = case opt_meth_level of
"safe" => "check_protocol" ^ "’" (* (if num_defs = 1 then "’" else "") *)
| "unsafe" => "check_protocol_unsafe" ^ "’" (* (if num_defs = 1 then "’" else "") *)
| _ => error ("Invalid option: " ^ opt_meth_level)
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val _ = Output.information (
"Proving security of protocol " ^ nth defs 0 ^ " with proof method " ^ m)
val _ = if num_defs > 1 then Output.information ("Using fixpoint " ^ nth defs 1) else ()
val _ = if num_defs > 2 then Output.information ("Using SMP set " ^ nth defs 2) else ()
in







Outer_Syntax.local_theory_to_proof’ command keyword 〈manual_protocol_security_proof 〉
"prove interpretation of secure protocol locale into global theory"
(security_proof_locale_parser >> (fn params => fn print => fn lthy =>
let
val ((name,prefix),opt_defs) = params
val (defs, proof_state) =
protocol_security_proof_proof_state true name prefix opt_defs print lthy
val subgoal_proof =
let
val m = "code_simp" (* case opt_meth_level of
"safe" => "code_simp"
| "unsafe" => "eval"
| _ => error ("Invalid option: " ^ opt_meth_level) *)
in
" subgoal by " ^ m ^ "\n"
end
val _ = Output.information ("Example proof:\n" ^
Active.sendback_markup_command (" apply check_protocol_intro\n"^
subgoal_proof^





































































inv(val(revoked(A,S))) where A:honest S:server
pair(A,val(ring(A))) where A:honest
occurs(val(ring(A))) where A:honest
timplies(val(ring(A)),val(ring(A),valid(A,S))) where A:honest S:server
timplies(val(ring(A)),val(0)) where A:honest
timplies(val(ring(A),valid(A,S)),val(valid(A,S))) where A:honest S:server
timplies(val(0),val(valid(A,S))) where A:honest S:server
timplies(val(valid(A,S)),val(revoked(A,S))) where A:honest S:server
〉
4.1.1 Proof of security
protocol model setup spm: keyserver
compute SMP [optimized] keyserver_protocol keyserver_SMP
manual protocol security proof ssp: keyserver



















agent = honest ++ dishonest
Sets:
ring’/1 seen/1 pubkeys/0 valid/1
Functions:




crypt(X,Y) ? inv(X) -> Y
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4.2 A Variant of the Keyserver Protocol (Keyserver2)




























4.2.1 Proof of security
protocol model setup spm: keyserver2
compute fixpoint keyserver2_protocol keyserver2_fixpoint
protocol security proof ssp: keyserver2































agent = honest ++ dishonest
Sets:
ring/1 valid/1 revoked/1 deleted/1
ring’/1 seen/1 pubkeys/0
Functions:




crypt(X,Y) ? inv(X) -> Y
























* PK in valid(A)
* NPK notin valid(_)
NPK notin revoked(_)
* delete PK valid(A)
insert PK revoked(A)
* insert NPK valid(A)
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* PK in valid(A)
attack.










# NOTE: The ring’ sets are not used elsewhere, but we have to avoid that the fresh keys generated
# by this rule are abstracted to the empty abstraction, and so we insert them into a ring’
# set. Otherwise the two protocols would have too many abstractions in common (in particular,
# the empty abstraction) which leads to false attacks in the composed protocol (probably



















sign(inv(val(deleted(A),valid(B))),pair(A,val(ring(A)))) where A:honest B:dishonest
sign(inv(val(deleted(A),seen(B),valid(B))),pair(A,val(ring(A)))) where A:honest B:dishonest
sign(inv(val(deleted(A),valid(A))),pair(A,val(ring(A)))) where A:honest B:dishonest






inv(val(revoked(B),seen(B),revoked(A),deleted(A))) where A:honest B:dishonest
















timplies(val(ring’(A)),val(ring’(A),valid(B))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring’(A)),val(ring’(A),valid(A),seen(A))) where A:honest
timplies(val(ring’(A)),val(ring’(A),valid(A),seen(A),valid(B))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring’(A)),val(seen(B),valid(B),ring’(A))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring’(A),valid(B)),val(ring’(A),valid(A),seen(A),valid(B))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring’(A),valid(B)),val(seen(B),valid(B),ring’(A))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring(A)),val(ring(A),valid(A))) where A:honest
timplies(val(ring(A)),val(ring(A),valid(B))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring(A)),val(deleted(A))) where A:honest
timplies(val(ring(A)),val(revoked(A),deleted(A),seen(B),valid(B))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring(A)),val(revoked(A),deleted(A),seen(B),revoked(B))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring(A)),val(deleted(A),seen(B),valid(B))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring(A)),val(ring(A),seen(B),valid(B))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring(A)),val(valid(A),deleted(A),seen(B),valid(B))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring(A)),val(valid(A),ring(A),seen(B),valid(B))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring(A),valid(A)),val(deleted(A),valid(A))) where A:honest
timplies(val(ring(A),valid(B)),val(deleted(A),valid(B))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring(A),valid(A)),val(deleted(A),revoked(A))) where A:honest
timplies(val(deleted(A)),val(deleted(A),valid(A))) where A:honest
timplies(val(deleted(A)),val(deleted(A),valid(B))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(deleted(A)),val(revoked(A),seen(B),valid(B),deleted(A))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(deleted(A)),val(revoked(B),seen(B),revoked(A),deleted(A))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(deleted(A)),val(seen(B),valid(B),deleted(A))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(deleted(A)),val(seen(B),valid(B),valid(A),deleted(A))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(revoked(A)),val(seen(A),revoked(A))) where A:dishonest
timplies(val(revoked(A)),val(seen(A),revoked(A),valid(A))) where A:dishonest
timplies(val(revoked(A),deleted(A)),val(revoked(B),seen(B),revoked(A),deleted(A))) where A:honest B:dishonest


















timplies(val(valid(A),deleted(A)),val(revoked(A),seen(B),valid(B),deleted(A))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(valid(A),deleted(A)),val(revoked(B),seen(B),revoked(A),deleted(A))) where A:honest B:dishonest
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timplies(val(valid(A),deleted(A)),val(seen(B),valid(B),valid(A),deleted(A))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring(A),valid(A)),val(deleted(A),seen(B),valid(B),valid(A))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring(A),valid(A)),val(revoked(B),seen(B),revoked(A),deleted(A))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring(A),valid(A)),val(seen(B),valid(B),valid(A),ring(A))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(valid(B),deleted(A)),val(seen(B),valid(B),deleted(A))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring(A),valid(B)),val(deleted(A),seen(B),valid(B))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(ring(A),valid(B)),val(seen(B),valid(B),ring(A))) where A:honest B:dishonest
timplies(val(valid(A)),val(seen(A),valid(A))) where A:dishonest
〉
4.3.1 Proof: The composition of the two keyserver protocols is secure
protocol model setup spm: kscomp
setup protocol checks spm kscomp_protocol



































































senc(M,K2) ? K2 -> M #This analysis rule corresponds to the decrypt2 rule in the AIF-omega specification.










































4.4.1 Protocol model setup
protocol model setup spm: ATTACK_UNSET
4.4.2 Fixpoint computation
compute fixpoint ATTACK_UNSET_protocol ATTACK_UNSET_fixpoint
compute SMP [optimized] ATTACK_UNSET_protocol ATTACK_UNSET_SMP
4.4.3 Proof of security
manual protocol security proof ssp: ATTACK_UNSET









































extract/1 wrap/1 unwrap/1 decrypt/1 sensitive/1
Functions:
Public senc/2 h/2 bind/2
Private inv/1
Analysis:
senc(M1,K2) ? K2 -> M1 #This analysis rule corresponds to the decrypt2 rule in the AIF-omega specification.



























4.5 The PKCS Protocol, Scenario 7 (PKCS Model07)
# =====unwrap, generate new handler======
#-----------the senstive attr copy-------------









#-----------the wrap attr copy-------------









#-----------the decrypt attr copy-------------















































4.5.1 Protocol model setup
protocol model setup spm: RE_IMPORT_ATT
4.5.2 Fixpoint computation
compute fixpoint RE_IMPORT_ATT_protocol RE_IMPORT_ATT_fixpoint
compute SMP [optimized] RE_IMPORT_ATT_protocol RE_IMPORT_ATT_SMP
4.5.3 Proof of security
protocol security proof [unsafe] ssp: RE_IMPORT_ATT
for RE_IMPORT_ATT_protocol RE_IMPORT_ATT_fixpoint RE_IMPORT_ATT_SMP


























4.6 The PKCS Protocol, Scenario 9 (PKCS Model09)
theory PKCS_Model09
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extract/1 wrap/1 unwrap/1 decrypt/1 sensitive/1
Functions:
Public senc/2 h/2 bind/3
Private inv/1
Analysis:
senc(M1,K2) ? K2 -> M1 #This analysis rule corresponds to the decrypt2 rule in the AIF-omega specification.


































# =====unwrap, generate new handler======
#-----------add the wrap attr copy-------------
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4 Examples
unwrapWrap(M2:value,K2:value,N1:value,N2:value) where M2 != K2, M2 != N1, M2 != N2, K2 != N1, K2 != N2,









#-----------add the senstive attr copy-------------
unwrapSens(M2:value,K2:value,N1:value,N2:value) where M2 != K2, M2 != N1, M2 != N2, K2 != N1, K2 != N2,









#-----------add the decrypt attr copy-------------
decrypt1Attr(M2:value, K2:value,N1:value,N2:value) where M2 != K2, M2 != N1, M2 != N2, K2 != N1, K2 != N2,









decrypt2Attr(M2:value, K2:value,N1:value,N2:value) where M2 != K2, M2 != N1, M2 != N2, K2 != N1, K2 != N2,


























4.6 The PKCS Protocol, Scenario 9 (PKCS Model09)

























4.6.1 Protocol model setup
protocol model setup spm: LOSS_KEY_ATT
4.6.2 Fixpoint computation
compute fixpoint LOSS_KEY_ATT_protocol LOSS_KEY_ATT_fixpoint
The fixpoint contains an attack signal
value "attack_notin_fixpoint LOSS_KEY_ATT_fixpoint"
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